The Battle of Marston Moor on 2 July 1644 is regarded as one of the most significant battles of the English Civil War. In addition to its significance within the course of the war, in that it left the Parliamentarians in control of almost all of Yorkshire, it is also significant for its illustration of the tactics of the era, the problems of command during the early modern period, and the advances in command and tactics being made by Oliver Cromwell.
To understand the course of the battle, one must first look at the battlefield itself and the initial dispositions of the opposing sides. Marston Moor slopes gently downhill from a road towards a ditch a quarter mile away. The Allied army, composed of Parliamentarian and Scots troops lined up along the road in a battle line one and a half miles long, stretching from Long Marston in the east to Tockwith in the west. From left to right, the army consisted of a contingent of horse under Oliver Cromwell, which contained a contingent of Scots horse under David Leslie, a contingent of foot under Lord Manchester, a contingent of foot under Lord Fairfax, a contingent of Scots foot under Lord Leven, and, on the right flank, a contingent of horse under Thomas Fairfax.
The Royalists commanded the ditch which separated the arable lands from the moors. They had a small contingent in front of the ditch, with the main line about one hundred yards behind it, prepared to fire upon the Parliamentarians when they attempted to cross the ditch. From left to right, the army consisted to a contingent of horse under Prince Rupert, a contingent of foot under Lord Eythin, which included Lord Newcastle's "Whitecoats", and second contingent of horse on the right flank, commanded by Lord Goring.
Initial Positions
As initially set up, the two armies were out of musket range of each other, but well within cannon range. Both side had set up their cannons in twos and threes between the regiments, with the exception of a few Drakes which Rupert had positioned in front of the ditch. The Royalists had twenty-eight guns in a total force of seventeen thousand men, while the Parliamentarians had twenty-five guns in a total force of twenty-seven thousand men, half of whom were Scots. Although there was some harassing cannon fire between the two lines during the course of the day, artillery played an insignificant role in the course of the battle.
Even before the battle had begun, there were disagreements among the Royalist commanders as to the proper course of action. Rupert proposed attacking early in the day before the Parliamentarians had time to arrange their lines and prepare for battle, even though this would have meant attacking before the arrival of Newcastle's infantry. Lord Eythin objected to this course as being too rash, reminiscent of Rupert's enthusiastic but unsuccessful tactics on the Continent during the Thirty Years' War Once Newcastle arrived, both he and Eythin tried to dissuade Rupert from giving battle on that day. Rupert, however, remained determined to fight that day, feeling that to do otherwise would be a failure to carry out his orders to defend Yorkshire. Once it became clear that Rupert could not be dissuaded from giving battle on that day, Eythin attempted to at least persuade him to move his cavalry back some, which Rupert refused to do. If, as Eythin believed and as many historians have written since, Rupert's cavalry was stationed too far forward, this problem was complicated when Lord Byron, commander of Rupert's front line, advanced to meet the Parliamentarian charge rather than standing his line to receive it, as Rupert had ordered.
If the Royalists were reluctant to give battle at Marston Moor, the Parliamentarians were equally so. Both sides spent the entire day lined up facing each other, with neither side willing to make the first move. Finally, at around 7:00 that evening, Lord Leven, commander of the Scots infantry, managed to convince the other Parliamentarian commanders that their numerical advantage coupled with their advantage in holding the high ground more than made up for Rupert's tactical advantage in holding the ditch and an attack was ordered. By this time,several of the Royalist commanders, including Rupert and Newcastle, convinced that a battle was not to take place that day after all, had retired from the front lines for dinner. The absence of these commanders at the beginning of the battle could have been disastrous had the Parliamentarians been able to capitalize on it.
On the right flank, Thomas Fairfax's cavalry managed to cross the ditch. Although their going was hindered by scattered gorse bushes, which made maintaining their lines difficulty, Fairfax's first line managed to withstand the charge of Goring's first line and drive them from the field. As was typical of cavalry tactics of the day, Fairfax's first line continued on in pursuit of Goring's fleeing troops, which effectively removed them from the remainder of the battle.
The initial Parliamentary success was reversed, however, when Goring's second line met Fairfax's second line and drove them from the field in a blind panic. To make matters worse, during the course of their flight, Fairfax's fleeing troops rode through and over part of Lord Leven's Scots infantry, causing most of that unit to flee as well. This left the field clear for Goring to wheel his troops to the right, with the except of a few who continued in pursuit of the fleeing Parliamentarians, and hit the right flank of Lord Fairfax's infantry, causing this unit to also break ranks and flee the field.
The panic also spread to Lord Manchester's infantry, causing part of this unit to flee the field, and their commander with them. By retaining sufficient control over his troops to prevent all of them from taking off after the fleeing Parliamentarian cavalry, Goring managed to not only drive off the cavalry he was facing but also to drive off most of the Parliamentarian infantry in one fell swoop. Of the remaining Parliamentarian foot, the Scots had formed a pike square and were able to hold off repeated assaults from Goring's horse, while Lord Manchester's foot were left demoralized and temporarily immobilized by the flight of their commander.
On the left flank, Parliamentarian dragoons advanced, dislodging the Royalist musketeers from their position in front of the ditch and clearing the way for an assault by Cromwell's horse. As the ditch had been partially filled in at this point, it was easy for Cromwell's horse to cross, and they were able to sweep away the first two brigades of Royalist cavalry, who, as previously mentioned, had been moved too far forwards to receive support from their third rank. After this attack, Cromwell had to retire to the rear of the Parliamentarian lines to receive medical care for a pistol wound in his neck, which was probably caused by one of his own troopers during the course of the attack. It is at this point that Rupert arrived with the remainder of the Royalist force and began to push back the Parliamentarians, who found themselves temporality leaderless. While Rupert's arrival undoubtedly prevented the immediate collapse of the Royalist flank on that side, by saving the hour he probably lost the day, since once he entered the battle he could concentrate only on the immediate melee and had to let the rest of the battle take its course.
Even Rupert's presence on the left flank could not save the Royalist horse once David Leslie brought up the Scots horse who formed the third line of Cromwell's horse. Seeing that Cromwell was missing from the field, Leslie also took command of the remainder of the Parliamentarian horse. The Allied horse were able to fight the Royalists to a standstill and by sheer weight of numbers began to push them from the field. As the battle began to turn in favor of the Parliamentarians, Cromwell was able to rejoin his troops. When the Royalist cavalry broke ranks and fled, Cromwell was able to rally and re-form his troops, keeping them on the battlefield when David Leslie and the Scots horse began pursuit of the Royalists.
While the cavalry struggled on the left flank, Major-General Lawrence Crawford managed to reform Manchester's foot, most of whom had not fled with their commander, and wheel them to the right in preparation for an attack on the flank of the Royalist foot. The fact the Crawford was able to maintain control of Manchester's infantry while both Leven and Lord Fairfax were unable to prevent their troops from fleeing the field demonstrates the extreme importance of the personal qualities of commanders during this period.
Meanwhile, Thomas Fairfax had left the remnants of his force who were still in pursuit of Goring's fleeing first line, sneaked behind the Royalist force and managed to link up with Cromwell. Together, they devised a plan, for which most of the credit should probably be given to Fairfax, whereby Cromwell's horse would pass around the back of the Royalist lines and attack Goring's horse in the flank. They were able to successfully implement this plan and Goring's horse were swept from the field. This freed up the remaining Scots regiments to take part in a coordinated attack on the Royalist foot. As the Scots attacked from the front, Manchester's foot, most likely still being led by Crawford, although there is some possibility that Manchester had returned to the field, attacked on the left flank and Cromwell's horse attacked on the right flank.
Under the pressure of the coordinated Parliamentarian attack, most of the Royalist foot fled. The only group which remained, Newcastle's "Whitecoats," were pushed back into White Syke Close, a large field bordered with a ditch and a hedge. Trapped and refusing to surrender, they fought on valiantly until they were brought down by musket fire. They are some historians of Royalist sympathies who contend that the Whitecoats were finally brought down by cannonfire, but given the difficulty of moving the cannon, this is highly unlikely and the possibility is dismissed by more impartial historians. At any rate, whether or not cannon were used, only thirty or forty Whitecoats survived the day, out of a total force of several thousand and the Parliamentarians were left firmly in control of the field and hence in control of most of Yorkshire.
Lessons
There are four main lessons which can be drawn from the Battle of Marston Moor. These are the importance of a clear chain of command in case of the death or absence of a unit's commander, the importance of a commander remaining with his troops, the importance of a commander maintaining control over his troops, and the importance of an army having an overall commander who is not attached to any particular unit within the army.
Both Cromwell's horse and Manchester's foot were without their commander for some or all of the battle. However, because there was a subordinate who was able to assume command, these units were able to continue to take decisive action. In contrast, after Lord Eythin fled the field at an unknown point during the early stages of the battle, there was no one to command the Royalist foot. Newcastle remained in command of the Whitecoats, but the mass of the Royalist foot were able to do nothing more than react to the Parliamentarian attacks. Had there been someone with the authority to take command in Eythin's absence, it is possible that the Royalist's foot could have attacked Manchester's foot while that unit was still in disarray and the course of the battle might well have been changed.
Even better than someone to take Eythin's place would be if Eythin himself had remained on the field. Indeed, at one point near the middle of the battle, Goring was the only major commander on the field: Cromwell was having his wound treated, Rupert had not yet entered the battle, Thomas Fairfax was in pursuit of Goring's fleeing first line, and Manchester, Fairfax, and Eythin had all fled. Fear of capture caused several commanders to flee at the first sign that the battle was turning against them, which naturally demoralized their troops. The English Civil War, along with the Thirty Years' War, marks a transition between medieval warfare, where all a commander had to do was lead his troops into battle and then fight alongside them, to modem warfare, where a commander continues to be a leader during the course of the battle and his leadership skills are more important than his skills as a combatant.
Part of this transition was the need for commanders to maintain control of their troops during a battle, Both Leven and Lord Fairfax were unable to present their troops from panicking and fleeing the field at the first sign of trouble. In contrast, both Goring and Cromwell were able to maintain control of their troops, preventing them from rushing off after fleeing enemies and maintaining them as forces to be reckoned with on the battlefield.
Finally, as was demonstrated in this battle, with the transition to modem warfare it became important for an army to have an overall commander who was not attached to any particular unit.
While Rupert was nominally supreme commander of the Royalist army, it was more of a "first among equals" status than of having true command over the other commanders. This led to a lack of cohesion within command as the various commanders each tried to impose their own vision of how the battle should be fought, or if it should be fought at all. Furthermore, this commander must not be part of any particular unit, as the lack of coordination among the Royalist forces once Rupert entered the battle demonstrated. This conflict among commanders can be seen even more clearly in the Allied army, as Parliamentarian and Scots commanders vied for supremacy. Far from being able to establish a supreme commander, the Allies were unable to even decide on an overall commander for their infantry, with Leven, Manchester, and Fairfax each commanding their own contingents independently.
But failure is not the only thing evident at the Battle of Marston Moor. The beginnings of greatness are also evident in the performance of Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell's tactics, rather than being the simple headlong charge favored by most cavalry commanders, were based on those of the greatest cavalry leaders of the day, including Gustavus Adolphus and Prince Rupert. Cromwell relied less on shock tactics than on effective use of pistols and on hand-to-hand fighting after contact was made. Moreover, his troops were extremely well-displined and had been taught to rally to him. In the performance of Cromwell's horse and in the execution of the final attack of the Royalist foot, one can see the beginnings of the discipline and skillful use of combined arms which were later to become the hallmark's of Cromwell's New Model Army.
Thus, in addition to its significance with regard to the outcome of the English Civil War, the Battle of Marston Moor is important as a case study of the transition between medieval and modem warfare. We can witness both the failures to adapt and the successful adaptations within the course of this one battle, as commanders struggled to adjust to the new realities of warfare.
Works Cited:
Ashley, Maurice. The English Civil War. London, Thames and Hudson, 1974.
---, General Monck. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977.
Burne, Alfred H. and Peter Young. The Great Civil War: A Military History of the First Civil War 1642-1646. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1959.
Cleugh, James. Prince Rupert. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1934.
Kishlansky, Mark A. The Rise of the New Model Army. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Woolrich, Austin. Battles of the English Civil War. New York: Macmillan, 1961.
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© Copyright 2001 Hal Thinglum
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