In pursuit of realism on the wargame table, and in this specific case, in order to recreate the actual events of the engagement, I developed a scenario-based, terrain-specific house rule for my re-fight of The Battle of Quatre Bras. The house rule concerned the effect and impact of tall crops on unit movement combat and morale. [1]
There were several other rule addendurns made, both specific to this engagement as well as general with respect to my understanding of combat in the period of Napoleon Bonaparte. One of these dealt with the effects of crossing water obstacles, such as streams, creek beds and the like. Again, in the pursuit of realism, the rule was revised.
In brief, units crossing water obstacles would not only be assessed a movement penalty, but would be marked with a 'disordered" counter. [2]
As the solo wargame progressed, with units moving across the historical terrain and engaging in combat I found myself thinking more about the subject of disorder. In point of fact, I became rather interested in this "condition" and how it is or should be reflected on the miniature battlefield.
I also found myself thinking about the comments made by Mr. Quinn in "Has He Luck?" (MWAN No. 105, May / June 2000, 92-95) In that this particular effort in being composed while the French and Allies baffle for possession of Quatre Bras on the floor behind me, I can readily identify with and admit to the "peculiarity" shared by other MWAN contributors. (If I might suggest, there are those wargamers who find the research, preparation and rule writing/amending to be more satisfying than playing a wargame.) I can also appreciate the sentiments expressed by Mr. Quinn regarding the convention of wargame turns. It does amount to an imposition of control where there was, more often than not, litfie or none at all. However, I would debate the conclusion drawn that most rules - however carefully constructed - are slow-moving and unrealistic.
My purpose here though, is not to take sides for or against the opinions and arguments advanced by Mr. Quinn. Nor is it to take Mr. Conliffe to task for not having terrain rules that address the history of Quatre Bras or rules covering the effect(s) of disorder to my personal satisfaction. (How could he?) Quite the contrary. Mr. Quinn is heartily thanked for providing me with the inspiration and material that lends itself to this topic. (The admitted un-original idea of doing away with wargame turns has also "set a fire", but thats another subject for another time and perhaps another arficle.) Mr. Conliffe cannot be thanked enough for the hours of enjoyment he has provided this wargamer by way of ARAMATI, ADVANCED ARMATI, and now, SHAKO.
My purpose here, as intimated above, is a consideration of disorder and the effects of this condition or state in Napoleonic miniature wargaming.
WHAT'S IN A NAME?
The SHAKO rules provide the following words or terms to represent units that are not formed / have taken casualties: Staggered, Fall(ing) Back and Blown. Each paints a clear picture of what is happening or has happened to the unit so marked. In an effort to simplify the classification, I replaced the three adjectives with one. That one word: Disordered. I n the adjective "disordered" there is a little bit of everything ... the infantry line that is staggered from taking a volley; the same line falling back as enemy pressure mounts; the cavalry regiment that is blown after a successful charge and melee with an opposing mounted unit.
Then, immediately complicating the above simplification, I decided that there needed to be two types of disorder. The first type, indicated by a red counter with DISORDERED (W), would address the disorder that was a direct result of taking casualties. This type would also apply to units routed into by friendly forces, or to those units that had a friendly unit fall back through their ranks. The distinction here is one of morale. Even if in the latter cases there were no casualties to the affected unit, the "assault" on spirit in addition to the physical violation of space -- jostling of ranks -- adjustment of spacing) would be enough to produce a degree of disorder.
The second type of disorder would be that which results from movement Units so affected would be marked by a yellow counter with DISORDERED (M), This is not to suggest that every time a unit moves, it gets such a marker or counter. It is to state that while negotiating certain terrain, units will be so identified. Further, the marker would be placed on units which declare and commit a charge against an enemy unit or units. [3]
Based on the above distinction then, it is entirely conceivable that during the course of a wargame, a unit could be marked with both types of counters. As an example, consider a light infantry battalion advancing against an enemy-held wood line. Just inside the wood (this movement "earning" a DISORDERED (M) marker), they take a close-range volley (and subsequent casualties - thereby "earning" a DISORDERED (W) marker) from an enemy infantry battalion.
MUSING ON MOVEMENT
In the previous example, it seems reasonable to me to assume that the light infantry battalion would have adopted a formation suitable for combat in the woods. As these kind of units were trained for such terrain-oriented combat, it also seems reasonable to assume that the formation adopted would be something akin to open order, or at the very least, half of the companies sent forward in skirmish order and the rest of the battalion staying back as a reserve. The question that arises if this example is followed to the moment the volley is taken, is: what effect, if any did the formation adopted have on the battalion's ability to move? And from this query, I reached a point where I wondered what kind of effect the "Jack of order" had on a unit that was moving ... advancing, marching, cantering or trotting across the battlefield.
In NAPOLEON AT WAR, AJbert A. Nofi reports that, depending on the ground and the troops making the advance, cavalry can cover 1,200 meters in about five minutes; infantry, the same distance in about twice the time. [4] (61)
The statistic is interesting on a couple of points. First, returning to the Quinn essay, it seems that a number of rule sets today also have a convention of severely (and unrealistically) reducing movement capabilities of the combat arms, let alone structuring the chaos of the battlefield into distinct and predictable phases or turns.
In a set of home-grown rules developed some years ago, the time of the game turn was approximately 30 minutes. The distance infantry could move in line formation was 10 inches. The scale? One inch represented 30 yards on the table. The math? It doesn't add up very well against the figures quoted from Nofi, as infantry under my rules would cover just 300 yards in half an hour. Even if, for sake of argument one makes the ground difficult and the troops fired, and these variables increase the time it takes the infantry in Nofi's introduction to negotiate that distance by a factor of three, Nofi's battalion still covers four times the ground in the same amount of time.
And second, what does this mean with respect to disorder? That is to ask, does the state of a unit directly influence how far they can move in a given amount of time? To be certain, a unit or parts of a unit trying to get out of harm's way, would most likely cover the ground more rapidly than a unit falling back while facing the enemy, trading shot for shot all the way. But if the situation is reversed, what then? Does a unit in disorder cover any less ground in an advance than the unit marching to the steady beat of its company drummers? Looking back to the Nofi statistic, it would seem that troops in good order can cover a lot of ground in a little time. There seems to be no reason to disbelieve that troops in poor order (another word for disorder) would have trouble keeping that same pace of advance. But to what end?
Changing the perspective from movement rates to one of combat effectiveness, a similar question may be posed. That is: Are units in a state of disorder more effective in an exchange of small arms fire and or in close combat than units formed as if on parade?
COMBAT CONSIDERATIONS
The answer to that question is based on a variable, and on an assumption. The variable being how many muskets and bayonets or swords / lances can be brought to bear on the enemy. The assumption, and perhaps the more important of the two: that on the battlefield there are really no units formed as if on parade ... they are all in a state of disorder, some more so than others. It is the unit disordered to a lesser degree that will usually win out in an exchange of fire or in melee.
It is difficult to determine whether morale should be considered as a second, separate variable, or be included with the assumption about the degree of disorder. If one looks at the exchange of musketry, it seems that all three elements were integral to the longevity of a unit. As Col. John Elting, U.S.A. ret., explains in his wonderful text SWORDS AROUND A THRONE: Napoleon's Grande Armee, "An infantry fire fight was a brutal, jostling, deafening affair ... It was dry, harried work; muskets slamming all around you, smoke in your eyes ... However, fire fights seldom lasted very long ... one side usually got its bellyful in short order and came apart." (481)
While his primary concern is on the effectiveness of musketry, Brent Nosworthy reinforces the impression of the "hell" that is the exchange of musketry when he cites a passage from Thoughts on Tactics by General Mitchell. [5]
When the focus is turned to cavalry, it appears that unit cohesion was more important than morale, or even, numbers.
- To rally quickly was of critical importance. As long as the body of victorious cavalry
was disorganized, which would invariably be the case in the moments that followed a
successful charge, it would be vulnerable to counterattack by any enemy cavalry in the
area who were not involved in the original charge. The other disadvantage was that as
long as the cavalry regiment remained disordered it was no longer under the control of its
officers and could not be employed to exploit any opportunities that might arise during the
ebb and flow of the battle. [6] (Nosworthy, 274-275)
One exception to this "rule", is contests of infantry and or cavalry against artillery. In The Face of Battle, Keegan cites the harrowing experience of one Lieutenant Hugh Wray of the 40th Regiment:
- We had three companies almost shot to pieces, one shot killed and wounded twenty-
five of the 4th company, another of the same kind killed poor Fisher, my captain, and
eighteen of our company ... and another took the 8th and killed or wounded twenty-three
... At the same time poor Fisher was hit I was speaking to him, and I got all over his
brains, his head was blown to atoms. (160-161)
In brief summary, the historical evidence points to a case for disorder being the common condition or status of troops on the battlefield. The evidence also points to the degree of disorder being the final arbiter. How then, to reflect this in miniature? Can one construct rules or procedures to replicate this reality without slowing down or otherwise detracting from the wargame?
The following rules are a work in progress. By no means are they complete nor thoroughly playtested. And, while the SHAKO rules system is the foundation upon which these revisions are built, by no means should they be construed as a rejection of Mr. Conliffe's effort.
RULES IN DEVELOPMENT
COMMENTS
At first glance, the above material seems to fit perfectly into the phenomenon described by Mr. Quinn in his article. I have taken a perfectly decent set of Napoleonic rules, and based on a certain bias (however supported by the reference material), modified them to my own liking. In so doing though, have I added to the mechanics that often serve to slow down a wargame? Is the decision to distriguish between types of disorder and the degrees of the same condition realistic?
The solo-project is presently at game turn 17, and things are looking very bad indeed for the Anglo-Allied forces. I cannot judge whether my rule additions / revisions will slow down the game process. This would require another re-play of Quatre Bras, or, on a less grand scale, a division versus division contest I would maintain, however, that the decision to make a distinction between the two types of disorder is a valid one.
Only time, more play-testing, and feedback from other contributors / readers of MWAN will tell.
NOTES
1. Please see my article, "Quatre Bras Considered: The Research and Development of a SHAKO Solo Wargame" submitted for publication in MWAN No. 107, September / October 2000.
2. In the above referenced article, the reader may note that the published rule addendum calls for a "staggered" marker to be placed on the unit in question. I have since revised the addendum, given that under Mr. Conliffe's excellent rules set, "staggered" really refers to a unit that has taken fire and as a result a number of casualties. In some wargames, this may well happen while a stream or river crossing is attempted. For my purposes, the rule concerned non-combat movement, and so, the unit in question is marked with a "disordered" counter.
3. In his masterful work, The Face of Battle, John Keegan offers the following when considering Cavalry v. Cavalry combat at Waterloo: "In theory, cavalry could be manoeuvered at a gallop, say at over twenty miles an hour, but it would shortly lose cohesion if it was, as stronger horses outstripped weaker ... (147). A similar theory or argument might be advanced for the infantry arm. While the foot soldier could not begin to approach the speed of the mounted arm, like the mounted arm, stronger men or more agile would outrun others, and the unit would lose cohesion. See "British Tactics in Practice (1809-1815)" , especially pages 222-230, in With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies, by Brent Nosworthy.
4. The editor is discussing the number of rounds artillery may fire against a given target advancing from this distance to the line of guns. Other sources consulted did not reveal any specific rate of march for infantry or cavalry. Nofi offers no specifics on the movement capabilities of artillery, but one suspects that like the infantry and cavalry, a lot depends on the quality of the ground and the state of the troops.
5. The following passage is found on page 209 of the Nosworthy text. It is quoted from page 160 of the Mitchell work. What precision of aim can be expected from soldiers when firing in line? One man is priming; another coming to the present; a third taking, what is called aim; a fourth ramming down his cartridge. After a few shots, the whole body are closely enveloped in smoke, and the enemy is totally invisible; some of the soldiers step out a pace or two, in order to get a better shot; others kneel down; and some have no objection to retire a step or two. The doomed begin to fall, dreadfully mutilated perhaps, and even bold men shrink from the sight, others are wounded, and assisted to the rear by their comrades; so that the whole becomes a line of utter confusion, in which the mass only think of getting their shot fired, they hardly care in what direction.
6. Reading this passage, I could not help but think of the Union Brigade at Waterloo and their subsequent "handling" by the French cavalry.
REFERENCES
(neither alphabetzed nor listed by frequency of use as reference)
MINIATURE WARGAMES, No. 82, March 1990, "In Search of the Realistic Wargame", 1. A
Sense of Proportion by Jason Monaghan, pp 10-12.
MINIATURE WARGAMES, No. 84, May 1990, "In Search of the Realistic Wargame", 2. Time
and Emotion by Jason Monaghan, pp 26-27.
WARGAMES Illustrated, Number 1, September 1987, "Can We Introduce Generalship into
the Tabletop Wargame?" by Arthur Harman, pp 19-22.
WARGAMES Illustrated, Number 118, July 1997, "Command Control and a long nose."
by Jeff Lewis, p. 15.
WATERLOO NEW PERSPECTIVES: The Great Bate Reappraised. David Hamilton-Williams,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, 1994.
NAPOLEON AT WAR: Selected Writings of F. Loraine Petre. Edited and with an Introduction
by, Albert A. Nofi. Hippocrene Books, Inc. New York, 1984.
The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. William H.
McNeill, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.
With Musket Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies. Brent
Nosworthy, Sarpedon, New York. 1996.
MIDWEST WARGAMER'S ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER, Number 105, May/June 2000. "Has
He Luck?", by Gerard W. Quinn, pp 92-95.
MIDWEST WARGAMER'S ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER, Number 85, January/February
1997. "The Random Draw System, or, Its Never Your Turn, Because There are No Turns.", by
Gerard W. Quinn, pp 56-58.
THE FACE OF BATTLE: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo & The Somme. John Keegan.
Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, New York, 1977.
SWORDS AROUND A THRONE: NAPOLEON'S GRANDE ARMEE. John R. Elting. The Free
Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc. New York, 1988.
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