The smell of powder and blood hung heavy in the crisp autumn air. In the fading daylight, General Buell could still make out groups of Confederates celebrating their victory in what was, a few hours prior, the Union encampment. His troops, those that still remained with the colors, would not sleep well tonight. In the surprise of the assault, few troops had the chance to gather their packs before the Rebels were among them, And, being October in the Midwest, Buell did not doubt that there would be frost on the ground tomorrow. He prayed for the well being of General Nelson, who had been captured by Confederate cavalry - cavalry that seemed everywhere at once on the battlefield that afternoon, The General made a mental note to check unit dispositions before returning to the shelter of Smith's Inn for what promised to be a short night. How long after first light on the 15th, he wondered, would the main body under General Grant arrive on the field and save his command - to say nothing of Union hopes for a victory in the West?
INTRODUCTION
The preceding narrative was the product of two separate table-top ACW engagements. The first "Battle at Groverton" (wargame) ended at Turn 13 due to frustration with a set of home-grown rules. The frustration stemmed mainly from revisions to the movement and command control sequence. This tinkering only served to prolong the length of each successive game turn, as more units arrived on the board. In brief, each unit (brigade size) must not only have its card drawn for that segment, but roll a die or dice for total movement allowance. The game turned into more of an exercise in accounting than of strategy and tactics. The second wargame was "fought" after a complete redesign of the miniature armies, production of ID cards, reconstruction of terrain, and a general rethinking of scenario parameters. In addition, the home- grown rules were set aside. This second game was fought using the commercially available and eminently playable (so much less frustrating) ACW Rules, FIRE AND FURY
The scenario for the wargame was based on conjecture. The premise was that the Union had been slow to launch an offensive in the Western theater of operations. The success at Gettysburg had not been repeated in the West. Buell's attempt to take Nashville had been thwarted, and so the Army retreated to regroup. Instead of waiting for another attack by the North, General Johnston adopted Lee's strategy of invasion, and by a series of well executed marches, worked his small force deep into Kentucky. Indeed, one corps of his army was within two days march of the Illinois border. Carrying what rations they could, the Rebel forces were eventually required to seek Union supply points, or, take from the local populace. Polk's Corps does just that, turning back south and marching into Groverton. The sharp battle on the afternoon of October 14th goes to the Confederates. Both sides remained on the field however, each command hurriedly sending couriers to bring reinforcements for the next day. The orders of battle, with a couple of minor exceptions, are however, historical. The armies used for this ACW contest were adapted from the lists provided in Issue 45 of Wargames Illustrated, (June 1991: pp 21-25), "Battle of Shiloh: A FIRE AND FURY Scenario", by Ray Pfeifer, Greg Lyle, and Rich Hasenauer.
This scenario was gamed solo, though the opposing plans of battle were supplied by two friends at work. The maneuver table within FIRE AND FURY works very well with respect to taking "control" out of the players, or in this case, my hands. There is no need for a redundant roll for unit activation, as there exists the chance that an ordered and well-commanded unit will sit and do nothing, or suddenly decide that a clump of trees 400 yards to their back looks much better than what lies ahead.
TERRAIN
General Buell's position (marked by I on MAP 1) was at the junction of the North-South Road, next to Smith's Inn. Immediately behind this two-story wood and brick structure, was Burr Oak Ridge. This gently sloping feature took up about one-third of the nine by six foot playing area, occupying the south-east corner of the table. Its eastern most edge was covered by a large wood. The thicker woods were screened by a lighter growth and scrub of varying depth. The Jenkinsville Road breeched this wood, running north and west into Groverton proper. At the edge of the woods there was an old wooden blockhouse (in some disrepair, as it had been first constructed at the end of the Revolutionary War). The Jenkinsville Road intersected with the North-South Road, as well as with The Emmittstown Pike, and here, was the town of Groverton. It was a mid-sized town, numbering around 40 houses.
Further west, along the Emmittstown Pike, there was a large church and outbuildings, including a rather substantial walled cemetery. Appropriately enough, this was called Groverton Church. The rest of the field (table) held a number of smaller structures, the most significant being: Magnuson's Farm, Black's Tavern, and Byrd's Mill. These latter two buildings were on opposite sides of Sawyer's Run; the tavern being west of the bridge and the mill being just east of the only fordable passage across the river (Again, please see MAP 1). Magnuson's Farm was located in the left-center of the field (table), just south of Fox Creek. Fox Creek was an extension of the Run, breaking off in the heavy woods near Iron Hill, and flowing in an easterly direction towards the North-South Road. On the northern edge of the playing area, Citadel Heights overlooked the Emmittstown Pike. This three-tiered hill was partially covered by a wood which extended off the top and down its left side. The remaining wooded area on the field was a light wood, taking up the far north-west corner. The rest of the terrain was classified as "open", except where fields, fences, and hedges or tree lines were placed. There was another small farm house placed at the junction of the un-named road running parallel to the Burr Oak Ridge line, and the trail leading to Byrd's Mill.
The last significant terrain feature was a large apple orchard, located west of Smith's Inn. This orchard was bordered on its north by a comparably sized cornfield. As it was mid-October in this particular scenario, the cornfields were considered to be dried stalks and so a possible fire risk as well as a hindrance to line-of-sight. The other fields were either ploughed or covered with fall vegetation. The apple orchard and wooded areas were classed as cover for defenders, giving them a +1 bonus in charge combat and a -1 modifier when taking enemy fire. What remained of the Union encampments was not considered an obstacle to movement or combat. The tents and other field impedimenta remained in an area bordered roughly by Groverton, Smith's Inn, the old blockhouse, and the eastern end of Fox Creek,
ORDERS OF BATTLE
UNION FORCES
MAP ID UNIT COMPOSITION
A Grant, Army of the West 1 E Ldr
B 1st Division, McClemand 1 Div Ldr
B1 1st, Hare's Brigade 12 / 9 / 6 Inf
B2 1st, Marsh's Brigade 8 / 6 / 4 Inf
B3 1st, Raith's Brigade 10 / 8 / 5 Inf
B4 1st, Artillery 2 stands
C 2nd Division, W. Wallace 1 E Div Ldr
C1 2nd, Tuttle's Brigade 9 / 7 / 5 Inf
C2 2nd, McArthues Brigade E, 11 / 8 / 6 Inf
C3 2nd, Sweeney's Brigade 18 / 14 / 9 Inf
C4 2nd, Artillery 2 stands
D 3rd Division, L. Wallace 1 Div Ldr
D1 3rd, M. Smith's Brigade 10 / 8 / 5 Inf
D2 3rd, Thayers Brigade 11 /8/6 Inf
D3 3rd, Whittlesey's Brigade 13 /10 / 7 Inf
D4 3rd, Artillery 2 stands
E 4th Division, Hurbut 1 E Div Ldr
E1 4th, Williams' Brigade 12 / 9/ 6 Inf
E2 4th, Veatch's Brigade 13 /11/ 8 Inf
E3 4th, Lauman's Brigade E, 8 / 6 / 4 Inf
E4 4th, Artillery 2 stands
F 5th Division, Sherman 1 E Div Ldr
F1 5th, McDowell's Brigade 10 / 8 / 6 Inf
F2 5th, Stuart's Brigade 7/6 / 4 Inf
F3 5th, Hildebrand's Brigade 9/8 / 5 Inf
F4 5th, Buckland's Brigade 11 /9/6
F5 5th, Artillery 3 stands
G 6th Division, Prentiss 1 Div Ldr
G1 6th, Peabody's Brigade E, 14 / 12 / 8 Inf
G2 6th, Miller's Brigade 13 / 11 / 8 Inf
G3 3rd, Artillery 2 stands
H Artillery Reserve 3 stands
I Army of the Ohio, Buell 1 Army Ldr
J 1st Division, Nelson 1 E Ldr
J1 1st, Ammen's Brigade 8/7/5
J2 1st. Bruce's Brigade 8/6/4
J3 1st, Artillery 1 stand
K 1. Gregg, Independent Cavalry 6/4/3
K1 attached Artillery 1 stand
CONFEDERATE FORCES
MAP ID UNIT COMPOSITION
1 Johnston, Army of the Mississippi 1 E Ldr
2 1 Corps, Polk 1 Corp Ldr
3 Clark's Division 1 Div Ldr
3A Russell's Brigade 10 / 8 5 Inf
3B Stewart's Brigade 10 / 8 5 Inf
3C Artillery 1 stand
4 Cheatham's Division 1 Div Ldr
4A Johnson's Brigade 9 / 7 5 Inf
4B Stephen's Brigade 9 / 8 5 Inf
4C Artillery 2 stands
5 II Corps, Bragg 1 Corp Ldr
6 Ruggle's Division 1 Div Ldr
6A Gibson's Brigade E, 13 / 10 / 7 Inf
6B Anderson's Brigade 8 / 7 / 5 Inf
6C Pond's Brigade 13 / 11 / 8 Inf
6D Artillery 2 stands
7 Withers' Division 1 E Div Ldr
7A Gladden's Brigade 14 112 / 8 Inf
7B Chalmers Brigade 10 / 8 6 Inf
7C Jackson's Brigade 11 / 8 6 Inf
7D Artillery 2 stands
8 III Corps, Hardee 1 Corp Ldr
9 Hindeman's Division 1 Div Ldr
9A Shaver's Brigade 12 /10 / 7 Inf
9B Cleburne's Brigade E, 12 / 10 / 7 Inf
9C Wood's Brigade 13 / 11 / 8 Inf
9D Artillery 3 stands
10 Reserve Corps, Breckinridge 1 E Corp Ldr
10A Trabue's Brigade E, 12 / 10 / 7 Inf
10B Statham's Brigade 8 / 7 / 5 Inf
10C Bowen's Brigade 6 / 5 / 4 Inf
10D Artillery 5 stands
11 Cavalry (attached) n/a Ldr
11A Wharton's Brigade 4 / 3 2 Cav
11B Forrest's Brigade E, 4 3 12 Cav
TOTALS (Scale of 200 / 8):
UNION at 215 Inf (43.000), 6 Cav(1200), 17 Artillery (136 guns), 9 Leaders
CONFEDERATES at 162 Inf (32,400), 8 Cav (11600), 15 Artillery (120 guns), 9 Leaders
DISPOSITIONS
Dusk on the 14th saw the battered Union forces withdraw and consolidate around Smith's Inn. The artillery of the reserve deployed along the first tier of Burr Oak Ridge, east of the Inn. The remaining brigade of Nelson's division, under the able command of Colonel Bruce, took up station in the area between the apple orchard and the field left of Smith's Inn. Buell was not attached to any unit. Ammen's Brigade, being cut-off by an enforced retreat disintegrated after another poor morale roll. Johnston, instead of pushing ahead in the fading light, also chose to consolidate his position and deployed his forces accordingly. Clark's Division held the ground directly in front of Groverton. Cheatham's Division was arranged in support, with one brigade deployed in line along the Emmittstown Pike and the other, to the left of Clark's force. There was one artillery battery dispatched to monitor the road exiting the wood line near the blockhouse. Here, Johnston placed Wharton's cavalry in a mobile reserve. The other brigade of horse, under Forrest, took up position between the lines of Clarks' and Cheathams' units. The General himself, made Groverton Church his headquarters and busied himself with further dispatches to his separate commands.
REINFORCEMENTS
The reinforcement schedule for this scenario was not based on the random roll of the dice. It was instead, pre-determined, in as much as additional forces for both sides were considered close. The real question was, how to schedule the arrival so as to not assign an overwhelming advantage to one side, but to reflect that "urgent" need for troops on the field: at this point, and "now". Thinking the problem through, it seemed sensible enough to presume that any reinforcements would be using the main thoroughfares in their approach to Groverton. As the Union forces were caught preparing for an offensive themselves, they would have to double- back. They would be using all three roads on their side of the table. The Independent Cavalry Brigade and Horse Artillery, under 1. Gregg, would arrive first on the morning of October 15th. Unfortunately, they would enter along Point X (see MAP I - the furthest point from the embattled Union lines). On turn three, the divisions of Hurlbut and L. Wallace would march on, utilizing the Jenkinsville Road - Point Y. (This access route would prove a major hindrance to the Union effort.) The main force, under the command of General U.S. Grant and comprising three divisions, would approach the field from the south. They would advance by the North-South Road over Burr Oak Ridge - Point Z. Finally, the Sixth Division, under General Prentiss, would make an appearance later in the morning, entering along the same road as the independent cavalry unit.
For the Confederates, the II Corps under Bragg would enter on turn two, on the far west edge of the board, (Point Q) along the road leading to Black's Tavern. The III Corps and Reserve Corps would enter on the North-South Road, on turns three and five. (Point T).
DAY TWO, ROUND ONE
The Confederates were up early and spoiling to continue the fight. Stephen's Brigade, with Cheatham attached, led the way into the Union defensive line. General Cheatham was second in line yesterday afternoon, and so missed a large part of the contest. He was eager to gain some ground and glory for his division, The Union fire however, was galling, the Confederates reeling under the crossfire of three artillery batteries. Trying to steady the line, General Cheatham and two aides were felled by a cannonball. Bruce's Brigade did what it could to hold on under the mounbrig pressure of Clark's Division. The timely arrival of the Union cavalry, who dismounted and deployed into the apple orchard, helped maintain this line. Indeed, under the withering fire of these troopers, Forrests Brigade suffered some loss and retreated out of range. Clark held his ground, wanting to clear the orchard first instead of enduring a flanking fire. And so, after an initial fury, the Confederate storm lapsed as Polk ordered his corps to withdraw and reorganize. For the time being, Polk himself took command of Cheatham's Division. It was while this action was being resolved to the front, that the Union force experienced a similar fate on the eastern side of the battlefield.
Units from the divisions of Hurlbut and L. Wallace were confined to the Jenkinsville Road.
Approaching in a long road column, they issued from the wood line and were met by a terrific fire from the artillery battery Johnston had deployed near the old blockhouse. The boys in blue pressed on however, marching over the bodies from the front ranks. Their commander pressing them into a line to the right of the blockhouse and the Confederate battery. Before the deployment could be completed, they were charged by cavalry from Wharton's command and pushed back into the woods. General L. Wallace could only swear and curse the fate of his troops, The woods were so thick along this road that deployment into and movement through would have been costly in terms of both time and order. It was only after two more aborted assaults that Hurlbut urged him to push through the trees and flank the Rebels. For a good part of the early morning hours then, the battle raged back and forth among the wood line on Jenkinsville Road. The Union troops would dress ranks and issue forth, only to be repelled by a concentrated fire. With the addition of Cleburne's Brigade to this sector, the Confederate defense became that much more solid.
The Brigade of Cleburne was one of many arriving on board that morning for the Confederates. Hardee's Corp was moving quickly along the North-South Road into Groverton. Hindeman's Division, containing Cleburne's Brigade and others, was deployed to the east side of Groverton. The remaining troops marched through the town and joined with Polk's Corps. Over on the far west corner of the field (table), Bragg's Corps also made an appearance. Ruggle's Division made excellent progress on the Emmittstown Pike, quickly reaching the area of Groverton Church. Wither's Division followed, but instead of crossing the bridge by Black's Tavern, detoured to the right. General Wither could make out a trail on the plains here, and could also see the mill across Sawyers Run. After some deliberation, he sent word to Bragg that he was going to "explore" this avenue of approach. Reinforcements did not favor the Rebel cause only.
General Buell could hear the exchange of fire to his right, to the east where the great woods were. He could see and was much relieved by the sight of General Grant arriving along Burr Oak Ridge with three divisions plus artillery, marching in field columns. It seemed for a moment that the ridge line was covered with streams of water, there was just so much blue moving across the fiers and through the grass fields - no less than 10 brigades of infantry and seven batteries of artillery.
The arrival was well-timed, for in a second assault upon the ridge, the Confederates had worked around the Union right. A battery of horse artillery was in position to take on the Union reserve artillery from the flank. Stephen's Brigade, now rallied, was also creating pressure for the Union line around Smith's Inn. MacArthur's Brigade - from W. Wallace's Division - advanced into and over the rebel battery, capturing part of it and sending the remainder off in a panic. For the time being, the Union line was restored on Burr Oak Ridge. Indeed, there was a tentative connection between troops here and those of L. Wallace. Brigades of Whittlesey and M. Smith had pushed through the wood and were deploying just inside the light wood line, to the left of the blockhouse. This deployment was not without cost, however. Again, the Confederates brought artillery to bear. The additional fire from Cleburne's Brigade destroying two stands.
Action in the center, especially around and in the Apple Orchard continued unabated. The dismounted Union troopers disordering Russell's Brigade and decimating Forrest's inactive command. Colonel Russell, angered as much by the fire as by the rout of the Rebel cavalry, ordered his men into the orchard. In this closein fighting, musket, bayonet, and Rebel fury outmatched the Union carbines. Gregg's troopers were pushed back with loss. Russell carried the position, and as events turned, would not retreat from it for the remainder of the contest.
To the Confederate right rear, the corps under Bragg continued its march along the Emmiftstown Pike. The leading brigade was a turn away from Groverton. Withers' units were making slower progress by Iron Hill, however.
CONFEDERATE REVERSAL
Turn six witnessed sloppy firing by both Confederate and Union brigades. Not one brigade lost a stand, but several were disordered in the exchange. In the lines covering the area around Smith's Inn, the Rebels had one infantry brigade and one battery low on ammunition. Due to their forward positions, Clark was unable to disengage these troops from combat. This lack of ammunition would contribute to be the eventual downfall of Clark's Division, but not of the Confederate cause.
MacArthur's Brigade, flushed with the success of capturing part of a Rebel battery, advanced into close combat with Stephen's Brigade at the base of Burr Oak Ridge. At first, the melee was close, each side "bleeding" the other. On the subsequent turn however, the fresh Union infantry broke through the line of butternut and grey. This was too much for the Rebels; they fled toward Groverton, ignoring the pleas of General Polk. In some disarray, Brigadier MacArthur directed his victorious troops onto the flank of Stewarts occupied brigade. Here too. the fight was brief but violent. The Confederates ran again, leaving behind as prisoner one stand and General Clark. Polk was now exposed. He and his staff retreated in the face of mounting Union pressure. General Buell contented himself with re-establishing the Union line around Smith's Inn.
This turn also saw the arrival of the Sixth Division, under command of General Prentiss. His division was not able to march along the road toward Smith's Inn and General Grant's command. Instead, as the first elements of Withers' Division were crossing the ford at Byrd's Mill, Prentiss was forced to arrange his units here.
In the center, the Union faced the problem of too many troops and batteries. It was a veritable traffic jam of units. General Grant sent courier after courier with orders to establish some sort of order.
Unfortunately, until these messengers arrived - if they did at all - it was up to the individual division commanders. General Sherman was immediately faced with the potential threat from the left: by Wither's troops. He was also confronted with the success of Russell's Brigade in the Apple Orchard.
AND RALLY
Exhorting his disordered and leaderless brigades, General Polk rallied them in front of Groverton. He was assisted in the effort by the Army Commander. It would take an hour to reorganize the line, let alone produce any offensive action. Fortunately, the Union command seemed satisfied with the ejection of Confederates from the locale of Smith's Inn. They also seemed more concerned with the slow progress made by the six brigades from W. Wallace's and Hurlbut's divisions. Of these six, only three brigades had made contact. The rest were strung out along the Jenkinsville Road --anxious to exit the woods and see what was going on to their front. All ranks were concerned by the noise of bade at the front of the column, and worried by the fact that movement was halted.
The arrival of Breckenridge's Corps certainly did much to cement an already strong Confederate position. One of the infantry brigades proceeded to the left, marching in support of Cleburne. The artillery reserve - five batteries in all - turned onto the Emmittstown Pike and drew up in a supporting line to the immediate right of Groverton. The other brigades of this corps marched through Groverton and helped buoy the confidence of Polk's shaken units,
The Confederate line of battle was beginning to take shape. Bragg's Corp, minus the division of General Withers, had executed a right-flank turn, and was marching across the field toward Magnuson's Farm and Fox Creek. They were almost within range of the horse artillery battery from 1. Gregg's detachment, This battery brought ranging enfilade fire against Stewart's men, but succeeded in only disordering the brigade.
WHAT'S LEFT OF THE UNION CENTER
Prentiss had deployed his two brigades in supported-line formation, each having an artillery battery posted to the right side of that line. The General took up a central position by the wooden barn at the rear. The artillery had unlimbered just in time, for Chalmer's Brigade had stormed across the ford and was forming into a long line. To the left of this first line, General Wither placed a horse artillery battery. The remaining two brigades of his division were having trouble on the north side of the ford.
On the edge of the Apple Orchard, the Union cavalry attempted to re-secure their position, and so charged the rebel infantry. Once again, carbine proved no match for the tired but bayonet-armed Confederates. To be sure, the Union cavalry were soundly repulsed. What remained of Gregg's command ran from the orchard, re-mounted, and made for the safety of Sherman's lines. Russell, bleeding from a light wound to his shoulder, moved his men to the forward edge of the orchard, facing the left-center of the Union line
Having regained control, Polk moved forward and engaged the Union position around Smith's Inn for the third time that morning. He was supported in the attack by Wood's Brigade and some three batteries of artillery. Marsh's Brigade, on the near right of the Union line, suffered terribly. Losing two stands, they were forced to retreat back up the ridge line. General L. Wallace did have additional brigades available to plug this gap. But again, space was at a premium, for there were too many troops milling around in the area south-east of Smith's Inn.
The Union problem continued on the far right flank, too. Here, Laumann's Brigade was disordered and thrown back by the advance of Confederates under Cleburne. Instead of adopting a completely defensive posture, General Hindeman had ordered Cleburne to attack into the wood line. Of course, this only served to further complicate the Union situation. It was getting to the point where General Hurlbut could not decide which was a more significant enemy: the woods or the Confederates.
In Sherman's sector - the Union left-center - artillery fire was directed on the advancing elements of Ruggle's Division. These three strong brigades had now crossed Fox Creek and were marching at an angle toward the Apple Orchard and the left end of Burr Oak Ridge. Pond's Brigade took several hits, but quickly dressed ranks and continued the advance. At the Orchard, Hildebrand's Brigade charged into the trees and wrestled with the tired Rebels led by Col. Russell. Though low on ammunition, the "boys in brown" fought well, ejecting the Yanks in short order. The Colonel realized the importance of this piece of ground and he did impress upon his men that significance by his action in the front line.
The division under Prentiss was finally blooded as Chalmers Brigade moved within range of the Union infantry. The resulting fire decimated the Confederates. They lost two stands, and retreated in some disorder. Chalmer escaped the volleys without injury, but was shocked by the experience. While this baptism was taking place, the rest of Withers' Division attempted to make its way across the narrow ford by Byrd's Mill. Needless to say, it was not easy going. It seemed that while the Union forces were hampered by woods, the Confederates were slowed by water.
On the Union extreme right flank, there was heated action around the blockhouse and great wood. The brigades of Thayer and Whittlesey had advanced into the pocket left by Polk's attacking units. They were met by the main line of Confederates however, Shaver and Bowen quickly moving their troops up to counter this small threat. It looked as if the Yankees would collapse under the weight of the assault, for Shaver's Brigade struck the right side of Thayer's line. It was, instead, the Confederates who were forced to recoil after a fierce melee. A similar story was played out to the left of this combat, when Veatch's Brigade charged into the line held by Cleburne and pushed them back to the edge of the light woods.
SHERMAN'S SWAN SONG
Turn eight saw a general attack by Union brigades all along the line. In every case though, the tide of blue was turned back. This started on the Union extreme left when Prentiss advanced his division against Chalmers depleted troops. The Confederate artillery could not stand the fire and retreated hastily to the ford. They were prevented from crossing to the North side, as Withers' other brigades were in the process of wading across. Peabody's Brigade was thrown back roughly and with loss. More significant, Prentiss misjudged the space to his rear, and the enforced retreat put half of the brigade stands off the game table. Peabody's unit was, therefore, lost. (Under these rules, a unit that is forced off the table - playing field - is considered beyond recall.) This put the Union left flank "in the air", as Miller's Brigade was in line north of the old barn, approximately 1,000 yards from table's edge.
On the other flank, Union troops fared just as well. Veatch's Brigade attempted to follow up their initial success, but was rebuffed by Cleburne. This, even with flanking fire on Cleburne by a battery of horse artillery. Hurlbut's Division however, was now fully on board. But, it was unknown when and if these troops could bring pressure against the Confederate left. Indeed, General Hurlbut was occupied with restoring Laumann's Brigade of veterans.
In front of Groverton, Thayer succeeded in pushing back the remnants of Stephen's Brigade. MacArthur's Brigade advanced into this same angle, attacking a lone battery of Rebel artillery. This time, the Rebels stood their ground. The combination of canister and pistol fire was too much - the Yankees were forced to retire. This general sequence of events was repeated in the left-center, where Sherman faced Ruggle.
Once again, the stalwarts of Russell's Brigade refused to relinquish the Orchard to attacking Union infantry. The attack was brief and without real support, as the rest of Sherman's Division was busy with Ruggle's advancing brigades. Gibson's Brigade was the first into the fray, assaulting the left end of Hildebrand's line. The other two brigades, bringing up the right, engaged Sherman's line - a line which was now being forced back against the first ter of Burr Oak Ridge. This pressure also served to completely isolate the Union left, as Ruggle's right-most unit was advancing across the rear of Miller's Brigade.
For the next three turns, Sherman did all that he could to stop this attack. There was brief success as Gibson's Brigade was stalled by concentrated Union artillery fire. However, this large unit rallied quickly and was joined by Russell's troops in a second assault of the Union line. This time, there was nothing for Sherman to do. He could curse, but that would not stop the Confederates from pushing back his units and gaining a foothold on Burr Oak Ridge.
Anderson's Brigade played a significant role in this sector as well. First, they advanced into the line made by Buckland's troops. The exchange was one-sided however. Anderson broke through Buckland and fell upon the supporting battery of artillery. The victorious Rebs were then challenged by the remaining troopers of I.Gregg's cavalry. Here too, the Rebels pushed them back. Sherman's line was falling apart. Couriers were sent to General Grant with urgent requests for support, but these pleas would not - could not - be answered.
RESIGNATION BY GRANT
It looked to General Grant that the day could yet be saved. The fighting was flowing back and forth across the ground near Smith's Inn and the old blockhouse. At first, the Union experienced success. The units of Veatch and Laumann continued to press Cleburne. In one particularly bloody close combat, Cleburne's Brigade was broken and General Hindeman found himself a prisoner of Colonel Veatch's men. The success was not long-lived, as Cleburne rallied his troops around Groverton. In his place too, moved the several units from the Reserve Corps: the brigades of Statham and Trabue, and two batteries of artillery.
In the middle of the Union center, Thayer's Brigade scored victory against both Bowen's and Stephen's Brigades. It was not as great a contest as that on the Jenkinsville Road, for Stephen's Brigade was much reduced in strength. (Stephen's Brigade had been heavily engaged in the early morning hours, and had suffered at the hands of Union artillery on Burr Oak Ridge.) Advancing to carry the newly won ground, Thayer exposed his unit to attack by Shaver's troops. The Yankees were subsequently routed. This opened up a channel of attack for Wood's Brigade. The commander of III Corps, General Hardee, ordered this unit to attack the Union line at the base of Burr Oak Ridge. Marsh's Brigade was the first to face the onslaught. General McClernand was attached to this unit, and was quickly captured as the Rebels rolled over Marsh and the two supporting batteries of artillery. One full battery was captured, while the other escaped with half of its guns intact. The brigade under the command of General Raith was next to face the attacking Confederates. The result here was similar. The Union line, if it could be called a line, was now threatened in two places.
Sherman's Division had collapsed under pressure of Ruggle, so Prentiss was cut off from support. More important, Withers had finally managed to move all of his troops across the ford. Prentiss was outnumbered, but a Union line of retreat could be threatened by a brigade - if not two - of fresh Confederate infantry. While the Union did have a small reserve available, it was needed in too many places at once. Relief was needed for Hurlbut's efforts, and this Gould only be offered by attacking along the edge of the great woods. Such an assault would possibly pin Union infantry against that same wood line. Moreover, the advancing lines would be subject to enfilade from the Confederate batteries stationed in front and west of Groverton. There was the presence of Rebels to the front. Groverton was very strongly defended. Bruce's Brigade, under personal command of General Buell, was testing these defenses. It was a forlorn hope though: a single unit, depleted and tired, facing a line of guns supported by infantry. McDowell had his brigade in support of Bruce, but again, there was the question as to purpose. In some respects, these troops were frozen by events elsewhere on the field. And, for Grant to commit the reserve to save Sherman, this would further expose his right and even give the high ground of Burr Oak Ridge to the Confederates. The successive - if hard won - victories in each sector by the Confederates forced General Grant to acknowledge defeat. Just after 11:00 on the morning of October 15th, Grant did just that. The order to withdraw was issued. Grant threw down his cigar and turned his horse around. His suite followed him off the field.
COMMENTARY
On review, it seems that the Union forces, while ostensibly dedicated to the attack, were not as aggressive as they could have or should have been. Indeed, it was the Confederates, on both days, who adopted the strategy of "offense as the best defense". Initially, Johnston did have the advantage of numbers. This was countered by the fact that action on the first day did not commence until a few hours before nightfall. Johnston too, had more of a plan - flexible as it was - compared to the Union command. His first objective was to secure Groverton and then consolidate his forces before launching any type of attack. This he did, as the Union frustrations would reveal, only too well. In contrast, the Union command found itself reacting to moves made by the Confederates. So, the Union plan was more or less predicated on reaction to any offensive action made by the Confederates. The two areas where the Union did try to launch counter-attacks were areas anchored by major terrain: the Apple Orchard and the Jenkinsville Road exit from the great wood on the east side of the board.
To the extent then, that terrain dictated or hampered Union efforts, it might be suggested that the lay out of the table was unfair to the Union command. The reinforcement schedule had Rebels arriving from two points: the one directly north of Groverton, the other on the far west side of the table. As their bade plan unfolded, this schedule was used to advantage. They first secured and established the defense of Groverton, and then used Bragg's Corps as the main striking element. The Union, on the other hand, had three points of entry. The one along Jenkinsville Road, as has already been mentioned, was not a good route of access. However, instead of adopting an offensive posture, the Union force could have stressed the defensive advantages of their position. Grant could have lined Burr Oak Ridge with his divisions and artillery - perhaps even have them dig in - and simply wait for the Rebels to attack. Going back to the original idea behind the scenario, the Confederates were the ones in enemy territory', they were the ones low on supplies; and, they were the ones who were outnumbered.
In terms of casualties, the Confederates enjoyed the advantage but suffered a greater loss of divisional leaders. The Union forces ended the day with three batteries of artillery lost and a like number damaged. Infantry losses were counted at 52 stands. At the scale representation of the rules, this amounted to approximately 10,400 troops. The brigades of Peabody, Buckland, and 1. Gregg's command, were forced from the field. General Nelson was taken prisoner on the first day, while General McClernand was captured by Confederates during the final attack on Burr Oak Ridge. Total infantry losses for the Rebels were 35 stands, or at scale, 7,000 men. Stephen's Brigade took quite an amount of punishment but remained on the field. The only brigades that dispersed were the independent cavalry units under Forrest and Wharton. Due to the aggressiveness of their assaults, Polk's divisional leaders were lost in the fight around Smith's Inn. Clark was captured; Cheatham was felled by artillery fire. Hindeman, of Hardee's Corp, was also captured. Artillery losses for the Confederates were just half those of the Union: one battery lost, and two damaged. In terms of percentage loss then, the Union took 22% for the two day engagement. The Confederates were a close second, at 18% of their total forces.
This second battle around Groverton lasted 16 turns before the Union commander resigned his position. In comparison to the first attempt, with the home-grown rules, this game was quicker and maintained a level of realism without sacrificing playing mechanics. In that respect, these rules are very good. The turn sequence is straightforward and the table reference is simple while providing an element of "the fog of war" as units may not do exactly what is desired. At the same time however, there were (are) areas of the RREAND FURY Rules that need revision or expansion, but this is a personal assessment. Besides, it is not the intention of this report to critique the set of rules. That is another project for another time. Perhaps another ACW gamer has already penned such an article in some other hobby magazine. It was the intention of this report to provide a narrative of the "Encounter at Groverton". It was the intention of this brief epilogue to discuss the strategy used by both sides, the scenario, and look at the total losses taken during the battle.
Maps
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© Copyright 2000 Hal Thinglum
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