Following the tactical American victory, but strategic British victory, at Lundy's Lane on July 25th 1814, the American army began an disorganized retreat to their supply base at Fort Erie. The American victory had been purely phyrric in nature, Scotts' brigade lost approximately 40% of its Strength. The army commander General Issac Brown was carried from the field as was General Scott. Many regiments were commanded by company grade officers and in the case of the 11th US Infantry by a junior Lieutenant. As was usual in the American Army at this time a council of war was held. The two remaining Generals, Ripley (regular) and Porter (militia), decided to retreat with many of the remaining officers concurring. In the early hours of July 26, 1814 the American Army straggled back into its camp around Chippewa and Street creek. When General Brown heard of this decision, he countermanded the order and directed the army back to Lundy's Lane. Upon returning to the battlefield a little after daybreak, the American Army found that the British had already occupied the hill which had been contested so hotly the night before. Neither side was prepared to renew the conflict. After a reasonalbe amount of time, for honors sake, the American Army withdrew. This allowed the Bristish to claim victory. Though the British claimed victory, they did not act as a victorious army. Pursuit of the Americans was lackluster at best. Many of the army's best units had been reduced to mere skeletons of their former strength. Casualities amongst the rank and file were horrific. The 89th lost 253 men out of 425 and 13 of it 18 officers, The higher echelon of the British command had not escaped unscathed. Many were wound, killed or in the case of the army commander General Riall captured by the 25th US Infantry. General Drummond, the Military Govenor, assumed command. He appeared unsettled by the fierce American resolve and did not know to retreat, stand or pursue. The Americans resolved his delemma by commencing a withdrawal that soon turned into an organized rout. General Brown and Scott has already been returned to Buffalo for treatment, leaving Ripley and Porter to their own devices. In their haste to leave, much of the American equipment was burned or thrown into the Niagara River. As the Americans moved back to their base, a British force of light troops and cavalry followed. But at a distance and did nothing to hamper the American evacuation. The Basis of this Wargame is what if the British had been a little more aggressive in their pursuit and caught up to the American rearguard around Chippewa. The figures used are a mixture of Old Glory, Redoubt and Foundry, all 25mm. As my ruleset is Carnage and Glory, there is not figure ratio. I go for big battalions of 16 to 32 figures. Due to the small size of forces represented a 1:20 or 1: 10 ratio is not unreasonable. The strength of the units was based on Donald Graves book Lundy's Lane. As his morning reports are pre battle, I used gamers license to arrive at my figures. I tried to deduct killed, nonreturning wounded and prisoners and took into account this was a night battle and many of the missing were just lost and would return to their units at sunrise. AMERICAN FORCES General Porters Brigade (-) (+) has been left at Street Creek to cover the withdrawal of US Forces. His orders were to hold his line, do not allow the British to cross the creek until nightfall and not to endanger his command. Contradictory orders, but this is the War of 1812. His command included: Major Woods Detachment: Fentons Penn. Militia Regiment - 212 men Harris MTD Dragoons - 70 men 3 companies 1st US rifles - 80 men Townsons 18pder Battery - 3 guns company Dismtd Dragoons - 50 men Levenworths' Brigade (formerly Scotts): 9th/11th US Infantry - 298 men 21st/25th US Infantry - 310 men 12pder Battery - 3 guns For a total of 1020 men and 6 guns. BRITISH FORCES Colonel Hercules Scott was dispatched to pursue the Yankees. Besides his own brigade, a detachment of light infantry and cavalry under the command of LtCol Pearson was attached. Col Scotts orders were simple. Catch the American rearguard and force the crossing a Street Creek. Scotts column consisted of the following: LtCol Pearrsons AdvanceGuard: 2 cos Glengarry Light Infanry - 80 men Mohawk warriors - 50 men 7th Lt Dragoons - 100 men Canadian Provincial Dragoons - 50 men Incorporated Militia Regiment - 300 men Col Scotts Main force: RA section 6pders - 3 guns 2/8th Kings Own - 270 men 103rd Canadian Fencibles - 579 men 104th New Brunswick Fencibles - 325 men Total of 1754 men and 3 guns MORALE RATINGS It would appear that the majority of the units would have poor mofale as they consisted of militia and fencible units. But that is not the case. The US regulars were given good ratings in morale, combat and firing. Even though they had been decimated in the prior battle. I feel this rating is justified as the regulars had become battle harden troops that had fought the British to a standstill at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane. Also at Lundy's, Lane the regulars constantly rallied and returned to the fight in the case of Scotts brigade. The Rifles were given above average marksmanship to reflect additional rifle training. The PA militia was rated poor across the board, This was to keep with the usual performance of militia in battle. Also the militia did not have bayonets and this was reflected in their close combat rating. The remained of the US forces were rated normal in all ratings. Even though the British had only one regular infantry regiment, the fencibles and militia were hardened veterans. The Four Canadian infantry units had all volunteered for the duration of the war. The Glengarry Light infantry was compsed of recent Scot immigrants and was uniformed as the 95th rifles, except that the officers worn their sash Scottish style. The Incorporated Militia came from lower Canada and had been together for about 2 years The 103rd performed so well in this war that the Crown offered to make them a royal regiment. But the unit refused as they did not want to lose their Canadian enthnicity. The 104th was transferred to the Army as a regular unit. The regulars, fencibles and artillery were all rated above average. The militia and provincial troops were given normal ratings. The Indians were given poor morale, combat and marksmanship to reflect their timidity in engaging in European style of combat. Additionally, the Indians had a penalty for coming under artillery fire or having artillery fire near them. Once one of this conditions is meet, the Indians will seek shelter in the nearest treeline The umpire will then take over command of the Indians and use his discretion on their conduct. This reflect the independent nature of the Indians. THE BATTLEFIELD The game was fought on a 6X4 table, refer to Map 1 for initial deployment, The scenario is designed for an American defense in depth. The woods the British enter from is considered thick forr movement and fire, The hill is a slight rise which slows movement both for ascending and descending. The woods on the flanks of the table is light for both movement and fire. As an added note, skirmisher movement is not affected by this woods. The ploughed field is enclosed by a split rail fence for light cover. As the ground is freshly ploughed, all movement is hampered by -2 inches. None of the artillery or cavalry can enter any of the woods. The ford is off table to the SW past the buildings. All British units are in platoon column except for the GLI and Indians which are In skirmish order. This is to reflect the British being in march column in pursuit of the enemy. The American units are deployed as follows: rifles and dismounted dragoons in skirmish order in the woodline to the north of the road, with one company rifles to the south. The dismounted dragoons are within range of the hidden ravine that runs across the front of the hill. The 18pder battery is deployed on the hill and covers the road, while the militia regiment is deployed in line across the road. the Dragoons are in column behind the hill. The regulars and the 12pder battery are in platoon column on the road marching away from the British. Turn 1 Co Pearsons first units, 17th and Provisional Dragoons, lead the advance. Upon exiting the woods, the US forces on the hill and road came into view. The GLI deployed to the fight and the Indians to the left to move on the flanks of the Americans. The militia regiment was to support the cavalry. Col Pearson thought a quick charge would decide the issue and give the follow on unit room to deploy. Capt Townson ordered his battery to open fire upon the dragoons. The fire was extremely effective emptying many saddles in the Provincial Dragoons. The Provincial retired in haste through the 17th LD and militia regiment disordering both units. Not a glorious beginning for the British.. Gen Porter sent an aide to halt the regular when the British appeared. Shockingly the aide was not ordered to have the regulars about face or deploy into battleline. This lack of foresight can be attributed to the Generals preoccupation with the Militia, regiment which was already showing signs of running. General Porter had attached himself to the unit to steady them. Turn 2 Both sides were able to steady their wayward troops. To give his units time to deploy, the British commander pushed his cavalry out as skirmishers. This kept the attention of the American artillery and militia while reducing the artillery effect upon his own troops. On both flanks the Anglo units worked their way through the woods and began a mad dash towards the opposite treeline. The lack of recon allowed for terrible consequences. The US riflemen waited until the British approached within 100yds of their position and opened a galling fire on the GLI. The GLI staggered to a halt and began a desultory musktery duel with the Americans. On the opposite flank the Indians received the same treatment but offerred a different response. They went to ground refusing to move and giving a pathetic return fire. The British militia regiment moved up and began its evolution into line. Behind them could be seen the gleam of hundreds of bayonets as the remaining infantry arrived. somewhat belately General Porter realized he forgot to tell the regulars to form into battleline. He quietly dispatched another aide. Turn 3 Sporadic musktry was heard as the light troops continued their cat and mouse game in the woods. The GLI and Indians seemed quite content to exchange musketry with the better hidden US troops. Townson turned his attention from the cavalry, after doing little damage, and began to pepper the British militia with round shot. The militia completed their evolutions into line and advanced on the guns on the hill. About 100 yds from the hill the British militia stumbled into the shallow, hidden ravine. This effectively stopped the unit. As the regiment was attempting to cross this obstacle, they came under fire from the artillery and hidden dragoons. Volley after volley cut through the milling mass of soldiers causing heavy casulities. Cot Scott rode to the unit in an attempt to ascertain its status when they suddenly broke and ran. They had suffered 30% casualties in 1.5 minutes. The regulars from both sides began their evolutions into battleline. The 12pder battery moved up behind the PA militia. The battery commander knew the militia would not stand much longer and once they were gone, he would have a good field of fire. Turn 4 As the British infantry was aligning its ranks, it began its advance toward the visible American units. (map 2). The RA section deployed along the road and began to shell the PA militia causing few physical casulties. The British cavalry reformed from skirmishers and acted as though it was preparing to advance upon the PA militia. This cause considerable consternation among the militia. The light infantry fight for the woods has degenerated into a musketry duel as both commanders seemed to be pre-occuppied and showed no interest in their flanks. Townsons battery, by this time fatigued and low on ammo, began to fire upon the 104th. Few casualties were caused. The PA militia leveled their muskets at the Approaching cavalry, fired one volley and promptly fled. The LT Dragoons were encourage and in the time honored traditions of the British light cavalry, launch a hell bent for leather charge. The movement of the militia unmasked the 12pder battery and the 9/11th infantry. Both units waited until the approaching cavalry was within 50 yds. They unleashed a a withering volley that stopped the cavalry charge cold. The British cavalry then routed from the field and played no major role in the game. General Porters' aides attempted to stop the PA militia to no avail. Col Pearson tried to reform the British Incorporated Militia. The British regulars ignored everything with typical British aplomb. The GLI and Indians suddenly began to move back toward the treeline from which they had originally moved. Much to the charging of their officers and the British Commander, The main part of the battleline reached the ravine. It did not come under heavy artillery fire as the American 18pder had timbered up and moved off. This was due to the left British regiment reaching the bottom of the hill. Capt Townson did not have any infantry support. Though he was covered by the American Light Dragoons. The American light infantry, though victorious in the firefight, was forced to fall back. The advance of the British line troops had compromised their position and left them even more unsupported. The American center was reinforced by the regulars that advance to cover the flanks of the 12pder battery. This was done by positioning the battery between them. As the RA section prolong forward, the only fire to break the silence was the 12pder battery. They fired a slow steady fire into the 103rd fencibles causing minor losses. Turn 6 The commanders took this time to reorganize their forces. (map III) The 104th ocuppied the hill with their fight flank anchored by the woods just vacated by the rifles. To their left was the 103rd and the RA section was to the 103rd left on the road. The Kings own was held in reserve behind the 103rd. The Advance-guard was being reorganized behind the Kings own. The US forces sent out skirmshers (rifles and dismtd Dragoons) to harass the British. The 18pder unlimbered next to the 21/25th with the intention of taking the 103rd under fire. The Dragoons were held back as the only reserve. Again firing was light with only the RA secton and 12 pder battery engaged. The British chose to concentrate their fire on the 12pder battery in counterbattery. All they succeeded in doing was wasting ammunition, The 12pder battery concentrated its fire upon the 104th. Though casulties were light, Cot Scott had the unfortunate honor of being brought down as his orders were being issued. This occurrance caused the British advance to come to a halt. The delay in finding LtCol Pearson, informing him of the problem and having him assume command was to cause the British some difficultly. Added to the mix was that only the 104th received the order to advance, Cot Scott was brought down prior to telling the other regimental commanders. Turn 7 Lt. Col Pearson's arrival to the front lines coincided with me beginning of the advance of the 104th -- Pearson unsuccessfully attempted to stop the unit, but did succeed in stopping the RA section that began to manhandle its guns forward in support. He also dispatched aides to bring up the advance guard and to stop the 104th. Meanwhile the 103rd was drawing the attention of the US rifles and attempted to drive off the rifles with volley fire. The American artillery targeted the advancing 104th, with each discharge bringing more British casulties. The 18pder switched to the 103rd as the 104ths advance took it out of the 18pders field of fire. The 12pder delivered deadly fire for the first time, knocking over files of men with each discharge. Once in range the US infantry added its musketry to the weight of lead flying down range. Amazingly the 104th closed ranks and charged both the 12pder battery and the 9/11 US infantry, A savage melee ensued with no clear victor- The only bright part of this fight was the abandonment of the battery by the gunners. Turn 8 Gen Porter and Leavenworth joined the 9/11 th to encourage the men as the melee continued. Capt Hinds lead his US Dragoons into a charge to reclaim the 12pders. On the British side of the field, the 103rd received its orders and charges down the hill with the intentions of closing with the opposing US infantry. The Kings Own moved up to the shouts of Pearson to support the 104th and add its weight to the melee if needed. The advance guard moved up to the base of the hill. The 21/25th delivered vicious volleys into the 103rd casing them to stagger to a stop a mere 50 paces from their lines. The 18pder added to the carnage by firing cannister into the milling ranks of the regiment. The 103rd attempted to return fire but was to disorganized to be of any effect. The melee of the 104th and 9/11th ended. These troops had been in melee for 30 minutes. The 9th Infantry lost it national color while the 104th lost its regiment flag. The mounting casulties combined with the casulties from the earlier musketry ended up being to much for the Canadians. The US Dragoons charged home and this caused the 104th to slowly break apart and withdraw 150 paces to reform. There was not a pursuit as the Americans were in no shape. The withdrawal of the 104th did not affect the Kings Own, but did have adverse affects on the militia. The militia officers had to halt the regiment to attempt to bring order into its ranks. The Indians decided that the battle was too hot and left the field after suffering 8 killed. Turn 9 The 12pder was re-crewed and the 9/11th reformed. The 21/25th unexpectedly charged the 103rd. The 103rd seemed surprised by this move and did not recover quickly enough to fire. As the Americans and 103rd engaged in melee, the militia was able to advance to the top of the hill. This was done by LtCol Pearson personally leading them. The RA section began to cover the Kings Own but with little damage to the 9/11 th. The melee ended badly for the Americans as the 21/25th recoiled off the 103rd. but the 103rd did not seem inclined to follow up on their success. The remaining time was used by the commanders to redress their ranks. Turn 10 The two US regular regiments withdrew 75 paces to reform their battleline. The artillery accompanied them, falling back by sections. This allowed them to continue to fire at the British though at reduce effect. The rifles and Dismtd Dragoons resumed skirmishing to harass the reforming British units. The mounted dragoons returned to their position behind the battleline as the sole reserve. The 103rd and Kings Own reformed their ranks under light artillery fire- The RA section continued its counterbattery fire on the 12pder battery. The results were the same, no casulties. LtCol Pearson sent the GLI out to attempt to drive off the rifles. The 104th and Militia regiments rallied and formed a second line, mainly behind the Kings Own. Except for sporadic musketry, both sides seemed concerned with reorganization. The American commander was running out of troops and began contemplating retreating. On the British side, LtCol Pearson was beginning to wonder if he could drive off the Americans. Turns 11-12 Neither commander seemed interested in closing with cold steel. They were content to engage each other in musketry -- thought the British did advance until they were within 100 paces of the American line. At tKs range the carnage was considerable. The 103rd had high casulties among its officers and ncos. This allowed the less determined to begin to ease away from the battleline. Also at this range, the skirmishers were forced to the flanks. On the American right flank their 3rd co of rifles were unopposed. The officer in charge decided to move his company past the front line of the British to engage the 1046 As was the habit of the British in this theatre, all flanks companies were detached 'Therefore the British were uable to respond. Turn 13 Attempting to end this stalemate, LtCol Pearson ordered a general charge. All four battalions responded with a cheer and quickly closed on the Americans. Due to the American practice of individual firing, no massive volleys greeted the British. But it was enough to stagger the 103rd only after moving 50 paces. This caused the following militia regiment to slam into their rear throwing both units into great confusion. The outcome was different with the Kings Own. Even though it suffered many casultites, the regiment did close with the artillery and 9/11th regiment. Again a desperate struggle ensued. The gunners stayed with their guns this time. Both sides believe this was the crucial moment of the battle. The American commander threw the Lt Dragoons into the fray in an attempt to swing the battle in his favor. The 104th, with a roar, entered the melee from behind the Kings Own. This caused more harm than good as the two units began to intermingle. This time the weight of numbers told against the Americans. The 9th/11th finally broke and fled toward the creek bridge. The gunners attempted to drag off their guns, to no avail, All 3 12pders fell into British hands. The 21/25th found its flank exposed and withdrew somewhat hastily 150 paces, leaving the 18pdr battery exposed. Turn 14 The Americans, army collapse began. The 9/1 Ith continued to retreat and was joined by the 21/25th, whose commander was afraid he would be cutoff by the British. Col Leavenworth grabbed what units he could to cover the retreat. Mainly being the rifles and dragoons. The British were content to watch the retirement of the Americans. The British commander was heard to mutter "thank God those people have left." (every British unit was placed under halt in confusion orders by the computer,) The pursuit of the American army from Lundy's Lane was over. Aftermath Casulties had been high in this battle. The US forces lost 397 men and 3 guns for approximately a 39% reduction of combat power. Even though they won the battle, the British lost more heavily. They suffer 628 casulities out of 1754 total. I am not going to critique the battleplan of each side. I believe that is part of the interest of reading battlereports. Also I took a minor role (Leaveworth), so therefore my perspective is narrowed. I do believe that the rule system carnage and glory gave an accrate protrayal of an 1812 battle. If anyone thinks that the casualities rates are high, I direct your attention to Graves book and many other books about the period. During Lundys Lane the 25th US Infantry was reduced to a single rank (file closers included) and the 11th US Infantry was commanded by a junior lieutenant. My main interest has turned from Napolenic to the War of 1812 for a couple of reasons. 1) The size of the Armies, The armies were small, usually the size of a Napoleonic division. This allows me to build my armies in 25mm using Old Glory, Redoubt and Wargames Foundry. 2) Battle can be setup, troops deployed and games Finished in a single game session using battalion level rules, To get the feel of Napoleonics, my group would have to setup multiple divisions or corps. This, with terrain, could take 1-2 hours of setup, Not having the luxury of permanent gamesite, we would have to tear the game down. Did not leave much time for gaming. This battle was fought on a Sunday night beginning at 6pm with setup and ending at 11 pm with the last person walking. out. The game could have pone quicker, except for a reporter from the local paper who was doing a special , interest story concerning Wargaming. He was interested in gaming, but did not think there were any other people out there with the same interest, We loaded him up with back issues of magazines, bookstores, possible rulesets and terrain list You never know where the next gamer will come from! Back to MWAN #103 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2000 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com