This "Monk's Corner" will include neither a battle report nor a copy of the rules used in the battle (I don't play enough). For that sort of thing I recommend Wally Simon's "PW Review."
I was touched by Charles Elsden's expression of appreciation in issue # 98 for my random and confused comments about tactics in the 17th century. It seems to me that the difficulty in dealing with the tactics of just about any period is the paucity of actual eyewitness accounts of what actually occurred on the battlefield. I understand that recently a collection of contemporary writings of the English Civil War was published. Can anyone tell me if there is a single eyewitness account of anything that happened on a battlefield? We are compelled to look to the drill books (which until well after the American Civil War really were drill books and not tactical manuals). At times we know that there was a considerable gap between the drill manual and battlefield practice.
Who knows what happened in battles of pike, shot and horse? It seems that armee blanche horse could chivy off mounted foes who preferred a more staid approach to the unpleasant business of letting others get close with edged weapons (less risky to stand off and exchange largely ineffectual fire). The difficulty (judging by all histories of the English Civil War) was rallying the horse once it had chased the enemy horse sufficiently far (how far is that, anyway?).
Against pikes the drill book response was for horse to perform a caracoLe with their pistols. How often was this complex maneuver performed on the field of battle? Judging by the accounts of piked horses, the tendency was for the horse to charge the pikes. Wouldn't this have even less chance of success than the cavalry charge against a later infantry square (pikes being considerably longer than muskets)? Had the pistols already been used against the enemy horse (surely not in a charge with cold steel)? Were men and horses just too excited? Or is the notion of "piked horses" simply something that authors regularly threw into standard battle accounts? If the pikes were there to protect the musketeers from the enemy horse, how could one third of the men (packed together since the use of their weapon required a massed formation) manage to defend the other two thirds (especially as they were widely dispersed to prevent accidental explosions)? Presumably musketeers could easily have been ridden down by the enemy horse--something that one might think a common occurrence given the "paper, scissors, stone" theoretical nature of the weapons systems, but I am unaware of any such occurrence). How to fit all these elements together?
Standard battle accounts likewise seem to have the infantry move forward and lock together in an inconclusive melee that is somehow broken off by the end of the day (and return of the victorious horse) resulting in an indecisive battle. Did musketeers engage in melee after firing away their ammunition? If so, did they rely on their swords or take advantage of the extra reach and heft of the butts of their shoulder arms? Did they fight primarily against other musketeers and avoid engaging the more heavily equipped pike armed enemy (assuming that the pikemen actually were provided with breastplates and the like)? Or did their lighter equipment as a matterof fact give them an advantage in combat once past the point of the pike? Again I confess my bafflement.
So much has been written about the tactics of the Napoleonic period that we think we know quite a lot about it. I would submit that the it is at least one where we know enough about what happened on the battlefield (or we think we do) that we know that there was a gap between theory and practice but hesitate to say more. I remember a comment by a player of many years ago that "we" were better tacticians than Napoleon or his marshals.
What he really meant (and what was doubtless true) was that we were better at playing "Column, Line and Square" than Napoleon or his marshals would be. The danger is in assuming that there is any similarity between what we do on the table top and what Napoleon or one of his marshals did on the field of battle. In spite of various innovative ideas in simulations, the fact is that what most gamers like to do is play a game that is fun to play and has manageable game mechanics and a fairly balanced situation that "feels right." This actually involves Wally Simon's notion of "recognizable patternity." No, I am not talking about DNA testing (that's "paternity") but what we expect on the table top (for example, Napoleonic games have skirmishers and squares). In spite of all the variety in wargame mechanics, there are certain patterns that gamers expect and designers neglect this at their peril (as I had have to learn time and again). Everyone one I game with expects the four "Ms" of Movement, Missiles, Melee, and Morale and seems to be incapable of following any other sequence (normal is what you are used to). There is nothing wrong with that, but such a procedures is not much like a battle (which is probably not much fun for any of the participants, has completely unmanageable mechanics and most likely not a balanced situation and no sensible sequence at all) nor is it remotely like what generals spend most of their time doing on the field of battle (even if you do not subscribe to the Leo Tolstoy theory of generalship). I am afraid that I must concur with Wally Simon that "any resemblance between history and a game on the ping-pong table is purely coincidental."
But what about our greater knowledge of Napoleonic tactics? Is it true that we know more about that period than we do about the 17th century? I suppose it must be since we know so very littleabout the 17th century, but this is hardly to say that we really know much about Napoleonic tactics. It does seem that the British foughi in two deep line (contra the drill book) and most everyone else in three deep lines. It does seem that the French liked skirmishers and artillery and tactical flexibility (whatever that translates into on the table top) but whether the French really attacked in column in the Peninsula or whether the British relied primarily on firepower (as per Charles Oman) or bayonet charges (as per Paddy Griffith) seems still a hot topic. As I recall, the British firepower in "Column, Line and Square" was more devastating than a machine gun.
And was British platoon fire more effective than other methods of delivering fire? There is a memoir that says so dating all the way back to the Battle of Malplaquet, but it turns out that the writer wasn't present after all (alas) and those few generals of the 18th century who actually wrote about the question all seem to have thought that the most effective method of delivering fire was to let each man load and fire as fast as he could. The drawback to this was not a diminishment of firepower but loss of control. If the commander wanted to get the men to stop firing and advance (or whatever) he was at a loss. Everyone was too busy firing away to respond to any commands from higher authority--doubtless part of the tactical friction in tactics of the American Civil War.
The fact is that there is surprising little eyewitness description of what happened on the field of battle. We have built up our notions of what it must have been like based on influential secondary sources. I confess that I am curious about the entire matter and wonder how much insight reenactors might be impart. How did infantry units in the era of black powder actually fight each other? I have not seen many attempts to demonstrate this on film and would have to rate the battle scenes in "Culloden" among the best (surprisingly effective considering what small numbers were used), but even here the duplication of opposing ranks of musketeers is not really addressed.
I read the reflections on war by one of the generals of Louis XIV (active during the War of the League of Augsburg) and he was adamant that the thinning of the ranks down from six deprived the infantry of any offensive punch. Obviously the tactical trend of the next century would be against him, conversely, he actually commanded troops in battle and one would like to think that he should have had some idea of what he was talking about!
Over the years many gamers, from Peter Young to Charles Grant have made a case for the "Horse and Musket" period (as we used to call it) for its suitability for the table top. Troops of the era maneuvered in formation and wore colorful uniforms. The distances for fire and movement seem right for the table top. Long ago a friend posited that the southern campaigns of the American Revolution were ideal for the size and scales that worked best on the table top (as I recall it was 10 men per figure, 10 yards to the inch and ten minutes to the turn). Somehow all of this came together when I saw the Prussians cuirassiers from Italieri. It led to a completely unanticipated "project" (as Hal would say), of which more anon.
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© Copyright 1999 Hal Thinglum
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