It is now known that Brig. General John Buford's cavalry arrived in Gettysburg along the Emmitsburg Road as early as 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, June 30, 1863. For days Confederate foraging and horse acquisitions had been occurring around the outskirts of Gettysburg. June 30 was no different. Foragers from Pettigrew's North Carolina brigade, one of the four under my command, foraging west of town were surprised by the Union cavalry and some were taken prisoner. The Union presence at Gettysburg pushed in the patrols of my division back to Cashtown. Unbeknownst to my command, Buford's cavalry was the screen for the Union left wing: the I, III and XI Corps. This wing consisted of approximately 30,000 infantry under the command of Maj. General John Reynolds. Their arrival in Gettysburg was expected by Buford on July 1. Meanwhile, we were unaware that Union infantry were rapidly approaching. My commanding officer, Lt. General A.P. Hill, had no objections to my marching in to Gettysburg and requisitioning a supply of shoes believed to be in town. To be on the safe side, I requested and received permission to take my entire division. Before I departed, General Hill reminded me that General Lee did not wish me to enter into any general engagements unless the entire army was up. Without General J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry present to screen our forces, we were very conscious that our right flank was open to any opposition choosing to take advantage. Given the success of the Confederate invasion to date, it was difficult to caution my command as to potential risks and have them taken to heart. I personally did not expect any serious engagements, but nonetheless I accepted my commanding officer's admonitions. I was part of a team and not eager to establish my self as a firebrand. There were already too many of those in the Confederate army. With his keen eye as an experienced cavalry officer, General Buford appreciated that the best terrain for the infantry was the high ground south of town: Powers Hill, McAllister's Hill, Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill, then south along Cemetery Ridge to the Round Tops. He had to formulate a plan of defense of this ground in case of an attack before Union infantry arrived. Buford had only 2,750 troopers formed into two rather exceptional brigades: Col. William Gamble's I brigade, (1,600 men) and Col. Thomas C. Devin's II brigade (1,150), accompanied by Lt. John C. Calef's Battery A, 2nd U.S. Artillery, consisting of six 3-inch guns and 75 men. Good as they were though, this force would be seriously outnumbered by my division alone, approximately 7,500 men and 15 artillery pieces. Should I encounter any difficulty, I knew that I could call upon General Hill to make available Pender's division. Although I did not anticipate such, still for several hours I would be on my own. How well Buford prepared for the rapidly approaching Confederate forces would go a long way toward determining his success or lack thereof on July 1, and the entire Army of the Potomac's success in the Battle of Gettysburg. First, he had to decide exactly where and how to fight. There were two types of defensive strategies he could employ based on the latest cavalry tactics of our day: an active or passive defense. There was the passive defense almost entirely predicated on strong terrain features, such as a hill or high ridge, a river or deep creek, etc., where the defender tries to achieve ultimate success on the very ground he occupies. Then there was an active defense where terrain is important as an obstacle to the attacker, to slow him down, but not so formidable as to discourage the opponent from attacking it. Thus Buford, as the defender, was to make his positions flexible. Ultimate success was to be achieved usually somewhere else by someone else. The lack of success for the Union army could be argued in this instance due to a number of causes, but foremost was Buford's failure of his cavalry to use their arms to the fullest. At approximately 0500, my men began their march down the Cashtown-Chambersburg Pike to Gettysburg. Brig. General James Archer's brigade was in the vanguard, followed by Brig. General Davis, Brig. General James Pettigrew, and lastly by Brig. General Brockenborough. I positioned the two batteries of artillery between Pettigrew's and Brockenborough's men, both for their protection and to expedite their deployment in the event that I needed to call upon them. At approximately 0700, Archer's brigade encountered the first vedettes of the Union cavalry. After pushing in these outposts, at approximately 0900, my men could see the cupola of the Lutheran Seminary on Seminary Ridge. The fog was slowly clearing and a line of dismounted cavalry could be seen covering both sides of the Chambersburg Pike. Given the heaviness of their fire, it was my mistaken judgment that many more were in linear formation than there actually were. The true character and length of their line soon became known to us, and we promptly moved upon their front and flanks. However, it took over an hour and a half to shake out our march columns into lines and to cross the creeks crossing the Pike. Archer's brigade stayed in the center, whilst Davis' led the outflanking maneuver to the Union right. Brockenborough's brigade stayed to the left of Archer's, acting as a reserve and anchor to our wheeling outflanking movements. Pettigrew's brigade stayed in march column to rapidly exploit any breakthrough achieved. It was at this time that steady puffs of dust were observed far to the south suggesting rapid movement of men, possibly attempting to take advantage of our hanging flank. Nothing came of this threat, but it was always a concern. In hindsight, it would seem that everything was calculated to a nicety on my part and those of my brigades. Sadly, the truth was otherwise. When I would have moved forward with dispatch, my brigades were barely moving, sometimes at half-speed and sometimes not at all. The presence of a Union battery played hell with my efforts to move forward. General A.P. Hill's soldierly advice and orders constantly cautioned me not to overextend my men. Before taking on the whole Union army, I had been ordered to confer with the rapidly approaching General Pender and his infantry division. General Robert E. Lee had sanguine hopes of Maj. General Robert Rodes appearing on the left flank of the Union XI Corps . What was not known to me then was that most of the Union XI Corps was situated on Cemetery Ridge. Only a division of the Union Corps had precariously positioned itself in front of Gettysburg, a position that beckoned to any aggressive general an outflanking attack being made on both sides of the Union XI Corps by the rapidly approaching Confederate divisions of Maj. Generals Robert Rodes and Dick Ewell. General Robert E. Lee was that type of general, and more. He was determined to bag the Union I Corps as well, especially with the XI Corps not covering I Corps flanks. Being unfavorably situated on the other side of Seminary Ridge, I was unaware that the Union XI Corps had come up. Strange as it may seem, we did not hear the sounds of fighting taking place between Ewell's men and those of the Union XI Corps. Being the highest ranking Confederate officer on the scene until Lt. General A.P. Hill arrived, I deemed it essential to push forward my men, which resulted in my eventual successful outflanking of the Union I Corps and Buford's cavalry division. The Union forces positioned to our front could have slipped away at any time, and no doubt would have done so but for the fighting fervor of their commanders. Further research might establish that the intentional delay on my part, and some not so devised, may have mislead Buford into believing that he could accomplish more than to delay our troops in front of Seminary Ridge. Such mistaken thinking was possibly encouraged by the extremely fine shooting on the part of the Union artillery. My two artillery batteries were disabled by their fire in short order. Under the threat of enemy fire, my men quickly retired to the rear. At this juncture, Pender's men were marching to the crossroads on Herr Ridge, thereby freeing up Brockenborough's brigade. With rapidly approaching numerical superiority, I felt comfortable in placing Pettigrew's men into line behind those of Archer and Davis. Archer's, the smallest of my brigades, constantly forced Buford's cavalry to vacate his hastily established lines of defense by rapidly made oblique movements to the Union right flank. Davis's fire was steady and galling, often doing no more than disordering them. The threat of my heavy hitters, Pettigrew's men, was made credible by several rushes, such as across Willoughby's Creek. On one occasion, the crushing combination, of Pettigrew in support and Archer and Davis in the advance, swept Gamble's brigade from the field. Several hundred Union cavalry were captured as a result. Under General A.P. Hill's vigilant eye, pursuit was ruthlessly made. The rush was kept against the Union cavalry and their supporting infantry, which was in the process of forming on Seminary Ridge and in its front. We found, much to our surprise, that our opponents were those of the Iron brigade and other units forming the Union I Corps. Although frequently our fire was extremely ineffectual, the disordering effect however took its toll on the Union command cohesion as exercised by Gamble and Devin. When our fire was successful, its effect was truly terrible to witness. General Buford lost his second brigade to my men's fire, and the same occurred to the Iron brigade of the I Corps. The other brigades, while suffering to a lesser extent, fled rapidly into Gettysburg and from there to Cemetery Ridge, where the Union army had successfully retreated to. The Union XI Corps had prepared entrenchments and awaited us with enthusiasm, almost daring us to approach. That our casualties were almost non-existent, I attribute to the following: a) Rode's artillery fired upon Doubleday's rapidly retreating division, which we learned later had been ordered back to Gettysburg, without informing the rest of I Corps; b) Pender's division, though not in full contact with the enemy, preoccupied most of the I Corps attention; c) The successful massing of the III Corps Artillery into a grand battery resulted in the rapid reduction of the previously successful Union artillery; d) Buford did not use his rapid-firing breech loaders to his best advantage, as witnessed by his failure to advance his men, as needed, to achieve local fire superiority, especially on the flanks of his lines; and e) my men once finally over Willoughby Creek moved rapidly and fired enfilade on the Union lines on several occasions. Although General Lee had ordered, if practicable, a most vigorous approach on General Hill's part to Cemetery Ridge, the Union army was readily found in entrenchments, almost daring us to approach. Union artillery in profusion dominated the heights. Our first truly serious losses, in fact, took place due to artillery after emerging from behind the town. With the rapidly approaching evening, our men could do no more. For me to order my men to expend their lives in unsupported attacks would have been criminal folly at its worst. The simple truth is that my division, with its wonderful support provided by Pender's division, laid strong foundations for the victories of the Confederate army on the second day. At the cost of approximately 250 casualties and two disabled artillery batteries, my Division captured nearly the whole of one Union Cavalry brigade, and destroyed three full infantry brigades of the I Corps. The Union cavalry and the I Corps was nearly rendered hors de combat, and my Division was ordered on the second day to lead the march up to the foot of Little Round Top, before outflanking the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge. I credit any success which I achieved to my valiant men and able Brigadiers, my colleagues in arms, Maj. General Pender and Maj. General Rodes and their fine divisions of men, and lastly to General Robert E. Lee and Lt. General A.P. Hill. Wargamer's Notes to the Battle of Gettysburg Personally, I have been most fortunate to be able to game the Battle of Gettysburg twice. On the first occasion, an Ohioan club to which I belonged, used the Stars and Bars, a regiment-level set of rules. The second was with Major Peter Panzeri, USMAPS, who used the brigade-level Fire and Fury. I willingly acknowledge that this limited gaming experience does not make me an instant expert on ACW miniatures, or wargaming Gettysburg in particular. Lest my comments be perceived as sour grapes, I hasten to add that I would have no objections whatsoever to recommending Panzeri's campaigns in their present form. Also, my side won on both occasions, once as the Union and once as the Confederates, with some luck, good tactics, better strategy, and best of all, partly from my participation. Then why the comments? I believe that a good game should be complimented on what it did right and critiqued to improve it for the future for both sides. As Maj. General Henry Heth, C.S.A., commander of a division in A.P. Hill's III Corps, I did my homework, preparing as best I could for the game. Before reaching Seminary Ridge, I anticipated encountering a light screen of dismounted Union cavalry, followed by one or two strong lines of the same. At some time, I knew that I would encounter high quality infantry, such as the Union I Corps, with its exceptional Iron Brigade, possibly on my flanks. While obviously I did not intend to bring on the disaster which my historical counterpart had, there was no reason to anticipate my being as successful as I was. After the completion of the game, I wondered if those playing Brig. General John Buford and Maj. General John Reynolds could have done any better in the absence of superimposed rules of idiocy upon the Confederate players, or was my historical hindsight too overwhelming to make this a playable game. If you have read Maj. General Heth's recollections, you too might come to this conclusion. Although I am not certain this was true, here are a few suggestions which might enhance any game, not only Fire and Fury. Variable Arrival of Forces 1. Major Panzeri's historical games are trademarked by their use of variable arrival of forces. Like many other people's games, he allows for the possibility of quicker or slower arriving troops, as well as ahistorical reinforcements of troops which could have been on the battlefield. Historical levels of morale and/or training are occasionally varied, again all at "reasonable" levels. All of this, of course, should play on the minds of the commanders, creating a fog of war, where uncertainty forces commanders at all levels of play to either be cautious or to take risks, with definite consequences for ones side. Here a little historical knowledge may create even more uncertainty. 2. Another Panzeri-campaign concept is that of purchasing options — political, military or economic, all of which are tailored to the game or campaign at hand. The C-in-C's on both sides are allowed to submit a list of "what-ifs" they would like to play with. The more unrealistic choices are likely to be excluded altogether. Some however are permitted to escape the screening process, and are listed as the more expensive options. Also, the more points taken, the more that are deducted from ones victory totals (talk about game balancing!). 3. If two sides were playing without a gamemaster, the players should agree among themselves as to what each option should cost. The sides then seal their choices into separate envelopes before announcing the total cost of the options chosen. 4. In a Panzeri game, the option-purchase has been developed and refined from its more basic models. First, options are rated by cost, depending upon the historical likelihood and probable impact upon the game. Second, picking an option does not guarantee that one will receive its benefits. After completing the purchases, the gamemaster must roll to determine when and if they receive the desired benefit. Again this would be at the time such an event was likely to transpire; e.g., Civil War Race Riots in NYC would be a very expensive option of low-to-moderate probability to occur. 5. In another fine touch, the Panzeri option-purchase process permits both sides to buy, say 0 to 100 points, in 25 point groupings. If one side chose 15 points and another 50 points, the least amount of points would be "purchased". On the other hand, if one bought 15 points and the other 25 points, both would be allowed their purchases since they both fell within the same band of purchase. If one purchased zero points, the maximum allowed would be 25 points for the other side. 6. In both cases, neither side would be informed as to whether the other side or even their own succeeded in their purchases. The gamemaster, with clever, possibly misleading, messages, could suggest that one or both sides did get their chosen options. During our game, the Confederate side was led to believe that Lincoln had been assassinated, even though this was an option which the Confederate High Command did not want to use, much less pick. Another series of messages led the Confederates to believe that a chosen leader had been, in fact, elevated to higher command, and that it would take place shortly. Other messages did accurately inform the Confederate High Command that Longstreet's Corps was only hours away, having forced marched from behind South Mountain to Seminary Ridge. This information, though highly significant, could have been spuriously planted, or even intercepted by the Union side. The interweaving of accurate messages with the false went a long way to create the desired fog of war. That it did not fully succeed is more a reflection on the quality of the players than upon the game itself. 7. Panzeri made inspired use of Fire and Fury's arrival chart, coupled with his own research from historic sources and well-designed board games. Also, Rick Barber, designer of the classic Summer Storm, for Clash of Arms, was on hand to balance much of this, as well as furnish a more historical content to the game. His insight was truly welcomed by all. 8. Unfortunately, for those interested in creating their own games, it is not enough to simply use historic times of arrival and/or departure times. For instance, if the dimensions of the table being used are unduly increased or decreased, perhaps in a manner unintended by the designer or the gamemaster, it will have a corresponding impact upon the game. Ground scale may be downplayed, but if units cannot march their historical rates of movement, even without opposition, the game is flawed from the outset. To prevent such problems, the gamemaster should try playing a game or two in advance. In this manner, the gamemaster can make proper allowances. In a similar manner, too much terrain can defeat the best plans or intentions of any organizer and his players. In a weekend campaign, much can be said for allowing troops to trudge through "impossible" terrain, but the risk is that no conclusion may be reached since one side has failed to come to contact with their opponents. Even if the ground scale and movements permitted by the rule system are in synchronization, there simply may not be enough time to permit a realistic conclusion. Again, this is where the organizer must be able to push the clock forward, merging several turns into one for the benefit of the game. Hidden Movement: Discussion: In place of the actual miniatures on the wargame table, usage of maneuver chits in the form of dominoes or poker chips is a well-known means of duplicating hidden movement, and thereby creating uncertainty or fog of war, an essential element to any game. Unfortunately, any stratagem of war permitted to players is subject to abuse, if not governed by well understood rules, preferably in writing. For example, on day two of Panzeri's game the Union cavalry was allowed two to three dummy counters for every one added brigade. This allowed the cavalry to forward screen the entire Round Top board. Personally, I did not object to the resultant cautious movement on my part and those of my colleagues. What I did object to was the organizers requiring revelation without ever ascertaining that an actual unit was capable of detecting the moving chits on the other side. General Rule: Chits represent the front and rear of the column or the flanks of the line of the respective divisions or separate maneuver brigades and batteries. If placed or moved beyond four feet from the closest opposing chit or unit, the chit does not need to be distinguished as to type — cavalry, infantry or artillery. Upon moving within four feet of an opposing chit or unit, the chit must be distinguished as to type. Line of Sight: a) Chits concealed within woods or other difficult terrain are not revealed until opposing units come within two inches of them. Variances from this must be clearly defined from the start; b) Dummy chits should not be revealed as such if placed or moved beyond three feet from opposing units or chits due to the inevitable dips in the terrain. Add one foot to the observation range for each elevation level that the observer is on. Elevation levels for observation purposes need not be the same as those for combat. Here too levels of various heights need to be established from the start; and c) Use the rules governing line of sight as provided after determining the chits are within observational range. Revelation of Chits: a) If two opposing sets of chits, one infantry or artillery and the other cavalry, come within (1) line of sight and (2) sighting range, the infantry or artillery chits must be first revealed as being dummy chits or a real unit. Only if the infantry or artillery chits are hiding real units are the cavalry chits, in turn, disclosed. If both chits are of the same type, both are simultaneously revealed; b) If chits are revealed to be hiding one or more real units, the chits are then removed from play and placed immediately into the chit pool. If the chits are revealed to be hiding dummy units, the chits are removed and placed into the chit pool two turns later. This can be varied depending upon the scenario; and c) Restored chits may be placed in play as reinforcements on any road, leading off the board, deemed to be under the side's control, moving at the appropriate movement rate. Chit Pool: a) Both sides may not utilize more than 20 chits in a given turn, remembering that each unit must use two chits to depict the terrain it covers; b) Dummy chits are allowed at no more than a 1:3 ratio for separate infantry or artillery maneuver elements (division or brigades or batteries). A 1:1 ratio applies to separate cavalry maneuver elements. If utilizing the screen rule recommended by Fred Hubig, the screens may not move more than half a move's distance from the parent unit. Special Effects: The pike roads leading to and from Gettysburg were fenced. Movement to and from the adjoining fields cost 4" for infantry/artillery and 8" for cavalry. Minor streams, though usually not significant barriers in themselves, cost both sides 2" in movement. Major creeks cost 4" in movement. Another minor factor not fully considered were the fences of the farms on the way from Willoughby Creek leading to Seminary ridge. Fences not only lined the roadways, but intersected with the pike roads. Fences should be placed approximately 12" to 15" apart to allow the Union an obstacle to advancing Confederate lines of infantry and a defensive barrier to fall behind. These fences should cost 4 inches to the infantry or artillery and dismounted cavalry. These fences should cost 2 inches to mounted cavalry. The fences would provide a factor of one in defense, and two if stone. General A.P. Hill's illness was a significant factor, perhaps underrated in its effect upon the battlefield. General A.P. Hill's effective range of command should be reduced to 12" and his maneuver bonus applies to no more than one brigade at any one time. (This too can be strengthened or reduced depending upon the number of players and how detailed a game one wants to play.) Gettysburg as a developed area did not lend itself to open terrain fighting or movement. In fact, the difficulties of accomplishing both were not properly depicted within the game, and should have been more fully considered because of its significant impact upon the actual fighting, and the game itself. a) Within the town of Gettysburg or any other built up area, units moving in the line formation become disordered and move no faster than 1/4 speed. b) Road movement within the town is reduced to 1 1/2 X if utilizing the main pike roads, as designated. All other roads are treated as being paths, which would provide no additional movement bonus. c) Treat houses for movement purposes only as being rough terrain and automatic disordering. The distance between the military crest on Cemetery Ridge and the town should have been made more than 8 inches or the firing range of the infantry. Fatigue: For those brigades battling in a multi-day engagement, roll to determine a change in status if the brigade did not become spent or worn at the end of the day. Daily Cumulative Chance of a "fresh" brigade regressing one status level (Crack to Veteran, Veteran to Green) Intense Activity (Combat): 50% Some Activity (March, Dig): 25% Low Activity (Guard): 0% Exceptional Leader* (only 1): -20% Average Leader* (only 1): -10% Poor Leader* (only 1): - 0% No Rest (Any Activity): 50% Some Rest (Half-Night): 0% Good Rest (Full Night): -25% * Use the best available. Using this formula, the Brigades having Intense Activity, Some Rest would have had a 50% chance of regressing one status level. This system fits well within the Fire and Fury rules and minimizes bookkeeping. Union Cavalry Fire & 3-Table System Small Arms: Discussion: We are all well aware that the carbine was outranged by the rifled musket. Presumably, for reasons of keeping intact the game balance and simplicity of the rules, the designers chose to make the range of the carbine equal to that of the musket. I personally agree with this decision, especially on this scale. Nonetheless, to enhance the value of the Union repeaters and good dismounted cavalry tactics, I suggest the following variant. Weapon Range Value Shotgun 1-4" X2 Carbine 1-6" X2 7-8" X1 Musket 1-2" X2 3-8" X1 * - If Confederate chooses this option, cavalry units or stands firing shotguns must be designated in advance (Suggested mixing ratio of 1:3 - 1:4). ** - Close range firing did occur, and it was often protracted far beyond what players believed actually took place. This addition will result in a far bloodier game. If coupled with the house rule allowing pre-measurement by the player moving or firing, it should not affect the overall play balance of the game. Once players become more experienced, the rhythm of the game should return more or less to units keeping their distance until ordered in. As always, FnF demands that players find the flanks of their opponents and keeping their troops in good order, while attempting to disorder those of ones opponent. Panzeri's Believe It Or Not: In closing, you may be interested to learn that my parents were out on the town while we were doing our game and staff ride. Accompanying their friends, a couple whom they have known for many years, was a new female acquaintance. She was most interested in what my father had to say about our doings. Apparently, on her grandfather's side, they owned the famous Codori farm from which Pickett's charge was launched. For more information about JodieCon: http://www.planet.net/pjtsavo/JodieCon99.html Back to MWAN #101 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1999 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com