"Nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex. " [1]

A Marine leader makes it happen. That means we must apply in practical terms the concepts outlined in this book. Merely reading the book will yield no victories. The question remains, "How do we get beyond reading about these concepts and begin applying them?"

TRAINING

Good tactics depend upon sound technical skills. These are the techniques and procedures which enable us to shoot, move, and communicate. Competence at the technical level is achieved through training, the building of skills through repetition. This is called the science of war.

Training develops familiarity with and confidence in weapons and equipment and the specialized skills essential to survive and function in combat. The ultimate aim of training is speed. Whether Marines compute firing data, rearm and refuel aircraft, repair vehicles, stock or transport supplies, or communicate information, the speed of their actions determines the tempo of the overall force. Training develops the competence which enables this effective speed.

At the small-unit level, training involves developing and refining techniques and procedures such as immediate actions, battle drills, and unit SOPs. These apply to all types of forces whether they are a section of aircraft executing air combat maneuvers, a maintenance contact team repairing a vehicle under fire, an artillery gun team conducting a hip shoot, or a rifle squad breaching a position. We develop and refine these measures so units gain and maintain the speed essential for decisive action.

Staffs, as well as units, must train for speed. Staff training should not focus on set procedures or processes. Rather, a staff should train to support a commander's individual approach to tactics. A staffs procedures should reflect the unique tactical approach of the commander and the abilities of each staff member. Operating in this way, staffs avoid the time-consuming work associated with a rigid, formal staff process. Cohesiveness, which can only be achieved through personnel stability, is the key to fast, efficient staffs.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel emphasized that: A commander must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset, and continuously keep them up to it. If he once allows himself to be satisfied with norms, or anything less than an all out effort, he gives up the race from the starting post, and will sooner or later be taught a bitter lesson. [2]

Training should also prepare Marines for the uniquely physical nature of combat. Living and caring for themselves in a spartan environment, confronting the natural elements, and experiencing the discomfort of being hungry, thirsty, and tired are as essential in preparing for combat duty as any skills training. The point is not training individuals to be miserable, but to adapt to limited resources and harsh conditions.

Likewise, training should establish the ability to act decisively in any environment. This includes operating during inclement weather and periods of limited visibility. To gain advantage and deliver decisive force at a place and time of our choosing demands that we make rain, snow, fog, and darkness our allies. We can neither simulate, anticipate, nor appreciate the inherent friction which these natural factors produce unless we experience them. History is replete with stories of victory gained by forces who maintained the ability to fight amid this natural adversity. Plentiful also are the histories of those forces who failed for lack of this same ability. Training should provide the confidence, hardiness, individual skills, and small-unit proficiency critical to decisive action.

EDUCATION

Success in combat also depends on our ability to combine all the various tools of combat to meet each unique situation. It requires sound decisions rapidly and resolutely executed. The heart of making sound decisions is conceptualizing the battle which was discussed earlier. This is the art of war. A good tactician develops his judgment to the point of having coup d'oeil. He does so through education.

While the battlefield affords the most instructive lessons on decision making, the tactical leader cannot wait for war to begin his education. Like the surgeon, we must be familiar and competent in our profession before entering the operating room. The lives of our men hang in the balance.

Our education in tactics must be focused toward developing three qualities within all tactical leaders.

The first is intuitive skill, the essence of coup d'oeil. The tactician must be readily able to recognize and analyze the critical factors in any situation. The enemy's intentions, the weather, the terrain characteristics, the condition of our own forces, these and many other factors concern us as tacticians.

The second quality is creative ability. Tactical leaders must be encouraged to devise and pursue unique approaches to military problems. There exist no rules governing ingenuity. The line separating boldness from foolhardiness is drawn with the ink of practiced judgment.

The third quality is battlefield judgment. While Marines must act as members of larger organizations, they must also make individual decisions. All Marines must be able to cut to the heart of a situation, identify its important elements, and make clear, unequivocal decisions. Establishing the intent, the focus of effort, and missions; determining when to shift the focus of effort; deciding when to give and when to refuse battle; recognizing and exploiting opportunity; creating advantage; and maintaining tempo are among the critical elements of our tactical philosophy. Our educational approach should emphasize making decisions which incorporate these elements.

Marine leaders need to learn not only how to make good decisions, but also how to make decisions fast. A good decision taken too late is, in combat, a bad decision. Speed in decision making is a key element in speed overall. The confusion of combat can easily lead commanders to delay making a decision while waiting for perfect information. Marine education must lead commanders at all levels to make timely decisions with whatever information is available.

General Patton's remark that "A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week" reinforces this point. [3]

There exists no single vehicle to develop our decision makers; however, any educational approach should be adaptable to all echelons and to all grades. The environment should be informal and conducive to free thinking; there should be no fear of the consequences of making a wrong decision. The following examples may provide some tools for developing tactical decision making in Marines.

Sand Table and Map Exercises

These exercises present students with a general situation, mission orders from higher headquarters, and minimum information on enemy and friendly forces. Sand table exercises are especially suited to novice tacticians since a sand table presents the terrain in three-dimensional array whereas a map requires interpretation. In both cases, students offer their vision of the battle, deliver their decisions, and issue orders to subordinates. Then those are discussed and criticized. The discussion should emphasize making a decision in the absence of perfect information or complete intelligence. There is no school solution -- only sound or unsound judgment based upon reason.

Terrain Walks

Terrain walks introduce the realities of terrain, vegetation, and weather. There are several ways to conduct terrain walks. The desired end results of all are, however, decisions.

The first method provides students with an area of operations, a general and enemy situation usually shown on a map, and a mission. As in sand table and map exercises students derive and support their view of the battle. Choosing one plan, the group then begins to walk the terrain according to the plan. The group not only encounters unanticipated terrain and obstacles, but the instructors introduce enemy actions into the play of the problem. In this way students must confront the uncertainty and disorder which terrain, vegetation, inaccurate maps, and the enemy bring to battle.

The second method involves historical battle studies. When opportunity permits, past battlefields should be traversed with an eye for both sides. Special note should be given to the commanders' decisions. We gain a special vantage on battle by walking the ground and seeing the battlefield from the commanders' perspective. We receive a new appreciation for the blunders of commanders that history has condemned as obvious. The art in decision making quickly becomes evident.

TEWTs

Tactical exercises without troops, or TEWTs, provide tactical leaders opportunities to exercise judgment. The general and enemy situations usually do not change during these exercises. There are two approaches to conducting them. 

The first method provides a leader an opportunity to evaluate a subordinate's ability to perform in a given scenario. This method places students in an area of operations and provides a situation upon which to plan and execute a task; e.g., "Establish a reverse slope defense."

The second method also places students in an area of operations and provides a situation, but they are then provided general guidance in the form of a mission order; e.g., "Prevent enemy movement north of Route 348." After walking the ground, the students must first decide whether to defend or attack, supporting their conclusions with reasoning. The reasoning is then discussed and criticized. Preparations for the attack or the defense may follow. This approach encourages the students to put forth maximum ingenuity and initiative. They have free rein to achieve the desired results.

Wargaming

Educating our Marines to think about battle, develop coup d'oeil, and acquire practical experience is not limited to map work and countryside jaunts. The playing of war games is essential for all Marines to understand the factors weighing upon the leader's decisions. Morale, the enemy and friendly situations, the higher commander's intentions, firepower, mobility, and terrain are only a few of the decision factors included in the play of war games.

In all these simulations, from the sand table to the TACWAR board to the CAS trainer, predictability should be constantly under assault. The less predictable the environment, the more creativity the student must display.

PROFESSIONAL READING AND HISTORICAL STUDY

Critical to developing coup d'oeil is the study of military history. Through it, we see how successful commanders thought through the situations facing them. A few people - very few - can do it instinctively. They have what we might call the Nathan Bedford Forrest touch, the inherent ability to think militarily. Most people are not that lucky. We have to work to develop coup d'oeil.

In our studies of historical battles, we find the clearest details and most readily available sources of information on our profession. The leadership considerations, the horrors of war, the sacrifices endured, the commitment involved, the resources required, and much more may all be found in a wealth of available books, unit histories, afteraction reports, films, and documentaries. Naval, air, and ground battles may all be addressed through this medium. Both individual study and group discussions expand our perspective on the decisions of leaders. 

EXERCISES

While both training and education provide the essential ingredients of combat, tactical success evolves from their synthesis: the creative application of technical skills based on original, sound judgment.

Exercises enable individuals, units, and staffs to use their skills while leaders at all echelons face decisions in a real-time scenario. Exercises also serve as proving grounds for immediate actions, battle drills, and combat SOPs. Any procedure or technique which does not stand up to the test should be replaced or improved.

An exercise should serve as an internal assessment of the quality of training and education. The conclusions should aim not to penalize poor performance but to note shortfalls so as to address them through future instruction. A unit will never be fully trained. There will always be room for improvement.

Exercises also test the ability of units to sustain operating tempo for an extended period of time. Since decisive results are rarely the product of initial actions, the ability to operate and sustain combat effectiveness over time is critical. Exercises should not become 4- or 5- or 10-day waiting games. Knowing when hostilities will cease is a convenience spared the combat soldier.

Equipment must be maintained, and people sustained with adequate rest, nourishment, and hygiene until they achieve their mission. The aim is to develop warriors whose only concern is the job ahead. Whenever possible, the duration of exercises should be tied to achieving specific aims.

COMPETITION

Exercises should provide realism. The means to achieve tactical realism is free-play or force-on-force exercises. Whenever possible, unit training should be conducted in a free-play scenario. This approach can be used by all leaders to develop their subordinates. It affords both leaders and unit members the opportunity to apply their skills and knowledge against an active threat.

Free play is adaptable to all tactical scenarios and beneficial to all echelons. Whether it is fire teams scouting against fire teams, sections of aircraft dueling in the sky, or companies, battalions, squadrons and MAGTFs fighting one another, both leaders and individual Marines benefit. Leaders form and execute their decisions against an opposing force as individual Marines employ their skills against an active enemy. Through free play, Marines learn to fight as an organization. 

CRITIQUES

A key attribute of decision makers is their ability to justify decisions with clear reasoning. Critiques elicit this reasoning process. Any tactical decision game or tactical exercise should culminate with a critique.

The standard approach for conducting critiques should promote initiative. Since every tactical situation is unique, and since no training situation can encompass even a small fraction of the peculiarities of a real tactical situation, there can be no ideal or school solutions. Critiques should focus on the student's rationale for doing what he did. What factors did he consider, or not consider, in making his estimate of the situation? Were the actions taken consistent with this estimate? How well were orders communicated? Were the actions taken tactically sound? Did they have a reasonable chance of being successful? These questions among others should form the basis for critiques. The purpose is to broaden a leader's analytical powers, experience level, and base of knowledge, thereby enhancing his creative ability to devise sound, innovative solutions to difficult problems.

Critiques should be lenient and understanding, rather than bitter and harsh. Mistakes are essential to the learning process and should be cast in a positive light. The focus should not be on whether the leader did well or poorly, but on what progress he is making in his overall development as a leader. We must aim to provide the best climate to grow leaders. Damaging a leader's self-esteem, especially publicly, should be strictly avoided. A leader's self-confidence is the wellspring from which flows his willingness to assume responsibility and exercise initiative.

In that light, the greatest failing of a leader is a failure to act. A leader should assume great risk willingly. For him, two steadfast rules apply. First, in situations clearly requiring independent decisions, a leader has not only the latitude to make them, but the solemn duty to do so. This is an honorable effort to practice the art of warfighting. Second, inaction and omission - the antithesis of leadership - are much worse than judgmental error based on a sincere effort to act decisively. While errors in judgment might result in unsuccessful engagements, the broad exercise of initiative by all will likely carry the battle. Failure resulting from prudent risk taken by a thinking leader carries no disgrace since no single action guarantees success.

SUMMARY

Waging maneuver-style warfare demands a professional body of officers and men schooled in its science and art. As Marshal Foch said, 

No study is possible on the battle-field; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has already to know a great deal and know it well . [4]

Everything we do in peacetime should prepare us for combat. Our preparation for combat depends upon training and education which develop the action and thought essential to waging decisive battle.