"Combat situations cannot be solved by rule. The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits. "

"It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these."

--Infantry in Battle

The first basic concept in tactics is achieving a decision. This concept marks a major change from the customary American way of war. In the past, American forces have generally sought incremental gains: taking a hill here or a town there, pushing the FEBA [2] forward a few kilometers, or adding to the body count. This attitude was consistent with attrition warfare, which sees war as a slow, cumulative process. In contrast, tactics in maneuver warfare always aim at achieving a decision. What do we mean by achieving a decision?

ANTIETAM

On September 17, 1862, General Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia fought the Union Army of the Potomac under Major General George B. McClellan in the vicinity of Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg, Maryland. Lee's Maryland campaign had begun on September 4, when his army crossed the Potomac River, entered Maryland, and invaded Northern soil for the first time.

On September 16, both armies massed near Sharpsburg. McClellan initially enjoyed an almost 4:1 advantage in infantrymen but did not attack. By midday General T.J. "Stonewall" Jackson's corps arrived from Harper's Ferry, but the Union still had an advantage of slightly over 2:1. Again, McClellan did not attack. Outnumbered, with his back to the Potomac, Lee constructed defensive works.

At dawn on the 17th, General Joseph Hooker advanced his three Union divisions, with orders to assault the Confederate left. So began the savage fighting which remains the single bloodiest day in American military historyAntietam. Union and Confederate forces mauled one another in three essentially separate engagements. Twenty thousand Union infantrymen, over two divisions, were never committed. Combined casualties were nearly 4,000 dead, 17,000 wounded, and 2,000 missing. The Union suffered the lion's share.

The battle did not resume on the 18th, each force waiting for the other to move. That evening the Army of Northern Virginia recrossed the Potomac River into Virginia. Although he retained a fully rested, combat-effective force of 20,000, McClellan did not pursue. The starving, exhausted, and ill-equipped Army of Northern Virginia was not defeated or destroyed. It withdrew to rebuild and fight Union forces on many other battlefields. Antietam was not decisive. [3]

What commentators mean when they call the combat at Antietam Creek indecisive is that it had no result beyond many dead and wounded American soldiers, Northern and Southern. It had no meaningful effect. Lincoln implored McClellan to "not let him [the Confederates] get off without being hurt." In reply, McClellan promised to "send trophies"; however, all the commander in chief received was casualty lists and a prolonged war.

Some might argue that Antietam contributed to the ultimate Union victory because the Union could replace its losses more easily than the Confederacy. In a narrow sense, this is correct. Yet it reflects the attrition concept of incremental gains through body counts. Attrition warfare can lead to victory, but the cost is usually terrible-as the Civil War showed. The Marine Corps' doctrine of maneuver warfare is not satisfied to call an incremental gain a success. It demands a decision.

CANNAE

On August 2, 216 B.C., the Carthaginian general Hannibal fought the Roman army under Varro near the city of Cannae.

As dawn broke, Hannibal drew up his force of 50,000 veterans with his left flank anchored on the River Aufidus, secured from envelopment by the more numerous Romans. His center contained only a thin line of infantry; his main force was concentrated on the flanks. His left and right wings each contained deep phalanxes of heavy infantry. Eight thousand cavalry tied the left of his line to the river. Two thousand cavalry protected his open right flank. Eight thousand men guarded his camp in the rear.

Varro and more than 80,000 Romans accepted the challenge. Seeing the well-protected Carthaginian flanks, Varro dismissed any attempt to envelop. He decided instead to crush his opponent by sheer weight of numbers. He placed 65,000 men in his center, 2,400 cavalry on his right, and 4,800 cavalry on his left and sent 11,000 men to attack the Carthaginian camp.

Following preliminary skirmishes, Hannibal moved his light center line forward into a salient against the Roman center. Then, his heavy cavalry on the left crushed the opposing Roman cavalry and swung completely around the Roman rear. The Roman cavalry fled the field.

The Carthaginian heavy cavalry next turned against the rear of the dense Roman infantry who were pressing Hannibal's thin center line. At the same time, Hannibal wheeled his right and left wings into the flanks of the Roman center. The Romans were boxed in, unable to maneuver or use their weapons effectively. Between 50,000 and 60,000 Romans died that day, and the Roman army was destroyed. At the tactical level, Hannibal's victory was decisive.

UNDERSTANDING DECISIVENESS

What do these examples tell us about achieving a decision?

First, they tell us that achieving a decision is important. An indecisive battle wastes the lives of those who fight and die in it. It wastes the efforts of the living as well. All the wounds and pain, the sweat and striving, the equipment destroyed or used up, the supplies expended -all are for little. They bring no great result; they have no further meaning, except comparative attrition and perhaps an incremental gain.

Second, achieving a decision is not easy. History is littered with indecisive battles. Few of the commanders who fought them sought deliberately to avoid a decision. Sometimes the enemy kept them from achieving the decision they sought. In other cases, they were unable to think through how to make the battle decisive. In still other cases - far too many -the commanders had no concept of seeking a decisive result. They fought a battle because it was there to fight; they had no notion of a larger result. 

That leads to the third lesson our examples point out. To be decisive, a battle or an engagement must lead to a result beyond itself. Within a battle, an action that is decisive must lead directly to winning the battle as a whole. For the battle as a whole to be decisive, it must lead directly to winning the campaign-to an operational success. Similarly, a decisive campaign must lead directly to strategic victory. A battle like that fought at Antietam was indecisive because it had no larger result. It had no meaning beyond the blood-soaked ground and the rows of dead.

HOW TO ACHIEVE A DECISION

Once you understand what is meant by the term decisive and why it is important always to seek a decision, a question naturally arises: How do you do it?

CONCEPTUALIZING THE BATTLEFIELD

There is no easy answer to that question because each battle will have its own unique answer. As with so much in warfare, it depends on the situation. No formula or process or acronym can give you the answer.

Rather, the answer lies in military judgment, in the ability of the commander to conceptualize the battlefield and to act decisively. This is the first and greatest duty of a commander at any level: he must picture in his own mind how he intends to fight the battle. He must think through what he wants to do-what result he wants from his actions, and how he will get that result. Central to his thinking must be the question, "In this situation, what result will be decisive?" He must ask himself this question not just once but constantly, as the battle progresses. As the situation changes, so will the answer and the actions that derive from it.

We can see a good example of conceptualizing the battle so that it leads to a decision in General Robert E. Lee's approach to the battle of Chancellorsville. Despite Union pontoon bridges thrown across the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg, Virginia, General Lee foresaw that a battle at this location would merely be a Union holding action. Further, any Confederate attempt to stem a Union river crossing would mean fighting under Union artillery which dominated the town from the heights across the river. Thus, Fredericksburg itself was not a promising place for the Confederates to achieve a decision.

General Lee predicted that the Union main effort would be against the center of the Confederate line, arrayed northwest of Fredericksburg. Leaving minimum forces in the city itself to protect his right flank, he reinforced his units already in the vicinity of Chancellorsville, contrary even to the counsel of his trusted "Stonewall" Jackson.

After sending engineers forward to reconnoiter the Union center, General Lee confirmed his prediction: The Union positions at the center were too strong to assault. Having ruled out a Union attack to his right because of open terrain, and confirming no opening at his center, Lee considered what could be done on his left. Here, he determined to move a force around the Union right flank by way of concealed routes and to attack the Union rear. He put General Jackson to the task. Jackson's flanking march and attack at Chancellorsville unravelled the Union line and sent the Union forces reeling back across the Rapidan River. General Lee's ability to conceptualize the battlefield guided him in striking the Union forces at the decisive point.

COUP D'OEIL

At Chancellorsville, General Lee showed the quality which 18th century military pundits viewed as most important for any commander: coup d'oeil (pronounced koo doy). It means literally "strike of the eye." Coup d'oeil is the ability to look at a military situation and immediately see its essence, especially the key enemy weakness or weaknesses which, if exploited, can lead to a decision. [4]

We see this ability in history's great captains, in people like Alexander, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. It is largely what made them great captainswhat enabled them, in battle after battle, to achieve decisive results.

Napoleon demonstrated coup d'oeil in his recapture of Toulon in 1793. After just a quick look at the situation, he saw that the key to victory lay in isolating Toulon from the seaward as well as the landward side. That could be accomplished by placing artillery on a promontory that overlooked the harbor. The English held the promontory on which they had built a large, imposing earthwork known as Fort Mulgrave. Napoleon focused his effort, especially his artillery, on Fort Mulgrave with the result that it fell in the first hours of the French assault on December 17. By midday on the 18th, the French had a battery of ten guns on the promontory prepared to sweep the harbor. The British fleet was forced to evacuate. [5]

Coup d'oeil is the inspiration-the hunch-upon which a leader begins to conceptualize the battle. How does he translate that vision into action?

THE FOCUS OF EFFORT

The first and most important answer reflects one of the central concepts of maneuver warfare: You achieve a decision by focusing your efforts. The focus of effort is the commander's bid to achieve a decision. As he thinks about the battle, he determines, as best he can tell beforehand, what action will be decisive. Then, he designates a unit to perform that action. This is his focus of effort.

The focus of effort is the concept that makes maneuver warfare decisive. Maneuver means much more than forces rapidly moving around the battlefield with no intention of bringing force to bear on the enemy. Maneuver is the combination of movement and fire to gain an advantage on the enemy. The focus of effort ties together all the maneuvering and points it at the enemy so that Marines will win. Without a focus of effort, combat would quickly break down into a multitude of unrelated actions, each divergent from the others. With a focus of effort, you have a multitude of independent but related actions, each convergent with the others. Along with the commander's intent and the mission, the focus of effort is the glue that holds maneuver warfare together. And it does more than that: It hurls those many maneuvering elements against the enemy's key weakness.

The focus of effort is the commander's bid to achieve a decision; he works to ensure all his forces and assets support it. Sometimes, he may use them to support it directly. For example, he may give it all his air support, even all his artillery support. He may concentrate his reserve in echelon behind it. He may give it all his antitank or antiair weapons. Often, he will have to take substantial risks elsewhere in order to give his focus of effort the greatest possible punch.

In other situations, some actions may support the focus of effort indirectly. For example, a commander may use his aviation in an attempt to deceive, to lead the enemy to think his focus is other than where it really is. Aviation is particularly useful for this because it can concentrate to support the real focus more quickly than ground forces.

The Germans used their aviation this way at the beginning of their French campaign in 1940. On May 10, "by scattering their bombing across a broad area, they hoped to conceal their intentions to make their main attack across eastern Belgium and toward Sedan and to make the French think the main effort was taking place in northern and central Belgium." Yet, just three days later, on May 13, they had 310 medium bombers, 200 dive bombers, and 200 fighters over Sedan. They used the ability of aviation to drop its deception role quickly and focus its effort at the decisive point. [6]

While a commander always has a focus of effort, he may alter it during the course of a battle as events unfold. The enemy is unpredictable, and few battles flow exactly as the commander had originally conceived. He must adjust, and one way to do so is by changing the focus of effort.

For example, if, in an attack by a Marine Expeditionary Force, 2d Marines were designated the focus of effort but ran into heavy enemy resistance while the adjacent 7th Marines made a breakthrough, the ground combat element commander would probably redesignate 7th Marines as the focus of effort. This new designation must not, however, be merely nominal. It means that all the combat power which was originally directed to support 2d Marines now goes to 7th Marines.

Central to the ability to defeat enemies more numerous than oneself, focus of effort enables you to have greater combat power at the decisive point. That decision - deciding what unit would be the focus and why, then making it real by ruthlessly concentrating combat power in support of it - is a test of a commander's character. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg said that an operation without a focus is like a man without character .7

The focus of effort is the main and most important answer to the question, "How do you achieve a decision?" However, it is an answer that immediately raises another question: "How do I focus my effort?"

INTENT AND MISSION

From the commander's concept of how he will fight and win the battle comes not only his focus of effort, but also his intent and the missions he assigns his subordinates.

The commander's intent describes the result he wants to get from the battle and his general concept of how he will get it. It gives his subordinates a clear understanding of what is in his mind -his mental picture of the battle. The result is especially important because the battle will often develop in ways he could not anticipate. His concept of how he will get the result he wants may therefore change. But as long as his subordinates clearly understand the end result he wants, they can adapt to changing circumstances on their own without risking a diffusion of effort.

The commander's intent seems to be a simple concept. Yet, in practice, many people have difficulty with it. Often the difficulty stems from the fact that the commander does not have a clear mental picture of either the result he wants or how, in general terms, he thinks he can get it. Consequently, the commander's intent is either empty of content, like "Defeat the enemy," or focuses inward on process, like "Use initiative and boldness," rather than outward on the enemy and the situation. 

Remember, the commander's intent tells you what is in the commander's mind. A commander's intent that is empty or procedural is of no value to subordinates in terms of how to fight and win the battle.

Once the commander has a clear concept of the battle in his mind, he then has a responsibility to convey it clearly to his subordinates. In doing this, the form of the order is unimportant. It may be oral or written; it may be short and to the point with little or no adherence to any set format. Again, it is the result that is important: the subordinates' understanding of what is in the commander's mind. The means should be flexible so that they can be adapted to the situation and to the people involved. The words needed to convey the intent clearly to one subordinate may be different from the words needed with another subordinate. Generally, clarity is easiest to achieve in face-to-face meetings.

From the commander's intent comes the subordinate unit's mission. The mission is in effect a slice of the overall intent, the result the commander wants from that particular unit. The subordinate needs to know both the mission and the intent so that he understands how the result he is to obtain fits into the result wanted from the battle. Again, that understanding is of key importance in allowing the subordinate to adapt to changing circumstances while keeping his effort focused and ensuring it supports and complements the efforts of other friendly units.

Once the commander has made certain his subordinates understand his intent, their missions, and the focus of effort, he should generally give them maximum latitude in deciding how to accomplish their mission and get the result their superior desires. If the how is dictated to them in detail, they will be unable to adapt to the rapid change that is characteristic of combat. They will miss taking advantage of fleeting opportunities, and they will be unable to respond to dangers that appear suddenly and unexpectedly. In short, they will be rigid and ineffective.

In many respects, the heart of maneuver warfare is telling the subordinate what result is needed, then leaving it up to him to obtain the result however he thinks best. That is why maneuver warfare is also called mission tactics.

SUMMARY

As a leader, whether of a fire team or a Marine Expeditionary Force, you are responsible for results. In combat, the most important result is a decisive victory. To get it, you must work ceaselessly in peacetime to develop in yourself a talent for coup d'oeil and for thinking through how you are going to win whatever battle you face. You must learn how to translate that mental picture into a focus of effort, a statement of intent, and missions for your subordinates. Finally, in all your relations with your subordinates, you must learn how to make crystal clear to them the results you want - the output - while leaving it to them to determine methods-the input. Only in this manner can you hope to have the speed and agility in your unit that maneuver warfare requires.