The Vicksburg campaign has been fought since April, 1994 by the Drum Barracks Battle Group. It has since veered off historical course. Gardner's division was pulled from Port Hudson, the army of Arkansas sent a division, and additional surprises still await the Yanks. One thing this campaign has proven so far, is that Joe Johnston's strategy was correct, it was better to concentrate against Grant's army, rather than defend every square inch of Mississippi, which was Pemperton and Davis' idea.
To continue with the campaign: By May 20th both sides had licked their wounds from Raymond (which were considerable, see Messenger issue 25, Battle of Raymond), the Yankees were selecting their next move. The Confederates had left a corps of observation (Bowen's wing) to watch the Yankees while the rest of the army retreated to Edward s Station, a morass of tangled woods, swamp, watercourses, etc. that would play havoc with an attacking army. Maj. Gen. U. Sam Grant, commander of the Union army, decided to outflank the defenses at Edward's, and cross the Big Black getting behind the enemy. To do this, he fainted with Sherman s Corps (13,000) against Bolton Depot, pinning Bowen and his three divisions (15,000) in place while he moved himself and 13th Corps (McClernand's) (14 000) followed by 17th Corps MacPhersons large 17,500 man corps, north through Brownsville. What Grant did not know was Gen. Joe Johnston was at Brownsville with his scratch division; after his defeat at Jackson, he had retreated there.
Johnston accurately surmised that this was a Union move to flank the main army. He also recognized that his army (4500) was too small to stop the Yanks, but the large road net would allow him to send messengers to Edward's Station while his troops retreated faster than the Federals could move through Brownsville. He ordered Major Gen. Carter Stevenson's division (6600) the closest Confederate division near Edwards to join him. Also with Stevenson was Bg. Gen. Tilghman's division (4400) and Bg. Gen. M. Smith's small division (3600). With forces totaling 19,100 men, Johnston led the Confederate left wing in a surprise attack on the Yankee's strung out march column.
With the Union army was one of Grant's adjutant Lt. Raymond Belknap. It is to him we now turn for a description of the battle:
Major General Halleck
United States Army Comander in Chief
Washington May 23rd., 1863 12:00 AM
Sir,
By order of General Grant Commander of the Army of the Mississippi. I submit this report of the Engagement at Brownsville, Mississippi. 21st, of May, 1863.
The arm), after the eventful clash at Raymond, was set in motion from Clinton at daybreak to flank the enemy defenses at Bolton Depot Edward's Station. Gen Sherman'storps T three divisions (Tuttle, Blair. Jr. and Thayler) screened the movement from in front of Clinton.
Gen. Grant and Gen. McClernand, accompanied A. Smith's division. By 10:00 AM the lead division (Carr's) had cleared the enemy pickets away from Brownsville and after an indecisive cavalry skirmish, moved through the town and proceeded down the road toward Birdsong ferry where they planned to cross the Big Black River. By the afternoon the rest of corps was in motion through Brownsville and vicinity. With 13th Corps was our supply train, carrying our wounded, ammunition, some food and our pontoons for traversing the river. Because this train was so slow, a gap developed between the last division (Osterhaus) and the division assigned to guard the train (Hovey).
But the Rebels were not quietly lying idle. Under the command of Gen. Joseph Johnston, that energetic officer had rallied his division after his stinging defeat at Jackson, and together with Stevenson's wing of the army, planned to regain Brownsville, and destroy the 13th Cons, piecemeal, while it was on the march. With this force of 20,000, he would cut the Army of the Mississippi in twain.
By 3:00 PM it was reported to headquarters that large rebel forces could be seen moving along the Edwards Station' Brownsville road. Gen. McClernand ordered a reconnaissance taken. By 3:30 we had developed enemy forces advancing along a broad front flanking our army on the march, and arrowing toward the gap between the divisions of Osterhaus, Hovey and the supply train.
When Grant immediately recognizing his danger, ordered the 13th corps to contract. Only one division (A. Smith) was guarding our flank, behind a stream, now Gen. McClernand ordered Gen. Osterhaus forward to support as well. Sixty eight hundred men were ordered to stop 20,000!
Gen. Grant ordered Gen. McClerand to hold Gen. Carr's advance and return him as fast as possible to the fight. He also sent couriers to hurry up 17th Corps still strung out in order of march, along the Clinton to Brownsville road.
Perhaps this would be a good time to describe the arena. The area was overgrown with large clumps of woods. A ridge ran along the road, it was there that Gen. Osterhaus' two brigades deployed. The rest of the ground was rolling; many rivets and ravines made lateral communication difficult.
By 4:30 PM Gen. Smith was fully engaged, the Rebel line of battle from Stevenson, pushed Gen. Burbridge's brigade back, he losing a battery. (I believe it was the Chicago Board of Trade Battery.) At 5:30, Gen. McClernand ordered his reserve, the brigade of Slack from Gen. Hovey', to extend the line, and relive the embattled Smith. The Georgians of Cumming's brigade were caught in crossfire and broke, falling back across the stream. This gave the rest of Stevenson pause, while Gen. Smith rallied Burbridge, and the brigade recaptured its battery.
Phase one of the battle was over. By 6:30 the second half began. The rebels came up in division strength against Osterhaus' division.
In the twilight the stabbing flames of the discharges and the unearthly rebel yell, made me think of Dante's description of Hades, there was much similarity. Gen. Gerrard's brigade on the right, was struck in the flank and front by the South Carolinians of Gist's brigade led by Johnston himself. Gen. Gerrard attempted to rally his disordered regiments, but was seriously wounded. Rumors of his death, as well, as the incapability of the regiments to cooperate with one another, and the rebel's superior position, caused the brigade to break and retreat in wild disorder. In this retreat the brigade's battery 7th Mich. Artillery. (Capt. Lamphere) was overrun and captured. The battery consisted of 6 bronze pieces that were all lost to the enemy. The victorious South Carolinians of States Rights Gist continued to pursue Gerrard's brigade to the top of a rise. It was with good fortune that Osterhaus' other brigade (Lindsey's) held firm, and forced Gist to halt. Rather then be flanked, Gist now swung toward Lindsey.
On the other flank, Gen. Tilghman's division of Mississrppians lead moved forward and attacked Slack's brigade. Gen. Slack counterattacked with his large brigade and forced the Confederates to halt. This division later was to withdraw, as Tilghman heard that 17th Corps was moving on his flank and rear.
By 6:00 PM Gen. MacPherson had arrived with two of his three divisions. Gen. Grant, seeing the pendulum of battle swing in his direction for a change. ordered Gen. MacPherson to cut off the rebel retreat by blocking the Brownsville Edward Station Road and relieve the pressure of the Rebel attack on the ridge. Although the order was obeyed. 17th Corps was only able to deploy 5 batteries. and these were able to take very long range shots at the enemy mass, before darkness ended the affair
What of the third Confederate division. Martin Smith's? They were to flank Osterhaus' line from the Northwest. Had they been able to do so, we would have lost the battle. but Gen. Cair's timely return from the West with 2 brigades. caused Martin Smith's small division to fall back out of the battle.
As the evening wore on in the twilight. Gen. McClernand ordered his scattered line to condense. They were to fall back toward Brownsville to consolidate his line. The move necessarily spelt disaster for Lindsey. He was facing off Gist's brigade. As Gen. Lindsey prepared to fall back. Stovall-s brigade of Floridians struck him full in the flank. Simultaneously Gist charged his front. The brigade would have been lost except for Bg Gen. Lindsey's orders to Col. Fielding Mansfeld of the 54th Indiana. This regiment, 541 strong, was to hold up the Confederate advance allowing he rest of brigade to escape. They bravely set to their task until they, outnumbered and surrounded on three sides were forced to surrender. In the confusion and darkness Col. Fielding with 200 of his men and his colors were tae to regain Union lines.
With Gen. Cart approaching from one end of the field and 171h Corps the other. Gen. Johnston ordered his forces to break off the action. He had inflicted casualties, had stopped the Union flanking movement, temporarily, and most important, found the Federal supply train.
It this that almost caused our undoing. While we were all facing to the South repelling attack after attack, the Confederates were preparing to fall on our supply train. It seems that Lyon's Kentucky horse was ordered to wait until we had committed our reserve, then raid the train. Captured prisoners boasted that they got within 300 yards before the alarm was raised. McArthur's division's lead brigade, Hall's, at seven PM saw in the gathering dusk a large force of horse some 350 yards before him. Not being sure of the nationality of the troops, he held his fire, but formed his men into line, ready for any challenge. Pickets returned, unsure, but believed that the group was enemy cavalry. Hall realized that this large group of cavalry was several hundred yards behind the supply train. If the horse was the Third Ill. (train guards) then he would apologize later. He ordered a volley fired. This dispersed the horse and after several additional scattered volleys he ordered the fire ceased. From several hundred yards away the roar of gunfire and the scream of horses told Hall he had been correct to fire.
At the train's rear, the tumult caused by Hall's vollies confirmed the pickets' report that enemy horse was on its way. Lt. Col. McLaughlin's regiment, 47th Indiana, McGinnis' brigade, Hovey's division, was the rearguard. They heard shots then the thunder of hooves as the rebel cavalry came down on them. They shook out into line and waited. They did not wait long,, stung into action by Hall's timely volley. the rebs in their usual style.. swarmed forward firing pistols, carbines, and shotguns. While the 47th held firm against this onslaught, some horses reached the wagon;
"The panicked teamsters cut the traces on some 30 wagons and ran off. The rebels captured the wagons, but unable to bring them off and were forced to burn them instead. Lyons by now no doubt realizing that 47th was holding and that Union unit that fired in their rear would be now double quicking to get into the battle, taking his bluegrass horse from behind. He too gave the order to withdraw.
As the Rebel cavalry disappeared in the trees, our train was saved. Later General Grant upon hearing of Lt. Col. McLaughlin heroic stand, and his saving of the train, breveted him to full Colonel. remarking that he was not going to have his campaign plans delayed again by van Dorans' cavalry. Indeed, prisoners reveled to us that the unit was part of van Dorans' cavalry Corps -- the same one that raided Holly Springs and derailed Grant's plans the year before.
Gen Grant also promised McGinniss' brigade that they would no longer have train guard duty. ire would appoint someone from 17th Corps, for the task. The General was unhappy that Gen. MacPherson did not move faster to seal off the Confederate escape route. Nevertheless he has continued on with his plan MacPherson would lead the advance the next day followed by McClernand, then Sherman. Our army marches on again.
Our losses were 850 wounded and killed. Six bronze 12# Napoleons were lost to the enemy and 340 men taken prisoner from the gallant 54th. We believe the rebels lost more.
Gen. Grant has declared the engagement at Brownsville "a near run thing," but with his army intact and in high spirits. we continue to tramp toward Vicksburg.
Respectively submitted.
Lt. Raymond Belknap U.S.V
Map
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