by Gen. Sir Edward Hamley, K.C.B.
Seeing how desperate was the condition of the fortress,
Prince Gortschakoff had resolved, after the battle of the
Tchernaya, to abandon the place. In letters to the Minister for
War, of the 18th and 24th August, he expressed this intention,
saying there was not a man in the Army who would not call it
folly to continue the defence longer. It was with a view to
operating a retreat that he pressed forward the construction of
the bridge across the harbour, which was to have a roadway of
sixteen feet, and to bear heavy vehicles.
He also conferred with Todleben on other measures to protect the withdrawal, and, accordingly, barricades were built across the streets, and formed into armed and defensible works, in which, as a last resort, to hold in check the assailants. Preparations were also made for blowing up the principal forts and magazines. Another great cannonade had begun on the 17th August. The French lines had now approached so close to the place that new additions to them were immediately destroyed or rendered untenable by the fire from the Malakoff and Little Redan ; and the shower of small shells, easily cast into the trenches from the ramparts, and called by the French bouquets, greatly increased the losses of men. It was for the silencing of the artillery which thus hindered the French, that the Allied batteries opened in full force against the part of the enemy's lines from the Redan to the great harbour. But the town front was not included, and the English batteries suffered greatly from want of support by the works on their left. On the 20th August Gortschakoff entered the fortress, and went round the lines of defence, upon which the fire of the Allies was just then at its height. What he saw might well confirm him in his resolution to retreat. There was no longer either a city or a suburb to defend, for both were heaps of rubbish and cinders. The parapets of the works, dried in the heats of summer, and split in huge fragments by the shot, were crumbling into the ditches. The interior space was honey-combed with holes made by the shells. Gabions and sandbags could not be procured to repair the embrasures, which remained in ruins. Many of the dismounted guns could no longer be replaced, not because there were not plenty in the arsenals, but because to mount them by night, under the deadly fire of the mortars, entailed such frightful sacrifices of men. The defenders of the works were packed in caves under the parapets; the gunners lay dead in heaps on the batteries; the wounded could not be removed by day, because the communications with the rear were now searched throughout by the fire of the Allies, and so lay where they fell, in torment, in the sun, beside the more fortunate slain. On landing, the Prince had passed the hospitals, full to overflowing, and the ambulances with the wounded, crowding what had been the squares. There was nothing to relieve the horrible monotony of destruction and devastation, except the bridge, which promised retreat from this misery, and which was approaching completion. Yet it was after this visit that the Russian General changed his mind in the direction of what he had before termed folly. "I am resolved," he wrote to the Minister for War, on the 1st September, "to defend the south side to the last extremity, for it is the only honourable course which remains to us." Calculating that the daily loss of the garrison was from 800 to 900, and that he could bring 25,000 men from the Army outside to reinforce it, by leaving only 20,000 to guard the Mackenzie heights, he considered he might still prolong the defence for a month. Everything was against such a cruel determination ; but he proceeded to execute it so far as in him lay. It did not, however, rest with him to determine the end. The cannonade once more reduced the Malakoff, its dependencies and neighbours, to absolute silence, and enabled the French to push their works yet closer. The soil between the Mamelon and Malakoff could be cut into like a cheese, and the trenches were more easily made and better constructed here than elsewhere. The English trenches before the Redan had been stopped by solid rock; the French approaches to the Little Redan, now only forty yards from it, had also got into soil so stony as would no longer afford cover. The most advanced approach to the Malakoff was only separated from it by twenty-five yards; in the soft soil the trenches might have been pushed to the very edge of the ditch, but only with great loss, and, besides, the facility of mining below them would increase as the distance lessened. It was therefore deemed that the time for assault had come, and it only remained to determine the details. Accordingly, a council of war considered the matter. After the members had delivered their opinions, Pelissier expressed himself thus: "I, too, have my plan, but I will not breathe it to my pillow." There is, however, no need to be so reticent with the reader. The French commander had learned that the relief of the troops in the works before him took place at noon, and that in order to avoid the great additional loss which would be caused by introducing the new garrisons before the old ones moved out, the contrary course was followed of marching out most of the occupants before replacing them. Thus noon was the time when the Malakoff would be found most destitute of defenders, and noon was to be the hour of the assault. Also another advantage was offered to the French. The salient of the Malakoff had been adapted to the form of the tower which it covered, and was therefore circular, consequently there was a space in it which could not be seen or fired on from the flanks ; that was the space upon which the troops were to be directed. Roadways, twenty yards wide, were made through the trenches, and then masked by gabions, easily thrown down, by which the reserves could be brought up in the shortest time. The Malakoff, the Curtain, and the Little Redan were each to be attacked by a Division, supported by a brigade; and four Divisions, with other troops, were destined to attack the Central Bastion and works near it, and break from thence, by the rear, into the Flagstaff Bastion. But, first, the cannonade was to be renewed. It began on the 5th September, and this time it encircled the whole fortress, the French batteries before the town opening no less vigorously than the rest. At night a frigate in the harbour was set on fire by a shell, and the conflagration for hours lighted up the surrounding scenery. On the 6th and 7th the feu d'enfer went on, the Russians replying but feebly; on the night of the 7th a line-of-battle ship was set on fire by a mortar, and burnt nearly all night ; it contained a large supply of spirits, the blue flames from which cast a lugubrious light on the ramparts from the harbour to the Malakoff, producing, says Todleben, " a painful impression on the souls of the defenders of Sebastopol." Daylight, on the 8th, found the Russian defences completely manned, the guns loaded with grape, and the reserves brought close up. But, as the reader knows, the assault was not yet, and the result of these preparations to receive it was increased havoc in the exposed ranks of the defenders. Many names which acquired fresh distinction in future wars are found among the French commanders on this occasion. The Division to attack the Malakoff was that of MacMahon, one of whose brigades was commanded by Decaen, the other by Vinoy; and in reserve to it was De Wimpffen's brigade of Camou's Division, and two battalions of Zouaves of the Guard, under Colonel Jannin. Dulac's Division, composed of the brigades of St Pol and Bisson, was to attack the Little Redan. In reserve were Marolles' brigade of Camou's Division, and a battalion of chasseurs of the Guard. Between these two was posted, opposite the Curtain, between the two bastions, La Motterouge's Division, formed of the brigades of Bourbaki and Picard; in reserve two regiments of voltigeurs, two of grenadiers of the Guard, the whole under General Mellinet, with De Failly and Ponteves for brigadiers. Pelissier's headquarters were in the Mamelon. To avoid giving warning to the enemy by signalling, the Generals set their watches by his, and on the stroke of noon, Bosquet, commanding the whole attack on this side, was to launch his troops against the lines where the defence was conducted by General Khrouleff, to aid whom, with their guns, four steamers were held ready in the waters below. The attack on the Redan was to be directed by General Codrington. His Division (the Light) and the Second, under General Markham, were to supply the column of attack, of which the covering party, the ladder party, the working party (to fill up the ditch, and convert what works we might gain to our own purposes), and the main body, were to number 1700, and the supports 1500. The remainder of these two Divisions, numbering 3000, was to be in reserve in the third parallel. Also, in last reserve, were the Third and Fourth Divisions. No attack on the Redan would have been undertaken by the English as an isolated operation. Our compulsory distance from that work, the want of a place of arms (that is to say, a covered space in the advanced trenches of sufficient extent to harbour large bodies of troops), the construction of which was forbidden by the rocky soil, and the still unsubdued fire from the ramparts, all condemned an assault. But it was deemed necessary as a distraction in aid of the French, and that purpose it fulfilled. The two French Divisions for the assault of the town defences were assembled in "the work of the 2d of May." In the right portion of it, and in the adjoining ravine, was the Division of D'Autemarre, formed of Niol's and Breton's brigades; in reserve was Bouat's D ivision. In the left of the same work was Levaillant's Division, composed of Trochu's and Couston's brigades, which was to head the attack on the Central Bastion and the adjoining works, with Pate's Division in reserve. Cialdini's Sardinian brigade was to attack the Flagstaff Bastion as soon as the Central Bastion should be carried; and two French regiments were to cover the left of the forces attacking this part of the lines, which were all under General de Salles. The town defences opposite him were commanded by General Semiakine. The English were to await the hoisting of the tricolour and the Union Jack together in the Mamelon as the signal for their advance; the French before the town were to expect further instructions. At noon the whole of Bosquet's first line rushed from the trenches. Not a shot was fired at MacMahon's leading brigade as it crossed with flying steps the short open space, pushed the planks over the ditch, and partly by means of these, partly by leaping into the ditch and mounting the battered escarp, crowded over the parapet. And here P61issier's expectations were exactly fulfilled. The few defenders in the salient were completely surprised, their commanders killed or captured, and the Zouaves, who headed the attack, took absolute possession of this corner of the work. But, though the redoubt covered 350 yards in depth by 150 in width, the open space within was very small, for, behind the round tower, rows of traverses, each forming a new line of defence, partly crossed it from side to side. As soon as the Russian garrison issuing from their shelter caves under the traverses, and the reliefs swarming in, had manned these, the real struggle began, and it was desperately bloody. Every traverse was fought for, taken, and retaken, and it was not till Vinoy's brigade, directed on the eastern face, had broken in there, in rear of the traverses, and had from thence combined with the Zouaves in front in attacking them, that the enemy was at length forced out of them, and MacMahon's troops occupied the work throughout its extent. Many times the enemy brought up reserves to retake their strong hold, but they could do nothing against the closed rear, now powerfully manned, and Prince Gortschakoff who had come up to the foot of the slopes surmounted by the Malakoff, at length caused his troops to be withdrawn from the hopeless struggle. It was four o'clock when the conquest of the principal work was thus fully assured. Though well worth the price, it had cost very dear. MacMahon's Division had issued from the trenches with 4520 bayonets and 199 officers. Of these twenty-nine officers and 292 men lay dead, and 89 officers and 1729 men were wounded. The Zouaves of the Guard had lost 311 men out of 627; Wimpffen's brigade, 637 Out Of 2100; in all, 3087. St Pol's brigade went against the Little Redan, and Bourbaki's against the Curtain. Both broke into those works, but there was an interior line of defence stretching across the space from the rear of the Malakoff to the rear of the Little Redan. This was strongly defended, field batteries were brought up by the Russians, and the ships, keeping in motion, and bringing their broadsides to bear, made havoc amongst the French in the open ground. Both the brigades were compelled, with considerable loss, to re-enter the trenches, which were filled with wounded, and along which it was not easy to pass. However, Marolles' brigade was at length sent against the Little Redan, the voltigeurs and grenadiers against the Curtain, where they once more broke in, and were once more driven out. It was now that a singular feat was performed. Bosquet gave the order for two batteries of field-artillery to advance by the prepared road through the trenches, and come into action against the guns which were firing on the French from the Curtain. From their station behind the Victoria redoubt they advanced at speed, losing many horses as they went, formed up in the open space before the Curtain, and came into action with their twelve-pounders. But the ground was swept both by the artillery and musketry from the 'enemy's parapet. The batteries were at once crushed, and what was left of them at last withdrew, leaving most of their men and horses, and their commandant, Souty, dead on the spot. It was a new operation to essay with artillery. It was brilliantly attempted, but the heavy sacrifices were incurred absolutely in vain. The attack on this side made no further progress. The portion of Codrington's troops destined to head the attack on the Redan moved rapidly and steadily across the open space, though suffering much loss from the heavy fire of round shot, grape, case, and musketry now directed on them from every available point, and those in front passed with ease over the battered rampart and entered the work. But the rest, with too strong a reminiscence of their mode of action in the trenches, lay down at the edge of the ditch and began firing alongside of the covering troops, who alone should have performed this duty. The supports also reached the ditch, and some of them entered the work. But the great reserves, in moving through the trenches towards the point of issue, were obstructed and discouraged by meeting the numbers of wounded men and their bearers, who were of necessity brought back by the same narrow route, a difficulty which also hindered some of the French attacks. Colonel Windham, the leader of the attacking troops, finding that his messages for support produced no result, took the ill-advised step of going back himself to procure reinforcements. It was not surprising that, before lie returned, his men also had withdrawn. It is probably in reference to this that the Engineer Journal remarks, in excusing the troops, "they retired when they found themselves without any officer of rank to command them." They had been overwhelmed by the numbers which the Russians brought into the open work; and as they hurried back they suffered not less heavily than in their advance. It was unfortunate for them that the French had spiked the guns in the Malakoff instead of turning them on the enemy moving into the Redan, as they ought to have done. With the immense increase of difficulties in making way through the crowded trenches, and renewing the attack against works now fully armed and manned, the attempt was postponed till next day, when fresh troops, headed by the Highlanders, were to renew it. In the meantime our batteries once more opened with full effect on the now crowded Redan. On the French left the two leading brigades of Couston and Trochu attacked the two works which flank on each side the Central Bastion. At first Couston's troops had some success ; but the Russians, reinforced, drove both brigades back upon the trenches. A second assault was even more fruitless. Levaillant's Division was preparing for a third attempt, when Pelissier, hearing how complete was the failure, ordered the attack in this quarter to cease. The French General had learned, soon after the Russian attempts to recapture the Malakoff had ceased, that masses of the enemy were passing by the bridge to the north side. Still he could not yet feel assured that his victory was decisive. But, in truth, even before darkness set in, the Russians, withdrawn from all their works, were collecting and moving to the harbour, under cover of the barricades; those in front of the town towards the bridge, those from the works of the suburb towards points in the harbour where steamers and boats were to transport them to the north side. By daybreak the whole of the garrison, carrying most of the wounded with them, had made good their retreat. But the means adopted to prevent the Allies from pressing into the place revealed, during the night, that Sebastopol was being abandoned. Measures had been taken by the garrison to ensure the explosion of the magazines in the works and forts at considerable intervals. Thirty-five of these were blown up successively, the first at eleven o'clock; at the same time fires broke out wherever anything combustible yet remained in the ruined city, and the glare of the conflagrations was augmented by the burning of two line-of-battle ships in the harbour, where most of the rest were at the same time sunk. All night sleep was driven from the camps by the roar of the explosions, which shook the plains as if with the tremors of an earthquake, and combined, with the red light glowing murkily against the canopy of smoke, to render the scene terrific. Soon after daybreak an explosion more tremendous than the rest seemed to blow the city and suburb against the sky, a vast cloud rising in earthy volumes and darkening the sun. Beneath it the bridge was seen to be disconnected from the southern shore, and the last of the retiring troops were descried ascending the opposing slope. Divided by the harbour, the hostile armies, from the heights, looked on the destruction of the city, which seemed a fitting conclusion to the hardships and the conflicts of the immense hosts that had contended for it. Copious libations of blood marked this final sacrifice. The French lost, in all, 7567 officers and men ; Generals St Pol, Marolles, Ponteves, Rivet, and Breton were killed; Bosquet, Mellinet, Bourbaki, and Trochu. were wounded. The English lost 2271 officers and men; Generals Warren, Straubenzee, and Shirley among the wounded. The Russians lost, on this last day, 12,913 officers and men; two generals killed, and five wounded. Next day access to the Malakoff showed how completely it dominated the surrounding works. It looked into the interior of the Redan, swept in its view every corner of the suburb, was only 1200 yards from the harbour, and commanded, within range, the only anchorage of the fleet, as well as the bridge which formed the sole line of retreat for the Russians. In consideration of its importance, Todleben had lavished on it all possible means of defence, making of it a citadei, and in order to guard against an attack on its rear by an enemy who might have penetrated elsewhere, he had closed the gorge, a precaution, however, which had the grave disadvantage of assuring possession of it to the French when they had once succeeded in expelling its garrison. On the other hand, the Redan showed an open interior space, which, widening from the salient to the rear, enabled the troops assembling in its defence always to enter in great force, and to present a front more cxtensive than that of the assailants. These different conditions in some degree account for success on one point, failure on the other. The explosions still continued on the 9th, when in the afternoon Fort Paul was completely blown into the air; a failure in the firing arrangement prevented Fort Nicholas from following it. On this day the dead were brought out for burial. The open space between the Curtain and the intrenchment in rear of it, and the corner of the Little Redan, were heaped with slain. The explosion of a great magazine in this latter work had opened a chasm there, which was now made the grave of the Russians; while the French killed in this part of the assault were brought out and laid on the grass before the Curtain, extending in long rows, according to their regiments, to the number of more than a thousand. One part of this space was heaped with the wreck of the two field batteries, and the bodies of the artillerymen and horses. On the 10th the Vladimir crossed the harbour, under a flag of truce, to ask for certain of the wounded which, in the retreat of the garrison, had been left behind in a hospital. The building was very spacious, and in it was concentrated an extraordinary amount of human misery. It had afforded shelter to 2000 desperately wounded men. They had lain here two days and nights, without aid, without nourishment, surrounded by the din of explosions, and by flaming buildings, which alone dispelled for them the darkness of night. In one vast room were 700, many of whom had undergone amputation, and who were all dead of misery, lying in blood on their beds, or on the floor as they had writhed on to it. Five hundred were still alive, and were conveyed to the Vladimir. Three English officers wounded and captured in the assault were found here, who lived long enough to be conveyed to camp. Perhaps even stronger testimony to the unhappy condition of the garrison was afforded by the provision made for sheltering the troops who occupied the works. Huge subterranean barracks had been dug under the ramparts, the earth above being supported on the trunks of trees. These dismal chambers were entered by tunnels, and it was here that the troops destined to oppose assaults found all the repose that could be given to them when not immediately called on to face the unrelenting iron storm which swept across the open space of the interior. Phrases can hardly do justice to the constancy, the military spirit, of a soldiery that could, under such conditions, readily obey the call which brought them to the last struggle, and so bear themselves in it that their enemies had everywhere recoiled, except at one point. The only vulnerable spot of the defences had proved to be that on which every resource of war had most profusely been brought to bear, and success here had been achieved almost by accident. Pelissier tersely expressed how sharp had been the crisis, how doubtful the chance, when he said, "We were four all, and I turned the king." Vast consequences were involved in the fate of the Malakoff, for the chiefs of engineers and artillery, in face of the fact that we were again brought round to the time of year at which we had first approached Sebastopol, had come to the conviction that, if the place were not taken before winter, it would, as a matter of course, be necessary to raise the siege; and they had gone on to the deduction that it was therefore indispensable to hasten its conclusion by an immediate assault. Next day two eight-inch guns, placed on the esplanade of the town, were brought to bear on the Vladimir, hulling her several times. In the night the Russians consummated the sacrifice of all that they had fought to defend by burning or sinking the remainder of their war-vessels. Morning saw of the Black Sea Fleet no tokens except protruding stumps of masts, and fragments floating on the waters--a sight which any Turk who may have chanced to survive the massacre of Sinope must be thought to have surveyed with peculiar pleasure. Chapter XIV: The Close of the War Back to War in the Crimea Table of Contents Back to Crimean War Book List Back to ME-Books Master Library Desk Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2005 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in ME-Books (MagWeb.com Military E-Books) on the Internet World Wide Web. Articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |