The officer who now took command of the French Army was of a singularly strong and marked character. Its distinguishing element was hardihood: hardihood in thought, in dealing with others, and in the execution of hisprojects. His comrades had formed an extraordinary estimate of his determination.

Left to right: Lord Raglan, Omar Pasha, and General Pelissier: at a council before the assault of the Mamelon.

Marshal Vaillant, comparing him with Canrobert, said, "Pelissier will lose 14,000 men for a great result at once, while Canrobert would lose the same number by driblets, without obtaining any advantage."

General Changarnier bore stronger testimony: "If there was an insurrection, I should not hesitate to burn one of the quarters of Paris. Pelissier would not shrink from burning the whole." But it would do him great injustice to imagine that he was merely a man of dogged resolution. He was not only a soldier of great experience and distinction in Algerian warfare, but took strong, clear views of strategical problems, and expressed them in a correspondingly strong, clear style, indicative of great sagacity. And there lay before him, when he assumed the command, a problem not easy to solve, yet demanding immediate solution, and of vast importance. It was whether to put in execution the project of the Emperor and Niel, or to devote all his forces to pushing the siege.

Now there is no doubt that the design of defeating the Russian field army, and severing the communication between the interior of Russia and Sebastopol, would, if successful, have speedily caused the surrender of the place. So far the view was sound. But its two advocates erred in insisting on treating it as if it were the only project which rendered success possible, and in denying that the siege operations contained any promise of victory. For there were several circumstances which clearly pointed to the probability, nay certainty, of the capture of the south side of Sebastopol on the plan hitherto pursued.

The enemy had never taken from the Allies an inch of ground on which they had once established themselves. If the Russians had not abandoned all intention of attempting to raise the siege by an attack with their field army, the Allies were confident of defeating any such enterprise. There were signs that if the material of war in Sebastopol showed no token of exhaustion, yet the trained seamen who worked the guns were greatly reduced in numbers. The besiegers' fire could always establish a superiority, constantly increasing, over that of the place.

And, finally, the enemy's losses must, from the nature of the case, continue to be immensely greater than those of the Allies. In the preceding month the garrison of Sebastopol had lost more than 10,000 men, and there were good grounds for believing that the whole of the Russian Forces now in the Crimea scarcely numbered more than 100,000 men. It was certain, therefore, that should the Allies persevere with the siege, the day, though not yet near, would come when the enemy's fire would be overpowered, his works stormed, and the south side rendered untenable.

Firm Grasp

Pelissier's mode of grasping this problem is first shown in a letter which he wrote to Canrobert while that general was still Commander-in- Chief He first expressed his belief that the Allies, by pressing the attack on the works, could certainly render themselves masters of Sebastopol; "Difficult," he says, "but possible." Therefore he proposes, before all things, to push the siege to extremity, without regard to what was outside of it. Nevertheless, in case an exterior operation should be 11 inexorably commanded by the Emperor," he has his plan for that. But he presently shows that this was merely a concession to the weakness of another, by explaining that, before anything of that kind can take place, the Russians must be shut up so completely in their works that no sortie need be feared, and that the first operations must therefore be the capture of the Mamelon and the White Works at any price.

"If there are to be operations in the field, they must only take place after we have restricted the Russians absolutely to their defences, and have thus achieved security for our base of operations."

He meant by this to insist on the necessity of driving the Russians from all those works which, to the great annoyance and injury of the Allies, they had pushed out beyond the general line of entrenchment. He had given a practical illustration of this view, on the 1st May, when he was still only the commander of the 1st Corps in front of the town. Todleben had, on the 23d April, effected some large lodgments of rifle-pits between the town ravine and the next one on his right of it, and in the ensuing week, employing a great number of labourers, and a strong force to protect them, had formed these into an important work, closed and partially armed, and so close to the French trenches and so menacing to them, by stretching towards their flanks, that it would have immediately become a most serious addition to the difficulties of the siege.

Pelissier so strongly represented to Canrobert the necessity of driving the Russians out of it at all hazards that he was allowed to have his way. In two hand-to-hand encounters of considerable forces on both sides, on the 1st and 2d May, the French were so completely successful that they not only took the counterguard, but converted it into part of their own siege works, within 150 yards of the main line in front of it, with a loss to them of 600, to the Russians of 900 men.

In a letter to Bosquet, written immediately after he took command of the army, Pelissier discusses the alternative plans. The difficulties offered by the ground which the enemy's field army occupied, the want of information respecting its strength and positions, the danger of operating through long defiles with large forces, the perils of a retreat in case of failure, these and other reasons caused him to reject, or at least to postpone, the Emperor's scheme "without regret," as he phrased it.

"I am very determined," said this clear-seeing man, "not to fling myself into the unknown, to shun adventures, and to act only on sound knowledge, with all the enlightenment needful for the rational conduct of an army." He then announces his intention of extending the part of the army not engaged in the siege along the valley of the Tchernaya, so as to get air, water, elbow-room, and consequently health, and from thence to study the country for future operations, by reconnaissances, and force the enemy to spread themselves.

"But," he adds, "all this is only the prelude to an operation much more important and more decisive in my eyes, the storming and occupation of the Mamelon and White Works. I do not disguise from myself that the conquest of these counter- approaches will cost us certain sacrifices; but whatever they cost, I mean to have them."

Then, after detailing the features of his plan, he observes, "All this may be thorny, but it is possible, and I have irrevocably made up my mind to undertake it." Here, then, was a general who had occupied the firm ground of knowing what he meant to do, and setting about it with an unchangeable purpose. But he did not keep his opinions for his generals only. Niel noted the new commander's course with great disquietude, and even felt justified, in the strength of being the Emperor's emissary, to offer to his chief, in a note written in reply to a request for his view of affairs, a strong remonstrance.

He said his views remained the same as always; that to attack without first investing the place would lead to nothing except after bloody struggles; that he could not understand why the Emperor's plan was to be abandoned ; and that the persistence of Pelissier in his projects would entail every kind of disaster. Scarcely had Pelissier received this when he telegraphed thus to the Minister of War, for the Emperor's information:

"The project of marching two armies, from Aloushta on Simpheropol, and from Baidar on Bakshisarai, is full of difficulties and risk. Direct investment, by attacking the Mackenzie heights, would cost as dear as the assault of the place, and the result would be very uncertain. I have arranged with Lord Raglan for the storming of the advanced works, the occupation of the Tchernaya, and finally, for an operation on Kertch. . . . All these movements are in train."

This he explained fully in a letter to Vaillant next day, and asked for complete latitude of action. When we remember that Louis Napoleon was an absolute sovereign, that he had just raised Pelissier to the chief command, that he was the fountain of honours and advancement, and that, if he had set this self-willed general up with one hand, he could pull him down with the other, it must be admitted that, in thus opposing the cherished scheme of his master, P61issier showed himself an uncommonly strong man.

To the Emperor and his Minister, absorbed in contemplation of the excellences of their plan, and hoping to hear that it was in process of accomplishment, this uncivil treatment of it caused something like consternation. The stout warrior at one end of the wire was arousing great perturbation and resentment in the Imperial theorist at the other.

At first some angry messages were flashed to the Crimea -- one from Vaillant to Niel, relating to the expedition to Kertch: "This news to-day is a great trouble. What! generals and admirals, not one of them thought it his duty to consult the Government on an affair of this importance!"

Then the Emperor sent a rebuke to his unappreciative subordinate: "I have confidence in you," he said, "and I don't pretend to command the army from here," ("But you do!" was probably Pelissier's comment); "however, I must tell you my opinion, and you ought to pay regard to it. A great effort must be made to beat the Russian army, in order to invest the place. To gain space and grass is not sufficient just now." (this in sarcastic reference to Missier's reasons for extending the army).

" If you scatter your forces, instead of concentrating them, you will do nothing decisive, and will lose precious time. The Allies have i8o,ooo men in the Crimea. Anything may be attempted with such a force, but to maneuvre is the right course, not to take the bull by the horns; and the way to maneuvre is to threaten the weak sides of the enemy. The weak side of the Russians seems to me to be their left wing. If you send 14,000 men to Kertch, you weaken yourself uselessly ; it is to avow that there is nothing serious to attempt, for one does not willingly weaken one's self on the eve of battle. Weigh all this carefully."

Resolute

But, whether weighed or not, these arguments had not the slightest effect on the mind of this resolute, even refractory, man. It might be all very well for an Emperor to amuse himself with making plans ; it was for a general to conduct operations. Seeing all this, and knowing how indispensable was Pelissier, Vaillant took a very judicious course. He desired Niel to aim at moderating P61issier's too strong style of expression The General was to be made to understand that the most complete confidence was reposed in him, and to be adjured to assume that as a basis in everything he might write.

Whether Niel ever found an opportunity of discharging this mission seems doubtful, for he is shortly afterwards found uttering a lamentable wail, in a letter to the Minister. "At yesterday's meeting," he says, "General Pelissier imposed silence on me with indescribable harshness, because I spoke of the dangers which characterise vigorous actions with large masses at great distances apart. We were in presence of English officers; I saw he was irritated, and I wished at any price to avoid a scene which would have rendered my relations with him impossible."

No matter whose emissary he was, Niel must know his place. There was no doing anything with so intractable a chief; he had his own way, and the French Army had a commander.

Pelissier's two first steps towards the execution of his projects, namely, an attack on an important outwork and the expedition to Kertch, took place at the same date, the 22d May, when he had been six days in command. The first of these was caused by a new enterprise of the indomitable Todleben. Between the Central Bastion and the bastion near the Quarantine Bay the line of defence was a loop-holed wall, strengthened behind with earth, but much battered by the heavy fire directed on it.

Seeing its precarious state, Todleben resolved to cover it with a salient earthwork on a ridge in front, where he had already placed rows of rifle pits. Between these pits and the French trenches was a cemetery, lying in a green hollow, having in its midst a small church, surrounded by crosses and headstones. Once peaceful as any country churchyard in England, it had now for months been an arena of conflict, where riflemen had crouched in the grass of the graves, or lurked in the shadow of the tombstones.

The French trenches were already close to its southern wall, when Todleben, on the night of the 21st, began his outwork with characteristic vigour with 2400 workmen with spade and pickaxe, while 6000 infantry, and many guns bearing on the ground in front, guarded them. But the French also were making a trench that night, therefore both parties had an interest in keeping their batteries quiet. But morning showed that while the French, with their working party of ordinary strength, had made about 150 yards of trench, the Russians had made more than 1000 yards, besides a supplementary work close to the head of Quarantine Bay. And these works were not to play a defensive part merely; when armed, they would rake the French trenches, and form a new and serious obstacle to the progress of the siege.

Therefore Missier ordered that the new works should be attacked that night; the enemy was equally resolved to defend them; and it so happened that about 6000, men were devoted to the purpose on each side. All the guns, Russian and French, that could aid the infantry were laid on their objects, ready to open. At nine on the night of the 22d the fight began, and continued without intermission till three in the morning. There was a glimmering moon, and against a low bank of clouds the flashes of the guns marked the hostile lines; the rattle of small-arms resounded through the night, and at times a cheer, rising out of the gloom, showed where a charge had been led, or some advantage won. Many times had each side gained a temporary success; but as the French could not remain in the work by day, under the fire of the place, the Russians still held it in the morning, though it had cost them dear. They had lost 2650 men; the French, 1800.

It so happened that the neighbouring bay of Kamiesch had presented, on this same 22d, an unusually busy scene, for the troops destined for the expedition to Kertch were embarking there. From the ships they heard the conflict raging at no great distance. In the morning they sailed on their enterprise.

Unluckily for the Russians, one of their posts, from a tower of observation, saw and signalled that large forces were in movement from the harbour. Gortschakoff imagined that they were about to be landed on the coast for an attack on his forces in the field. He concluded he could spare no troops for another fight in the trenches from his army, which lay between Mackenzie's Farm and the heights of the Belbek. Therefore, only two battalions were to hold the new work. If the French should prove to have had enough of fighting the night before, these would suffice to protect the completion of the work; but if attacked by superior numbers, they must withdraw.

The French did come on again that night in great force, drove out the guard, and converted the line of trench into a parallel of their own. This night the losses were about 400 on each side.

Kertch Expedition

The much-talked-of expedition to Kertch had a very practical object. The eastern point of the lozenge which the outline of the Crimea forms runs in a long, narrow isthmus towards the Circassian coast of the Black Sea, from which it is separated by the narrow straits of Kertch, and these give access, from the waters of the Euxine, to those of the inland Sea of Azoz.

Into this sea the River Don empties itself, and thus the resources of large districts on its banks, and of Circassia, can be swept into the isthmus ; and the superiority of this route, compared with that along the wretched roads of Southern Russia, and through the barren country by Perekop to Simpheropol, had made it the great line of supply to Gortschakoff's army. The Sea of Azoz was thronged with craft, occupied in transporting stores to great depots on the shores of the isthmus. Taganrog, on the shore of the Sea of Azoz, near the mouth of the Don, was a considerable town, and in former days had even, from its pleasant situation, been thought of for the capital of Russia. The whole region was at this time specially full of business and activity.

The ships reached the straits of Kertch on the early morning of the 24th. They bore, in all, French, Turks, and English, 15,000 infantry, and five field batteries. There were about 9000 Russians in the isthmus, of which 3000 were cavalry. There were batteries guarding the straits, armed with sixty-two heavy guns, and some forty others, unmounted, of large calibre. And there had been plenty of time to prepare for an attack, since the fiasco of three weeks earlier had warned the enemy.

It might have been expected that, with such means at his disposal, General Wrangel, who commanded in the isthmus, would have made at least some show of resistance. But seeing how exposed his forces were, in their straitened position, to be cut off by a landing in their rear, he made haste to withdraw them, at the same time destroying his coast batteries, while, of fourteen war-vessels, ten were burnt by their crews.

The Allied Squadrons therefore passed into the straits without molestation. The landing of the troops was effected the same night, in a bay a few miles from the town of Kertch, which they entered early next morning, while a flotilla of vessels of light draught passed into the Sea of Azoz. There they captured or destroyed all the great number of vessels engaged in transporting supplies for Gortschakoff's army, as well as vast quantities of corn, flour, and stores. At one point they came on the wrecks of the remaining four steamers of the Russian Naval Squadron, destroyed by order of its commander. A complete clearance of everything that could aid the Forces in the Crimea was made throughout the shores of the Sea of Azoz.

At Taganrog, the depot of the immense supplies brought down the River Don, where some semblance of opposition was made by the garrison, the destruction of the stores on the beach was accomplished under cover of a fire from the boats of the flotilla. The fort of Arabat was bombarded and taken. Meanwhile the large men-of-war of the Allied Squadrons, outside the straits, made for Soujoukkale and Anapa, strong places on the Circassian coast, which at their approach were abandoned by their garrisons. These operations were concluded by the second week in June, and the result was thus summed up by Pelissier, in a letter to the War Minister: "We have struck deep into the Russian resources; their chief line of supply is cut. I did well to concur in this expedition, so fertile in results. Confidence is general, and I view with calm assurance the approach of the final act." In fact, the expedition had fulfilled, in no slight degree, the Emperor's policy of investment.

Meanwhile the clearance of the crowded Upland had been effected. At daylight, on the 25th May, Canrobert, with two Divisions, and cavalry and artillery, passed the Traktir Bridge, drove the Russians from Tchorgoun, and destroyed their camp and their barracks. The force then recrossed the stream, and took position on its left bank, holding an armed work at the bridge. Italy, having some time before joined the alliance against Russia, had despatched General La Marmora, with a small army of 15,000 men, including some cavalry and artillery, to the Crimea. These troops now occupied ground on the French right, across the road from Baidar. In rear of all a large force of Turks from Eupatoria took up the same line of heights across the valley of Balaklava which they had occupied on the 25th of October.

The land on which the Army was encamped had at this time resumed its smiling aspect, except, indeed, the ground between the Turks and Balaklava, where the small paradise which had greeted us on our first arrival had been completely destroyed. It had then been one large and well- stored garden. Plums and apples grew overhead, the clustering vines were thick with green and purple grapes, and between the vineyards was a rich jungle of melons, pumpkins, tomatoes, and cabbages.

All this had given place to the grim features of war. But elsewhere the grass had sprung up, mixed with flowers in extraordinary variety and profusion ; the willows again drooped their leaves over the Tchernaya ; even the field of Inkerman resumed its green carpet, all the richer, perhaps, for the battle, and turf like that of our south downs once more covered the Upland.

A most remarkable feature of the southern coast of the Crimea is the rare beauty of the colouring of its iron-bound coast. Those cliffs, so implacable in the storms of winter, are dyed with the loveliest rose-colours, pearly greys, yellows, dark reds, and rich browns, with purple shadows, in the most effective combinations.

On a summit of these, in full view of the Black Sea, stands the Monastery of St George, with its long low ranges of building, its green domes and turrets, reared on solid basements of masonry, white like the rest of the edifice. Here the brotherhood, clad in black gowns, with tall cylindrical caps, from which black veils descended behind, continued to pray and chaunt; here, too, lived in peace some Russian families, including that of the late commandant of Balaklava; and here was established our telegraph station.

Near this was the site of an ancient temple of Diana; Cyclopean remains exist there, the palace and gardens which contained the famous Golden Fleece had looked from hence over the sea; and it must have been in the valley below that "Medea gathered the enchanted herbs, which did renew old Aeson."

There were tokens, too, of inhabitants compared with whom Medea and ZEson are moderns. Across a gully, which led to a cove used by our troops as a bathing-place, lay a ridge which might have been the roof of a tunnel. But the many footsteps at length wore away the soil of ages, and it was apparent that a huge Saurian had been in some way swept across the gully, and become fixed there; and it was his skeleton, hidden even in Jason's time, that was now laid bare to the view of British riflemen.

Crossing the valley of the Tchernaya, in grass and flowers to the horses' knees, and ascending the green hillsides of Kamara, beyond the Sardinian outposts, the explorer came on expanses of tall coppice, with trees of larger growth, which enclosed glades like those of a park. Here were some British marines, whose lines had fallen in a place pleasant as the meadows of Devon, in front of which rose a wooded mountain, its craggy peaks breaking through the verdure. A wood path, winding amid tall trees, led to the next summit, which disclosed a magnificent landscape. Below lay the valley of Baidar, stretching from the edge of the sea-cliffs to the distant mountain range--a tract of flowery meadows sprinkled with trees and groves.

In the midst of the valley stood, at some distance apart, two villages, their roofs gleaming red through the surrounding trees ; but no labourers, nor waggoners, nor cattle gave life to the scene, nor had any corn been sown for this year's harvest. The villages were not only deserted but, as some visitors had ascertained, quite bare of all tokens of domestic life.

Turning back along the seacliffs, the silent, deserted, beautiful region came to an end on reaching the fortified ridge above Balaklava; here were the troops busied with their camp duties, mules and buffaloes toiling with their loads; and up the hills beyond Kadukoi, above the Turkish camp, the bearded pashas, sitting in open, green tents, smoked their long-stermmed pipes in that blissful calm which such matters as wars and the peril of empires could not disturb.

Chapter XII: Succession of Conflicts