Between the Revolution of September and the coup d'etat of General Pavia, there had been a great change in the composition and division of parties. Of the three parties of the Revolution, the Progressist, the Liberal Union, and the Democratic, the first, after the assassination of Prim and during the reign of Amadeo, had split into two distinct and opposing factions, the Constitutionals or Conservatives under Sagasta and the Radicals under Ruiz Zorilla.

As distinct party organisations, the Liberal Unionists and the Democrats had virtually disappeared. A number of the former, like Martin Herrera, Silvela, and Romero Robledo, who were disgusted with the failure of the Democratic Monarchy and the excesses of the Republican experiment, had openly joined the ranks of the Alfonsists; while the remainder, who, like Serrano and Topete, still had some lingering hope of the final success of the Revolution, had coalesced with the Constitutionals. Those of the Democratic party who had been originally Monarchists, like Rivero, Martos, Becerra, and Moret, and who had not joined the Republicans in the Constituent Cortes of 1869, had become merged with the Radicals; and after the retirement of Ruiz Zorilla on the abdication of Amadeo, Martos succeeded him in the leadership of the Radical party. The Republicans were also irretrievably divided into the moderate or conservative Republicans, followers of Castelar, and the advanced Republicans or Federalists under Pi y Margall. There were also a few scattered supporters of a centralised Republic, of which Garcia Ruiz was the conspicuous and able exponent. The transformation of parties had, therefore, been from Progressists, Liberal Unionists, and Democrats to Constitutionals, Radicals, conservative Republicans, and advanced Republicans or Federalists. These with the dynastic parties, the Carlists and Alfonsists, made up the composition of parties at the beginning of 1874.

The Constitutionals and Radicals not only differed from each other in their opinions, but also in their attitude toward the Alfonsists and Republicans. The Radicals were in favour of a Republican form of government as the only possible means of avoiding the restoration of the Bourbons and of giving form to the aspirations of the Revolution, and for this purpose they were disposed to an alliance with the moderate Republican followers of Castelar. The Constitutionals were rather the party of opportunism. They were not opposed to retaining the Republican form of government, but they regarded with disfavour any alliance with the Republicans, and rather hoped to increase their numbers and influence from the ranks of the moderate Alfonsists. Their single aim was to acquire exclusive control of the Government, and to keep it with the view of securing the most influential position in the future government, republic or monarchy, which might be evolved from the course of events in the final solution.

Pavia's Coup

On the completion of the coup d'etat, General Pavia called together the military and civil chiefs of all the above parties with the exception of the Carlists and Federalists. Castelar, who had been invited as the representative of the moderate Republicans, refused to attend the meeting, and responded by publishing a protest against the suppression of the Constituent Cortes of the Republic, which was signed by sixty Deputies of the Right. To the representatives of the remaining parties who had obeyed his summons, the captain-general explained that he had no intention of destroying existing institutions. With a self-effacement unprecedented in the annals of Spanish pronunciamientos, which gave him with many people the reputation of not being entirely sane, the man who could have made himself dictator entrusted the representatives of the different parties with the formation of a government of "conciliation and coalition." It was a surprise and disillusion to him to find that the leaders did not wish to arrive at an understanding.

On seeing that Pavia as well as the other notabilities present were in favour of giving the name of Republic to the new government, Canovas del Castillo, in behalf of the Alfonsists, declared that they could take part only in a government entirely without political colour, whose sole aim was the reestablishment of order and a preparation for the restoration of Alfonso of Bourbon. The Alfonsists therefore withdrew and took no further part in the discussions. By their retirement and the refusal of the moderate Republicans, General Pavia at the very outset saw two important conservative elements holding aloof from the Government which it was his aim to create from all the parties of order. The Constitutionals and Radicals then formed a coalition cabinet, with Serrano as President. To Sagasta and Martos, leaders of the Constitutionals and Radicals, were respectively given the Departments of Justice and of Foreign Affairs. The remaining portfolios were entrusted to members of these parties, except that of the Interior. This Department, in consequence of the insistence of General Pavia, was given to Garcia Ruiz, the most conspicuous and able advocate of the centralised Republic.

The first act of the new Ministry was the issue of the usual circulars to the provincial governors by the Minister of the Interior and to the Spanish representatives abroad by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The difference, or rather the direct opposition, in the tone of these two documents showed the divergence of views which existed in the Cabinet. Sagasta's circular was an attack upon Republican misrule, and pointed to a future Constituent Cortes which should "fill the gaps left in our institutions by the voluntary abdication of the Monarch, and introduce the remedies which the costly experience of these later days has shown to be necessary."

Garcia Ruiz, on the contrary, declared with no less emphasis that the future Cortes was not to be a Constituent Cortes; that the present Government was Republican, and that the "Government is resolved not to allow open or secret attacks by any one or in any way against the existing form of government." In fact, the Cabinet and the country were for some time in doubt as to just what form of government had been established by the coup d'etat of January 3. General Pavia was opposed to the election of a president or chief of the executive, and had so expressed himself in the meeting of party leaders which he had summoned. The Government, therefore, had at the beginning the character of a simple provisional government, with Serrano as President of the Council of Ministers, similar to the Government which existed during the Constituent Cortes of 1869, in the interval between the expulsion of Isabella II. and the Regency of Serrano, and during the Republican administrations of the previous year. The expediency of a plebiscite was at one time discussed, but differences of opinion prevailed among the Ministers as to just what should be submitted to the people for decision. The views of the Radicals, who gained the support of Serrano, finally carried the day, and it was resolved to call the Government a Republic and to promote Serrano from the presidency of the Council of Ministers to the position of chief of the State.

The decree in which Don Francisco Serrano y Dominguez resigned the former office to become the President of the Executive Power of the Republic appeared in the Official Gazette of February 27, 1874.

In the preamble of this decree it was declared that the indefinite continuance of the present indefinite state of affairs might be a source of serious conflict, and that the chief of the State should not be a member of the Ministry, but should be an impartial judge between the different tendencies which in modern society strive for power through public opinion.

Serrano on Top Again

With a change of title Serrano for the second time found himself the appointed ruler of Spain. His title was now President of the Executive Power of the Republic. In outward form the Government was the same as during the previous year. The only difference was that the chief of the State was no longer a member of the Cabinet, as were the four Presidents of the Executive Power of the Republic who had preceded him. The result of the act of General Pavia was to transfer the Republican dictatorship from a civilian to a soldier. The Government continued to be as much of a republic as its predecessor had been.

The suppression of the insurrection at Carthagena and the final disappearance of the Canton of Murcia relieved the new Government of the necessity of dealing with the cantonal question which had proved such a cause of uneasiness to the preceding Governments of the Republic. On January 6 the arsenal at Carthagena exploded with great loss of life. On the 9th the besieged made a last desperate attempt at a sortie, and were driven back with great loss. On the evening of the 11th negotiations were begun for the surrender of the city. On the 12th the Numantia with the members of the junta and 2500 Federalists succeeded in escaping from the harbour in defiance of the efforts of the Government squadron to detain her. She landed on the coast of Algeria, where the French authorities detained her passengers but restored the vessel to the Spanish Government. On the 13th General Lopez Dominguez made his entry into the city. Carthagena was almost a mass of ruins; only twenty-eight houses were left uninjured by the terrible bombardment, and the losses to the city by the experiment of the Canton of Murcia were estimated at over ten million dollars.

The position of the Government was, however, full of difficulty. There was still the Carlist war in the North, the insurrection in Cuba, the necessity of quartering troops in the South to prevent any reawakening of the Federalist craze. During 1873 no appropriation had been made for interest on the debt, but the best efforts and the most consummate ability were required from the Ministers of Finance to extract from the country sufficient to meet the military expenditures. The army of operation in Cuba amounted to upwards of 80,000 men, and it was necessary to send continual reinforcements to replace the losses resulting more from the climate than the insurgents.

In the Peninsula itself, with the garrisons, the forces in occupation of the South, and the armies in the field against Don Carlos, there were about 200,000 men under arms. Commerce was in a dying condition. Communications with France and with the rest of Europe by land except through a few mountain passes were entirely interrupted. The trains no longer ran between Saragossa and Barcelona and between Barcelona and Valencia, and the only communication between the principal seaport of the country and the ports of the rest of Spain was by sea.

In addition to these open misfortunes, the Government had to contend against the secret efforts of the Monarchists to undermine its influence and to give the impression that it was a provisional government which could not endure, and which was only the last step to the Restoration.

Of the rising tide in favour of the return of Alfonso of Bourbon as a final settlement, of the far-reaching spread of the movement in the army, the aristocracy, and the wealthy classes, the Government was not ignorant. But in the ranks of the Alfonsists themselves there was a difference of opinion between the military and civil elements. Senor Canovas del Castillo, the leader of the latter, was in favour of a waiting policy.

He believed that the Restoration was destined to be the outcome of the varied course of events which had intervened between the fall of Isabella and the coup d'etat of General Pavia. He preferred, therefore, to let the parties of the Revolution exhaust themselves and the country by continued experiments in government and by repeated failures, until, in weariness and despair, the nation would call upon his prince as a saviour to heal its woes. He was opposed to the introduction of the new regime by the old and time-honoured method of a pronunciamiento, and he saw the prestige to be gained if the Monarchy were the peaceful result of the vote of the people after the confessed failure of the parties which had brought about the expulsion of the dynasty. He was also anxious that the civil rather than the military should be the preponderating influence in the future reign.

These views of the most eminent leader of the Alfonsists were combated by the military and reactionary element of the party. They argued that the Government of Serrano owed its existence to a coup d'etat, and that it was only just that a coup d'etat should destroy it. They claimed that there was no disadvantage for the Monarchy to owe its restoration to the army, because it would be compelled after that restoration to depend upon the army for its defence and support.

To counteract the growing influence of the Alfonsists, Serrano hoped to strengthen his Government by the addition of two other elements in the country. He believed that he could in time secure the support of the moderate and the good-will of the advanced Republicans, who would prefer anything to the return of the Bourbons.

The other element was the former revolutionists, who had joined the Alfonsists through disgust at the Republic and the belief that the Revolution had failed. These he thought capable of being enticed back to their former friends as soon as they saw in the new Government a promise of solid endurance. He imagined, finally, that the country in general would be satisfied with any government that gave it tranquillity.

The problem, which in its importance and in the possibilities of its effect on politics overshadowed all others, was the method of dealing with the Carlists. It seems to have been doubtful in the minds of Serrano and his Ministry whether the entire suppression of a movement which had now grown to the proportions of a civil war would result in advantage or disadvantage to their Government.

At one time they appeared to believe that the danger of a pronunciamiento in favour of the Restoration was less to be feared while the army was in the field than after the defeat of the enemy, when the Ministry would be brought face to. face with the necessity of a final settlement of the form of government, and would not be able to oppose any solution which the victorious army might propose. At another time they had the air of imagining that a decisive success would make Serrano so popular in the country that he would become master of the situation, and would be able himself to dictate his own solution, whether the Restoration or a conservative Republic. The existence of these two opinions and the oscillation from one to the other give the key to the policy and attitude of the Government of General Serrano towards the Carlists during the winter of 1874.

It is this which explains the vacillations from activity to quiescence, the bursts of energetic and successful effort followed by periods of complete inaction, which enabled a crushed and despondent enemy to regain his courage and recruit his strength.

The principal army of Don Carlos occupied the country between the Ebro and the French frontier, and in the beginning of 1874 consisted of about 80,000 men. This did not include forces scattered through Catalonia, Lower Aragon., Castellon, and Valencia, which consisted rather of bands of guerillas and bandits than of regular troops, and which devoted themselves to the commission of every kind of outrage in these provinces. From the Ebro to France the Pretender commanded in person, and had established the semblance of a regular government, with Estella as his capital.

Taxes were levied, and the traveller who wished to penetrate southward through the Carlist lines was compelled to pay his right of passage to the custom house officers of Carlos VII., who at many points plied their vocation within a short distance of the Liberal lines. In the midst of a friendly country, and in possession of almost the whole frontier of the Pyrenees, the Carlist army had no difficulty in securing supplies from the surrounding country and from France, where their juntas were in direct and open communication with the forces of the Pretender, with whom the merchants of Hendaye, Bayonne, Pau, and other cities of the frontier carried on a profitable trade without the slightest interference from the Government of Marshal MacMahon. (A. Houghton, Les Origines de la Restauration des Bourbons en Espagne)

Operations in the Field

At the beginning of 1874 the operations of the main army of the Carlists were directed towards the blockade and capture of Bilbao. This city, one of the wealthiest and most prosperous of Spain, had always been a stronghold of Liberalism in the midst of Carlism. In the first Carlist war (in 1835) it had earned the title of "villa invicta," "the unconquered city," by its stubborn resistance to the armies of the first Pretender, until it was relieved by Espartero. It is situated in greater part upon the right bank of the Nervion, which connects it with the sea, and is surrounded on the south, east, and north by high hills, which give a view of the interior of the city. It was garrisoned by four thousand men, under the command of General Castillo.

By the end of January the forces of Don Carlos, after capturing Portugalete, which gave them the command of the river Nervion, surrounded the city, cut off all its communications with the sea, and prepared for a regular siege, with the hope of increasing the prestige of the Pretender in Spain and the rest of Europe by the capture of this stronghold of the Liberals in the Basque Provinces, and of adding to his resources by the imposition of a ransom on one of the richest cities of the Peninsula.

To oppose these operations of the Carlists was the Army of the North, under the command of General Domingo Moriones. The forces at the disposal of this experienced and distinguished officer amounted to about forty-five thousand men; but after leaving garrisons in the cities in Carlist territory which were still in possession of the Liberals, and detaching sufficient troops to ensure his communications and supplies in a hostile country, not half this number could be used for an offensive movement.

The plan of the general-in-chief was to advance to the mining district of the Somorostro, near the coast, to seize the mouth of the Nervion, and to advance along both banks of the river, in order to compel the besieging army to retire into the interior of the Province of Vizcaya.

The advantage of position was all in favour of the Carlists, who were in possession of the heights which separate the valley of the Nervion from that of the Somorostro. Among the rocks, behind the ridges, and in their trenches, the followers of Don Carlos were concealed and sheltered, while the Liberal troops were compelled to march to the attack up a steep incline, in full view and exposed to the sweeping fire of the enemy.

General Moriones was fully impressed with the inadequacy of his forces to dislodge the Carlists from their almost impregnable position. In vain he appealed to the Madrid Government to send him sufficient reinforcements to enable him to turn the left of the enemy, while making a pretended attack upon the trenches of Somorostro, - a movement which he could not execute with his slender forces without extending his line over too great a stretch of territory and running the risk of having his army cut in two. The Government refused to give him the additional forces required, and ordered him to proceed with the forces at his disposal.

On February 25, with grave doubts as to the result, Moriones attempted to seize the fortified positions of San Pedro de Abanto, which commanded the roads from Bilbao and Portugalete, and after a desperate fight was driven back with the loss of twelve hundred men and seventy-five officers.

In his telegram giving a report of the battle, the commander-in chief of the Army of the North communicated his resignation as a mark of his dissatisfaction with the course of the Government in forcing him to the attack without supplying the forces necessary for success. The news of the defeat caused great excitement in Madrid, and roused the Government from its lethargy. Serrano summoned a Cabinet Council, and expressed his determination to take command himself of the Army of the North. He gave orders for the immediate advance of all reinforcements that could be spared from the garrisons of the South and the capital. He left Madrid for the North immediately after the meeting of the Cabinet and the acceptance of the resignation of General Moriones, and arrived as soon as possible at the headquarters of Somorostro.

A month was occupied in bringing up reinforcements, munitions of war, and supplies. This interval was not misspent by the Carlists, who increased their trenches, strengthened the defences along their line, and transformed the heights into veritable fortresses. This increased advantage of the Carlist position made more surprising the determination of the Liberal generals to follow the example of Moriones and storm the heights from the front instead of attempting to turn the Carlist left, although their forces, which now consisted of twenty-seven thousand men and sixty pieces of cannon, would have enabled them to execute the movement which Moriones had desired but feared to undertake with the insufficient forces at his command.

On March 25, the Liberal troops, protected by their batteries, made a simultaneous attack upon the right, the centre and left of the Carlists, and succeeded in carrying a few positions. On the 26th there was desultory fighting without important results. The decisive conflict was left for the 27th, when Serrano began by an assault upon the Carlist right and left in the hope of drawing the attention and forces of the enemy from the centre, which was to be the real point of attack. It was his object to carry the position of San Pedro de Abanto and San Julian, and cut the line of the enemy in two at its centre. This would have compelled the Carlists to fall back, leaving their right between the Liberal army and the sea, where the frigates of the Government were stationed at the mouth of the Nervion ready to cut off their retreat.

The Carlist leaders were quick to see, however, that all depended upon the successful defence of San Pedro de Abanto and San Julian, and massed at the centre all their best troops. The Liberals, under the command of Generals Loma and Primo de Rivera, stormed over seven hundred yards of open space, swept from three sides by the fire of the enemy. When both these generals fell dangerously wounded, Serrano placed himself at the head of the troops. With that contempt of personal danger which he was always ready to display, in advance of his staff, which had dismounted, alone on horseback, the most conspicuous figure in the field, he remained exposed to the fire of the enemy, impassible alike to the acclamation of his soldiers and to the solicitations of his aides. It was all in vain. When night came on, the Liberals were compelled to retire, and after one of the bloodiest battles of the war, the Carlists still held the heights and trenches of San Pedro de Abanto and San Julian. The Liberals lost two thousand men and a hundred and eighty officers, and the Carlists but little less.

A truce was agreed upon for the burial of the dead, and during the suspension of hostilities the officers from both sides visited each other, and there was much friendly intercourse between the two, camps.

Siege Operations

This further check to the Liberals encouraged the Carlists to prosecute with renewed vigour the siege of Bilbao, which they now regarded as a certain prey. The President of the Executive Power, on the other hand, was fully alive to the emergency. He notified the Government that a third army corps must be formed. The garrisons were withdrawn from the South, and the civil guards were ordered into the field. To the command of this army corps, with which it was finally decided to turn the Carlist left, he appointed Don Manuel de la Concha, Marquis del Duero. Concha was at this time in his sixtyfourth year, and was the brother of Don Jose de la Concha, Marquis of Havana, the last Minister of Isabella II. The two brothers had long been eminent in the army and in politics. The Marquis del Duero had been one of the most energetic and resourceful leaders in the first civil war. He was now regarded as the best strategist and most severe disciplinarian in Spain.

On his arrival at the camp of Somorostro, the entire control of the operations for raising the siege of Bilbao was entrusted to him. The plan he recommended was the same which bad suggested itself to Moriones. The third army corps was to advance through the mountains of Vizcaya and turn the Carlist left, while the main body under Serrano was to engage the right and centre.

This movement was begun by Concha on April 28, and on the 30th, after some resistance at various points in his march, he took up his position in the rear of the enemy.

In a council of war, the Carlist generals decided that it was impossible to wait for the attack of Serrano while exposed to an attack from Concha in the rear. The command was, therefore, given to abandon the lines of the Somorostro. The troops blockading Bilbao were also ordered to raise the siege. These movements were accomplished with such secrecy that Concha advanced unobstructed to the gates of Bilbao, and Serrano was in possession of the heights in front of him before it was known or suspected that the enemy had retreated. In silence and discontent they had disappeared in the night, leaving their campfires burning.

The unconquered city was again rescued in the second as it had been in the first civil war, and by the same military operations. The siege had lasted a hundred and twenty-five days. Almost all the houses, churches, and public buildings were injured by the terrific bombardments. No one thought of surrender, for all knew the treatment that the hated city, which had given them check in two wars, must expect from the followers of Don Carlos. The patient courage with which the women bore privations and dangers excited the admiration and cheered the spirits of the defenders. Relief arrived none too soon. Provisions for five days and thirty cartridges to a man were all that remained when, on May 2, a date celebrated in Spanish history, Concha and Serrano made their entrance into Bilbao amid the oyous acclamations of its weary inhabitants.

The Carlists were disheartened by the failure of their efforts. The rank and file charged their generals with incompetency or treachery. Everything was now favourable for an offensive movement by the Liberals, which might result in the expulsion of the Pretender from Spanish soil and the early ending of the war. The forces around Bilbao were in the neighbourhood of fifty thousand, with a hundred pieces of artillery, and the troops were full of enthusiasm and confidence in their commanders. It was an opportunity for Serrano to remain at the head of the army and to gain the distinction and popularity which would redound to the victor of the second civil war.

But the President of the Executive Power evidently did not take this view of the state of affairs. He seemed still to be of the opinion that the ending of the war would only hasten the Restoration. He knew that Concha himself was a partisan of the exiled Prince, but that he was opposed to any movement in his favour while in open campaign against the enemy, and that he had so expressed himself in emphatic terms to a number of officers of the Army of the North, who had approached him on the subject of an Alfonsist pronunciamiento.

It might be assumed, however, that with the defeat of the Pretender and the termination of the war, the Marquis del Duero would be one of the most influential and powerful advocates of the Restoration. The Madrid Government was not over-anxious, by a sudden elimination of the Carlist question from the field of politics, to remove what many people regarded as the last impediment to the return of Alfonso of Bourbon. Immediately after the raising of the siege of Bilbao, Serrano resigned into the hands of General Concha the command of the Army of the North, and returned to Madrid. Concha and his army were left as long as possible in inactivity around Bilbao, while the Carlists had time to reorganise their forces, and to prepare for an indefinite prolongation of the struggle.

On his arrival at the capital, the President of the Republic found that the politicians had not been idle during his absence. The discord in the Cabinet between the Constitutionals under Sagasta and the Radicals under Martos grew day by day more bitter. With that incapacity for personal sacrifice which is the striking characteristic of Spanish politicians, each party was struggling and intriguing for the;, lion's share of the offices and for a preponderating influence on public opinion. The Ministerial crisis which had been delayed only with difficulty broke out with the return of Serrano, who found himself compelled to choose between a Radical Ministry with the possible entrance of the moderate Republicans, and a Ministry composed entirely of Constitutionals.

The experience of the Cabinet of the coup d'etat had shown the difficulty of forming a coalition of the two groups. It was impossible to create any satisfactory understanding between the Constitutional members of the Cabinet on the one hand, and the Radical representatives with the Republican Minister of the Interior, Garcia Ruiz, on the other. Serrano decided in favour of a homogeneous Constitutional Ministry, which was formed on May 13. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers with the portfolio of War was given to General Zavala. Sagasta, who remained the leading spirit in the Cabinet, exchanged the Department of Foreign Affairs for that of the Interior.

The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was taken by Ulloa, a former member of the Serrano ministries of January, 1871, and May, 1872, during the reign of Amadeo. Camacho, who for years was regarded in Spain as the ablest financier in public life, was placed at the head of the Treasury. The Department of Justice was entrusted to Alonso Martinez, who, until his death, in 1891, was almost continuously in office; and the Departments of Public Works, the Colonies, and the Navy to Alonso Calmenares, Romero Ortiz, and Admiral Rodriguez Arias.

The formation of this Ministry was, after all, a logical sequence of the coup d'e'tat of January 3, which was an act of conservative and reactionary import; and it was but another step in the course which had begun with that event. The author of the coup d'etat did not take that view. When General Pavia saw the fall of the Coalition Ministry and the rupture of the coalition between the different groups, which was "to make the Revolution of September re-enter its natural course," he sent in his resignation as Captain-General of Madrid and retired in disgust.

Towards the end of May General Concha determined to transfer the theatre of operations against the Carlists from Vizcaya to Navarre. His plan of campaign was to attack the united forces of the enemy by a movement upon Estella, the capital of the latter province, the "sacred city" of Carlism. He was sure that Don Carlos would bring forward his best troops to the defence of the city, and a defeat of the Pretender at that point would compel him to flee into France and bring the war to a speedy termination. To carry out this plan with success, it was necessary to execute a wide semi-circular movement from the south to the northeast of the Carlist line. More than once while preparing for these operations, the general-in-chief was heard to express his bitter regret at not having an additional army corps at his disposal. The Government, as usual, had not furnished the reinforcements sufficient to give a certainty of success, but the Liberal commander hoped to bring the movement to a favourable issue by the superiority of his artillery and the energy of his attack.

The Carlists occupied a position almost at the centre of the semi-circle made by the Liberal forces. They understood that Estella was not so much threatened in the south as upon the east and southeast, where the general-in-chief was directing his best troops. They withdrew their battalions which were holding the positions of Monte Jurra and Monjardin, and massed the pick of their forces at this point.

Battle

The battle began on the afternoon of June 27 by an attack in front on the Carlist positions by the third army corps under the command of Concha; while the other divisions, under Generals Reyes and Martinez Campos, endeavoured to turn the right and left of the enemy. It was late in the afternoon when General Concha, in advance of his staff and accompanied by a single aide-de-camp and his orderly, dismounted for the purpose of reconnoitring. As he was about to remount and rejoin his staff, he fell mortally wounded by a ball from the Carlist trenches. At the same time the assault in front and the attack upon the right and left were repulsed. If the Carlist generals had known of the fall of the commander-inchief of the Liberals, they would doubtless have made an offensive movement and followed up their advantage from their trenches.

In spite of illness, General Echague, the commander of the second army corps, took the supreme command, and after consultation with the other generals, ordered a retreat. The Liberal army had suffered great losses in officers and men, and the attempt to finish the war at one blow had proved a complete failure.

The news of the death of the Marquis del Duero caused great delight among the Carlists, but in the rest of Spain was heard with universal regret. It made a particularly painful impression in Madrid, where for more than a generation he had been a familiar and conspicuous figure. It was also an event of great political importance.

For a second time, as by the assassination of Prim, Serrano saw removed from the scene the one man who would soon have overshadowed the brilliant personality of the conqueror of Alcolea. If General Concha had brought the operations against Estella to a successful issue and had survived, he would, at the head of his victorious troops, undoubtedly have played the part of the General Monk of the Spanish Restoration. By his death the hopes of the Alfonsists, who had confidently counted upon this turn of events, were for a moment checked.

There was now an opportunity for Serrano to succeed to the possibilities of the dead general by placing himself at the head of the army, by displaying the same energy he had displayed at Somorostro, by collecting in the valley of the Ebro forces more numerous than those of Concha, and by executing in person a successful movement upon Estella. There was also an opportunity for taking advantage of the discouragement of the Alfonsist officers in the Army of the North in order to replace them by others who still adhered to the Revolution.

The President of the Executive Power did none of these things; he did not even appoint to the command of the Army of the North the general whom all regarded as fitted by ability and experience to succeed Concha. Instead of General Moriones, the Government assigned General Zavala, the President of the Council of Ministers, to the post of commander-in-chief, while Moriones was appointed to the command of the second army corps.

The regret which was felt at the Liberal repulse from Estella was now increased to dismay by a bold and successful inroad of the Carlists to within sixty miles of the capital. The traveller in Spain who will undergo the inconvenience of a slow and roundabout railway journey, and will be contented with somewhat humble accommodations, will be well repaid for his trouble by discovering in Cuenca, the capital of the province of the same name, one of the quaintest and most picturesque of the many quaint and picturesque towns of the Peninsula. It was against this place that Don Alfonso the younger, brother of the Pretender, now made a sudden raid. He had collected for this purpose the scattered bands which harried the rich provinces of Catalonia, and he was accompanied by his wife, Dona Blanca, a lady whose tastes and temper seem to have been in entire harmony with such an expedition and with such a cause.

The attack began on July 12 and raged until the 15th, when the small and exhausted garrison was unable any longer to resist the general assault of the Carlists. Street by street, and house by house, the Liberals defended every inch of ground. The defenders of religion and legitimacy, as the Carlists claimed to be, pillaged houses, churches, and public buildings, and spared neither age nor sex. Those who surrendered under promise of safety were ruthlessly shot down.

The venerable bishop of Cuenca besought the intercession of the wife of Don Alfonso, who was present with her husband, an impassive spectator of the massacre. "Go and thank God," was the stern reply of this daughter of the Church, "that you too are not among them."

After having signalised their victory by every exhibition of barbarity, the Carlists fell back before General Pavia, who had been appointed to the command of the Army of the Centre, and who re-occupied Cuenca.

The attitude of the French Government towards the Carlists was a source of great dissatisfaction in Madrid. It would have seemed natural for the French Republic, both from intent and inclination, to show some sympathy with the nation which was endeavouring to establish a democratic government on the other side of the Pyrenees. The policy of the Government of Marshal MacMahon was the direct opposite of this. The Legitimist and Catholic supporters of Don Carlos and the juntas of the Pretender in the frontier cities of France were allowed to extend all possible aid to the enemies of the Spanish Republic. Bayonne, Pau, Perpignan, and other towns of the frontier swarmed with Carlists.

The French custom house officers and gendarmes paid no attention to the contraband of war shipped under the pretence of merchandise. The Spanish Ambassador at Paris, the Marquis de la Vegade Armijo, had made unavailing appeals to the French Foreign Office to secure a stricter supervision of the Pyrenean frontier.

In striking contrast to this short-sighted and foolish policy of republican France was the attitude of imperial Germany. Public opinion in the latter country had been grievously excited by the murder at Villatuerta of a German newspaper correspondent, Captain Schmidt, who had fallen into the hands of the Carlists. In adopting a policy of marked benevolence toward the Government of General Serrano, the German Chancellor not only injured the cause of Don Carlos, but also laid the foundation of the cordial relations which existed between the governments of Madrid and Berlin after the Restoration, and which were only temporarily interrupted by the affair of the Caroline Islands. It was also a part of the policy of isolating France from the rest of Europe, which was adopted by Bismarck after the close of the Franco-Prussian war.

Prince Hohenlohe, the German ambassador in Paris, was instructed to support the Marquis de la Vega de Armijo in calling the attention of the French Government to the encouragement and help extended to the Carlist cause from the French border. The Government of Berlin also intervened with the Powers to secure their recognition of the Government of General Serrano. The difficulty lay in deciding whether recognition should be given the Spanish Republic or the Dictatorship. The result of the negotiations was that all the Governments entered into official relations with the Executive Power except Russia. In the address made by the representatives of the Powers on the presentation of their letters of credence, Serrano was addressed as Duke, or as President of the Executive Power.

No mention was made of the Republic, even by the representative of the French Republic, although Spain was almost as much a republic as France. The result of German diplomacy, which aimed to establish friendly relations with Spain while it en couraged the coldness between that country and France, was entirely successful; but its success was due more to the behaviour of the French Government (Lauser, Geschichte Spaniens; A. Houghton, Les Origins de la Restauration des Bourbons en Espagne) than to any other cause.

With the death of Concha and the appointment of General Zavala as his successor, the prosecution of the war came to a standstill. With the exception of some bursts of activity on the part of General Moriones and his capture of Oteiza, the months of August and September were passed in complete inaction. In the beginning of August the Carlists again appeared in the neighbourhood of Cuenca. Seo de Urgel fell into their hands by treachery. They even crossed the Ebro between two corps of the Liberal army, and plundered and levied a ransom upon Calaharra, a town on the Liberal side of the river, not far from Logrono.

In view of the dissatisfaction expressed at the failure which characterised his conduct of the operations, Zavala sent in his resignation, and on September 4 Serrano modified his Ministry. Sagasta became President of the Council, though he retained the Interior Department. General Serrano Bedoya became Minister of War, and Navarro Rodrigo succeeded Alonso Martinez as Minister of Justice. The retiring Ministers joined the ranks of the Alfonsists. Their successors were both Conservatives of the immediate surroundings of Serrano and Sagasta.

The Radicals again saw themselves excluded from any share in the Government, which remained in the hands of the Constitutionals. Ruiz Zorilla, who had withdrawn from public life since the abdication of King Amadeo, now reappeared on the scene. He summoned a meeting of the chiefs of the Radical party, on which occasion he declared that the experiment of the Democratic Monarchy had proved that a foreign king was impossible; the only choice now left to the country was the Republic or the Restoration; he had never been a Republican, but he preferred the Republic to the return of the Bourbons.

Thus the ancient Radical leader and former Prime Minister of King Amadeo was transformed into a Republican of the most advanced type. From that day Ruiz Zorilla was regarded as the leader of the disorderly elements of the Republicans; and although in exile, every conspiracy, every disturbance of a Republican origin after the Restoration was with more or less justice accredited to him.

General Laserna had succeeded General Zavala as commander-in-chief of the Army of the North. The inactivity still continued, until, at the end of October, the Carlists under Don Carlos himself began to besiege Irun, the first Spanish town entered by the traveller from France on the route of Bayonne and Hendaye. The Pretender had taken measures to prevent the arrival of succour from San Sebastian, and had entrenched troops upon the neighbouring hills to command the road and railway between San Sebastian and Irun. As was usual, the Government bestirred itself in the face of absolute necessity.

General Laserna was ordered to take fifteen thousand picked men, to proceed by forced marches to Santander, and to transport the men by sea to San Sebastian. In obedience to these orders, the siege of Irun was raised without difficulty, and the Liberal troops entered the city on November 10, 1874.

This expedition aroused great enthusiasm among the Liberals of the North. They believed that a movement which entailed so much labour and expense would not be limited to raising the siege of Irun. It was the general opinion that Laserna would occupy the whole of the Spanish side of the frontier, and force the enemy from their principal base of operations and supplies by cutting them off from their communications with France. Since the operations around Bilbao, there had been no opportunity so favourable for striking a mortal blow at the cause of the Pretender.

The Carlists showed the same symptoms of discouragement and defection as after the siege of Bilbao. Great was the surprise, therefore, in the army and among the Liberals of the Basque Provinces, when General Laserna, in reply to his report of the success of the operations around Irun, received a telegram instructing him to embark his troops at San Sebastian and to withdraw to his former position on the banks of the Ebro. The Army of the North, therefore, withdrew from Irun, leaving only a few battalions. A temporary check was the sole result of the elaborate and successful operations to raise the siege, and was the last movement of importance against the Carlists during the Republic.

The withdrawal of the Liberal forces produced the same effect as after the siege of Bilbao. The Carlists regained their courage and reappeared as soon as the army of General Laserna had vanished, cut the communications with San Sebastian, and again prepared to invest Irun.

In the meantime the movement in favour of the Restoration was becoming day by day more imposing. In the middle of November rumours of an Alfonsist rising were rife in the capital, and the majority of the nation began to assume an attitude of expectancy. Alfonso of Bourbon was a student at the English military school of Sandhurst, and had just completed his seventeenth year. On November 20 a document was published over the signature of the grandees of Spain and the nobility of Madrid and the provinces, for the ostensible purpose of congratulating the young Prince on reaching his seventeenth birthday.

In this address an effort was cleverly made to call attention to the constitutional character of the future Monarchy. After alluding to the school of misfortune through which the Prince had passed, and to the brilliant success of his studies in France and Austria, the address concluded as follows: "We rejoice at seeing your attention fixed upon the English nation, which is the true model of a constitutional monarchy. There you can enjoy the spectacle offered by a people among whom tradition possesses the greatest stability, the laws receive the greatest respect, and the love of country finds its most glowing development. In every family, in every society, in every province of the United Kingdom you can recognise and estimate how much strength and prosperity is offered by a monarchy which, although manifold in its forms and extending under every sky, still guards and holds firm to its national integrity. The undersigned grandees of Spain and the nobility, faithful to their traditions, firm in their belief, devoted to their legitimate King, and closely united to the representative institutions of their country, wish Your Majesty all good fortune, and pray God, through whom kings rule and by whom kings are endowed with righteousness, that you may find the reward of your noble effort, and become in every way a prince worthy of the name you bear, of the century in which you live, and of the country which saw your birth."

In reply to this address of the Spanish nobility and to other felicitations which he received from Spain, Alfonso published a manifesto from Sandhurst, dated December 1, which was evidently from the pen of Canovas del Castillo. The eminent leader of the Alfonsists had never wavered in his policy of opposition to a pronunciamiento by the army in favour of his Prince. He still believed that the true policy of his party was to allow the Government of Serrano to exhaust itself, in order that when no substitute for it seemed possible elsewhere, when there appeared no possibility of a stable government by any other means, the Prince of Asturias might then be summoned and greeted as a preserver.

He now regarded the time as ripe for the publication of a royal programme in which there could be found something to appeal to all the classes who had begun to tire of the Revolution, as well as to the natural supporters of the Monarchy. The statement that Serrano was finally to take command in person of the Army of the North, and by a victory over the Carlists to make a last effort to prop his tottering Dictatorship, had no doubt a certain influence upon the mind of Canovas in prompting him to take this step at this especial time. The programme before the people could be regarded as a counter-move against Serrano; and with this enunciation of the inducement offered by the new monarchy, he believed that the youthful claimant could wait and allow events to take their course.

The following is the manifesto which Prince Alfonso of Bourbon issued from Sandhurst. It bears the date of December 1, but was not allowed by the Government to appear in the Spanish press until towards the end of the same month.

"I have received from Spain, as well as from some of my fellow countrymen living in France, a large number of birthday congratulations. All who have written me show a like conviction that it is only the re-establishment of the Constitutional Monarchy that can put an end to the oppression, the uncertainty, and the cruel perturbations which Spain is undergoing. They tell me that the majority of our countrymen already recognise it, and that before long all conscientious men will be upon my side, regardless of their political antecedents, because they will understand that they need have no fear of repudiation either by a monarch who is new and unprejudiced or by a regime which is to-day imposing itself upon the country for the very reason that it represents union and peace.

"I know neither how nor when this hope may be realised, nor even whether it will ever be realised at all. I can only say that I shall leave nothing undone to make myself worthy of the difficult mission of re-establishing in our noble nation concord, order, and political liberty, if God in his lofty designs entrusts me with this mission.

"By virtue of the spontaneous and solemn abdication of my august mother, as generous as she was unfortunate, I am the sole representative of monarchical rights in Spain. This right is rooted in the legislature of ages, confirmed by all historic precedents, and indissolubly bound to the representative institutions which never failed to operate legally during the thirty-five years which elapsed from the beginning of my mother's reign until, when still a child, with all my family, I first trod upon foreign soil.

"The nation being now bereft of every public right and indefinitely deprived of its liberties, it is natural that it should turn its eyes toward that constitutional right to which it has been accustomed, and to those free institutions which did not prevent it from defending its independence in 1812, nor from finishing another civil war in 1840. It owed besides to those institutions many years of constant progress, of prosperity, of credit, and even of some glory, -years which it is not easy to blot from the recollection when there are so many still living who remember them. It is for this reason, without doubt, that the only solution which now inspires confidence in Spain is the hereditary and representative Monarchy, which is regarded as a guaranty of rights and interests for which there can be no substitute.

"In the meantime, not only has everything that existed in 1868 been demolished, but also everything which there has been an attempt to create. If the Constitution of 1845 has been in fact abolished, in the same way the Constitution of 1869 has also been abolished; for it was formed on the basis of a monarchy which no longer exists. If a Chamber of Senators and Deputies, constituted without legal form, decreed the Republic, the only Cortes convoked for the deliberate purpose of establishing that form of government was very soon dissolved by the bayonets of the garrison of Madrid. All political questions are, therefore, still pending, and are still reserved by the present rulers for the free decision of the future. Fortunately the hereditary and constitutional Monarchy possesses in its principles the necessary flexibility and all the qualifications necessary for the solution, in conformity with the wishes and convenience of the nation, of all the problems to which its re-establishment will give rise. It must not be expected that I shall decide anything suddenly or arbitrarily. The Spanish princes in the ancient times of the monarchy decided nothing without the Cortes; and this most righteous rule of conduct I shall not forget in my present condition at a period when all Spaniards are accustomed to parliamentary procedure.

"When the time has once arrived, it will be easy for a loyal prince and a free people to understand each other and to agree upon the questions to be solved. There is nothing I so much desire as to see my country in this condition, and the hard lesson of these times of trial must powerfully contribute to this end. For none must this lesson be lost, but least of all for the honest and respectable classes of the people, who have been the victims of perfidious sophisms and absurd delusions. All that we see teaches us that the greatest and most prosperous nations in which order, liberty, and justice are the most closely united, are those which most respect their own history. This does not prevent them from observing with attention and following with firm footsteps the progressive march of civilisation. May it be the will of Providence that the Spanish people shall some day take inspiration from such examples.

"For my part it is a debt I owe to misfortune that I am in contact with the men and conditions of modern Europe; and if Spain does not attain in Europe a position of independence and sympathy as well as a position worthy of her history, it will not be my fault, either now or ever. Whatever my lot may be, I shall not cease to be a good Spaniard, or, like my ancestors, a good Catholic, or truly liberal, as becomes a man of our generation.

--ALFONSO DE BOURBON. "YORKTOWN (SANDHURST), December 1, 1874."

This proclamation was skilfully drawn so as to attract all classes. The dyed-in-the-wool Royalists, many of whom preferred even Don Carlos to the Republic, could be gratified by the allusion to the "monarchical right rooted in the legislature of ages, confirmed by all historic precedents;" the more liberal could take comfort in the expressions of veneration for parliamentary government; the fomenters and supporters of the Revolution could still cherish the hope of playing a part in the settlement of the numerous problems to be solved, since they were assured that both the Constitutions of 1845 and 1869 should be regarded as abolished, and that "all political questions are still pending."

For the benefit of the powerful religious element in the country, the young Prince, when he asserted that he was liberal, as became one of his generation, did not forget to declare in the same breath that he was also a good Catholic.

The Government, in view of the continued growth of the Alfonsist movement, of which it was fully informed, had at last decided that it must take some definite step to secure a firmer position in the country. It was resolved that General Serrano should do what many believed he ought to have done long before, that he should again take command of the Army of the North, and put an end to the war after a series of brilliant operations.

Into the Field

On December 9, the Official Gazette announced that the President of the Executive Power would take the field in person. The Government was influenced to take this measure not merely by the appreciation of the benefits to be derived from a decisive victory over the Carlists, but also by the belief that the very presence of the chief of the State would exert a restraining influence upon the Alfonsist inclinations of the officers of the Army of the North. Before the departure of Serrano, prominent posts were assigned to officers on whom the Government thought that it could rely.

In September, the important office of Captain-General of Madrid had been entrusted to General Fernando Primo de Rivera. This officer had received rapid advancement during the Revolution, and owed many favours to General Serrano. He had been severely wounded in the assault of San Pedro de Abanto on March 27, 1874, and had been made lieutenant-general on the field of battle. - He was proposed for the Cross of St. Ferdinand, the highest distinction that can be given in Spain to a soldier for a feat of arms. The Government believed that there was no question as to his loyalty to the existing order of things. The command of the Army of the Centre was given to Lieutenant-General Joaquin Jovellar, who had been sent as Captain-General to Cuba by Castelar, and who also owed rapid promotion to the Governments of the Revolution. The Army of Catalonia was entrusted to Lieutenant-General Lopez Dominguez, the nephew of Serrano, who had distinguished himself by the subjection of the insurgents of Carthagena.

On December 9 the President of the Executive Power left the capital, to which he was destined to return only as a private citizen. On the following day he arrived at Logrono, where he paid a visit to Espartero, who was tranquilly spending in this provincial town the closing years of a long and remarkable career.

The arrival of the Duke de la Torre made a favourable impression upon the army, but he had waited too long. Snow had begun to fall, and all the rigour of winter had set in. As soon as the state of the weather permitted him to cross the Ebro, he set out for Castejon for an interview with General Moriones, the commander of the first army corps, of whose capacity and trustworthiness he had the highest opinion. In reply to questions upon the loyalty of the troops as well as upon the military outlook, Moriones stated it to be his belief that the fidelity of his army corps could be relied upon, but that any military operations were impossible in the present state of the weather; and that in view of the abundant rains and snow, any movement on a large scale against the enemy would have to be deferred until the middle of January, or perhaps later.

General Serrano returned to Logrono somewhat disheartened by this interview. He saw that the brilliant operations against the Carlists, which were the last move left open to him in his somewhat desperate game, must be indefinitely postponed. While the wintry days forced him to inaction, while he gazed upon the increasing snows and continued bad weather, he must have regretted with bitterness the wasted months and lost opportunities. It was a gloomy Christmas that the Duke de la Torre passed at Logrono, where "he spent his time in gazing at the horizon and the barometer, when not occupied with the disquieting reports which Sagasta sent him regarding the state of the country and parties." (A. Houghton, Les Origins de la Restauration des Bourbons en Espagne)

Many of the military leaders of the Alfonsists had become more emphatic in their dissent from the opinion of Canovas in favour of a policy of what he regarded as masterly inactivity. A number of officers believed that it would be much easier to overthrow the present government before General Serrano had time to gain any material advantage over the enemy, and they viewed with uneasiness the journey of the President of the Executive Power to place himself at the head of the Liberal forces. One of the most impatient and active of these officers was the General of Division Arsenio Martinez Campos. At the time of the departure of General Serrano, this officer was no longer in active command against the Carlists, and had received permission from the Government to fix his residence in Madrid.

About the middle of December, Sagasta received information that General Martinez Campos was preparing a movement affecting the garrison of Madrid and the Armies of the Centre and Catalonia. The Government then ordered the Captain-General of Madrid, General Primo de Rivera, to arrest him. Instead of executing this order, the captain-general appeared before Sagasta and the Minister of War, General Serrano Bedoya, and upon his word of honour responded for the innocence of his companion in arms.

"General Martinez Campos," said he, "is incapable of doing anything against honour and duty. To-day honour and duty forbid the raising of any flag so long as the Carlists are in arms. Martinez Campos is my companion in arms. I know his loyalty; I will answer for him as for myself; and I assure the Government that he does not belong to the race of traitors. His arrest at this time would indicate anxiety on the part of the Government for which there is no reason."

In consequence of these assurances the Government decided not to insist upon the arrest of General Martinez Campos, but instructed Primo de Rivera to hold him under strict observation; and this the Captain-General of Madrid faithfully promised to do.

It was true that General Martinez Campos had for some time been the leading spirit in an Alfonsist conspiracy. At the beginning of December he had secured the assent of a number of generals in the three armies; but the appearance of Serrano at Logrono had cooled the enthusiasm of the officers in the Army of the North, who were unwilling to take the lead in a pronunciamiento while the chief of the State was present in command. It seemed too much, so to speak, like a violation of the laws of hospitality.

Martinez Campos was thus compelled to have recourse to the Army of the Centre, where there was one of those most implicated in the movement, BrigadierGeneral Luis Daban. This general wrote to his brother in Madrid, Colonel Antonio Daban, that the Army of the Centre was well prepared for the movement, but that he could not keep the officers in suspense any longer than the end of the month; and that if General Martinez Campos or some other leader of the Alfonsists was not ready to initiate the movement before that time, he should resign his command and withdraw.

This letter created a great impression upon the mind of Martinez Campos. At the outset he had preferred that the pronunciamiento be made by some more conspicuous leader, or by some general of higher rank than himself, as General Jovellar in the Army of the Centre or General Laserna in the Army of the North. As he saw the occasion slipping from him, he determined to begin the insurrection himself, and in this determination he was encouraged by Colonel Antonio Daban.

Troops in Motion

Martinez Campos, accompanied by Brigadier General Bonanza and Colonel Antonio Daban, secretly left Madrid by train on the evening of December 26, 1874. They arrived in Valencia on the 27th, remained in hiding there until the night of the 28th, and then proceeded by carriage to Saguntum. The ancient Roman city, which had so heroically resisted the army of Hannibal more than twenty-one centuries before, was to be awakened from its long oblivion to figure in history once more.

The conspirators reached Saguntum late in the night, and proceeded at once to the quarters of General Luis Daban. There were at Saguntum under the orders of this officer two battalions of infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and a very small number of artillery. It was decided that General Martinez Campos, with these troops and with all the forces that could be united to them on the journey, should set out for Valencia.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of December 29 the column was formed, and the troops, ignorant of their destination and of the object of the movement, were ordered to begin the march. At about a mile and a half from Saguntum, the column was halted and formed into a square. General Daban then announced to the troops that the General of Division, Arsenio Martinez Campos, had an important communication to make to them. Martinez Campos, beginning with some hesitation but increasing in vigour as he proceeded, delivered an address in which he declared that the only way to terminate the civil war was to have a flag and "a king representing the old traditions of monarchical and Catholic Spain."

He appealed to them to aid in establishing on the throne their legitimate King, Alfonso of Bourbon. The generals and colonels, who were in the plot, cheered lustily, and the cheers were repeated as a matter of course by the other officers and soldiers. There was but one exception. An old captain, stepping out of the ranks, said that during his long life he had never taken part in a pronunciamiento, and that although all his sympathies were with the exiled Prince, he did not intend to begin now. They permitted him to abstain from the oath which was taken by all the other officers, "to defend to the last drop of blood the flag that they had thus unfurled in the face of the misfortunes of the country, as a propitious sign of redemption, of peace, and of grandeur."

As soon as the pronunciamiento was an accomplished fact, the column set out for Valencia. The commander of the Army of the Centre, General Jovellar, to whom the insurrection caused no surprise, decided not to attempt resistance, and telegraphed to the Government that he had adhered to the movement, in view of the necessity of keeping the Army of the Centre united, in order to make headway against the Carlists and to prevent anarchy. Thus the whole Army of the Centre was won over to the insurgents.

Amid the general defection, there was but one example of loyalty. This was General Castillo, who had so distinguished himself by the heroic defence of Bilbao against the Carlists, and who was now the Captain-General of the Province of Valencia. This officer has to-day in Spain one distinction almost impossible to find among officers of equal rank and prominence. During a long and brilliant career he has never taken part in any pronunciamiento or military insurrection of any kind.

He now declared that his honour would not allow him to fail in his duty to the Government to which he owed his appointment. Although devoted to the cause of the Bourbons, and although in his time as colonel of a regiment of engineers he had escorted Isabella II to the Spanish frontier on her flight from San Sebastian, he denounced the leaders of the insurrection, and in conjunction with the civil governor of the province, attempted to take measures to oppose the movement. It was only when he saw all resistance impossible that he yielded and requested the Government to relieve him of his command.

On the morning of December 29 the Government was informed by the civil authorities of Valencia of what was taking place in that province. Sagasta immediately summoned a meeting of the Cabinet. Primo de Rivera was ordered to appear. When the conduct of Martinez Campos, of whose loyalty he had given such fervent assurances, was reported to him, he cried out, "Now, more than ever, may the Government count upon me and the garrison of Madrid. The treachery of Martinez Campos compels my loyalty to the greatest sacrifices."

When in the evening of the same day he was informed that some distrust was felt as to his own intentions, he replied, pointing to his epaulettes: "I should sully the epaulettes which I owe to the Duke de la Torre and to this Government, if I acted inconsistently with my duty. He who wishes to disturb order, be he Alfonsist or Republican, or whatever else, is a traitor, and deserves to be treated as such."

At one time it occurred to the Ministry to arrest Primo de Rivera himself, and to transfer his important post to some other officer whose devotion to the Revolution was beyond suspicion. They feared, however, that such a measure might cause dissatisfaction among the other officers of the garrison. The Minister of War, General Serrano Bedoya, also protested against the necessity of any such proceeding, and insisted that General Primo de Rivera was entitled to the fullest confidence. The Government, therefore, contented itself with instructing the civil governor to arrest several important leaders of the Alfonsists, who were suspected of supporting the insurrection. Among these was Canovas del Castillo, who, still faithful to his policy of peaceable evolution, is said to have exclaimed, "We are lost! Everything that is being done is premature. The madness of Martinez Campos will ruin us." He is even reported to have written to several generals, urging them not to support the movement of Martinez Campos, but to await a more favourable occasion.

The reception of the telegram of General Jovellar and the news of the adhesion of the Army of the Centre to the movement made the night of December 29 an anxious one for the Council of Ministers. They had kept the Duke de la Torre informed by telegram of the course of events, and advised him to return to Madrid with the forces on which he could rely. They were somewhat encouraged by the tone of his reply, and by the assurance that he would take the measures necessary for the maintenance of order; and that he would himself direct the movement of the troops upon the capital. Before the adjournment of the Cabinet Council, the following proclamation was drawn up for publication by the Official Gazette in the edition of the following morning, the 30th:

"At the moment when the chief of the State is setting in motion the Army of the North to deliver a decisive blow against the Carlists, and is availing himself of the immense sacrifices which the Government has required of the country, and to which the latter has responded with so noble a patriotism, some of the forces of the Army of the Centre, commanded by Generals Martinez Campos and Jovellar, have raised in front of the enemy the factious flag of Alfonso of Bourbon.

"This discreditable act, which aims at initiating another civil war, as if there were not already sufficient calamities of every kind weighing upon our country, has fortunately found no echo either in the Armies of the North or of Catalonia, or in any of the different military districts. The Government, which, in this supreme crisis of the nation in the Peninsula and in America, has appealed to all parties calling themselves Liberal to stifle by a common effort the aspirations of absolutism, has an incontestable right and even a sacred duty to characterise harshly and to chastise with all possible rigour a rebellion which, if it should spread, would be advantageous only to Carlism and to demagogy, and would dishonour us in the eyes of the civilised world. The Ministry, faithful to its purposes and to the engagements it has assumed before the country and Europe, is to-day more than ever resolved to fulfil its duty and will fulfil it."

On the night of the 29th a crowd thronged the reception of the wife of the President of the Executive Power. All the prominent leaders of the parties of the Revolution were represented. "The conversations in the salons of the Duchess de la Torre were singular, and many of the people of Madrid remember that strange reunion where they spoke aloud the opposite of what they thought or foresaw, where they conversed in corners, in a low voice, as in apartments next to the chamber of a dying man who has not entirely lost his sense of hearing or his consciousness." (A. Houghton, Les Origines de la Restauration des Bourbons en Espagne).

Calm

The wife of General Serrano, whose calm beauty even now seems to defy the ravages of time, bore herself as arrogantly as ever in the midst of that scene which was to be the last of the regime in which she had played so brilliant a part, nor allowed to appear upon her haughty features the slightest trace of the emotion which she must have felt.

At five o'clock in the morning of the 30th the Captain-General of Madrid appeared at the Ministry of War. He gave orders to the troops to allow entrance or exit to no one. In fact, General Primo de Rivera had arrived at the conclusion that it was time for him to make a pronunciamiento before he should be anticipated by some one else.

The Minister of War was sleeping, but, in spite of the earliness of the hour, the Captain-General insisted on seeing him, and presented himself before the Minister with the declaration that the garrison of Madrid not only refused to oppose the insurgents, but on the contrary was determined to join in the movement.

Thereupon a violent scene took place between the Captain-General and the Minister of War. General Serrano Bedoya, mortified and angered at seeing himself betrayed and abandoned by an officer of whose loyalty he had given such emphatic assurances, seized a revolver and threatened to shoot himself. Primo de Rivera lost countenance before this emotion, and fell back upon renewed protestations. He assured the Minister of War that he would do his duty to the death, and that he would use every effort to restrain the garrison. "I will make every sacrifice," he continued, "to keep them to their duty; if I cannot succeed, I repeat that I would rather die a thousand times than to be wanting in duty to the Government in return for the confidence which it has imposed upon me."

General Serrano Bedoya was somewhat comforted by these protestations. At his request a Cabinet meeting was called, at which it was decided that the Minister of War, accompanied by the Captain-General, should visit the barracks and investigate and report upon the attitude of the troops. He found sympathy for the cause of Alfonso openly expressed in the quarters of the engineers and artillery, and in the other barracks the majority of the officers were resolved "to maintain order and discipline, but not disposed to oppose the movement begun by Generals Martinez Campos and Jovellar at Saguntum and Valencia."

On the return of the Minister of War and the Captain-General from the tour of inspection, between five and six in the afternoon of December 30, 1874, the Ministry of the Provisional Government of the Republic was convoked for the last time. On hearing the report of the Minister of War and his statement that the Captain-General of Madrid was also about to adhere to the movement, they placed themselves in telegraphic communication with General Serrano, who had announced his arrival at the station of Tudela. One after the other, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Works, and the President of the Council of Ministers held at the telegraph instrument a conference with the President of the Executive Power.

They informed him that almost the whole of the garrison was prepared to unite with the Alfonsists, and that the remainder refused to fire on their comrades; that the CaptainGeneral of Madrid admitted that the new Monarchy which they were about to establish ought to avoid a contest, and to count to a certain extent on the assent of the present chief of the State; that the captain-general would not oppose the coming of Serrano to Madrid, but that the garrison feared a collision if he came with troops; the captain-general would answer, however, for the safety and authority of the President if he decided to come to the capital, and was ready to confer with the President, if he so desired.

The Duke de la Torre replied that there was no necessity of his conferring with any one except the Ministers, and that neither alone nor accompanied would he go to the capital under the tutelage of the Captain-General of Madrid; that he had a train ready with one battalion, and seven others were on the march. He must, however, loyally state two facts first, that he did not wish a collision, because the Carlists, the common enemy, would be the only ones to be benefited; secondly, that General Laserna and other generals had informed him that morning that in their opinion the troops would refuse to fire on their comrades. He could arrive at Madrid rapidly only by taking a single battalion; to take the others and the artillery would delay him two or three days.

In reply to the suggestion that resistance might be possible at some point outside of Madrid, he answered that if the Carlists were not in front, he should have himself proposed such a solution, but that his patriotism forbade his allowing three Governments to be established in Spain. The conference then closed by the following statement from Sagasta in behalf of the entire Ministry: "The Ministry believe that you are acting with the most elevated patriotism, but our loyalty made it our duty to propose to you such a step. Matters being as they are, it appears to us that you may remain at Tudela and suspend the movement of troops upon Madrid. In this hour of difficulty, more for the country than for ourselves, when we are taking leave of you for perhaps a long time, we send you an affectionate embrace, and hope that you will send in exchange a word of recognition for the honesty, loyalty, and profound devotion with which we have served you."

To this the Duke de la Torre replied: "Receive, my dear friends, my immense gratitude for your friendship and your affection; for the loyalty, honesty, and energy with which, in these times of such great calamity, you have discharged your arduous duties. Recall me with tenderness to the recollection of your families, and I recommend to all of you my beloved children and my dear wife. Farewell, my noble and dear friends."

After this conference the Cabinet meeting was adjourned to meet at nine o'clock in the Ministry of War. On beginning their deliberations at that hour, the Ministers were informed that the court and environs of the Ministry of War, or the Palace of Buenavista, as it was called, - the ancient palace of Don Manuel Godoy, the Prince of the Peace, who had been the foremost figure in the Spain of the Napoleonic era, was filled with troops.

A few minutes later, the Captain-General of Madrid, General Primo de Rivera, entered and announced that a committee of the garrison of Madrid wished to speak with the members of the Government. When this committee appeared, Primo de Rivera placed himself at its head, and with a hesitating voice spoke to Sagasta as follows: "Mr. President, I see myself in the unpleasant necessity of announcing to you that the garrison of Madrid has joined the movement of the Army of the Centre, and that a new Government will be formed."

To this Sagasta replied with emphasis: "In the name of the Government and the Spanish people, I raise a protest against the act of violence which is being committed here. The Government does not answer by an appeal to arms, because, after a consultation with the chief of the State, and in accord with him, Spanish before everything and inspired by patriotism which is lacking in others, it is unwilling to summon to its defence any other forces than those which it has organised and armed to defend order and to conquer the Carlists. These are the same forces that are in insurrection to-day. The Government, therefore, retires; but not without an energetic protest against this attempt, against this act of violence, the characterisation of which I leave to the honourable men of all parties, to the conscience of the chivalrous Spanish people, and to the impartial judgment of history."

Thus the Ministers of the last Government of the Revolution, the victors of the coup d'etat of less than a year before, were in their turn compelled to yield to an act of violence from which there was no appeal.

As they retired from the Ministry of War, they could see in the corridors and on the stairways the hastening crowd of officers and notabilities of the Alfonsist party, who, in more senses than one, were ascending as the late Government was descending.

After his telegraphic conference with the Ministry, in which it was decided to make no attempt at resistance, General Serrano ordered all further concentration of troops to cease. He informed the generals who had followed him to Tudela, as well as the officers of his own staff, that he released them from all engagements, and that they were at liberty to act as they saw fit. In reply to a telegram of General Primo de Rivera, communicating the pronunciamiento of the garrison of Madrid, he stated "that in front of the Carlists, there could not be three Governments in Spain, and that he would remain at his post as general-in-chief only until he should be relieved."

As soon as he learned that General Laserna had been appointed to succeed him in the command of the Army of the North, he took the train for Saragossa, accompanied only by two aides-de-camp. From Saragossa the ex-President of the Executive Power of the Republic made the passage of the Pyrenees -- a difficult journey in the middle of winter -- and proceeded to Biarritz, that haven of refuge for Spanish exiles.

On the withdrawal of General Serrano from the command of the Army of the North, General Laserna, his successor, issued the following order of the day: "Soldiers, the Army of the Centre, the garrison of Madrid, and at this moment the whole of Spain, have proclaimed Don Alfonso XII. From to-day you have a war-cry to rouse your enthusiasm and to lead you to victory; for this cry means order and liberty, and is a certain pledge of the regeneration of our country. Soldiers, long live Alfonso XII!"

The soldiers and non-commissioned officers listened to the reading of the order of the day in silence, without protestation but without enthusiasm.

At Madrid, General Primo de Rivera was now master of the situation, and immediately gave instructions for the release of Canovas and the other Alfonsist leaders, who had been placed under arrest by the orders of the previous Government. He then sent the following telegram to the provincial governors "The Armies of the Centre and the North, the garrisons of Madrid and of the other provinces, have proclaimed Don Alfonso of Bourbon King of Spain. Madrid and the places where this event is known receive it with immense enthusiasm. The Duke de la Torre has declared that in view of the attitude of the army, he will not oppose the movement. The members of the Cabinet presided over by Senor Sagasta have just placed their resignations in my hands."

The thorough organisation which the Alfonsists had effected under the supervision of Canovas and Romero Robledo enabled them to take charge of affairs at once, without any interval between the retirement of the ministers of Serrano and the beginning of the Monarchy.

Arrests

Canovas was armed with a decree dated August 22, 1873, and signed by Alfonso, which authorised him to appoint a ministry to act as a Regency until the arrival of the King. In recognition of his services in the pronunciamiento, he gave the portfolio of War to General Jovellar. The Departments of the Colonies and of the Interior were entrusted to Lopez de Ayala and Romero Robledo. These were both men of the Revolution, who had turned to Alfonso after the abdication of Amadeo. By a singular coincidence, Lopez de Ayala held in the first Cabinet of the Restoration the same portfolio he had held in the first Cabinet of the Revolution. The remaining departments were distributed among Royalists who had been in retirement from public life during the Revolution, ancient Moderados, or members of the Liberal Union, who had remained loyal to the Bourbons. During the absence of General Jovellar, who was with the Army of the Centre, General Primo de Rivera was to be acting Minister of War.

Almost the first act of the new Ministry was to promote General Martinez Campos to the rank of lieutenant-general ; and according to the decree published in the Official Gazette, this promotion was in consideration of his services against the insurgent Federalists at Valencia and Carthagena and in the operations against the Carlists. No mention was made of his services on December 29. He was also appointed to the command of the Army of the Centre, to succeed General Lopez Dominguez, who had caused some irritation in the Ministry by telegraphing "that he would yield to any Government having the sanction of the national will."

The news of the pronunciamiento in favour of Alfonso at Saguntum was communicated to him at the Palace Basilewski in Paris, the residence of Isabella II during her exile.

In reply to the telegrams of congratulation, he telegraphed to Canovas on January 5 as follows: "Your Excellency, to whom I entrusted my powers on the 23rd of August, 1873, informs me that I have been unanimously proclaimed and called to occupy the throne of my ancestors by the valiant and the heroic Spanish people. No one can interpret my sentiments of affection and gratitude to the nation so well as Your Excellency, to whom I owe so much, and to whom I am grateful for your great services, and the Ministry you have appointed in the exercise of the authority I have conferred upon you, and which I confirm to-day. You cannot better interpret my sentiments than by ratifying the opinions contained in my manifesto of the 1st of last December, and by affirming my loyal intention of executing it, and my lively desire that the solemn act of my entrance into my dear country may be a pledge of peace, of union, of forgetfulness of past discord; and that its consequence may be the inauguration of an era of true liberty, in which, by uniting our efforts, and with the protection of Heaven, we may obtain new days of prosperity and grandeur for Spain."

Return of the King

On January 7 the King embarked at Marseilles upon the Spanish frigate which had been sent with the new Minister of Marine, the Marquis of Molins, to bring him to his kingdom. The ease with which the movement in favour of the son of Isabella II had been brought to a success ful issue was mainly due to one circumstance: the weariness of the Spanish nation at the end of 1874.

In six years the Spaniards had seen a panorama of governments pass before them -- the Provisional Government, the Regency of Serrano, the Democratic Monarchy; the Republic, with its four Presidents, its civil and military dictatorships, -- each a failure and each in turn replaced by another failure. The result was a bankrupt treasury, a ruined commerce, the continuance of the civil war at home and the insurrection abroad, and a feeling of anxiety and unrest in all classes of society.

If the Revolution had not, "like Saturn, devoured its children," it had certainly consumed all the Governments to which it had given birth. It had gone farther than the majority of its own advocates had expected or desired. The Republic, its natural outcome and the form of government in best accord with the spirit of the Constitution of 1869, was rendered impossible by the jealousies and incapacity of the Republicans themselves. The final result of the course of reaction which began with the coup d'etat of General Pavia was never in doubt. The Restoration was the result of the logic of events, -- a solution to be adopted when all else had failed; and before Alfonso XII. had even entered his capital, his subjects, with that remarkable proclivity for looking upon the bright side of everything, which is the characteristic of their race, had already begun to contemplate the new reign with pleasing anticipation.

The Royalists -- those who had been faithful to the exiled dynasty -- saw themselves covered with honour, the foremost figures of a brilliant and superb regime. The Revolutionists of September were preparing to re-enter the political arena, comforting themselves with the thought that much of the work of their Revolution could not be undone, and that the Spain of Ferdinand VII and Isabella II was gone forever.

The patient soldier amid the snows of the North, who reeked little of pronunciamientos and whose only politics was obedience to his superiors, hoped that it might mean an earlier return to his home and fireside; while the plain citizen, whose sole ambition was to follow his daily occupation undisturbed, nursed a feeble expectation that the return of Don Alfonso of Bourbon to the throne of his ancestors might bless his exhausted country with an era of reconciliation and peace.