How will you model this in the Waikato game? What are you going to do to stop the game from going down the slippery slope that Louisburg did? Firstly, John, I thought Louisbourg went quite nicely and didn't involve any "slippery slope". There are a few things I'd like to tweak- such as expanding the Morale track so there are more gradations, enabling players to specify a 1 increment shift even for minor victories and multiple increments for larger events- but basically I was happy with the general system, and so will use it again. Although the scenario information in the Waikato War game will be more extensive (including, as per a previous recommendation of yourself, further detail concerning potential reinforcements for the 2 sides), the rules are likely to be fairly similar to those used in Louisbourg, without grafting on any special mechanisms to handle this situation or that. At one stage I thought there should be a special supply mechanism, but I now think that it would add little but complexity to the game. Basically, I think the system is flexible enough to deal with most types of games involving 2 teams fighting one another without having to write a new, tailor made system each time. One does, however, have to "prime" the players with the scenario information so that they have a good idea of what is historically reasonable and what is not- to keep the general standard of Argumentation at a high level (as it was in Louisbourg) and to keep the game on a reasonable track by such means. In other words, the game is preserved by the "hidden hand" of the adversarial system, rather than by direct intervention by the referee or artificial restriction by means of rules on what the players may attempt. If I were the Maori player, I could write all my arguments before the game even started. Every turn I'd make an indirect attack: bad weather, disease (of several varieties), bad roads, sick mules (or whatever their transport was), mismarked maps, miscommunication between columns, disagreements between commanders, delayed reinforcements, changing strategic goals and political climate, etc. In the same way, I would make every combat some kind of ambush that causes few real casualties, but lots of disorder, morale effects, and losses in materiel. Now maybe that's "realistic" - but where's the game? There's a reason that many of these factors are abstracted out of traditional games. I don't see why the concentration upon strategic issues means there is no game, just a game a little different to some. Also, the battles and the tactical issues will always be there for players who revel in them, and are not without some importance of their own. For example, historically, on one ocassion (at Gate Pa) tactical factors meant the Maori's dramatically defeated the British when the strategic situation suggested strongly that they would lose. Of course, in the game, the British might find more decisive victories than they did in history, defeating and capturing large numbers of Maori on the battlefield. The indirect attack approach might indeed be a good strategy for the Maori, but how good will depend on what precautions the British take. If the British troops just plow into the bush without accumlating supplies, establishing secure bases, or arranging adequate transport then this style of Argument is likely to be devastating, and rightfully so. Historically, the British spent the first 3 months of the campaign almost stationary preparing for their advance in a number of important ways, as the Maori tried to slow their preparations with raids of various strengths (many just harassed Pakeha settlers and tied down troops in rear areas, whilst a major raid actually took out a main British supply base). In spite of these efforts, the British were eventually ready to move, but the Maori had in the intervening period been building fortified lines. In due course, the British had to negotiate 3 sets of fortified lines (2 of which were bypassed and another successfully stormed). Without direct, physical resistance by a significant force (in fortified lines or not), it becomes much easier for the British to send a small "flying column" of troops down the Waikato to seize the British territorial objectives. The Maoris need to compel the British to either use a large army (with all the inherent difficulties and delays of supply, finding transport- and, indeed, finding that number of troops to begin with) or to force the British to chance it with a small army and risk major defeat in battle. This cannot be done without a credible "main force" being kept in the field, supported by Arguments such as those involving construction of fortifications and recruitment of further contingents of warriors from elsewhere in New Zealand. The adoption of an almost purely indirect defensive strategy could certainly be tried, but I doubt very much that it is the optimum strategy for the Maori. Historically, the Maori were man-for-man more effective fighters than anyone the British fought against in the 19th century (with the possible exception of the Boers), and were consumate masters of field fortification and bush warfare alike. They were not the typical woodland opponent capable of little more than exchanging a few shots with a European force (preferably from ambush) and then running away. Players of forces like this have few strategic options, and so the indirect strategy may well be the best for them, but it is different for the Maori. Finally, I would like to say that I consider the "indirect attack" style of Argument to be very important in MGs (and particular in some genres, such as those dealing with colonial warfare), and not a pernicious evil that needs to be rooted out or abstracted into a set of tables. If players (including the British players- the economic strain experienced by the Maoris was an important pro-British factor in the war) approached Waikato War without the indirect attack Argument as an important part of their armamentum, then not only would they be selling themselves short, but the game would have little chance of resembling either the historical conflict or any other plausible chain of events. *But how? For a game to be engaging, it has to reward planning and execution. If one side's arguments consist solely of speed bumps for the other, where is the strategy for either? As explained in my last above, I don't think a purely indirect attack strategy would be optimal for the Maori, but for the sake of Argument lets imagine one has a game in which it was optimal. Indeed, at one stage I envisioned writing a game based on the British campaign to cature Magdala in Abyssinia in 1867-8, in which the Abyssinian army was utterly pathetic yet the supply difficulties in marching a sufficient force to ultimately storm the fortified town of Magdala across large tracts of inhospitable terrain was an enormous challenge in itself, and required superlative planning by Sir Robert Napier. This would be a game in which the Abyssinian player would be very foolish if he didn't use mainly indirect attacks, as his army was fit for litle actual combat- even holding fortified heights the British simply brushed them aside with contemptuous ease. A time limit on the British would make the game interesting- this would be quite realistic as the British had calls on their forces in many parts of their empire at any one time, and couldn't afford to get booged down in any one place for too long (particularly in Abyssinia, which was a very low-priority campaign). It thus makes a good example for use in the present debate. I do not agree that the Abyssinian game described above would lack strategy, or would fail to reward planning or execution. Indeed, any attempt for the British to advance without copious thought and preparation at every stage would likely lead to disaster. The British player would have to make important strategic decisions such as how much force to push forward on the advance, and how much to hold back performing logistical tasks and putting less strain on the supply system. There would be risky and fast and safe but slow options. For example, a small "flying column" could be sent forward with enough supply to sustain it for a limited period, but without contact with the supply system and in danger of being cut off and fall apart if something went wrong. Alternatively, a system of supply depots, narrow gauge railways and roads could be constructed, and supplies slowly moved forward and the frontline gradually advanced until the objective was reached. Sir Robert historically arrived at a compromise between these strategies, pushing the advance slowly forward in a systematic fashion as supplies accumulated, and then lauched a small flying column from a well-advanced secure supply base. The Abyssinian player would be largely concerned with finding holes in the British plans and working out the best ways to exploit them. Just say the British detached a flying column prematurely, the Abyssinian player would then have to think how to turn this to advantage. One possibility is to try to hit the flying column with immediate supply or similar difficulties attempting to force it to turn back. Another possibility is to allow it to proceed, but attempt to set up a situation in which the column will stall just short of its objective (and thus as far from chance of help as possible) and then attempt to wipe it out wholesale with little chance of retreat. *Indirect factors would be handled randomly - influencing play, but not interfering with it. (And, of course, planning the military side of the operation to take these factors into account would be part of the strategy.) I see the "indirect factors" as often constituting the major part of campaigning, not a side issue that is hived off so they don't "interfere" with the real business of war. Moving and supplying troops and contending with the constraints of nature IS a vital part of the real business of war, and in many cases is considerably more important than fighting the enemy directly. I consider this to be a major failing in many traditional wargames- either they give only lip-service to logistical factors and arrive at completley unrealistic games, or they have enormously cumbersome systems to give logistics their proper due, but in the process render the game unplayable. Hence the beauty of the MG. In a traditional game, the design of the map, counters, and game systems (movement, combat, and supply) are what players have to manage in order to succeed (in terms of the victory conditions). If there are not even guidelines for this in a matrix game, it degenerates into a a series of one-turn trumps - as we saw in Louisburg. I agree there should be information in a scenario with respect to the resources the players have and guidelines as to how they may be used, but this is generally a matter of scenario writing rather than rules-crafting. Occasionally one factor (such as supply in Desert Rats) may be of such importance that one might have an extra rule to draw attention to it, but generally this is not necessary. The resources one manages in an MG are the same as in a traditional wargame, except without the artificial limitations that if there is not a counter, table or specific rule for a resource, then one simply ignores it. Perhaps some traditional wargamers are discomfitted by having to deal in a game with realistic challenges their historical counterparts faced (as opposed to simply parrot some artificial rules), but I think one can never truly understand the nature of strategy if such matters are ommitted. And MGs allow one to deal with these matters without paying any significant price in playability. I would agree that indirect attacks can present a problem if one has a referee who doesn't properly evaluate the chances of their success, but with appropriate referee they will, in my view, only enhance the game. One cannot, for example, adopt the philosophy sometimes applied to more light-hearted storytelling games in which almost every Argument is rated Average or better, and even very silly Arguments have a 1 in 6 chance of success. If one can rain down improbably indirect attacks and have a 50% change of success each time, then the game would go seriously out of kilter, and even a 1 in 6 chance of destroying the enemy utterly in a ridiculous fashion is too much. But if referee does a good job of assigning realistic probabilities to Arguments, then I cannot see why that would lead to an unrealistic result. If bad weather really has a 1/3 chance of delaying attack, then surely a game that allows a bad weather Argument to succeed on a roll of 5 or 6 is more realistic than a game that leaves weather out altogether. Of course, traditional wargamers unused to dealing with such factors tend to underestimate the importance of logistical factors and may think that indirect attacks are being rated too highly, even when the ratings are quite conservative... Back to Table of Contents -- Matrix Gamer #29 To Matrix Gamer List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Chris Engle. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com