(originally published in Lone Warrior 57) In a sense, every wargamer makes decisions even if he subcontracts most of the work by buying off-the-peg sets of rules. Often these decisions are taken implicitly without any realization that other choices could have been made. This is a pity as apparently trivial decisions can lead to problems later when change will be difficult and possibly expensive. A clearer understanding of the design process can help produce more informed design decisions and hence better games at less cost. Know Where Your Towel is The most important thing to do is define clearly the scope of any game under development. This is essentially a matter of pleasing yourself but needs to be done nonetheless. Most wargames are played for relaxation: hence their form is not to be dictated by professional pundits who stridently denounce or advocate games of a particular type. The level of style of a game and the type of player aids to be used (e.g. figures, maps, cardboard silhouettes, rhomboidal tables etc.) depend on what the eventual user wishes to pay for, whether in cash or operational constraints. How a system is implemented matters less than what is expected. All this is not to imply that there may not be a requirement to play a game with specific means. I like Peter Laing colonial figures so I use them for nineteenth century colonial wars although 5mm figures might be more convenient. The decision to use particular implementations however must be a conscious one, made in full awareness of the resulting self-imposed constraints. Human Factors There are some operational constraints which must be considered when deciding the scope of a game. The most obvious is the inverse relationship between size and playability. The more function is required of a system, the more difficult it will be to use. It is a good idea to set some more or less arbitrary limit on the amount of detail to be allowed in a game. For example, if you are writing a set of rules for a figures game, decide how many pages of A4 are acceptable. If a particular design fails to meet this limit, then modify it or find one that does. This may appear to put the cart before the horse but there are physical limitations that demand this type of approach. When a game is played there will be only a finite amount of time and space in which to play it. There will be other competing demands on the players’ energy and attention. It is no use trying to play SPI’s War in Europe with nine large maps and hundreds of cardboard counters if you live in a shoebox at the bottom of a pond. The probable number of players and their level of commitment must also be considered. Generally, the more players involved in a game, the lower their level of commitment so the simpler the game ought to be. The most important consideration about any set of ideas is whether they are memorable and can be easily transmitted to other people. If something cannot be remembered then it doesn’t exist. Consequently, brevity can be considered the soul of a good wargame system unless one is content to play alone or with a small group. Personally, I find it increasingly difficult to remember what I wrote even last week. Although I play solo more often than not, I prefer back-of-a-postcard rules. These can be typed up in an evening and easily modified. De Quoi S’Agit-il? As a wargamer defines the boundaries of the model he wishes to create, he enters the most crucial stage of system design: requirements definition. If he is to avoid bogging down in detail, he must constantly ask himself the question that Marshal Foch used to ask himself when confronted by complex problems: What’s it all about? Before any design decision can be made, one must know what it’s all for. It’s no use designing an elaborate and hyper-authentic system for small arms fire if over 75% of all casualties are caused by mortars and artillery. At the same time, irrevocable decisions about the hardware to be used must be avoided as these will limit the game’s development unnecessarily. Indeed, as far as possible a game should be independent of how it is to be implemented. The Myth of Research It is at this point of the design process that some research should be done in order to understand the environment to be modeled. Not too much, however, research of an unstructured nature can be as dangerous as none at all. Research is like experience; without imagination it remains devoid of insight. Without a trained historical approach, the researcher is no better off than the mule in Frederick the Great’s supply train that had seen forty campaigns and was still a mule. Research Research can also too easily pile up distracting trivia if the essentials of the subject are not identified early on and pursued single-mindedly. For example, a satisfactory simulation of the waterloo campaign depends far more on a proper understanding of the nature of war than a minute and tedious knowledge of the Order of Battle of the Armee du Nord. Rarely has a campaign more clearly illustrated Clausewitz’s analysis of war as the interplay of uncertainty, exertion, chance and danger. Little of this comes out in commercial treatments of the campaign, such as SPI’s Napoleon’s Last Battles. As usual, the game concentrates on the easily researched aspects of orders of battle, arrival times and terrain. The more problematical questions of how Napoleonic strategy really worked are ignored. In general, an appreciation of the nature of war will stop the wargamer from accepting the usual easy assumptions about soldiers’ behavior, weapons effects and so on. Weapons systems rarely meet manufacturer’s specification. Orders are not always carried out, if they were ever received. The enemy is not always identified as such while friends may be received by a hail of bullets. Regiments marched through woods may vanish for the duration of the action except for a few gung-ho officers and NCO’s. Everything in a wargame should be very simple, but the simplest thing is also very difficult, or words to that effect. Do Your Research Afterwards (when you know what you want to prove) In case I appear to decry the need for research I would emphasize the usefulness of confirmatory research to test the validity of concepts as they are formulated. First hand material is especially useful for this. If contemporary sources appear largely irrelevant to your game then perhaps it’s the game that’s wrong. A Short Detour Via the Western Front The 1914 Field Service Pocket Book is full of details apparently useless to the average wargame, concentrating on minutiae of combat resolution. Tables of data about field works or logistics only matter if a wider view is taken than the ten minutes at the climax of an assault. However, they are rather more helpful for understanding tactics in the Great War than the most precise documentation of the differing effects of the SMLE and Mauser rifles. Tables of Organization take on a new significance when the flow of information and control is seen as the key to success rather than the number of sabres and bayonets. The Design Phase Only when the hitch-hiker’s requirements are known and written down, should he proceed to actually designing game systems. This may sound bureaucratic but is actually very productive. Too much so as I can now design wargames faster than I can play them, let alone paint figures. Once the requirements are clearly defined it becomes a simple mechanical process to full them out with game mechanisms. For example, if you want your Army Corps to march an average of fifteen miles per day, with a maximum and minimum of twenty and eight miles, then all you have to specify is the rolling of an average die, its score being multiplied by four. If you differentiate leader’s ability, then add or subtract one from the original score to reflect the difference between a Bonaparte and a Melas. This may appear a horribly crude approach to design. It doesn’t matter, as long as your requirements are met, the simpler the design the better. Simple designs are easier to use and require less maintenance as they contain fewer bugs. They need not, however, reduce the interest for the designer. The provision of elegant and simple solutions to complex and often contradictory requirements poses far more of a challenge to the game designer. It is not necessarily easy to produce a game that is easy to play but complex enough in its workings to be interesting. Divide and Rule One way of simplifying game design is to modularize. Logically distinct parts of the system should be separated so the user only has to learn the parts he is interested in. At a basic level this means not muddling the movement rules with the points system. More subtly, it implies broader subdivisions between such things as: Tactical rules needed by junior commanders on the ground/tabletop. Command and control rules needed by the higher command. Logistics rules needed in between face to face confrontations. Strategic attrition and replacements. Weather rules and so on. Some form of loose-leaf presentation should be used to avoid ploughing through a 30-page book every time a picket discharges his flintlock. A personal computer with its facility for ‘menu’ style presentation would be ideal if one had the money. Bending the Rules Another advantage of modularization is a more flexible design. Changing one module need not imply a total rewrite. Flexibility is particularly important where complex hardware (e.g. model soldiers) is needed to play the game. The life of a set of rules may be as short as one game. The life of a toy soldier may be decades. In practical terms this implies not hard-coding any one design by such practices as: Fixed unit sizes: real units vary enormously in numbers. A convenient number of figures under one system may not fit another. I try to collect figures in large multiples like 24 or 36 so that reorganization doesn’t involve redundancy or repainting. Funny base sizes: always try to use the same base size whatever the period. It’s easier to fudge a set of rules than re-base an army. Anyway, base sizes are mostly a matter of what looks best and stops the figures falling over. They can only give a poor reflection of an obscure and intractably variable reality. Napalm in the Morning Apart from the scent of victory, what makes for a good game? There’s more to it than worrying about base sizes, whether one wishes them to conform exactly with the regulations of 19th Vendemaire Year VI or whether one would scrap them entirely as too tidy by half. Either approach shows too much concern for the hardware used and not enough for the overall effect produced. As long as the physical details are broadly correct, then there are other, more important, indicators of the success of a game. Just what these are depends to a degree on personal choice. My own suggestions are as follows: Is the result the outcome of a series of lesser decisions? These obscure the developing situation as some will tilt the advantage one way and some the other. This gives a more satisfactory game as the astute but losing commander can try to pull off before disaster becomes irretrievable. Are the main problems of the game related to the internal Command and Control of the forces rather than reacting to the enemy’s behavior? In reality this is dimly perceived compared with the problems of persuading one’s own troops to do anything. Do strength of will and common sense prove more useful than tactical subtlety which is often only a snare and delusion? Flank attacks look good on maps but tend to cause loss of control, dissipation of effort and hence defeat in detail. It’s often better to simply smash the enemy centre before he has sorted himself out. Is there a low level of information about: The precise effect of ground on movement, until you try it. Enemy morale and equipment: in 1944, British tank crews thought all panzers were Tigers. Precise positions of enemy concentrations, particularly reserves. Lack of such knowledge forces wargamers to operate in depth and even to reconnoiter. Otherwise they risk suffering devastating tactical surprises. Own or enemy reaction time to changes of plan. Actual weapons effects outside broad limits such as: a battery can defend its own front by its fire. Variations in ground and formation cause a wide range of effects that are not always predictable. The lie of the ground may match the trajectory of the enemy’s fire making an apparently safe area into a killing ground. Alternately, a fold in the ground may unexpectedly give cover to a firing line. The saving throws used in many of the original wargames rules gave just this type of uncertainty. Presentation All the above come down in the end to personal preference, despite my assurance in reeling them off. What does not depend on personal preference is the way the design is presented. The purpose of any document is to communicate its contents. If the presentation of an idea obscures it, then the idea might as well not exist. The ultimate test of a game is: can it be played by someone else, without lengthy personal explanations? There are various ways of ensuring it can. One of the best is to “walk-through” the design with someone not particularly involved in the hobby. Wives are good for this as they have few inhibitions about pointing out one’s faults. A walkthrough implies not just reading but paraphrasing what has been written. This is a good test of the effectiveness of your deathless prose as a communications medium. There are some general points about how a game design should be presented: Be brief - the less you say, the less room there is for misinterpretation. Avoid sentences more than twenty-four words long. Use tables where possible rather than text. Use short words and avoid jargon, particularly unmilitary or anachronistic jargon such as ZOC’s, Bounds, Extra Heavy Light Infantry etc. Eschew gratuitous obfuscation (see what I mean?): make it obvious what is going on. Real regiments under fire do not lose organization points. People fall over with exit holes the size of soup plates. When casualties occur, knock the figures over or scatter deaders around. Use a standard set of terms so that other people can tell when you are talking about the same thing and when you aren’t. Programming constructs such as IF, THEN and ELSE or DO UNTIL can also be useful as they enforce a structured approach. Have a glossary so that obscure military terminology can be explained offline. The concepts behind the game are also best explained outside the actual playing rules. Suck It and See The final stage of the game design process might appear to be trying it out. However, playtesting should not be left entirely to the end. Ideas should be tested as they are developed, even if only on paper. Do the results of a given algorithm conform to the requirement? Are the range of possible results both reasonable and acceptable? The more thoroughly a game is prototyped in this way, the fewer nasty surprises await the designers when it is unveiled to Other People. The “Muggergame” technique of developing games by a process of discussion is an excellent way of eliminating bugs from a game before they even get into it. Personal bias, inaccurate assumptions and cloudy analysis will be exposed to criticism before being enshrined in the written word. Even if you don’t want to play all your games as muggergames, the technique is a good way of developing a consensus among a group of wargamers. This need not only be about a game system, but, more significantly, about the sort of historical interpretations that underlay the game. Full Circle The true game designer will find at this point that he still hasn’t reached the end of the road even with a fully tested and perhaps popular set of rules. Playing a game for any length of time produces a whole new mass of requirements. Some of these will be spurious: “Why don’t my Ultra-Heavy Scythed Chariots get better factors against Varangian Guards?” Others will be valid and will start the whole cycle going again. This is not a bad thing and should not cause disappointment. Redesign prevents stagnation but also forces the wargamer to consider different views of a complex and often obscure subject. An appreciation of how these views fit together is not the least important payoff from adopting a positive approach to wargames design. Back to Table of Contents -- Lone Warrior #137 Back to Lone Warrior List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Solo Wargamers Association. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com