Battle of Bannockburn

1314

by Don Featherstone

In June 1314 King Edward II, the unwarlike son of a warlike father, invaded Scotland with the objective of relieving Stirling Castle, whose English defenders had agreed to surrender to the Scots if not aided by Midsummer Day. Robert Bruce, King of Scotland, attempting to intercept the English army, elected to hold a partly open plateau overlooking the marshy valley through which the Bannockburn meandered to join the Forth. His right flank was protected by the burn at the Newmiln bog and the left by a forest on Gillies Hill. The Scots right wing was further protected by 3ft deep pits with a stake in each, lightly covered with sods and branches. Holes (or 'pottes') were dug in the road that ran behind them and iron caltrops with sharp points were strewn over areas where cavalry might be expected to charge.

Bruce divided his army of 8 - 10,000 men into 4 'battles' - the right commanded by his brother Edward, the left by Douglas and the young Stewart of Scotland, the centre by Thomas Randolph, the veteran Earl of Moray, and the reserve under his own command. With the exception of 500 cavalry under Sir Robert Keith, the Marshal, which were stationed about 1/4 mile forward of the left wing, the knights were ordered to fight on foot like heavily armoured infantrymen.

On the afternoon of 23 June Edward's army came into view. It consisted of at least 3,000 heavy horse, 5,000 archers and 15,000 infantry. The cavalry was divided into 10 'battles' in 3 lines of 3 battles each, with the tenth forming an advance guard. It was an impressive array, under gaily-coloured pennons and banners, burnished arms and armour glittering the sunshine.

Two companies of English cavalry came forward to reconnoiter the Scots position and, after Sir Henry Bohun had been killed charging at Bruce, one company was easily repelled by a force of 500 tightly packed Scottish pikemen.

There was no more fighting that day, and the discouraged Edward ordered his men to build a wooden causeway over the marshland so that the packed infantry formations could reach the field of batt1e. Throughout a cold and uncomfortable night, 20,000 men laboriously attempted to cross the stream and bog. Daybreak saw the English main body a cross the stream on the marshy flats milling about in disorder. Only Gloucester's cavalry vanguard was formed up for battle.

This situation so encouraged the Scots that they moved forward in echelon, causing Gloucester, without waiting for archers to support him, to lead his ‘vaward’ uphill in a charge at the Scottish right wing, ‘which was slightly in advance' of the other three 'battles.' The ponderous steeds of the knights lumbered into the forest of outstretched Scottish pikes as the two formations clashed. For a few minutes they stood locked to­gether, then Gloucester fell dead and his demoralised cavalry drew off. But their respite was short. The Scots charged in their turn, bearing down the floundering English soldiers with their pikes. Many of the cavalry were immediately unhorsed, to roll helplessly on the ground among their plunging horses.

Seeking a vantage spot, a body of English archers ran forward to a position on the English right flank, whence they fired unchecked into the packed Scots ranks, bringing down man after man. Seeing this, Bruce ordered Sir Robert Keith and his cavalry to charge diagonally round the fringes of the morass, into them. Caught by surprise in flank, without support and lacking spears, the archers were either cut down or dispersed in all directions, adding to the disorder in the English ranks. The Scottish cavalry so intimidated the English archers that they spent the rest of the battle firing flights of arrows from the rear over the heads of their own troops, doing little damage to their unseen targets.

The nine remaining English cavalry divisions now came lumber­ing up the slope towards the Scottish centre and, as the huge mass of horse and foot locked together, the battle developed into a confused melee between Scots pikemen and English men-at-arms. In such tight order and on such a narrow front only the foremost English ranks could strike the enemy, those in the rear being unable to move. Mounted knights and men-at-arms, in small bodies, made ineffective charges that all failed to break through the pike formations. So it came about that the English archers and spearmen waited in disarray behind their struggling cavalry until the piles of their own dead were so high that any forward movement was impossible. The English formations began to falter and the tidal wave of defeat mounted when thousand of Scottish camp-followers, who had been watching the fight from Gillies Hill, swarmed excitedly down the slopes waving banners and shouting 'Slay! Slay!' Imagining the rabble to be Scottish reinforcements, the English wavered and fled. Soldiers in the rear who had not even struck a blow stared incredulously at comrades fleeing past them, until panic took hold of them too and they ran for their lives, turning the defeat into a rout.

Down the hill came the Scots, driving the English into the bogs of the burn, where they were smothered or drowned, and soon the narrow ravine was choked and bridged over by the slain. Together with some of his knights, King Edward turned tail and galloped off to Stirling Castle, but was refused admittance and struggled on to the Castle of Dunbar. Behind him Stirling surrendered.

Commanders' Classification

Bruce and all his subordinates must be classified as Above Average. King Edward and his commanders, poor tacticians as they were, are undoubtd1y Below Average.

Quality of Troops and Style of Fighting

As an army, the English should have been superior but, on the day, inept leadership, the terrain, fate even, made them inferior to the Scots. The English commanders assumed that Bruce would not attack because he had taken up a defensive position on the hill, and that his tightly packed formations would be decimated by the English archers until they were so weakened that they could be ridden down by heavy cavalry. But this was not the case and the English were defeated, because by 1314 the heavy horseman was no longer master of the battlefield; even brave and determined cavalry could not defeat steady pikemen unless supported by archers, who themselves required the back­ing of heavy troops. Gloucester's cavalry vanguard was too tightly packed to be effective, and its impetuous charged showed a complete and disastrous lack of respect for the Scottish pike formations. Bruce knew that his formations, on suitable ground, could hold their own against cavalry charges, al­though he was aware that the few cavalry in his numerically smaller army could not cope with the English horsemen.

The ill-conceived night march prevented the English from being in any sort of battle order at daybreak, so that they were an easy prey to Bruce's advanced echelons, and were never able to employ even half their numbers. In this truly feudal conflict the English archers, still 30 odd years away from inspiring awe and terror in their foes, were left to fend for themselves, and after being ridden down quite naturally showed reluctance to move without support again. The Scots pikemen were superb. It is instructive to realise that their schiltrons or 'battles' were the formation, on which later commanders built their infantry squares for holding off cavalry, in use even as late as Waterloo in 1815.

Morale

Their successes of the previous day and the sight of the disorganised English at daybreak raised the Scots' morale. The English began the battle with low morale, made worse by the course of the conflict.

Terrain

Bruce made, the terrain an ally of overwhelming strength, justifying 'King' Robert's Testament: “Always fight on foot, positioned on a hill and flanked by woods, with a marsh before you; keep the battle front narrow; lay waste to the land through which the enemy must pass; keep your foe awake all night by noise and mock attacks.”


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