Abbreviations Used in Notes

Brief History- U.S. Army, Far East Command, General Staff, Military Intelligence Section, A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA and Affiliated Units (Tokyo, 1948).

"Daily Intelligence Summary" - U.S. Army, Southwest Pacific Area, General Staff, Military Intelligence Section, "Daily Intelligence Summary and G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation

"Historical Report" - U.S. Army, 112th Cavalry Regiment, "Historical Report, Aitape, New Guinea, 112th Cavalry Regiment, 21 June 1944 to 25 August 1944."

JM 39 - U.S. Army Forces Far East, Military History Section, Japanese Monograph no. 39: Southwest Area Operations Record, 18th Army Operations (March 1944 through August 1944).

Japanese Night- U.S. Army Forces Far East, Military History Section, Combat Japanese Night Combat, pt. 3, Supplement: Night Combat Examples.

"MSJAS" - U.S. War Department, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Special Branch, Military Intelligence Division, "Magic Summary Japanese Army Supplement."

MTRS - Boeicho Boei kenshujo senshishitsu [Japan Self Defense Forces, National Defense College, Military History Department], ed. Minami Taiheiyo Rikugun sakusen 5 Aitape-Puriaka-Rabauru [Imperial Army operations in the South Pacific, vol. 5, Aitape Empress Augusta Bay-Rabaul] (Tokyo: Asagumo shinbunsha, 1975)

PTF, "G-3 Journal" - U.S. Army, 32d Infantry Division, Persecution Task Force, "G-3 Reports, G-3 Journal and File, 32d Infantry Division, Aitape Campaign."

The following SRH series documents used in this paper are in "Index of NSAICSS Cryptologic Documents offered to and accepted by The National Archives of the United States," Record Group 457, National Archives, Washington, DC:

SRH-044 - "War Department Regulations Governing the Dissemination and Security Communications Intelligence," 1943-45.

SRH-059 - "Selected Examples of Commendations and Related Correspondence Highlighting the Achievements of U.S. Signal Intelligence during World War II," 10 January 1946.

SRH-107 - "Problems of the SSO System World War II," August 1952.

SRH-127 - "Use and Dissemination of Ultra in the Southwest Pacific Area," 1943-45.

SRH-140 - "History of the 'Language Liaison Group,' Military Intelligence Service, War Department," 22 September 1945.

SRH-169 - "Centralized Control of U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Activities."

Preface

1. James Jones, WW II (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1975), 97.

2. The exact ratio of support troops to combat troops in SWPA remains unclear. According to John Ellis, The Sharp End. The Fighting Man in World War II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 157, eighteen men were needed in the supply service for each rifleman. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton place the ratio of combat to service troops at one to six in Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943- 1945, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1968), 496-98.

Part I

1. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), 596-97.

2. This information is derived from Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 22; Allied Geographical Section, Southwest Pacific Area, Terrain Handbook 21: New Guinea-Aitape- Wanimo, 21 March 1944; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Papua New Guinea, January 1980.

3. An excellent summation of the Quadrant Conference and its effect on MacArthur's planning may be found in D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 2, 1941-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975), 331-35.

4. Ibid., 335.

5. Brief History, 66-69. Two excellent examples of a critical examination of Ultra in SWPA are Desmond J. Ball, "Allied Intelligence Cooperation Involving Australia During World War II," Australian Outlook: Journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs 32 (December 978):299-309, and D.M. Homer, "Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War II," ibid., 310-27. A negative assessment of Central Bureau may be found in a 10 July 1945 memorandum, ultimately intended for General George C. Marshall, from Maj. Gen. Clayton A. Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Bissell wrote: "Akin has built a signal intelligence empire in Central Bureau which in my opinion, judged by results in other areas and by other agencies, is not very efficient." SRH-169, 76.

6. See, for example, the laments of MIS Special Security Officers in SWPA in SRH-127, 23, 29-34, 181.

7. Officially defined, "Traffic Analysis Intelligence" is the term for information obtained by or inferences drawn from a study of the volume, direction, patterns, and characteristics of the enemy's signal communication system and traffic but without reading the texts of such traffic. See SRH-044, 6.

8. SRH-140, 5. According to Clay Blair, Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1975), 606, U.S. Army troops after a landing on the northeastern New Guinea coast in January 1944 discovered a "trunkful of Japanese army codebooks, buried in the sand along the beach." Presumably this discovery occurred during the Saidor operation conducted by the 128th Regimental Combat Team (126th Infantry and 21st Artillery Battalion).

9. Brief History, 18.

10. Smith, Approach, 6-9. In late February 1944 Allied airmen reported no enemy reaction to their presence over the Admiralties. MacArthur then ordered a reconnaissance in force of the islands. The 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, with attached units, about 1,000 men, made the initial landing on only four days' notice. The cavalrymen surprised the more than 4,000 Japanese defenders and in turn were surprised by the large number of enemy troops. Far from abandoning the islands, the Japanese soldiers had been ordered not to fire at Allied aircraft for fear of revealing Japanese defensive positions. U.S. reinforcements landed shortly after the initial invasion and were able to secure the islands. See Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953), 45-52.

11. Smith, Approach, 9.

12. Brief History, plate no. 9 and accompanying text.

13. Smith, Approach, 12.

14. See Brief History, 28, for an excerpt of the Japanese appreciation. The complete text of the Japanese message appears in MTRS, 29.

15. See David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: Macmillian, 1968), 578-79. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate described Allied aerial operations against the Hollandia airfields in The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 4, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 583- 99. Of the estimated 351 Japanese aircraft at Hollandia, Allied pilots claimed more than 200 destroyed. Ultra sources mention 410 Japanese aircraft, but only 169 in serviceable condition. In any case, 5th Air Force's new tactics, its redeployment and concentration of heavy bombers, and its ability to extend the range of P-38 escorts via wing tanks, resulted in the annihilation of Japanese air power near Hollandia. In addition, based on information gleaned from Ultra, 5th Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft attacked and sank several Japanese resupply ships trying to reach the beleaguered Japanese forces at Wewak.

16. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, The Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 263.

17. MTRS, 458.

18. It is interesting to speculate on the role of Ultra in MacArthur's decision to leap to Hollandia. His Reno III Plan called for an invasion near Hansa Bay, exactly the area the Japanese expected a landing. Perhaps the increased Ultra revelations of early 1944 convinced MacArthur to take the risks involved in the Hollandia operation because he knew the area would be only lightly defended.

19. Kengoro Tanaka, Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II (Tokyo: Japan-Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society, 1980), 83-84. Tanaka was a staff officer assigned to 18th Army.

20. James, Years, 447; Krueger, Down Under, 62-63.

21. Reports of MacArthur, 266,

22. Karl C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), 532-33.

23. U.S. Army, 6th Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Comments on the Aitape Landing," in 6th Army's Combat Notes, no. 3, 15 September 1944, 8 (hereafter cited as "Comments Aitape Landing").

24. The 49th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, an eleven-man detachment of the 629th Ordnance Ammunition Company, a four-man antiaircraft repair team from the 253d Company, and about one-third of the 41st Infantry Division's Light Maintenance Company provided ordnance support. See Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1968), 375-76.

25. "Comments Aitape Landing," 10.

26. U.S. Army, 6th Army, "Training Memorandum Number 6, Headquarters 6th Army," 6 September 1943, and U.S. Army, 6th Army, "Training Memorandum Number 7, Training Program-Rehabilitation of Units," 7 September 1943. 1 am indebted to Professor Jay Luvaas for pointing out these changes in training schedules for SWPA units.

27. For details see Smith, Approach, 116-20.

28. MTRS, 105.

29. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry Regiment, lost 18 killed, 75 wounded, and 8 missing in action. Japanese losses in the 1st Battalion, 78th Infantry Regiment, and two companies of the 80th Infantry Regiment were about 100 killed or wounded. Smith, Approach, 123; MTRS, 75.

30. U.S. War Department, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, 15 June 1944, para. 597.

31. A cursory review of the two pertinent U.S. Army Jungle Warfare manuals, U.S. War Department, FM 31-20, Basic Field Manual: Jungle Warfare, 9 December 1941, and U.S. War Department, FM 72-20, Jungle Warfare, 27 October 1944, reveals the 1944 version superior in its section on march and bivouac and more elaborate in its discussion of attack and defense in jungle terrain. The 1941 version spent as many pages on personal hygiene, disease, and jungle living (15) as it did on tactics. The later edition did devote more space to tactics (37 pages) but still spent fifteen pages on hygiene, disease, and living conditions. Of special significance for the covering force on the Driniumor is the fact that the 1944 edition's chapters on Retrograde Movement and Delaying Action (96-98) are verbatim from the earlier manual (45-46). Similarly, the section on night attack in the 1944 version (83-84) is verbatim from pages 47-48 of the 1941 manual.

32. U.S. War Department, FM 7-20, Rifle Battalion, 1942, paras. 192, 216, 219.

33. Smith, Approach, 126.

34. U.S. Army, Southwest Pacific Area, "Monthly Summary of Operations," May 1944, 10.

35. MTRS, 52.

36. Ibid., 76-80.

37. Ibid., 83. The 32d Division lost one regiment to U.S. submarines northwest of Luzon on 26 April during its move from Shanghai to Manila.

38. The officer flew in a heavy bomber which had dropped off supplies at Wewak and returned to Davao with the officer and eight stranded Japanese pilots.

39. Cited in MTRS, 97, IGHQ Order No. 1030, 17 June 1944.

40. Yoshihara Kane, "Aitape no shito" [The death struggle at Aitape], Bessatsu Chisei, July 1956, 286. Also see JM 39.

41. MTRS, 120.

42. Ibid., 139.

43. JM 39, 101.

44. Yoshihara, "Aitape," 286.

45. MTRS, 103-4 and app. 5, "A go sakusen kogeld" [Instructions for "A" Operation Offensive], Headquarters, 18th Army, 5 May 1944, 468-74.

46. Krueger, Down Under, 71.

47. "Daily Intelligence Summary," nos. 763, 770, 773, 778, 786, 795. Krueger's concern about PTF being bypassed appears in Lt. Col. Millard G. Gray, "The Aitape Operation," Military Review 31 (July 1951):51. Gray was the G-3 for Persecution Task Force. I am indebted to Lt. Col. (Ret.) Theodore C. Florey for bringing this article to my attention.

48. A copy of this message may be found in SRH-059, 53. That single message, however, can be misleading. A glance at the various interpretations and translations of a duplicate message gives the layman an inkling of how complex and difficult decryption and translation into English actually were.

49. "MSJAS."

50. "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 803, 2-3 June 1944.

51. See "MSJAS," no. 80, 7 June 1944; Brief Hi8tory, 23.

52. Krueger, Down Under, 71. Statistical information to support the veteran versus green unit performance in battle may be found in U.S. Army Ground Forces, Plans Section, "Study of AGF Battle Casualties," 25 September 1946, 8 (hereafter cited as "Study of AGF Battle Casualties").

53. Smith, Approach, 132-33. Krueger's preference for the 112th Cavalry RCT also stemmed from his hope to keep the 31st Division intact for future operations.

54. Ibid., 133. General Gill's remark may be found in William H. Gill, Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

55. U.S. Army, 32d Infantry Division, Persecution Task Force, "Report After Action 28 June to 25 August 1944, Aitape, New Guinea," 1 (hereafter cited as "Report After Action").

56. Smith, Approach, 128.

57. Ibid., 130.

58. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the organic 155-mm howitzer support of the 32d Division and Persecution Task Force, had already been sent to the Biak operation.

59. Mayo, Ordnance Department, 377.

60. U.S. Army, 32d Infantry Division Artillery, "Summary of Lessons Learned (Defense Perimeter, Aitape Area) 3 May 1944 to 27 June 1944," extract from "Historical Report, 32d Division Artillery, 30 April- 27 June 1944."

61. Krueger, Down Under, 71.

62. SRH-059, 26. There remains an element of confusion about the provenance of this message. It is cited in SRH-059, but an investigation of the original or "raw" intercepts shows this signal was translated on 18 July 1944 or one week after the Japanese breakthrough. The "MSJAS" for 27 June 1944, however, refers to this identical message as well as SWPA G-2's analysis and comments. Apparently the copy sent to MIS in Washington was a duplicate or retransmission and thus was decrypted and translated at a later date.

63. SRH-059, 26, 51-52; "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 821, 21 June 1944; "MSJAS," no. 76, 2 June 1944, no. 99, 27 June 1944; MYRS, 104, has the original 5 May 1944 attack directive.

64. Tanaka, Operations New Guinea, 203.

65. The scheme of maneuver appeared in the "MSJAS," no. 99, 28 June 1944. What is more remarkable is the fact that after the battle SWPA continued to maintain that a two-pronged attack did occur. See "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 843, 12-13 July 1944; Brief History, 22-25; SRH-059, 26; and "Report After Action," 1-3. Also see Gray, "Aitape."

66. Krueger, Down Under, 71. Hall actually took command at 2400, 27 June.

67. Ibid., 71-72; Gill, Papers.

68. PTF, "G-3 Journal," radio from Krueger to G-2, XI Corps, sent 27 June 1017K and received at 1127K the same day.

69. Ibid.

70. "MSJAS," nos. 99 and 100, 27 and 28 June 1944, respectively; PTF, G-3 Journal; "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 289, 28-29 June 1944.

71. MTRS, 144-45.

72. Smith, Approach, 144.

73. "Report After Action," 3.

74. Ibid., 2. The wording of Krueger's order provides further evidence of his determination to conclude the Aitape campaign in rapid fashion. According to the order, the mission of the reconnaissance in force was "to locate and develop enemy concentrations and force disclosure of his dispositions and intentions . . . ... Cited in "Report of After Action, Eastern Defense Command," 3, appearing in "Report After Action." According to Gray, "Aitape," 52, experienced jungle soldiers in the division did not agree with the concept of a reconnaissance in force.

75. General Gill believed that Krueger did not think a Japanese attack was imminent, so he refused to reinforce the 32d Division and instead ordered the reconnaissance in force. See Gill, Papers.

76. U.S. Army, 6th Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, "Action of an Infantry Battalion at Aitape," in 6th Army's Combat Notes, no. 3, 15 September 1944, 38, 40 (hereafter cited as "Infantry Battalion Aitape").

77. Gill, Papers; interview with Wendell H. Brewbaker, Milwaukee, WI, September 1982.

78. Smith, Approach, 143-45.

79. "MSJAS," no. 113, 11 July 1944.

Part II

1. Interview with Col. Alexander M. Miller III, Dallas, TX, August 1981.

2. U.S. War Department, War Department Replacement Board, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., tab 41, "112th Cavalry Regiment," 12 June 1947, 7 (hereafter cited as Replacement Board). The information about the 112th's unit cohesion is derived from interviews with 112th veterans and correspondence with Col. (Ret.) Philip Hooper, 8 November 1982.

3. "Study AGF Battle Casualties," 3.

4. Ibid.

5. "Historical Report." I am indebted to Claude Rigsby for providing me a copy of this report. Hereafter unless specially identified otherwise, the detailed information on the 112th's operation comes from this "Historical Report."

6. Ellis, The Sharp End, 281.

7. Based on Samuel Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 2:70. The remaining third either could get no food or did not feel like eating.

8. "Historical Report," 16.

9. MTRS, 134.

10. "Historical Report," 2.

11. Replacement Board, 3.

12. "Historical Report," 2.

13. Replacement Board, 7. Also see Smith, Approach, 135.

14. U.S. Army Ground Forces, Dissemination Division, G-2 Section, "Report on Equipment for Jungle Combat Troops," 8 August 1944, 1.

15. Interview with Ray A. Titus, Dallas, TX, August 1981.

16. Italics in original, PTF, "G-3 Journal." Next to the comment another person had written "Yes." The racial overtone may account for the willingness of combat troops to kill Japanese but not Germans as evidenced in Stouffer, American Soldier, 34, where roughly six times as many Americans said that they would "really like to kill" a Japanese soldier as gave a similar response in the case of a German soldier.

17. MTRS, 127; Tanaka, Operations New Guinea, 209.

18. MTRS, 129-30.

19. JM 39, 89-94; Yoshihara, "Aitape," 287.

20. Yoshihara, "Aitape," 287.

21. Ibid., 288.

22. Japanese Night Combat, 605-6.

23. MTRS, 141.

24. Ibid., 142.

25. Japanese Night Combat, 605.

26. Gill, Papers, 9-10. General Gill also stated that he felt neither Krueger nor Hall believed a Japanese attack was imminent. Based on the intelligence reports they received, specifically General Willoughby's 10 July estimate, Gill has a point.

27. Interview with D. M. McMains, Dallas, TX, August 1981.

28. The 3d Battalion's expectation as cited in Smith, Approach, 145; the 112th's as noted in U.S. Army, 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, "Headquarters, 112th Cavalry RCT S-2-3 Journal, 26 June 1944 to 11 August 1944," entry for 07/1631 (hereafter cited as "112th Cavalry S-2-3 Journal"); the 2d Battalion's from "Infantry Battalion Aitape," 38.

29. "Infantry Battalion Aitape," 40.

30. MTRS, 150.

31. Japanese Night Combat, 613.

32. Smith, Approach, 144; "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 841, 10-11 July 1944.

33. Japanese Night Combat, 608.

34. MTRS, 154.

35. Ibid., 155, based on Kawahigashi's recollections. My account of the Driniumor battle is based on MTRS, 153-60; Smith, Approach, 152-58; "Infantry Battalion Aitape," 38-42; and interviews with Thomas E. Bell, Theodore C. Florey, and Karl K. Wilke, Milwaukee, WI, September 1982.

36. At 0120 General Martin sent a terse signal: "C[ommand]P[ost]CO[mpany]E captured. CO E all out of ammunition and cut off."

37. In fact Company E's center platoon remained in position until about 0400 on 11 July, when the men realized that they were surrounded and fought their way out.

38. Company G's account of the battle and its withdrawal appears in "Infantry Battalion Aitape," 41-47. The Company H men had been manning supporting positions in Company E's sector. Martin's message sent at 0525K, appears in PTF, "G-3 Journal." 39. Interview with Serph Smigiel, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 1981. On 10 July 1944 Smigiel was head of a

platoon of Company B, 198th Signal Battalion, assigned directly to XI Corps. See also General Gill's comments on Hall's appreciation of the battle. Gill, Papers.

40. Ibid.

41. "112th Cavalry S-2-3 Journal."

42. See "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 842, 11-12 July 1944, and "MSJAS," no. 114, 12 July 1944.

43. See "Historical Report," 30. Boyce and his men most likely ambushed members of a fortyman, all- volunteer, Japanese long-range patrol led by a Captain Saito. This patrol crossed the Driniumor in the Torricelli foothills around 10 July. Its mission was to infiltrate U.S. lines and reconnoiter American defenses and airfields near Aitape. Despite the ambush, survivors accomplished that mission and returned to control of the 20th Division on 23 July with the results of their two-week patrol.

44. Smith, Approach, 156-57, has a detailed account of the 112th's withdrawal. Martin's comment is from "112th Cavalry S-2-3 Journal," entry for 11 July, 1100K.

45. Smith, Approach, 155-56. Krueger's optimistic assessment probably stemmed from his Ultra-derived awareness of the pitiful condition of Japanese logistics. Martin was not privy to such information.

46. MTRS, 163.

47. As cited in Smith, Approach, 159. Also see ibid., note 10, 159. General Gill recalled, "Anybody that knows anything much about this kind of fighting is that you don't have very long to determine whether this was an overpowering force or whether you were just too weak to resist. You had to get out of there and get back on a stronger position" (Gill, Papers). As expressed in a 19 July 1545 message from Hall to Krueger, Hall's intention was to relieve Gill only of tactical control of Eastern Sector and assign him command of the covering force. According to General Gill, General Martin was "just about played out" after "three or four nights of fighting." General Hall asked Gill who would take over the covering force if he, Hall, brought Martin in for "a chance to rest." Gill volunteered, and the change of command was accomplished (Gill, Papers). General Martin remained as Commander, Eastern Sector, and Assistant Division Commander, 32d Division. According to Professor Jay Luvaas, General MacArthur became more and more loath to approve the relief of senior officers in SWPA because he believed that it reflected poorly on his ability to select qualified subordinates.

48. "Report After Action," 5.

49. As cited in MTRS, 163.

50. Details on "North Force" operations may be found in Smith, Approach, 161-64. A Japanese account of operations against "North Force" appears in MTRS, 162-68.

51. Interview with J. B. Corbitt, Dallas, TX, August 1981.

52. PTF, "G-3 Journal," 11-15 July 1944. The total 105-mm artillery units of fire on hand dropped to 1.6 by 21 July. A supply ship arrived that day with 48,000 rounds of 105-mm ammunition, which built the units of fire to 2.3 by 30 July. Another supply vessel arrived 30 July and brought an additional 43,000 rounds allowing for 2.9 units of fire even with the continued high expenditure. A 105-mm unit of fire was 200 rounds per gun per day. See U.S. Army, 32d Infantry Division, Persecution Task Force, "Report After Action, PTF, 28 June to 25 August 1944, Aitape, New Guinea," annex no. 8, "Ordnance Report," 2 (hereafter cited as PTF, "Report After Action"); and U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), "Report No. 132 USAFFE Board, SWPA Ordnance Questionnaire Inclosure No. 1," 11 August 1944.

53. PTF, "G-3 Journal," 291050K entry.

54. "Historical Report," 47; "112th Cavalry S-2-3 Journal."

55. MTRS, 168-69.

56. Interview with Carlos A. Provencio, Dallas, TX, August 1982.

57. Smith, Approach, 165-66, explains Cunningham's anger.

58. According to one postwar U.S. Army study, troops were thoroughly disgusted with K rations and dehydrated foods. Hunger had to be acute for troops to eat them in proper quantities. Refer to "Report on Equipment for Jungle Combat Troops," 2. See also, "Historical Report," 16: "However, for a period, 'K' ration was issued and it is unsatisfactory over a period of more than three days."

59. PTF, "Report After Action," annex 7, "Quartermaster Operations Persecution Task Force, 27 June to 25 August 1944"; interview with Albert Earl Gossett, Dallas, TX, August 1981.

60. MTRS, 170-71.

61. "Historical Report," supplemented by interviews with Jasper Fortney, Frank Salas, and O. B. Kent, Dallas, TX, 1981 and 1982.

62. MTRS, 171-72. The decrypted parts of the message appeared in the 24 July 1944 "MSJAS." The 79th Infantry had been 18th Army reserve.

63. PTF, "G-3 Journal," 15-19 July 1944.

64. James, Years, 521-42, provides an excellent discussion of the intricate decision-making process that in September finally resulted in approval for MacArthur's Philippine invasion.

65. Smith, Approach, 170.

66. Interviews with Charles C. Brabham and Walter Stocks, Dallas, TX, 1981.

67. MTRS, 179.

68. Ibid., 180.

69. Interviews with Joe H. Stinson, Travis McDermott, and Robert E. Baskett, Dallas, TX, August 1981.

70. MTRS, 182-83.

71. Stinson and McDermott interviews.

72. "112th S-2-3 Journal," entry for 24 July 1600.

73. MTRS, 199.

74. Tanaka, Operations New Guinea, 222.

75. MTRS, 182-85.

76. PTF, "G-3 Journal," Cunningham to Gill, Situation Report 251600K.

77. Smith, Approach, 182.

78. See, for example, "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 859, 28-29 July 1944; no. 860, 2930 July 1944; no. 861, 30-31 July 1944.

79. Details may be found in Smith, Approach, 188-200.

80. Ibid., 184.

81. Yoshihara, "Aitape," 290.

82. MTRS, 184.

83. Ibid., 194-95.

84. Ibid., 189.

85. Ibid., 194-95.

86. "Report After Action," 11. General Hall's daily situation report to General Krueger mentioned this action and noted that two Japanese companies had forced back a battalion, leaving Company G isolated. Several hours later Krueger signaled Hall that "if confirmed," the incident "appears to warrant an investigation." See PTF, "G-3 Journal," entries for 30 July 1944 1100K and 2137K, respectively.

87. "Report After Action," 11.

88. "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 861, 30-31 July 1944, 4.

89. Interviews with Clyde E. Grant, Dallas, TX, August 1981 and 1982.

90. MTRS, 203-5.

91. "Study AGF Battle Casualties," 4.

92. MTRS, 205-6.

93. Ibid., 185, 208.

94. Participants in this final attack included members of the 238th and 239th Infantry regiments, 41st Division, 41st Independent Engineer Battalion, and 66th Infantry Regiment, 51st Division. 95. "Interrogation Report, 2d Lieutenant Nakamura Tomosaburo, 2d Battalion, 239th Infantry," 4 August 1944, in "Historical Report," annex, "Operations and Intelligence Journal and Diary," July 1944.

96. Interview with Claude Rigsby, Dallas, TX, August 1982, and Grant interview.

97. Gossett interview.

98. Krueger, Down Under, app. 4, 381, gives total U.S. casualties for the Aitape campaign as 441 killed, 2,551 wounded, and 16 missing.

Conclusions

1. "Daily Intelligence Summary," no. 871, 9-10 August 1944, 3.

2. Cited in SRH-059, 25. The popular historian Ronald Lewin uses the same source for his interpretation of the Aitape battles in his The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982), 253.

3. See FMs 31-20 and 72-20, Hooper correspondence.

4. References to MacArthur's displeasure with Krueger may be found in Robert L. Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em: General Eichelberger's War in the Pacific, 1942-1945, ed. Jay Luvaas (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972), 176-77, 179, 203, 214, 237.

5. Perhaps the consistency of these officers was their strength. Could any army function smoothly with a dozen George S. Pattons or Douglas MacArthurs, or would their personalities and genius make them unable to work efficiently with the other commanders in their units?

6. While it may be fashionable to dismiss such tactics lightly, they did conserve American lives and make use of the United States' greatest advantage, its undamaged industrial capacity. As Maurice Matloff has lucidly noted, "the Allies had from the beginning accepted the proposition that the single greatest tangible asset the United States brought to the coalition in World War II was the productive capacity of its industry. From the very beginning, American manpower calculations were closely correlated with the needs of war industry." Maurice Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1960), 367. It is possible then to argue that American strategy dictated tactics that relied on materiel superiority to crush its enemies.

7. "Historical Report."

8. This figure is based on the 260 casualty figure cited in Smith, Approach, 184, which covers the period to 31 July 1944. I have extracted the additional 60 casualties from the 112th's "Historical Report," for the period 1-10 August 1944.

9. "Study of AGF Battle Casualties," 12.

10. Several 112th Cavalry veterans do not recall or believe that they became progressively wearier or their sense and reflexes duller as the campaign ground along. They may have been the strongest and most adaptable and thus did not experience the physical and mental exhaustion that others said they suffered.

11. "Study of AGF Battle Casualties," 6.

12. Ibid., 11.

13. These strength figures are based on U.S. Army, 112th Cavalry Regiment, "Morning Reports" for July and August 1944. Simply subtracting the August figure from that of 1 July is misleading because the 112th received reinforcements, replacements, and casuals during the fighting. What the figures do show is the dramatic erosion of manpower in line combat units.

14. Ellis, The Sharp End, 162. Incomplete statistics by branch of service for U.S. Army soldiers killed in action in Vietnam also bear out the grim fact that the infantry suffers most. Approximately 69 percent of all enlisted men killed in Vietnam were infantry, and infantry officers accounted for 44 percent of all officers killed. The difference in percentage killed between infantry officers and men is explained, in part because 25.2 percent of total officers killed were Aviation Branch, which reduces the relative percentage of infantry officer casualties. In absolute terms, however, infantry officers and men suffered equally. Figures based on U.S. Army, The Adjutant General Center, "Casualty Extract: Active Army Killed During Vietnam War," 27 July 1982. The AG Center compiled this special casualty study for the author.