The Russian winter defeated Napoleon, as every Frenchman knows. It also defeated Hitler, as most Germans know. Many Americans share that "knowledge" - which is false in both cases! Those popular myths illustrate the uncritical acceptance and perpetuation of rationalizations designed to obscure the fact that those "invincible" Western military paragons were humbled by the "inferior" Russians.

This paper will not discuss either of those ill-fated campaigns in detail. However, in regard to the claims of "General Winter," it should be noted that the main body of Napoleon's Grande Armee, initially at least 378,000 strong, [1] diminished by half during the first eight weeks of his invasion [2] before the major battle of the campaign. This decrease was partly due to garrisoning supply centers, but disease, desertions, and casualties sustained in various minor actions caused thousands of losses. [3]

At Borodino on 7 September 1812--the only major engagement fought in Russia- Napoleon could muster no more than 135,000 troops, [4] and he lost at least 30,000 [5] of them to gain a narrow and Pyrrhic victory almost 600 miles deep in hostile territory. The sequels were his uncontested and self-defeating occupation of Moscow and his humiliating retreat, which began on 19 October, before the first severe frosts later that month [6] and the first snow on 5 November. [7]

Hitler's plans also miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather; he was so confident of a lightning victory that he did not prepare for even the possibility of winter warfare in Russia. Yet his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties (about 23 percent of its average strength of 3,200,000 troops) [8] during the first five months of the invasion, and on 27 November 1941, General Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported that "We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and materiel. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter." [My italics.] [9]

Although the plans of both of those would-be conquerors of Russia failed before the arrival of winter, there is no denying that snow and severe frost contributed greatly to the magnitude of their subsequent problems and casualties. This study addresses those aspects of warfare in the vicinity of European Russia. The harsh climate of that region can be an indiscriminate killer, and the successful army must adapt to winter conditions. In the following examples, all illustrating combat in northern and subarctic European Russia, both Russians and their opponents paid the ultimate price when they overlooked this reality.

Before turning to specific operations, it may be useful to list some of the pertinent environmental factors and their military ramifications. The obvious special conditions encountered in the northern latitudes are: extreme cold, deep snow, short days, and-in most subarctic locales-dense coniferous forests, sparse population (and consequently few ready-made shelters), and poor and widely separated roads. Their military corollaries are also readily apparent [10] :

• Mobility and logistical support are restricted. Roads and runways can only be kept open by plowing or compacting the snow. Cross-country transport-if possible at all-requires wide-tracked vehicles or sleds.
• Infantrymen moving through deep snow rapidly become exhausted.
• Extended marches require skis or at least snowshoes.
• Without special lubricants firearms and motors may freeze up and become inoperative at subzero temperatures.
• Human efficiency and survival require adequate shelter. If not available locally, portable shelter must be provided.
• Frostbite* casualties may exceed battle losses unless troops wear proper clothing, including warm gloves and footgear.
• Speedy removal of the wounded from the battlefield to shelter is essential to prevent even minor wounds from resulting in death from exposure.