About 0830 on 31 March the Reds cut the phone lines between Obozerskaya and the road positions, and later in the morning three battalions of the 2d Moscow Regiment flanked the Allies on the north and attempted to capture two 75-mm guns from the rear. Lieutenant Lukovsky, the White Russian in charge of those pieces, reversed them in time to get off four rounds of shrapnel at point-blank range. His action, coupled with the effective fire of Corporal Pratt's Lewis gun* team (Company M, 339th Infantry), halted the attack with heavy losses to the Muscovites.

*The Lewis gun was a gas-operated, air-cooled light machine gun with a horizontal drum magazine which held 47 rounds of .30-inch caliber ammunition; its rate of fire was about 500 rounds per minute.

Thereafter the fighting shifted to the frontal positions, where the Reds launched repeated attacks from the direction of Bolshie Ozerki throughout the day. All failed under the devastating fire from the forward blockhouse and the frontline posts, and Allied artillery took an added toll of the enemy until darkness brought a lull in the battle.

The main Soviet effort began on 1 April about 0330 (shortly after daybreak) with determined frontal attacks and a weaker demonstration in the rear. Inflicting heavy losses, the defenders drove back these and all subsequent attacks with the same effective machine gun, rifle, and artillery fire. [25] At times they even used rifle grenades when the attackers came within their 200-yard range. [26]

Several deserters who crossed the lines intermittently on that April Fool's Day revealed demoralization within the Red units; they reported that an entire company of the 97th Saratov Regiment had refused to advance. [27] 

Nevertheless, because the Allies were still outnumbered and because the fighting was so protracted and intense, the Allied command ordered a diversionary attack on Bolshie Ozerki from the west to relieve the pressure on the units so heavily engaged east of that village.

As envisioned in the operations order for the diversionary blow, Company C of the 6th Yorkshire Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Marsh, would move along a trail through the woods to flank the village from the north. A White Russian officer had recently reconnoitered the trail, and Lieutenant Marsh had Russian guides. Captain Bailey's Company A (Yorkshires) would advance along another trail made about a week earlier; a detachment moving along the main road leading into the village from the northwest would protect its right flank. Bailey would be assisted by an American trench mortar detachment and a machine gun team from Company H, 339th Infantry, which would also provide two infantry platoons for the reserve. Part of a White Russian machine gun company would also support the two Yorkshire companies. A company of Polish troops was to advance along the main road and to deploy south of the roadway upon enemy contact. [28]

This counterblow, however, was no more successful than the Soviet offensive that continued at the same time. The Allies had fixed zero hour for 0300 on 2 April, but at 0200 Lieutenant Marsh reported that his company was lost in the woods, that his horses were belly-deep in the snow, and that he could not proceed. Thus one of the main elements in the attack was neutralized until it returned to the main road, far from its objective, about 0510. By then the Poles had suffered heavily and had retired from the battle temporarily. By 0610 Company A was partially surrounded and forced to yield ground. Captain Bailey was killed about this time, and his successor, Lieutenant Goodloss, ordered a withdrawal. Lt. Clifford Phillips's platoon (Company H, 339th Infantry) rushed up from the reserves to cover the British pullback. [29] In the subsequent delaying action, that American officer was also mortally wounded. [30]

The remainder of the day witnessed mostly artillery and mortar exchanges, until Red pressure on both flanks provoked a successful Allied counterattack about 1730. The Reds disengaged around 1900, and about an hour later the Allies began withdrawing under the cover of darkness to their quarters at settlements in the rear. By then they were suffering from exhaustion, and there were many cases of severe frostbite. [31]

Soviet operations at the road position east of Bolshie Ozerki had resumed on 2 April with an exceptionally heavy artillery and mortar barrage, answered by an effective counterbarrage. Only weak infantry attacks were attempted, however, and even they petered out by noon. The costs of the previous attacks apparently decided the issue: there were no more attacks after 2 April, [32] and by the fifth the Reds were withdrawing from the area.

Further delay would have risked the loss, or at least prolonged immobilization, of their guns and sleighs in the spring mud. [33] Those fierce engagements at the turn of the month were the last major battles of the campaign in northern Russia. The Soviet forces had been temporarily checked, and the Allies began to evacuate as soon as Arkhangelsk was reopened to navigation.

In the battles around Bolshie Ozerki, the defense won both of the main rounds: the Allies defended their road positions, and the Reds defended Bolshie Ozerki. Both attacking forces suffered heavy casualties from exposure to the weather, although the days were sunny and the nighttime temperatures by then were no worse than a relatively mild -200C (-40F). [34]

By day the sunshine melted the snow, which soaked through the canvas tops of the Shackleton boots and caused more cases of frostbite among the Allied troops than they had experienced during the coldest days of winter [35] when temperatures sometimes dropped below -40'. (= -40degrees F)

Their enemies suffered even heavier losses; a Soviet source acknowledges more than 500 frostbite casualties in the brigade from Kamyshin alone. [36] In view of that, Allied estimates of 2,000 Red casualties from all sources may have erred on the conservative side. [37]

One reason for those excessive Soviet losses was that the Red command recklessly committed the brigade that arrived from the milder climate of the southern Volga before it could receive proper clothing; it had neither the felt boots (valenki) nor the sheepskin coats issued to other Sixth Army units. [38] Nevertheless, the mere fact that thousands of Soviet troops were deployed in the open for days on end doomed many to freeze to death or to suffer frostbite.

The operations near Shenkursk in January 1919 provided examples of other pertinent problems. Having occupied that imposing district center of several thousand inhabitants in September, [39] the Allies had had time to fortify it strongly. When the crisis described below developed in January, the Allies had sufficient provisions to last two months, and the garrisoncounting the outposts in nearby villages-totaled about 1,700 American, British, Canadian, and White Russian troops. [4]

They undoubtedly could have taken a terrible toll of any force attacking them in winter. The town, however, was situated on the frozen Vaga River more than 200 miles southeast of Arkhangelsk, far in advance of any Allied positions on either flank [41] and therefore highly vulnerable to encirclement. General Ironside ordered the local commander, Colonel Graham, to evacuate at once if the enemy attempted an enveloping movement. [42] 

Commander Samoilo had in mind just such an operation, one intended not only to destroy the Shenkursk garrison, but also to seize the mouth of the Vaga north of the town. [43] He made elaborate preparations for the offensive, deploying at least 3,100 infantry [44] for coordinated attacks from three directions. The supporting artillery included several 4.2-inch howitzers [45] and one 6-inch gun. [46]

A detachment of about 150 local partisans was detailed to strike at Shegovari, a village some twenty-five road miles to the rear (north) of Shenkursk, held by about ninety Americans. [47] Two other partisan units of similar size were to reconnoiter, harass the enemy flanks, select populated points along the march routes, and stock them in advance with provisions, fodder, and medicine. [48] Although white camouflage coveralls were not available, some of the units prepared for surprise attacks by removing their sheepskin coats and substituting quilted trousers and jackets, over which they wore long white peasant shirts and white pants. Thus blending into the snowy landscape, they could not be detected beyond 50-125 feet. [49]

The largest of the three main detachments, led by future Soviet Lieutenant General Filippovsky, consisted of more than 1,300 infantrymen, [50] six heavy guns, [51] and twenty-one machine guns. [52] Assigned the task of a frontal assault, it bore the brunt of the actual fighting, [53] which took place primarily at the outposts south of Shenkursk. Nizhnyaya Gora, farthest from the town-about fifteen miles-was hit first and hardest. The only troops there when Samoilo's massive blow fell were the forty-seven men of the 4th Platoon of Company A, 339th Regiment, and even that small unit was divided: Lt. Harry Mead had twenty-two men at the exposed southern point, and a sergeant was in charge of twenty-three others at the other end of the village. To the left rear, a company of Cossacks held the neighboring village of Ust'Padenga. About a mile farther to the rear, at Vysokaya Gora, the remainder of Captain Odjard's Company A manned five sturdy blockhouses on a commanding bluff, supported by two light guns which were serviced alternately by Canadian and White Russian gunners. In all three villages Captain Odjard had a total of 450 riflemen, eighteen machine guns, and two artillery pieces. [54]

Early on the morning of 19 January, when the mercury hit -360C (-33'F) [55] Filippovsky's powerful guns shook Nizhnyaya Gora from positions beyond the range of the smaller Allied pieces. [56] From their tiny outpost Lieutenant Mead's half platoon saw far across the frozen Vaga River hundreds of dark figures advancing slowly through powder snow, which varied in depth from three to more than four feet. [57]

Just before they came within small-arms range, the barrage lifted, and the Americans were stunned by the sudden appearance of about 100 to 150 ghostly white- clad figures 58 who rushed them on three sides from nearby snowdrifts into which they had crept undetected before dawn. Within seconds a bitter fight was underway, and the Allied machine guns tore into the attackers with great effect.

But Mead's hopelessly outnumbered men were also taking losses, and he ordered a hasty retreat. When the survivors joined the remainder of the platoon at the rear of the village, they faced a terrible prospect: their only route to the security of Vysokaya Gora lay down a hill, across a valley 800 yards wide, and up another hill to the friendly blockhouses-the entire distance through deep snow with no protective cover. As they struggled through the snow drifts, they made perfect targets, and only seven of the platoon's original forty-seven members made it unscathed to friendly shelter. [59]

The Reds had lost an estimated 150 men, [60] and the hundreds who swarmed into Nizhnyaya Gora were no doubt exhausted from their own long march through the snow; consequently, there was no determined pursuit on that day. Filippovsky seemed content for the moment to wear down the defenders with his artillery, which fired about 1,000 rounds on the nineteenth and 800 the next day. [61] The Cossack company at Ust'Padenga departed under the cover of darkness and reached Vysokaya Gora undetected on the night of the nineteenth. [62]

Red Attack

From 20 to 22 January it was the Reds' turn to face the ordeal of crossing the open valley below Vysokaya Gora. Canadian gunners, firing shrapnel from their commanding positions on the hilltop, slaughtered the Soviet infantry struggling through the snow below them. A Soviet source acknowledges that one of the Red battalions lost half its men in those unsuccessful attacks. [63] The Allied defenses stood firm, but on the evening of 22 January Colonel Graham ordered Captain Odjard to retire on Shenkursk, because it had become obvious that the town was the main Red objective. [64]

Odjard's weary troops had scarcely reached Shenkursk, late in the afternoon of 24 January, when Colonel Graham decided to evacuate that town without a fight, in compliance with General Ironside's standing order. The day before, the partisan raid had been carried out at Shegovari, and reconnaissance had revealed that Soviet forces held nearly all of the roads from Shenkursk. Enemy artillery was shelling the town from the northwest, the northeast, and the south, [65] and communications to the rear were severed in the afternoon. [66] A successful withdrawal was already problematical; to remain longer meant slow but nearly certain annihilation. In fact, by midnight all three of Samoilo's main columns were in their designated positions in nearby villages, ready to begin a coordinated attack on the morning of the twentyfifth. [67]

The escape of the entire Allied force, approximately 1,500 troops accompanied by about 500 civilians, was due to a combination of intelligent leadership, strict march discipline, and sheer luck. In silent but determined flight during the night of 24-25 January, the evacuating column followed a little-used winter trail that the Reds had overlooked. [68]

Lt. Hugh McPhail of Company A ingeniously ordered his platoon to cut off their cumbersome overcoats at knee length, a precaution for which they were thankful on the long and difficult march that covered thirty-five to forty miles in two days. [69] The awkward Shackleton boots, however, caused more trouble. After struggling along precariously on the icy trail that night, many soldiers discarded those boots and continued in stocking feet-which led to disabling frostbite. [70]

Shenkursk was an important psychological and tactical victory for the Sixth Army, but Commander Samoilo acknowledged that it failed in two of its main objectives: it did not destroy the Allied garrison or capture the mouth of the Vaga River. [71]

Among the causes for those disappointments enumerated by his military commissar, Nikolai N. Kuzmin, was the fact that the attackers did not pursue aggressively because, after twelve days of slim rations and exposure to severe frost, the comforts and vast stores of provisions at Shenkursk proved irresistible. [72] Samoilo also noted that this operation served as a school for his troops, especially by demonstrating the need for ski training. [73]

Although a detailed description of all the Allied positions and local engagements is impractical, certain additional aspects of the campaign in northern Russia warrant attention for their technical lessons. At Obozerskaya Allied troops lived in 257 converted railroad boxcars. (The same improvised shelters were used at Murmansk.) Remodeled, insulated, and heated with small sheet-iron stoves, they were warm and comfortable, [74] although one veteran of the expeditionary force remarked that they were "most unhygienic." [75]

Both sides recognized the value of skis, but neither had enough troops trained to use them. For example, a Soviet ski battalion from Vyatka (modern Kirov), destined for and needed by the Sixth Army, had to be assigned instead to the Third Army. [76] The British employed a Finnish officer to train Company D of the 6th Yorkshire Regiment as a mobile ski column; however, in its first three weeks of combat, it suffered 160 cases of frostbite (compared to only eighteen battle casualties). [77]

Snowshoes were also used on occasion, but a major Allied experiment with them proved a disappointment. Captain Barbateau, an experienced French Canadian woodsman, ordered several thousand pairs of appropriate snowshoes from Canada, but they were shipped to Murmansk instead of Arkhangelsk. He therefore had to use the "bear paw" type issued by British Ordnance. Oval hoops about eighteen inches long, they were too small to support a man's weight in the dry and powdery snow of the northern Russian winter. He nevertheless trained several platoons of White Russians to use them and proudly dubbed his detachment "Les Coureurs de Bois."

Their first combat mission was a flank attack on Emtsa in December, as part of a larger operation designed to capture Plesetskaya. Floundering in the deep snow in the woods, his men covered only a kilometer or so an hour. During the first day they progressed only about six miles-less than halfway to their objective. Even then they were so exhausted that Barbateau requested a two-day rest before proceeding, and the whole operation was called off before his detachment could engage the enemy. [78]

The extreme cold caused many weapons to become inoperative. Lt. John Baker (of the 339th Infantry) reported an engagement on 30 December during which all of his Lewis guns were either frozen or broken. [79] In an operation on 5 December, a strong Allied detachment was preparing to attack a superior Red force northeast of Shenkursk. The Allies narrowly escaped disaster when, just before the scheduled assault, they learned that neither the automatic cannon nor the Vickers* machine guns were working because their oil had frozen.

*The Vickers was a water-cooled, recoil-operated, tripod-mounted medium machine gun fed by a fabric belt holding 250 rounds of .303-inch caliber ammunition; its rate of fire was about 500 rounds per minute.