In 1999, the Northern Ohio Wargaming Society conducted a campaign game based on the Avalon Hill "Roads to Gettysburg" board game. The resulting battle was resolved with 15 mm ACW figures using the Fields of Honor System at the brigade level. In addition to an overall commander, each side had a separate person to command each infantry or cavalry corps.

The campaign game is noteworthy in that it concluded in a war-ending decisive Southern victory, hence, giving a sobering insight into what could have happened in 1863. Below is a summary of the campaign report that was distributed to the participants. To best understand the movements, remember that the game was played with strictly limited intelligence as to the other side's movements. Players conducted their own movements in a true fog of war environment. Use either the Avalon Hill game map or any other good Civil War era map as a reference for the place names. There is an excellent map on page 347 of "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" that contains most of the place names.

Detailed below is a summary of the campaign and battle.

Milestones on the Road to Ruin

Between June 22-25, 1863, Confederate Army of Northern Virginia advances into Pennsylvania, ignoring the Harpers Ferry garrison. On June 26, the Army of the Potomac advance guard consisting of the I, III and the XI Corps enters the map area. The Union commits two of the first three corps to march to Harpers Ferry. Specific intelligence provided by cavalry from the Harpers Ferry garrison that the Confederate are not concentrating nearby is ignored. The remaining I Corps moves north alone. It is dangerously close to the mountains and without close cavalry support.

On evening of June 27, the scout Harrison briefs the Confederate commanders that the I Corps is moving north alone and is a full day and half march from any support. Throughout much of the early part of the campaign, the Confederates also kept major portions of the federal army under direct observation from an outpost located on top of the Catoctin Mountains west of Fredrick. Information gathered by them, along with the report from Harrrison, is the basis for the Confederate plan outlined below.

The Confederates bait a trap on June 28. Pender, McLaws, and Pickett are dispatched to strike at the I Corps while much of the remainder of the army begins to shift toward the southeast. The Confederates deduce that if the I Corps is imperiled the Union Army will rush to concentrate there leaving the Baltimore area undefended. Rodes is recalled from the northern Cumberland Valley leaving only one brigade behind to threatened Harrisburg. Hood is dispatched to Williamsport on the Potomac River to defend the Confederate line of communication against Union forces around Harpers Ferry.

Also on the 28th, having not found any Confederates at Harpers Ferry, the Union XI Corps begins to return from Harpers Ferry to the main theater of operations. The III Corps remains in the Cumberland Valley to cut the Confederate line of communications at Williamsport. A heavy rain slows progress this day and the next.

A limited engagement occurs on June 29 when the Union I Corps runs into the divisions of Pender and Picketts near Emmitsburg. It is saved from being flanked by McLaws by the lingering effects of rain and by the chance presence of two cavalry brigades from the second echelon of Union reinforcements. McLaws is sufficiently delayed by cavalry rearguard actions so as to allow the I Corps to escape to the south.

Throughout June 30th the Union forces rush to concentrate around the I Corps south of Emmitsburg. Pickett, Pender and McLaws follow the rest of the Confederate army to the southeast toward Baltimore. The Confederate forces are now partly interposed between the Army of the Potomac and Washington.

On the evening of June 30, a dispatch rider from the Confederate III Corps to the ANV HQ is intercepted by Union cavalry under Huey near Westminister. General Mead is advised the leading elements of the ANV are east of Westminister and threatening Baltimore. General Hill is advised that his dispatches have been lost.

On July 1 and 2, the Union forces pursue the Confederates to the southeast. The Confederate III Corps is east of Westminister near the Hanover Pike where Stuart makes contact with General Hill. Rodes is returning from the Cumberland Valley. The Union III Corps begins to return via rail movement from the Harpers Ferry area. The Confederate army is now concentrated in and around Riesterstown and located between the Union army and Baltimore.

Confederate infantry enters Baltimore on July 2 to the joy of its pro-southern citizens. The governor and many of the members of the state legislature are freed from prison where they had been held without trial for two years. A rump session of the state legislature meets and Maryland secedes from the Union.

Also on July 2, Hood begins a five day forced march from Williamsport (west of Harpers Ferry) to the east along the National Road. During this time the Union forces will completely lose track of him. On the eve of battle (July 6) Hood will finish his march and will start on the battlefield the next morning. Hood's impact is even greater because he brings with him the fourth and fifth brigades from Pickets Division (Corse & Jenkins) which had been left behind in Virginia at the beginning of the campaign. The 2,500 man loss to march attrition is a high price to pay but these additional six brigades will prove decisive for the Confederates.

The Union army decided to turn the Confederate right flank at Riesterstown on July 3. This movement leaves them marching north away from Washington D.C. for most of a day, while the Rebel army marches south. An opportunity to turn the Confederate left flank is missed. The Army of Northern Virginia is now directly between the Army of the Potomac and Washington D.C. Confederate raiders cut the B&O at Fredrick Junction and other locations. The Second Division of the Union III Corps is marooned at Harpers Ferry. The Confederates decide to abandon their position at Riesterstown and move to a stronger position behind the Patapsco River at Ellicott Mills.

Between July 4-6 both armies concentrate toward the Ellicott Mills area. The War Department moves the Union III Corps (now out of command control) to Laural, MD, near Washington D.C., where a new Second Division is formed from two brigades from the Washington area (Briggs & Spinola). The War Department sends a dispatch rider on the long ride around the Army of Northern Virginia. He carries the message to Mead that the III Corps will attack into Elk Ridge Landing (six miles east of Ellicott Mills) from the south on the morning of July 7th. This attack is intended to assist the Army of the Potomac across the Patapsco River beyond the Confederate right flank. It will also get them back between the national capital and the Army of Northern Virginia. The Army of the Potomac elects instead to turn the Confederate left flank and marches away to the southwest. A request by the Army of the Potomac to the War Department to redirect the III Corps to more westerly axis of advance does not arrive soon enough to change their orders.

The Battle of Ellicott Mills

The Battle of Ellicott Mills opens on the evening of July 6 when the XI Corps, acting on its own initiative, forces a crossing of the Patapsco River at Marriotsville beyond the Confederate left flank. The Confederates are caught anticipating an attack on their right flank where the Union III Corps is already south of the river and could assist in the crossing. The Army of Northern Virginia has only the division of Early and one cavalry brigade guarding the Patapsco River crossings west of the Ellicott Mills area. This is where the chance presence of Hood in the area becomes important. Despite Hood, a very brief window of opportunity opens for the Union to drive into the Confederate left flank. The Confederates are aware of this peril but after heated debate they elect to make a stand rather than retire to Virginia with a minor victory.

On the morning of the 7th, General Early's confederate division delays the advance of six Union Corps for three crucial hours at the Woodstock crossing of the Patapsco River, while the southern army redeploys to meet the threat to their left flank. The Confederate army is able to concentrate on the north-south trending high ground running from Saint Charles College to the river.

Throughout the remainder of the 7th, the Union makes a series of uncoordinated piecemeal attacks on Saint Charles College Ridge. The option of massing the entire army for an attack the next day and bringing the III Corps around to enter from the south is not considered. All of the attacks are repulsed. Later, old men will thump their chests and say what brave charges they were.

The Union Army withdraws from the battlefield. Like most ACW engagements, this one was largely decided by the maneuvering of the armies prior to battle.

Aftermath

On July 9, the U.S. Government abandons Washington D.C. and moves to New York City. The Army of the Potomac is ordered to redeploy into Pennsylvania. Mead is removed from command and court martialed. General Reynolds assumes command of the Army of the Potomac (now 50 miles north of its namesake river).

In the Fall, 1863, faced with this new debacle, anti-Lincoln sentiment explodes throughout the north. Great Britain and France establish diplomatic relations with the Confederacy and offer to mediate an end to the war based on a permanent separation of the states. They also demand that neutral flagged merchant ships be allowed to resume free trade with the south.

The war to save the Union has been lost.

Gamemaster's Analysis

The five most important events leading to the defeat of the Union forces were:

1. The commitment of two of the three leading Union corps to enter the map to march to Harpers Ferry on June 26. The Union forces never seemed recover their balance. Much of the rest of the game seemed to flow from this bad start.

2. The Confederate plan to strike at the Union I Corps at Emmitsburg with a few divisions while moving the rest of their army to the southeast worked. The Union forces rushed there while the Confederates marched east toward Baltimore and Washington.

3. Deciding to turn the Confederate right flank at Riesterstown allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to completely interpose itself between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Now, it was only a question for the Confederates to find that high ground to concentrate on. Longstreet's dream had come true.

4. The heroic march of Hood to the battlefield and the failure of the Union forces to keep track of or delay him completed the strategic debacle.

5. Two Union Corps, reinforced by a unit of the Artillery Reserve and two cavalry brigades, hesitate to mount a vigorous attack on the lone Confederate division holding the ford at Woodstock early on the morning of the first full day of battle. The three-hour delay in opening this road is all the Confederates need to redeploy the army to face the threat to their left flank.

Final Note

Watching this campaign develop in slow motion into a Union disaster gave a sobering insight into what could have happened in 1863. I am most grateful that this was just a game that could be forgotten and not real history.