Part 1

(Editor's Note: Last issue, Clinton Reilley began a series on how computer- moderated rules should work. His first article examined the concept of "casualtie so as opposed to "losses," and which is a more effective indicator of decreasing unit morale. He continues this issue by looking at levels of casualties, and how they differed in various time periods.)

The Historical Levels of Casualties and Losses

Now we come to the second aspect of the debate - How have casualty levels differed over time?

The best quantitative historical perspective seemed to come from Dupuy's work. In his book, Understanding Warfare(especially Chapter 13) and Understanding Defeat, Dupuy discusses casualties, losses and their effect in different periods of history. After extensive research, he concludes that as we go back in time the average casualties suffered per day by a large body of troops actually increases dramatically, contrary to popular wisdom. So much for the idea that casualties are becoming higher and so are an increasingly reliable measure of unit effectiveness.

This view however is so contrary to intuition that it does need further explanation and substantiation. In broad terms, it seems that as the power of weapons grows, troops are motivated to take increasingly effective counter measures to survive. These counter measures can be summarised under the two headings Dispersion (with a related issue of Command & Control) and Proximity to the Enemy.

Dispersion

For example, in the later half of the 19th Century, as longer range, faster firing weapons were widely adopted, troops in turn adopted defensive measures such as the skirmish (dispersed) formation and entrenching. This made them harder to pick out and hit, thus contributing to a reduction in casualty levels. This trend has escalated over time, thus making the modern battlefield comparatively devoid of targets.

The following table demonstrates this by comparing the area occupied by a large body of troops over history. The average density of troops in combat formations increased from about 10 square meters in Ancient times to about 27,500 square meters in World War 11. Dupuy has reduced this to a comparative index and, as you can see, the field of battle becomes much more "target rich" as we travel back in time.

Comparitive Index of Troop Density

Ancient Armies 1
Napoleonic Era 20
American Civil War 25
World War I 250
World War II 3,000
1970s 4,000
1980s 5,000

The reverse side of the coin is that troops in a dispersed formation tend to be less subject to command and control, particularly without wireless communications. Consequently, they tend to fire more wildly or not at all (in the Pacific Theatre of World War II, research indicates that only about 25% of troops used their firearms). Consequently, the fire of units is much less effective anyway, as well as being targeted on a more elusive enemy.

With less command and control, the troops are also much more prone to conceal themselves and not play a part in the battle. In this regard, John Keegan talks of "internal desertion" in a variety of battles from Trafalgar to Dien Bien Phu. At a battle like Trafalgar, troops who have had enough try to flee to the relative safety of the Orlop deck and conceal themselves amongst the wounded and dead. In a modern battle like Dien Bien Phu, troops concealed themselves in hideouts and lived on supplies stolen from parachute drops. In both cases they were not casualties, but were completely lost to the fighting strength of the unit.

Command & Control

As troops become more dispersed, they can be subjected to less control. Consequently, fire control is reduced and the personal effect of officers on troops is reduced. Keegan's discussion of the need for "bully boys" to provide "physical coercion" to make men fight is also relevant. Consequently, men could be forced to fight in earlier times and the steady trickle of losses could be controlled to a greater extent. In earlier times such as the 18th Century, the potential for physical coercion was much higher due to the close packed formations and the close proximity of officers and NCOs.

Proximity to the Enemy

Proximity relates to the distance at which combatants engage each other. The distance at which troops engaged began to increase considerably after the mid-19th Century. During the Gunpowder era, until about 1860, troops typically engaged in fire fights at about 50-100 yards. You could even shout out to the enemy you fought. In Ancient times, the combatants fought in even closer proximity to each other.

If combatants are in close proximity, as in Ancient times, then the potential for disaster is higher. A unit that is put at a considerable disadvantage (e.g., forced to recoil in disorder) has little time to recover. Its disadvantage can be exploited almost instantaneously by the enemy. When units are at a distance, a disadvantaged unit has a better chance of disengaging and recovering.

Increase dispersion and proximity seem to be increasingly more effective in reducing casualties. Dupuy explains this much more thoroughly than I can here, so I will not try to duplicate his work. However, in summary, he does show that compared to the daily percent casualties sustained by units in World War II, other periods were much higher. This is shown on the following table which uses the historical computer database of HERO.

Average Daily Loss Rate for about 15,000 - 20,000 men (Approx.)

World War II 5%
World War 1 10%
American Civil War 15%
Napoleonic War 20%
Seven Years War 25%
Ancient Period 30%

The trend has continued into modern times to the point where casualty levels are no longer particularly useful at all as they are typically so low. Instead, the effect of modern weapons has to be represented by the strongly psychological phenomena of "suppression" and "neutralisation."

Suppression is a term used to describe a situation where a unit comes under fire and becomes ineffective for the duration of the attack, but then returns fire and continues on. In other words, the troops dive for cover and keep their heads down under a withering fire, but once the fire slackens, will continue on. It is still a fighting force. Neutralisation is like suppression, but with the difference that the unit does not continue on after the attack. It is no longer a fighting force and so is ineffective and lost to the combat strength of the army. A unit may or may not suffer casualties when it is neutralised.

Once again, there is no clear relationship between casualties and unit collapse on the modern battlefield. Modern warfare seems to produce fewer average casualties, but a much higher level of losses. Losses, in fact, are a major factor on the modern field of battle.

In the next article the issue of losses will be examined.