I recently visited the battlefield of Bou Gafer in the Jebel Sarhro range of mountains in southern Morocco. This is a barren and desolate but strangely evocative place. Today little remains of the debris of the battle but I did obtain a fragment of a 75mm shell case which I presented to a museum in Marrakech. The visit spurred me on to learning more about this little-known action, almost the last phase in the French 'pacification' of Morocco, and the following account is based on my researches at the British Library in London. It is a story of bravery, treachery and defiance.

By 1931 the pool of oil, Marshal Lyautey's metaphor for increasing French influence, was spreading inexorably across Morocco. In 1931 the French garrison at Erfoud was given permission to advance into the territory of Les Chleuh (their nickname for the local Berbers, Chleuh or Shleuh being the local tribal dialect).

Under the leadership of Capitaine Henry de Lespinasse de Bournazel, known to the tribesmen as L'Homme Rouge because he wore his scarlet full-dress spahi tunic into action, the French took Tafilalt palm grove; and de Bournazel, a legendary figure because of his apparently charmed existence, became military governor of the area.

Further to the west, the ancestral stronghold of Bou Gafer was the scene of a last stand by the chief of the semi-nomadic Aït Atta tribe, Hassou Ba Salam, and his brother, Hammou. They had collected together a fanatical band of about 1,000 well-armed warriors (estimates range from 500-2,000) in a natural fortress formed by sheer rock faces and pinnacles devoid of any attacking cover, making the twin peaks at the summit, separated by a natural cleft, almost unscaleable in the face of a determined defence. Stone walls erected by the tribesmen added to the strength of the position.

Two strong French columns, based on Marrakech to the west and Bou Denib to the east, commanded respectively by General Catroux and General Giraud, carried out a pincer movement on the position; while two further columns manoeuvred in support. The largest column in these operations consisted of three infantry battalions, a mounted company of the French Foreign Legion, three tirailleur battalions, a spahi regiment, a tank company, three batteries of 75-mm artillery, three goums, 2,200 partisans and five air squadrons (Monthly Intelligence Summary, December 1935).

It was hoped that this display of strength would induce the rebels to surrender. But it soon became clear that Hassou Ba Salam intended to fight to the death for his mountain stronghold: on 13 February 1933, after an initial artillery and aerial bombardment, an attack by the goums (native companies) and partisans of the French vanguard, led by de Bournazel in his red tunic, failed completely. That evening the weather worsened and besiegers and besieged shivered in icy rain. The assault had got off to a very bad start.

The Legion's War Diary indicates that further attacks took place on 19, 21, and 23 February. On the 21st and 22nd the goumiers gained ground up to the foot of 'La Chapelle' pinnacle, a conspicuous black obelisk of rock. Lieutenant Nicholas L'Aridon and Lieutenant Alessandri were killed in this push, as was a French ally, Boua Ichou, the sheikh of Alnif; and Lieutenants Bureau and Charette, all goum officers, were severely wounded.

On the evening of the 23rd, the ground won at such cost was lost in a surprise Berber counter-attack. Two days later Hassou Ba Salam called for a 24-hour truce; and General Giraud agreed to this.

Having regrouped, the French mounted a final all-out attack on the summit on the morning of 28 February - mardi gras day - bringing in the Legion for the first time. Two assault waves were told off for the attack, under the overall direction of Colonel Despas.

The first wave, led by de Bournazel, had orders to take the southern pinnacle at the summit of Bou Gafer, some 660 metres from the start line: it consisted of a platoon from the mounted company of 1er R.E.I. (Régiment Étrangère d'Infanterie) under Lieutenant Brincklé, the mounted company from 3e R.E.I. under Fauchaux (or Faucheux), three goums (16e, 21e and 28e), and 200 partisans.

The second wave, commanded by Capitaine Fourré, was then intended to pass through the first wave and take the northern pinnacle: it consisted of a platoon under Lieutenant Margot, Fourré's own company, 7e and 17e goums, and 100 partisans. Fourré's company consisted of four rifle platoons from 2 R.E.I, composed of two officers, ten N.C.O.s, and 70 legionnaires.

A support force, commanded by Colonel Tarrit and consisting of Balincourt's squadron, all the machine-guns, and the remaining partisans had the task of providing covering fire for the attack waves.

By this time de Bournazel's apparent invulnerability was such that many Berbers believed that a bullet aimed at the scarlet-coated figure would be turned in mid-air to strike down the firer! But for the final assault General Giraud sent a message to the Red Man that he must cover his distinctive tunic with a grey gandourah.

De Bournazel obeyed but told his standard-bearer to keep close to him so that the goumiers could see where he was. At 7.00am he began the advance, a walking stick in one hand and a revolver in the other. Right from the start the attackers met accurate and sustained fire from the tribesmen. One bullet hit a haversack of grenades which exploded and wounded four legionnaires. At 7.20am, de Bournazel was shot in the stomach and was carried back wrapped in a burnous, dying some hours later. He was 35 and before Bou Gafer had fought in ten actions without a scratch. The goums wavered at the loss of their leader but the second echelon took over the attack and by 7.40am the leading troops had reached the foot of the Berber defences, so that the French artillery was obliged to stop firing.

Here the attack ground to a halt in the face of vigorous opposition. In response to grenades thrown by the legionnaires, the tribesmen rolled down rocks on the attackers and emerged from behind walls of rocks in groups of 20-30 to deliver devastating volleys that mowed down the men caught on the exposed slopes of the barren mountain. The Berber women were particularly active in screaming war cries (the strident youyouyou), distributing water and ammunition, rolling down rocks, and even taking the places of men who had died in the firing line.

Furthermore, some 200 warriors began to mass for a counter-attack. The situation rapidly became critical: the goumiers began to give ground and then broke almost entirely. Only the Legion held on.

Casualties Mount

The casualties continued to mount. Lieutenant Brincklé was mortally wounded. Sergent-chef Peters, Sergeant Augsten, and Légionnaires Lacaste and Schneidereit were killed as they threw their last grenades. Distaining to take cover, Captain Fauchaux walked across from the 1st to the 2nd Platoon of 3e R.E.I. on the left and was hit by a bullet which shattered his right forearm and passed into his body. The 2nd Platoon had reached a position evacuated by the goumiers where they immediately came under heavy fire. Sergeant Jobovec and Légionnaires Franchi, Alzua, Richard and Schmidt were killed in seconds. Lieutenant Jeanpierre gave the Legion's answer to an emergency: fix bayonets and charge!

Together with Légionnaires Polak and Coghetto, he reached a crest higher up still being held by Lieutenant Binet of 28e Goum and Cavalry Sergeant Perouse with a handful of the remaining goumiers. They hung on for 15 minutes before being forced to retreat to a better defensive position 150 metres to the rear. As they fell back, Binet fell with three bullets in his body and Polak was also killed.

At 4.00pm, nine hours after the battle had started, Lieutenant Jeanpierre, who had taken over the company after Fauchaux was killed, received the order to regroup 600 metres down the slope, ie beyond the original start line. The battle was over. Légionnaires Vurusic and Abassi volunteered to stay behind and retrieve Captain Fauchaux's body. In the face of great danger they did this in accord with true Legion tradition and eventually arrived back in the French lines.

Altogether the Legion had lost two officers (Brincklé and Fauchaux), five N.C.O.s, and 15 legionnaires killed; and three N.C.O.s and 22 legionnaires wounded, a casualty rate of 55%. De Bournazel and Binet of the goums had also joined the list of martyrs for the French cause.

Not even the Legion could sustain this level of attrition and direct assault was replaced by a policy of starving out the defenders. In the resulting stalemate the French maintained a cordon around the mountain; while Aït Atta warriors would creep out from cover at night to murder French sentries and steal bullets for the next day's sniping. These raiders were reputedly accompanied by a sorceress who cast a spell over the French army by waving a human liver torn from a living body. The weather grew steadily worse. After 42 days' exposure to snow, ice and bitter winds, Hassou Ba Salam surrendered on 25 March 1933. He and his men were led away for relocation in a more settled area: their main question as they left Bou Gafer was when would they get their rifles back?

Today

To this day, Berber guides entertain tourists visiting the Bou Gafer pinnacles by re-enacting these scenes; and the bravery of the fallen tribesmen is commemorated annually in an official ceremony at Ouarzazate; while de Bournazel's death is still commemorated at the French army's cavalry school in Saumur. The story of de Bournazel is well known in southern Morocco: interestingly, he is regarded as an ally of the Berbers who was over-ruled by his superior officer, Commandant Guillaume, and ordered against his will to attack the position rather than negotiate a peaceful outcome.

According to local tradition, de Bournazel had sought to consolidate peace by means of a festival at Bou Gafer but Guillaume saw an opportunity to attack the Aït Atta while they were all gathered together. A spy in the French camp told the Aït Atta, who promptly removed most of their women and all of their children to safety and were ready when the French attacked Bou Gafer. The French sources do not mention Guillaume in connection with Bou Gafer but there was an officer of that name who fought in the campaign and went on to reach the rank of general and in 1951 became French Resident-General in Morocco. If he was the man mentioned in the locally-told story, it seems the good die young and the devious prosper.