by Denis Judd, Windrush Press 1973,1999

Yes, I had great hopes for a book with the subtitle "Calamities of the British Army in the Victorian Age". Alas, they were to remain unfulfilled. The problem is certainly not in the author's writing style which is crisp and direct, but rather in the limitations he appears to have placed on himself. Simply put, this is written for those with no prior knowledge of the area and, even then, the author appears content to follow previous writers and add no insights or conclusions of his own.

The book covers six campaigns of the period: the First Afghan War especially the retreat from Kabul, the Crimea, the Sepoy Mutiny, the Zulu War, mostly Isandhlwana, and the First and Second Boar Wars. Maiwand is not mentioned for reasons we can only guess at. In each instance, the author does nothing but provide a basic recitation of the facts and throw in a few quotes from letters or diary entries from the (European) participants. with maps, and pretty good ones at that, the whole work contains only 172 pages. Even so, some misconceptions are repeated. For example, we are told that Zulu men practiced celibacy until receiving the right to marry (iKhela) by showing prowess in battle. This repetition of the Victorian officers' fantasy that unmarried people must be celibate is contradicted on the very next page where the author relates how a royal order that women of the younger age group (the inGcugce) marry men of the generation which was next in seniority even though many of the women were living with men there own age. We are also told that Zulu shields could be pierced by bullets "...like tissue paper." A direct hit at close range, yes, but otherwise it was by no means certain.

The more serious shortcoming, however, is that no insight whatsoever is provided. This problem ranges begins the immediate; for example, and staying with the Zulu, Chelmsford took "part of the army" on "reconnaissance". Why he would do such a thing or the assumptions behind it (so well addressed as long ago as " The Washing of the Spears" in 1965) are not addressed here. Chelmsford just did it and that's that. The problem extends to the fundamental. Where the disasters flukes or were they caused by basic flaws in the British organization? Or the Officer class mind-set? Or Victorian attitudes and assumptions? Or mixed feelings in a representative government committed to ruling millions of subject peoples? Or some other thing?

In spite of the promise in the preface, the author spends little effort on these questions or the implications of the events he describes beyond the obvious official embarrassment and a generalized and sanitizing view that mistakes were made and lessens learned.

To sum up: the book is a pleasant read and an acceptable introduction to the period. Nothing more.