Number of Pages: 228 (Three Foldout Campaign Maps Included).
Publisher: Battery Press.
Retail Price: $39.95.

Sometime ago I discovered Battery Press, which produces facsimile reprints of out of print books.

Due to my interest in 19th century British colonial military campaigns, I picked up the 1883 English translation of The Egyptian War of 1882 by Lt. Colonel Herman Vogt.

Vogt started with the background of the 1882 Egyptian campaign, where Arabi Pasha led a successful rebellion against the Khedive of Egypt over foreign control of its government. The Egyptians were initially trained and organized by the British. The average fellah was equipped with breach loading Remmington rifles, while Egyptian artillery batteries were armed with breaching 7.7 cm Krupp field guns.

Otherwise, the Egyptian army mirrored the British.

The British intervened on the pretext of reestablishing the Khedive's rule in Cairo and controlling the Suez Canal, which they saw as a vital link to their possessions in the Indian subcontinent. London also set the Victorian troubleshooter Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley to be the overall British field commander, while Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Seymour led British naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. The opening shots of the war began with Vice-Admiral Seymour's naval bombardment on of the forts at Alexandria. Once Alexandria had been secured, British sailors established order on the city streets through the persuasiveness of their Garnder and Gattling guns. While the naval landings distracted Arabi Pasha's attention, Wolseley ordered the British Indian army from Bombay to the Egyptian port of Ismailia in the Suez Canal. British forces from England met the Indians and marched up the Isamalia Canal to the Kassassin Loch, where the Egyptians threatened to disrupt British supply lines (especially fresh water). The Egyptians put a rearguard as British General Graham's forces fought for the contested village. When night fell, the fighting ended in a draw and the Egyptians retired from their positions.

However, the campaign's main fighting occurred at Tel El-Kebir, where Arabi Pasha had entrenched his army of 25,000 men and 75 guns along four miles of fortified earthworks. Wolseley ordered his 17,000 men to attack the Egyptian trenches at dawn on Sept. 9, 1882. The surprised Egyptians put up fierce resistance at first but then broke as the British stormed their trenches. The British victory at Tel El-Kebir effectively ended the war, which only lasted four and a half weeks.

Vogt's insights into Britain's professional army during the Victorian era are as enlightening now as they were then. His criticism of the British having to piecemeal its regular and crack forces to deal with the Egyptians is well founded. The author also praised of the conduct of British soldiers and their officers in the face of overwhelming difficulties during the campaign.

However, Vogt's assessment of Britain only being able to hobble a corps of troops to deal with a overseas operation were right on target. Even during the Pax Britainnia, the British army only had about 200,000 professional soldiers under arms scattered throughout its empire due to its reliance on an all-volunteer force. This fact really came home to rooster during the drawn out Second Boer War, when over 250,000 Imperial troops had be rushed to South Africa deal with a Boer army of only 25,000 men!

Barring Vogt's own 19th century prejudices, I recommend The Egyptian War of 1882 as a good first hand account of the conflict seen through the eyes of a neutral Prussian observer.