Sir Hugh Gough was appointed Commander-in-Chief in India in May 1843 with the local rank of general. He held the popsition until 1849. During this period he commanded the armies who fought victoriously in the Gwalior Campaign of 1843, the First Sikh War of 1845/46 and the Second Sikh War of 1848.

Lord Gough's career in India and the campaigns he fought have been the subject of bitter discussion. Much of the controversy arose during the 1st Sikh War, although the Commander-in-Chief's tactics at Maharajpore in December 1843 did not escape criticism. No army likes heavy casualties and, outmatched by the heavy artillery of the most martial and best organised enemy it had yet encountered in India, losses were heavy.

Regrettably, the diaries and papers of Sir Patrick Grant, Gough's most intimate and trusted Staff Officer were accidentally burned in later years. Talking of Ferozeshah, a private letter of Lord Dalhousie's says: "....Pat Grant will give you quite a different impression of that usually accepted as to where Harry Smith's force spent the night."

No doubt, there was a feeling in the army that they had not been handled to best advantage, which some authorities ascribe to the interference of the Governor-General. Hugh Gough was an exceptionally brave man; there is no record of him showing fear on any single occasion, but his bravery may well have been that of a man lacking the imagination to conceive any sort of danger or harm.

Public Indignation

Public indignation at Gough's apparently heavy losses was fed by reports in both Indian and English newspapers. The writers, ignorant of the conditions of the warfare on the Sutlej, expected the army, with small loss, to sweep before them the hordes of barbarians; passionately they talked of Clive and Plassey. The Sikhs were not barbarians; they were disciplined soldiers equipped with the best weapons of the day, trained by European officers and inspired by martial traditions. In a conflict with such an army, the British losses were bound to be relatively high; nevertheless, the grand total of killed and wounded was less than eight percent at Moodkee, and Sobraon, and less than fifteen percent at Ferozeshah.

It may not be relevant to compare these figures with the losses of Marlborough at Blenheim (twenty three percent) or of Wellington at Talavera (twenty five percent) but the battle of Assaye furnishes a reasonable comparison. In that battle, on September 23, 1803, Wellesley defeated a large Mahratta force. His losses were about thirty one percent of the total force killed and wounded; however, it must be admitted that the enemy's superiority in numbers was much greater at Assaye than at Ferozeshah or Sobraon. At home, it had been forgotten that native opponents could fight; the large proportion of casualties among the 11 British regiments which took part in the war caused a loud outcry against the "Tipperary Tactics" of the Comander-in-Chief.

On 18 April 1846, Sir Hugh Gough wrote to his son: There were three good causes for the heavy loss in the first two battles. First, the army generally had not recovered themselves from the fearful disasters in Afghanistan, the latter operations in which country were so unjustly lauded for political purposes...The second was the natural consequence, the Native Army almost dreaded the Sikh which was had never been beaten, and which they looked upon as invinciple. The third was that the Native Army participated in the general feeling throughout India of a desire that we should not overthrow the only remaining powerful Native Hindu Government. This is a fact that can be proved. Not that the Native Army had a wish to lose their 'salt' (as they term their maintenance), but they decidedly did not wish to see the Lahore Government annihilated.

These three causes made it necessary for the European portion of the army, especially the European officers of the Native Corps, to be foremost in the fight, and to expose themselves in a manner most creditable to them, but in many instances fatal.

These are facts, but facts that cannot be brought before the world, and I must bear the brunt. It is rather hard my actions in China were not accounted of any moment, because they were effected without much, indeed with very little loss. In India, I am a reckless savage, devoid of strategem and military knowledge, because my loss is severe; whilst the reasons, to any person knowing the army I fought with, and that I contended with in both countries, must be obvious, and could not be misinterpreted. In China, my force was almost exclusively European, whilst the force I contended with, although as brave and much more athletic than the Indian, was totally without military knowledge, and allowed me, in every instance, to turn the flank and bring the great weight of my force to bear upon a less powerful portion of them, thus making their artillery of no use, from their immoveable construction.

Not so the Mahrattas and Sikhs. They were both peculiarly military nations with a powerful artillery as well served as our own, infinitely superior in numbers and in the weight of metal of their guns. Led by officers accustomed to war, and in their tactics, from the knowledge that they had never been beaten, whilst they had before their eyes the fearful disasters of the first Cabool Army, and the retreat (for it can be taken in no other light) of the second, which they gave themselves the credit of having covered - but I find that I am entering into a justification of my conduct, and I feel as a soldier that such is not necessary. Let the world carp, let them call me savage, incompetent, and what they please; I am ready to bear all their taunts, rather than throw a shade over the bright laurels the Indian army have won. Posterity will do me justice.

Silence

It is interesting to note that Gough did keep silent; the reticence he imposed upon himself, from a sense of loyalty to the army, caused a certain degree of misconception of his policy and conduct. At all events, both he and the Governor-General received rewards for their efforts. Sir Hugh added considerable colour to his old "white fighting coat" by becoming Baron Gough of Chinkiangfoo in China and of Maharajpore and the Sutlej in the East Indiaes, with a pension of £ 2,000 a year from the Government and a like sum from the Honourable East India Company. The Governor-General became Viscount Hardinge of Lahore and Durham, with a pension of £ 3,000 from the Government and £ 5,000 from the Company.

Sir Harry Smith

The other great personality on the British side during the war was Sir Harry Smith, the victor of Aliwal. He was a colourful dashing figure who carved out a great military reputation in the Peninsular, at Waterloo, in South America, North America and South Africa, and in India during the Afghan, Maharatta and Sutlej campaigns.

Beginning his military career in 1804, he was still in action up to 1859. His Aliwal battle was a little gem and stands out, from a tactical point of view, as the one satisfactory operation in the whole of the First Sikh War. Rarely did Harry Smith fight a battle in which he did not display dash or show a typical panache, as when he careered forward with the colours of the 50th at Moodkee. He recorded disagreement with the official accounts of the tactics and events of the battles of the war. Perhaps his impetuous spirit and impatient nature tinged and coloured his views!

At the conclusion of the Sikh War Sir Henry Hardinge persuaded Gough to withdraw his resignation as Commander-in-Chief suppressing Gough's Letter of Service. Possibly, if he had foreseen the outbreak of the Second Sikh War, the Governor-General might have taken his place? Sir Charles Nap[ier, the obvious choice, was in bad health and would probably have been passed over. Might the post have been offered to Harry Smith? An officer of ability, he was thought well of by Hardinge. Under his direction, the Second Sikh War might have taken a very different course.

Whether or not Lord Hardinge was right at Ferozeshah, where he took over command from Gough during the battle, is open to debate; there is a strong case to be made out for both sides of the argument. The presence of two men on the field of battle, both of them veterans and both with apparently equal powers to give orders to those formations in their immediate vicinity, makes for immense confusion. Whatever one may feel about Gough's tactical ability, he was working under considerable difficulty and irritation through the presence of the Governor-General.

Sir Henry Hardinge was a veteran of the Waterloo campaign, where he considerably distinguished himself at Ligny, losing an arm. An intimate of the Duke of Wellington, it is apparent from the writings of the time that he had the best soldierly qualities. He was a direct man, free from vanity although aware of his reputation and position; he does not appear in any way to have been a self-seeker.

It was written: His thoughts were simple and sensible, expressed clearly. He sought the public good rather than his own glory. He was, in fact, a man of the Cornwallis school rather than the Wellesley; his utterances are a pleasure to read after the peacockings of Lord Ellenborough. He was ready for Sikh incursion as it was possible to be without giving provocation.

It is apparent that these commanders were kindly, gentle and courteous men. Writing at the time and later, they hesitated to adversely criticise or chide each other. In a word, they were aristocrats of the old school. This cannot be better illustrated than by a letter written from Peshawar by Sergeant Keay of the Bengal Artillery, on 14 November 1850. He had served under Gough in the Punjab Campaign. From it one receives a trustworthy estimate of the opinion held by the soldiers in the ranks of their leader's character and military qualities: I have just been thinking, on looking over some old newspapers, that you must have been led to believe that Lord Gough stood very low in the estimate of the troops as a commander. But if such be the case, depend upon it, you were never more deceived, for the very reverse of this is the case, for there was no dnager, no matter how great, nor any undertaking, no matter how desperate it might be, but they would have attempted it under him; indeed, WHEN HE WAS PRESENT THEY LOOKED UPON SUCCESS AS CERTAIN, and it was not as a commander alone that he was respected, but as a kind-feeling and good-hearted old man, who took a lively interest in the welfare of all those who were under him, and who took a pleasure in seeing everyone around him as comfortable as circumstances would permit.

For the officers and native troops I cannot speak, although I have every reason to think that they and us were alike in that respect. But for the European soldiers, cavalry, infantry and artillery, I don't think that men ever could have been more attached to a commander than they were to old Gough, and considering his kind and humane disposition, and the attention he always paid to the sick and wounded, there is little to wonder that he was looked upon as a father more than as a military superior.

I can never forget the reception he got from the troops as he rode along the front of our line just after we had been withdrawn out of the jungle on the evening of the Battle of Chillianwallah, I happened also to be at the General Hospital where the wounded and dying were lying in hundreds, and as soon as they caught sight of his venerable white head, there was such a cheer burst forth that the dullest observer could not have misunderstood for a moment; ay, and that from many a poor fellow who had scarcely a head left upon his shoulders to shout with--it said, as ever a cheer could say, "You will never find us wanting when you require us."

And afterwards his attention to the wounded and sick was such as to gain the esteem and affection of everyone. I used to see him in that hospital daily myself kindly enquiring after those who were recovering, and cheering up and consoling those that were bad; and , believe me, those that think that soldiers are incapable of appreciating these intentions on the part of a commander are woefully out in their calculations. May Gough long live to enjoy whatever rewards he may have got, for he is well worthy of them.

The affection of soldiers can not necessarily be taken as a criterion of military capacity. Fifty years later, Sir Redvers Buller was to be equally beloved by his troops dispite the way in which he continually mishandled them against the Boers.

Age

When considering Gough, Hardinge and Harry Smith, and indeed all the leading military figures of the First Sikh War, their age should be considered. The arduous march to Moodkee, and the long, dispiriting night at Ferozeshah was borne bravely by 65 years old Sir Hugh Gough, by Sir Henry Hardinge in his sixties and by Sir Harry Smith aged 57.

How much easier it is to be brave and brilliant when backed by the vigour and enthusiasms of youth! Every page of the accounts of the battles of this war proves that these three high-ranking offiers were not conducting the operations from a headquarters in a rear area. They had staff officers alongside them killed by musket fire, at ranges of about 300 yards. On the morning of the second day at Ferozeshah, Gough and Hardinge personally led forward their depleted forces to final victory.

Gough's biographer, Robert S. Rait, claimed that Viscount Gough himself decided that it was inadvisable, in his own lifetime, to reveal the differences of opinion that existed between the military and civil authorities. Apparently, Gough preferred to permit his whole military policy to be misunderstood by the press and the public rather than to defend himself by embarking upon an embittered personal controvery. As a result, the true facts are not clear even today, one hundred and fifty years later.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Butler, Sir Wm. F Sir Charles Napier (1890)
Cunningham, J D (Edt. H L O Garrett) A History of the Sikh (1918)
Farya Singh Bajwa The Military System of the Sikhs During the Period 1799-1849
Featherstone, Donald

All for a Shilling a Day (1966)
At Them With the Bayonet (1968)
Colonial Small Wars (1973)
Victoria's Enemies (1989)
Victorian Colonial Campaigns - India (1992)

Lieut. Gen. Viscount Hardinge
General Lord Gough
Major Gen. Sir Harry Smith
and other sources. (1846)

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