During the past few years game manufacturers have chosen the Origins convention to introduce their latest titles. This past year has been no exception, with the introduction of several wargames in the $30.00 price range. One of these, The Next War, is the subject of this review.

The Next War is an operational level game which was designed to simulate a hypothetical Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe. Air, land and naval combat are included. The time scale is two days per turn with most of the ground units being either divisions or brigades.

In evaluating this game I considered five factors which are important to a good game: graphic quality, cartography, accuracy and completeness, playability, and consumer considerations. Each is assigned a certain point value with 100 points being the maximum number a game can obtain. An excellent game should be able to score at least 85 points, while a good game will score between 70 and 84 points.

Graphic Quality

The graphic quality a game possesses is reflected in the maps, charts, counter sheets, and rules book. Good graphic art is not only pleasing to the eye, but also enhances the playability of the game. Good graphics should be able to communicate information to the player with a maximum of ease and a minimum of confusion. In The Next War I found the general quality of the graphics to be very good. Keep in mind, however, that the evaluation of graphics is, in part, subjective; good graphics like good art is in the eye of the beholder.

The graphics of The Next War include a rules book, a scenario book, two air allocation display charts, twelve counter sheets, three full size maps and two ancillary maps. The print quality of both the rules and the scenario books is very good. However, there is a problem with the eighteen tables and charts used in the game. They are printed on the center pages of the scenario book. In order for a player to refer to them he must either set the scenario book open and in front of him, or he must rip the pages out of the book. This latter option can be done without damaging the pages. However, once removed from the book, these pages tend to wear rapidly and become torn. It would have been better if the tables and charts had been printed separately on a heavy stock paper. The air allocation display charts are excellent.

The twelve counter sheets contain 2400 counters; approximately 1600 of these are actual units - the remainder are various unit status counters. As might be expected with a game of this size, several mistakes were made in the counter sheets. Fortunately, most of these errors are minor; a complete list of counter errata was printed in Moves No. 41. A more serious problem is presented with the counter print which is both small and often difficult to read. The problem is compounded by the choice of colors used for some of the counters. In several cases the print color is only a shade different from the counter background; for example, the French air units are printed white on a light blue background and the Czechoslovakian ground units are printed dark red on crimson. These problems could have been averted by the the judicious use of contrasting colors, and the use of larger type for the print. Despite these problems the counter quality in The Next War is good.

Like the counter sheets, the maps are good in graphic quality. There are a few mistakes in the autobahn hexes which were not connected and other minor problems which are a small annoyance. On the whole, the graphic quality of The Next War is very good. I gave it 81/2 out of a total of 10 possible points. Mr. Redmond Simonsen has done a commendable job as graphic designer.

Cartography

The cartography presented in a game is of fundamental importance to both the accuracy and playability of the game. In general, I found the maps in The Next War to be over-simplistic and riddled with inaccuracies. The problems in The Next War are two-fold. First, the underlying philosophy in the map design has been to simplify all the terrain from Denmark to Italy into four basic types. This simply does not do service to the rich and varied landscape of central Europe. Second, there are numerous inaccuracies and omissions which were the result of inconsistent terrain analysis. The result has been a set of maps which are disappointing at best.

The main problem with the maps in The Next War is that they have been badly oversimplified. The topography, that is, the surface relief and the cover vegetation, have been blended into a sort of hybrid terrain system which is inappropriate for an operational level game. In The Next War there are only four types of natural terrain: clear, rough 1, rough 2, and alpine. And since alpine terrain occurs only in Austria, Switzerland, southeastern France, and northern Italy, the terrain in central Europe has, for all practical purposes, been reduced to just three types.

Other terrain types, such as swamps, forests, scarps, coastal sand dunes (which occur in Denmark), and canalized hexes (which occur in northwest Germany), are either "fitted" into one of the four terrain types, or, as was more commonly the case, ignored altogether. The end result of this philosophy is seen in the movement and land combat rules. Ground units, which are mainly armored or mechanized infantry, are able to do strange and bizarre maneuvers. Airborne units, for example, are allowed to paradrop into clear or rough 1 types.

The problem is that many of the rough 1 hexes are moderately to heavily forested. In reality, any airborne unit attempting to jump into such an area would suffer an unacceptable casualty rate. Other problems occur with the land combat system as well. Because there is no distinction made between topography and cover, it is impossible for the players to identify forests, marshes, and other similar terrain which traditionally is not suited to armored warfare. To get around this sticky problem, the combat system in The Next War has been simplified to allow combat between any units in any non-alpine hex. The end result is that all terrain in Denmark, Germany and the low countries, the Bavarian forest, the Black forest, and even the Bavarian Alps, becomes a potential armored battlefield. Another problem area is chemical warfare. It is common knowledge that vegetation has a significant effect on the effectiveness of chemical agents. Here, as in the land combat rules, the lack of identifiable forest areas has forced the designers to use rather unsophisticated chemical warfare rules. More will be said about both land and chemical warfare in the next section.

The road net in central Europe is another component of the maps which suffers from oversimplification. Only one road system, the autobahns, is shown, and this road system is only partially accurate. In all cases other than the autobahn movement, the movement rate is determined by the terrain type the unit is passing through. Unfortunately, this system is hopelessly simplistic and inaccurate because it does not take into account the great differences in road density in various sections of central Europe. Nowhere is this problem more obvious then along the DDRWest German border. Since the end of the second World War most of the roads which once traversed this area have been abandoned near the border.

Currently, there are only ten roads which still cross the border, two of which are autobahns. In West Germany, the non- crossing roads typically end two to four kilometers from the border; in East Germany they end four to six kilometers from the border. The old roadways, where they still exist, are badly deteriorated from lack of maintenance. Yet, despite the normal five to eight kilometer gap in the road net, Warsaw Pact units are able to cross the border with as much ease as if they were tooling around East Germany.

Aside from the difficulties created by the oversimplification of the terrain, there is a second major problem with the cartography in The Next War: inconsistent terrain analysis. Quite simply, equivalent terrain features in various parts of central Europe are not always rated equally on the maps. This is a problem which appears in every map and every terrain type. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to point out every error; rather, only the major mistakes will be discussed.

The analysis of natural terrain in the maps is generally poor. In Denmark and the North German Plain there is a significant amount of rough 1 terrain. This is especially puzzling in the case of Denmark where almost all the land is flat and less than 500 feet in elevation. Moreover, Denmark is only 9% forested and the few major forested areas do not correspond to the rough 1 hexes shown on the map. Unfortunately, one of the major Danish terrain features was omitted - the areas of coastal sand dunes which extend along the entire length of the west coast. Much of this area could be classified as rough 1 terrain due to the steep and shifting dunes formed by the wind. Another feature that was ignored is that of coastal cliffs. This terrain form would have an important influence on naval landing operations. Hexes 4617, 4618, and 4718, for example, all have steep limestone cliffs which rise 50 to 100 feet above the narrow beach. However, this feature was completely ignored.

The terrain analysis of northern Germany and the low countries is somewhat better than that of Denmark. Most of the areas which present obstacles to movement have been noted. However, I question the wisdom of describing some of the hexes as rough 2. In general, there seems to be an overuse of rough 1 and rough 2 terrain classification in the northern half of Germany and not enough usage in the southern half of Germany. For example, an area located north of Munster is classified rough 1 and rough 2 on the map. But this area, located in the lower Rhine plain, is flat, and has less than 50% forest cover. A similar situation occurs north of Celle.

Probably the worst terrain analysis occurs in central Germany. Here numerous physical features are omitted. In the Kassel area the rough and wooded areas of Kaufunger Wald, Reinhards Wald, and Sollings Wald have been ignored and treated as clear terrain. Further to the west the famous Teutoburger Wald was alf,o omitted, although the Egge Gebirge was shown correctly east of Paderborn. To the south, three important features were omitted as well. North and east of Frankfurt the large, rugged, and forested areas of Vogelsberg and Hobe Rhiin were erroneously treated as clear terrain. (the area mistakenly labeled as Rohn, /hexes 2823, 2924/, is, in reality, another rough area known as Orber Reisig).

To the west of Frankfurt the Taunus Mountains were also rated as clear terrain. South of Frankfurt the situation is much the same. Hexes 2026 and 2127, for exainple, are not rough 1 terrain as shown on the maps. In reality, they are clear, flat farmland located the the Rhine valley. Physical features located west of the middle Rhine River which were omitted include Idar Wald, Osburger Wald, Pfalzer Wald, and Soon Wald. All these areas should have been classified as rough 1. Mistakes, similar to the ones mentioned above, are prevalent in Bavaria and Czechoslovakia as well. An especially baffling terrain feature is the so-called "Putlatch Trench" located north of Nurnberg. It is treated as an alpine hexside in the map; however, I have been unable to find any reference to this feature in any geography or geological text. Moreover, a detailed map of that area indicates that, far from being an impassable feature, there are several roads traversing the area. One of these, German Route 4, is a main road between Nurnberg and Coburg.

The cartography of Austria and Italy, as well as the Vienna ancillary map, is somewhat better than that of central Germany. The problems here are twofold. First, the alpine terrain is used rather sparingly. This confers more maneuverability to ground units than would actually be the case in real life. This is because, in a nation like Austria, the main and secondary transportation lines follow the narrow river valleys. The map simply does not adequately show the severe limitations on maneuver that are found in a mountainous area. This is especially true for the Salzburg and Tyrol Alps. A second problem is that of mountain passes. Traditionally, passes have been considered easier to defend because of their narrow frontage and approaches.

However, in The Next War passes have been omitted altogether - they have been treated as rough 2 terrain. The cartography of Italy is generally good. But here again, the mountainous areas could use some improvement.

The two small ancillary maps vary greatly in quality. The Vienna map is generally accurate and well done. Unfortunately, the Baltic ancillary map is one of the worst maps this author has seen in several years. Not only is the coastline inaccurate, there are no terrain features, not even the Vistula River. The actual location of the main Polish Naval airfield is 2 km north of Gdynia (which is, incidentally, misspelled) in hex 1222. This map also omits the main Soviet Naval airfield at Baltiysk.

The river and canal systems of central Europe form another important component of the maps in The Next War. These features are considered to be important defensive barriers, and they figure prominently in NATO defensive planning. Like the terrain analysis, the mapping of the rivers and canals is less than adequate, and suffers from inconsistent analysis.

There are seven major river systems located all or in part in the area covered by the maps - the Danube, the Elbe, the Oder, the Po, the Rhine, the Vistula, and the Weser Rivers. In addition to these river systems, there are several important canals and lakes in the area. In general, the maps show the major rivers accurately, but are inaccurate or incomplete in showing their tributaries.

The Danube River system suffers from many inaccuracies and omissions. Along the lower Danube, in the Vienna ancillary map, the Morava River which drains central Czechoslovakia is completely omitted. This would be classified as a minor river, but it is important because it forms part of the boundary between Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Further upstream, in Bavaria, the Naab and Regen Rivers are also not included as important tributaries. At Ulm the Danube actually continues west toward its source in the Black Forest. Apparently the cartographer confused the Danube with a minor river - the Iller. The map also shows the Altmuhl River as a major river; this is erroneous, it should be considered a minor river. The problems noted with the Danube River system are typical of the problems found in all the river systems. That is, there is no consistency in the evaluation of minor river systems. For example, the Danube River above Ulm, the Isar River, and the Altmuhl River are all approximately equal in size, flow, and drainage area (watershed). Yet, one is omitted, another is classified as a minor river, and the third is called a major river!

The Elbe River system is generally correct in Germany. I feel the Bode River, which is a tributary of the Saale River, should have been included. However, the main problem with the Elbe River system is in Czechoslovakia where the Berounka, Ohre, and Sizava Rivers were all omitted.

The Oder, Po, and Rhine River systems are all generally correct. However, I must question the wisdom of classifying the Rhine River as a major river all the way to its source in Switzerland. It would have been better if the upper Rhine were classified as a minor river. Another problem with the Rhine system is at Mannheim. Here the confluence of the Rhine and the Neckar Rivers is incorrectly shown. The Neckar River should flow along hexsides 1928/1929 and 1929/2028. This correction would properly orient the Neckar River with the Rhine River and Mannheim. Also, the Rhur and Sieg Rivers were both omitted. As mentioned earlier, the Vistula River was omitted in the Baltic ancillary map.

The Weser River system is a major river system which drains much of the North German Plain and central Germany between the Elbe and Rhine rivers. Unfortunately, many of its tributaries were omitted from the map. Specifically, the Eder, the Aller, the Leine, and the Werra Rivers were all not included. The omission of these rivers is a major mistake since they form important natural barriers in northern and central Germany.

Canals are another important feature which is included in the cartography. They have been used in Europe for the past several hundred years and are by most standards modest affairs. Most canals are from 50 to 100 feet wide with a depth of only 10 to 15 feet. The boats which ply these waterways are typically narrow, usually 15 to 30 feet wide, and have a shallow draft, usually 8 to 12 feet. Unfortunately, only some of the canals, such as the Dortmund-Ems Canal, were omitted. Actually, a small part of this canal was included on the map, however it was mislabeled as the Ems River.

In reality, the Ems River does not flow past Mimster. Another problem with the canals has been the mislabeling of them as major rivers. The Mittelland Canal, for example, is called a major river, but it is only about 60 feet wide and 12 feet deep at Wolfsburg. To place this canal in the category with the Rhine and Danube Rivers seems ridiculous. Like the river systems, the ca-.ials suffer from inaccuracies and inconsistent analysis.

The transportation system in The Next War consists only of autobalms and railroads. The autobahn system shown on the maps is semi-accurate at best. For example, the autobahn shown to connect Fensburg with Molding, Denmark, does not yet exist. It is only now in the planning stage and will not be completed until the early 1980's. Similar mistakes or omissions occur on most of the maps.

The railroads shown on the maps occur only in the Warsaw Pact countries. Why they were omitted in the rest of Europe is unclear. It is unfortunate that the transportation system of central Europe was not more accurately portrayed. This system has important strategic significance, especially for the NATO player.

In general, the cities of the maps are shown accurately. There are a few cities, such as Duisburg, which were shown on the incorrect bank of a river. Also, the city of Heidelberg (pop. 124,000) was not included on the map. The cities are one of the few bright spots in a rather dismal set of maps.

Needless to say, the maps in The Next War leave much to be desired. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, the cartography in a game is usually one of the easier items to research. The face of Europe has been mapped and remapped countless times and most of the information is easily obtained. The current status of the road systems, for example, can easily be obtained from European travel guides which are revised annually. Second, a correct analysis of the terrain is central to the accuracy of the game.

The terrain in Europe is an important component in NATO and Warsaw Pact strategic planning. The poor terrain analysis, especially in central and southern Germany, does much to damage the accuracy of the simulation. Had the designers of The Next War spent only a little more time on the terrain they would have produced a first rate product instead of a set of maps which appear thrown together. Overall, the cartography in The Next War is dismal and it deserves only 8 out of a possible 20 points.

Accuracy and Completeness

Probably no other characteristic a wargame possesses is more appreciated by the average wargamer than that of accuracy. In the past several years there has been a growing demand for games which are not only entertaining, but also accurate. This was to be expected since wargamers have become more sophisticated and selective in their buying habits. Accuracy and completeness are closely related. In The Next War each is concerned with the realistic portrayal of modern combat in Europe. In evaluating The Next War for accuracy and completeness, it was necessary to divide the game into four major categories - the basic rules, the optional rules, the orders of battle, and the relative combat strengths. It goes without saying that a game which cannot give an accurate representation of a situation cannot be considered a good simulation.

Generally, I found the rules to be fair to good. However, there are great variations in the quality of the rules, especially the optional rules. While some of the basic rules are good, well thought out, and innovative, many of the optional rules are unrealistic and often strange.

The order of battle appears to be fairly accurate. This is quite an accomplishment considering the difficulty in obtaining hard information on the status of both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. The relative combat strengths of the opposing forces is good to fair. However, these assessments were based on erroneous data on Soviet personnel and equipment levels used today. This has resulted in a Warsaw Pact division having a greater combat strength than is justifiable. It is obvious that a considerable amount of effort went into the rules and OB's, but there are some problem areas which deserve discussion.

The basic land combat rules are the heart of the game. They cover movement, zones of control, land combat, supply, reinforcements, and replacements. Generally these rules are fairly good and could be used, with a few modifications, in a World War II period game. The land movement is fairly aceurate with units either in tactical or road mode. I especially appreciate the movement cost for combat - this rule was long overdue and I look for it to be copied by other designers. The movement rules also allow for a unit to move beyond its basic allowance by becoming fatigued. There is a problem here, however - the additional movement allowance is so generous that it becomes unrealistic. An armored unit, for example, can move in a tactical mode up to 25 hexes, or 350 km in two days; this is over clear terrain. In road mode on the autobahn the same unit can cover up to 1400 km in only two days, depending on good die rolls. These figures seem a bit high since mechanical breakdowns would probably stop a unit long before these distances were reached.

The rules regarding land combat are accurate but tedious. Movement and combat are combined with each unit moving individually. This system is a modified version of the movementcombat system used in an earlier game: The Fall of Tobruk, published in 1975 by Conflict Game Co. This type of system worked well enough for the small tactical game which The Fall of Tobruk is. However, I question its use in a largescale operational game like The Next War. This system results in two major problems. First, the length of each turn becomes incredibly long. (More will be said regarding this in the next section). Second, this type of system confers on the player with the initiative, in this case the Warsaw Pact player, an uncommon degree of command flexibility which is quite rare in the Warsaw Pact command structure. The current Soviet doctrine advocates a front attacking in two echelons with most of the forces committed to the first echelon. Normally during an offensive each division is assigned objectives and is committed to a sector of the front. Units in the second echelon are held back and selectively committed where needed.

Unfortunately, the movement-combat system of The Next War permits the Warsaw Pact commander to deploy each division individually. This imparts a tremendous advantage to the Warsaw Pact player during the first few game turns. The Warsaw Pact player can commit units to critical sectors of the first front. Once the important objectives have been secured the remaining divisions can be committed to other areas of the front. This is a perfect system for the Warsaw Pact player because he always needs to commit only those units which are necessary to secure an objective; any surplus units can be diverted to other areas via the railroads or autobahns. The movement- combat system in The Next War could be greatly enhanced if both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces could be committed in only one of two echelons in a phasing player's turn. This would greatly simplify movement, reduce the time required to play one turn, and give a more accurate representation of land combat.

Another problem area which is related to combat is disengagement. This strategy of trading territory for time should be an important tactic in the NATO player's strategy. The problem with the disengagement rules is twofold. First, the rules treat disengagement as a sort of attack in a different direction. Second, the rules and CRT are such that only units with a favorable combat strength ratio (usually 1:1 or better in favor of the unit attempting the disengagement) can successfully disengage.

These notions are, of course, nonsense. Military history is filled with numerous examples from World War II, the Korean War, and the many Arab-Israeli Wars of units, both large and small, which successfully disengaged. These disengagements were a result of several critical factors - reduced visibility, good staff planning, and troop discipline and control. The relative strengths of the opposing units had relatively little effect on the success or failure of a disengagement. The most important factor seemed to be good staff work, followed by favorable environmental conditions, such as long nights or fog, which hid movement. Clearly, the disengagement rules should be rewritten to more accurately reflect these realities.

Besides the major problems listed above, there are several minor problems with the basic rules. The first regards the movement rate of non-motorized infantry. In the game these "leg" units have a movement rate of half that of mechanized infantry. This allows units to march along the autobahn at a rate of 70 km per day. This is ridiculous. Historically, the most distance an infantry unit can hope to cover in a day is 40 to 50 km, and that is under ideal conditions. A more realistic sustained rate of march is 30 to 40 krn per day. Another irritating problem concerns zones of control, which consist of the six hexes surrounding a land unit.

Unfortunately, this includes every land unit regardless of its size. Thus a batalion or a special forces group exerts the same zone of control as a division. A more realistic treatment of the situation would allow large units to overrun small units or allow them to move through their zone of control with only a slight additional movement penalty. Another problem with the zone of control rules is that they permit zones to be extended across major rivers and alpine hexsides. I feel these rules need to be rethought.

The nuclear rules are an optional set of rules which often come into play during the game. The nuclear rules in The Next War are inadequate and unrealistic, both in terms of the nuclear capabilities of both sides, and in terms of operational realism. In reality, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact possess tactical nuclear weapons. The NATO forces have about 7,000 warheads while the Warsaw Pact have about 4,000 warheads of all types. The NATO forces have a good balance of delivery systems while the Warsaw Pact forces rely primarily on rockets and aircraft for their delivery systems.

The typical tactical nuclear attack will feature a warhead from .5 to 1,000 kilotons yield detonated in an air burst. This method of attack will give maximum coverage to the blast and subsequent fireball while minimizing the induced radiation. The rules regarding nuclear combat are incorrect on several points. First, the relative number of types of delivery systems (i.e. air, artillery, or missile) both between the two opposing sides, and within the Warsaw Pact are erroneous. The Warsaw Pact has far too many artillery warheads relative to the number of missile warheads. In fact, the Soviets only have one tactical warhead type - the M-55 203 mm howitzer shell.

Another problem is the relative parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces (172 pulses for NATO to 134 for the Warsaw Pact). These two erroneous assumptions give the Warsaw Pact player more flexibility than he actually would possess. Yet another problem is that of radiation. The rules cover only induced radiation which is uaually minimal in an air burst. The assumption in the game is that substantial radiation will be present in a hex after a nuclear attack. In most cases this will be erroneous; the amount of induced radiation will be minimal and the coverage will be relatively small when compared with the size of the hex.

For example, a 100 kiloton warhead with an air burst will contaminate about 3 sq. miles with induced radiation. In most cases, the induced radiation from tactical nuclear blasts should be small and should decay down to safe levels within a few days. The question of decay brings up another problem with the nuclear rules. In The Next War this topic is treated in a rather strange manner. The rules provide for the removal of radiation by chance, that is, by advantageous die rolls. This whole notion is absurd because radiation decays at a constant rate. This decay rate is not affected by temperature, weather, vegetation, or die rolls. On the whole, the nuclear rules leave much to be desired.

The special forces rules are illogical and, generally, silly. The rules have special forces units tooling around Europe in helicopters and attacking navy bases, airfields, and other rear area targets. The whole rules read like a Sergeant Fury comic book. I find it highly unlikely that such missions would ever be launched during a war because of the risk involved, and also, because the same damage could be more easily inflicted by rockets with conventional warheads or by conventional bombing. Special Forces do exist in Europe and they do have a mission; but they would never be committed to the type of missions envisioned in The Next War.

Another set of optional rules which is inaccurate is the weather rules. This set of rules suffers from gross oversimplification. The time frame for The Next War campaign game is two months during any part of the year; the terrain involved includes four major climatic zones. Yet, the rules have condensed all the weather in central Europe into two types - wet and dry. This is hopelessly simplistic since a wet turn in December would mean rain for Milan, Italy and a blizzard for Innsbruck, Austria. It is simply impossible to try and have one weather zone for such a large area with so many different terrain types.

Aside from the problem of oversimplification, the weather table is inaccurate. This table shows the months with the greatest probability of wet weather to be January to March, October and November. However, an analysis of precipitation data from central Europe indicates these months are actually relatively dry. Most parts of central Europe receive the greatest amount of precipitation in May thru August. Hopefully, the weather rules will be corrected in the future since they can significantly affect the pace of combat.

The other optional rules which cover chemical warfare, helicopter units, alpine units, the Berlin Brigade, and electronic warfare are generally good. I would have liked to have seen a more sophisticated set of chemical warfare rules since many factors, such as terrain, weather, vegetation, and even humidity affect the success of chemical agents. Another rule which should be reviewed is that of electronic warfare. Actually, the only part of this rule which should be changed concerns the effectiveness of EW on troops in hedgehog or defensive positions.

Electronic warfare should not have as great an effect on these units because much of the communication is sent over field phones instead of radios. In summary, the rules, both basic and optional, have numerous flaws which mainly effect the accuracy of the game. Despite these problems, the rules can and do work effectively to have a reasonably balanced, although not particularly accurate, simulation of land combat.

In contrast to the ground combat rules, I found the air rules and system to be both accurate and very good. Each counter represents one squadron of aircraft, the NATO player has 114 air units while the Warsaw Pact player has 206. Helicopters are also included. Air units, other than helicopters, are kept in offboard holding boxes. Each box represents one airfield. Each turn the air units are committed to one of four sectors of the map. Once committed to a specific sector, each unit is assigned one of three basic missions types: air superiority, interception, or ground support. There are provisions for other mission types, such as reconnaissance and air transport. Rules on flak, pilots and airfields round out the set of air rules. Overall, the air rules are very good.

The naval rules and systems are a mixed lot - almost a separategame. For this reason I feel that most players will choose to omit the optional naval game. Except for the amphibious landings which affect ground units, the naval game is a separate entity. I found the rules to be tedious and incomplete. There is, for example, no provision for clearing mines with helicopters, and there is no comparable set of nuclear rules for the naval game. The naval game can be quite long, primarily because each turn represents four hours of real time instead of two days. Over a two month campaign game this can be quite a few turns 360 to be exact.

The order of battle in The Next War appears to be fairly complete and accurate. I have not been able to complete a detailed check on the entire OB as this would be a massive undertaking in itself. Listed below are some of the errors or omissions I have uncovered while preparing this article:

1. In the game, the 1st Bn./10th Special Forces Group is referred to as "Special Forces Detachment Europe". This unit is not stationed at Heidelberg as stated in the OB; rather it is stationed at Bad Tolz in Bavaria.

2. Hex C2126 has a permanent flak site which protects the Army airfield and the U. S. Army ammunition plant in Darmstadt.

3. The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armoured Division is not a Reforger unit. It is stationed permanently at Garlstedt near Bremen.

4. There is no unit in the U.S.Army known as the 1st Bn./75th Special Forces. Apparently the researcher mistook the 1st Bn./75 Rangers for this unit.

In addition to the errata listed above, Moves No.41 carries a complete 'official' OB errata chart. The air order of battle appears to be correct and complete, while the naval order of battle was incomplete. This is especially true of the Warsaw Pact naval units. Despite these minor errors, the order of battle is generally good and a compliment to the hard work of the SPI staff.

Another factor which must be considered in the evaluation of the accuracy of a game is that of relative unit strengths. In general the Warsaw Pact ground units appear to have been given greater combat strengths than is justified. The cause of this problem is the erroneous Soviet unit organization chart for tank and motorized rifle divisions which is found at the back of the Scenarios and Briefing Book. Presumably, the evaluations of relative Warsaw Pact unit strengths were based, in part, on these charts.

According to the organization charts found in The Next War, a Soviet tank division has 11,000 men and 415 main battle tanks (MBT's). In reality, the typical Soviet tank division stationed in the DDR has 1035 officers, 8394 enlisted men, and 325 MBT's. Thus, the figures used by the designers were 17% above the actual strength in manpower, and 28% above the actual strength in MBT's. Similar errors were made in the evaluation of the Soviet motorized rifle division. These mistakes have had a profound effect on the accuracy of the game because most of the Warsaw Pact units are either tank or motorized rifle divisions.

The accuracy and completeness of a game is fundamental to the success of the game and is a hallmark of good design. Despite the many problems there are still many good and innovative features in the rules. Overall, the game deserves 28 out of a possible 40 points in this category.

Playability

The playability or ease of play is an important factor in the acceptability of a game. It will, regardless of its quality, sit on the shelf or in a closet if it is hard or tedious to play. Unfortunately, I found the campaign game in The Next War to be such a game. The real culprit seems to be the ground movement-combat system which slows the pace of the game considerably. The naval game, with its 360 turns, is also a bottleneck. The result is a game that moves at a snail's pace. Because of these problems I gave the game only 11 out of a possible 20 points in playability.

Consumer Considerations

The topic of consumer considerations covers the quality of the material used in the game, the advertising policy, and the price. First there is the question of quality - which is generally good. The only problem areas, and they are minor, are that the single sorting tray is grossly inadequate for 2400 counters and the dice are incredibly tiny for $30 worth. The advertising campaign was generally truthful. However, I feel the advertising claims regarding the naval game are a bit exaggerated. I found the price to be reasonable and competitive. The Next War deserves 8 1/2 points out of a possible 10.

Conclusions

The Next War is a game which could have been a classic. Instead, it has all of the characteristics of a game which was rushed to completion to meet the Origins deadline. Despite moments of brilliance, the game is generally disappointing. In this review I feel the game deserves only 53 out of a possible 100 points. This is, of course, a very poor score, especially when one considers this to be a significant product from a major manufacturer. There is one bright spot - SPI has promised to annually update (and hopefully improve) The Next War with inexpensive kits. For now, though, the wise money is waiting to see if SPI can work the glitches out of the game before buying.