The subject for this issue's column is the design of operational/tactical games. By way of reiteration from last issue, the term tactical, as used in the industry, denotes a mechanical approach to combat resolution and movement exhibiting a high degree of concern with the behavior of individual men and vehicles or small groups of men and vehicles. Such an approach tends to be process oriented rather than product oriented; the primary concern is not merely which unit is more effective, but rather how and why one unit is more effective than another.

PanzerBlitz is an example of an early tactical game, due to its mechanical concern with such factors as variable effectiveness of specific weapon types at varying ranges and target types. An operational game, on the other hand, is concerned with operations (sorry, but there is no better term). It confronts players with the same sort of decisions that middleechelon commanders face over the course of a battle or campaign.

Battle of the Bulge is an operational game. Thus, while tactical games can be identified primarily with their mechanical combat and movement systems, operational games can be identified by their scope. It is therefore possible to combine the two and achieve an operational /tactical game. Examples of this game type are Fall of Tobruk, Highway to the Reich, Avalanche, etc.

While I've never been able to completely agree with Ecclesiastes that there is no new thing under the sun, I will go so far as to admit that there are damn few. Consequently, the most important attribute of a good designer is that he be an accomplished synthesist. The only alternative is to constantly reinvent the wheel (or the D back 2, as the case may be). This is as true with operational /tactical games as any others, and it is perhaps appropriate, since operational/ tactical games are a distinct minority of published titles and considered somewhat unusual, that the first source for plagiarism is itself somewhat unusual. Far down toward the bottom of SPI's list of lower-rated games languishes Lost Battles, a forgotten classic.

Lost Battles is, well, . .. it's awful, actually, and everyone knows it. The rules make no sense, the scenarios are dull, everybody has anti-tank factors but only anti- tank guns get to use them and they are always the same as the unit's conventional combat factor anyway. In short, Lost Battles was a disaster when it was published, and that in a much less demanding time than today.

Nevertheless, Lost Battles is the first operational/tactical game (in apparent attempt, if not in outcome) and while the gamer can ignore it, the designer had better take a look at it and give some thought to what the intent of the game might have been.

Buried somewhere in the clutter of meaningless, identical combat factors, of artillery rendered impotent by a ridiculous supply rule, of hinted-at mechanics, there is the spark of genius. The differentiation between conventional and anti-tank factors, although irrelevant to Lost Battles itself, is the inspirational building block upon which factor differentiation in Fall of Tobruk, Avalanche, Atlantic Wall, and Operation Crusader are based, as well as in all likelihood the effectiveness ratings in Highway to the Reich.

It also provided the inspiration for the differentiation between fire and melee of units in Torgau, and thus presumably (although perhaps indirectly) for the raft of similar gunpowder and bayonet operational /tactical games that have followed (La Bataille de la Moskowa, Terrible Swift Sword, Stonewall, Wellington's Victory, etc.).

More than anything else, this differentiation of factors (be they conventional fire versus anti-tank fire, or fire vs. melee) is the essence of operational/tactical games, for without it the game becomes purely operational, another Bulgeanziokursk.

Evolved

The system has evolved considerably over the last few years. Fall of Tobruk emphasizes the interaction between conventional fire and anti-tank fire by separate factors, combat phases, and different unit level representations for armor and infantry. Avalanche carried that particular line of development further with a detailed consideration of ranged supporting weapons (as opposed to ranged artillery, which the entire family of games covers). The next major development in this family of games was Highway to the Reich, (at one time referred to by SPI staffers as Terrible Slow Arnhem) which experimented with a number of interesting new variables. Although many can and do find fault with the specific handling of those variables in the game, their inclusion in a World War II game will continue to influence subsequent designs for some time to come. Those two variables are formations and morale, both of which had been used in gunpowder/ bayonet games as early as Torgau, but which had not yet been applied to more modern subjects. The most recent entries in the field, Atlantic Wall and Operation Crusader, represent two different and diverging paths of development from the same common roots.

So what does all of this mean, anyway? Does the operational /tactical game actually represent a distinct difference in design with important influences on the field as a whole or is it just another category label made possible by the inevitable diversification that comes with the increased output of games over the last half decade? Obviously, I hold with the former, or I wouldn't waste my time thinking this much about it.

Profound Effects

The truly important aspect of the gradual maturation of the operational /tactical game is as of yet only dimly understood, or even perceived, by most, but in the long run may have a profound effect on the overall quality of designs of any force now operating. Because an operational/ tactical game concerns itself so much with the mechanics of combat and movement, its actual combat resolution process is much more visible and thus subject to critical analysis by reviewers and players. In a purely operational or strategic game, a designer is able to "cheat" fairly easily and it becomes difficult to construct solid criteria to determine if his fudge factors are valid or not. One can certainly argue about the relative strength ratings of German divisions versus Russian divisions in Drang Nach Osten (or War in the East, or Anzio, or anything else), but the argument is ultimately unproductive, based on opinion and relative weight assigned to entirely too many variables to objectively evaluate.

For example, suppose a player complains that "Russian divisions are too strong." The designer can reply, "Well, we built in a lot of non-divisional units to reduce counter clutter," and there isn't much more the player can say. Or, "German divisions are too strong." "That represents doctrinal superiority and greater combat experience." Both of these explanations are valid. They may or may not have been the basis for the actual strength assignments. In any case, there is no way of telling for sure.

By contrast, if someone were to say, "Unit X in Crusader has a higher anti-tank factor than Unit Y, although both units are equipped with the same number of equivalent anti-tank guns," the designer (in this case, me) is left with very little to say. "Unit X has better morale." "So what? Morale and its effects are covered separately." "Unit X has more experience." "No, that's morale again." "Well, Unit X shoots better than Unit Y." "Okay, valid if true. Now prove it."

By dealing with the actual nuts and bolts of fire and maneuver, the precise strength evaluation formulae, the accuracy and degree of research, the decisions about doctrinal modeling - in short, the entire design process - becomes much more visible and subject to rational and informed discussion.

But, you say, this is true of any tactical game as well. All tactical games rather visibly show their hard-data research in terms of combat factors.

True, but whether by intent or coincidence, most tactical games lack the operational check that an operational/ tactical game has. In a PanzerBlitz holding scenario, if the Germans place their tanks in position 1 and their anti-tank guns in position 2, and as a result prosper, there's very little to compare this with as a check. General doctrinal works can be consulted, of course, and some criticisms can be made, but doctrine is always altered to the situation, and the argument loses much of its impact and specificity. But if in the Battleaxe scenario of Crusader the British consistently overrun Point 208 with insignificant casualties, given a historical defense and attack force, something is obviously rotten. In the Market Garden campaign, troops of the 101st Airborne were often called upon to clear out anti-tank guns that had held up the armor. If in Highway to the Reich this proves impossible, something is rotten. In short, the operational setting of the game provides clear and irrefutable criteria upon which to evaluate the historic modeling of the game.

This does not mean that an operational/ tactical game will necessarily be better, only that it is becoming much easier to tell good solid historical research from eyewash and old wives' tales. The marketplace being what it is, the caliber of games of this type cannot help but improve as a result. Also, as that happens I suspect that the general level of research will improve in other types of games as well, since a very high proportion of research on any one game generally tends to be spill-over research from a previous title.

All of this argues well for design quality. Operational /tactical games are much more demanding projects, and demanding projects tend to stretch peoples' capabilities.