Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War (Cambridge University Press, 1977)

Perhaps no element of military science has been more neglected by military writers and historians than logistics. For every book dealing with this subject, dozens have been written covering tactics and strategy. This is unfortunate since the logistical realities an army faces often dictate the tactics as well as the strategy that the army must follow. Moreover, logistical considerations have assumed a major importance in strategic planning over the past 150 years as armies became larger and more complex. In Supplying War, Dr. Van Creveld traces the art of logistics from its inception during the "Age of Enlightenment" through the Second World War.

Supplying War is, first and foremost, a study of the various systems of moving armies and keeping them supplied. The author guides the reader through the past three hundred years of European military history with a flowing style which is both enjoyable and straightforward. The work's 284 pages are divided into eight chapters followed by a lengthy section of chapter notes and a bibliography. The chapters are arranged in chronological order beginning with the logistical systems used in Europe in the 1600's. Each chapter covers a single period or campaign and is an independent unit which can be enjoyed separately from the rest of the book. A section of "Conclusions" at the end of each chapter adds to its clarity.

When all chapters are considered together they reveal the dynamic evolution of logistical systems from the plundering bands of ruffians of the late Renaissance to the highly structured Allied Expeditionary Force which landed in Normandy in 1944. Supplying War, although a thoroughly scholarly work, is not ponderous; the reader is not overwhelmed by an excessive amount of random data. Rather, Dr. Van Creveld makes judicious use of the facts and figures he has chosen to include in the book; each set of data is used to develop a particular point. Supplying War contains a wealth of information which is intelligently arranged and easily absorbed by the reader.

The first chapter traces the general development of land warfare in Europe from roughly 1560 to 1760. This period was characterized by siege warfare on one hand, and the rapid growth of armies with their corresponding growth in supply requirements on the other. Armies could no longer be expected to live entirely off the country; once an army stopped to lay siege to a town it soon exhausted the local resources. To alleviate this problem military leaders began looking seriously at logistical planning.

During this period supply requirements (rations) were set, magazines (supply depots) were established, and the first primitive transportation services appeared. Although some progress was made, the limitations inherent in the technology of the age made it impossible for an army to transport more than a small portion of its requirements; thus, armies of the period continued to live primarily off the land.

The second chapter is concerned with the Napoleonic period; specifically, the campaigns of 1805 and 1812. The great German writer Clausewitz has contended that the success of the Grande Armee was a result of an entirely new strategy which made Napoleonic warfare qualitatively different from earlier periods. However, Van Creveld takes exception to this theory. The author, using an abundance of facts and figures, argues persuasively that the success of the French Army was due largely to the stature of its leader rather than to any great departure from established supply procedures. This chapter is perhaps my favorite and should be required reading for anyone even slightly interested in Napoleonic warfare.

The third chapter covers the period between 1815 and the end of the Franco- Prussian war in 1871. Although most of the chapter is devoted to the Franco-Prussian war, the author also comments on some of the lesser campaigns waged in Europe during this period. It was during this time that railroads became increasingly more important to military planners of all countries. A number of myths concerning the Prussian logistical system have arisen from this period. Most were generated by Moltke who portrayed the Prussian Army as a well- supplied, highly coordinated fighting force. Van Creveld paints a different picture of the Prussian Army and its supply services. As in the previous chapter, the author uses a wealth of data to show how poorly the Prussian supply system functioned once the Army had left German soil. Once in France, the Prussian Army lived off the land much as the Grande Armee had done sixty years earlier.

The first few months of the First World War are the subject of Chapter Four. This was the period of mobile warfare when the German General Staff tried unsuccessfully to overrun France using the Schlieffen Plan. This plan is thoroughly scrutinized by Van Creveld. Unlike the previous chapters, this chapter contains no firm conclusion as to the logistical soundness of this campaign. However, the reader is likely to conclude that the whole Schlieffen Plan was completely unsound due to flaws in the logistical planning.

The next three chapters deal with the Second World War in Europe. The fifth and sixth chapters are concerned with the German supply system in Russia and North Africa, while Chapter Seven deals with the Allied Expeditionary Force in 1944. In all three chapters the author has done a first class job in analysing the various logistical problems encountered in each campaign. I found Chapter Five to be especially interesting because of its profound analysis of the complex logistical problems encountered by the Wermacht during the Russian campaign. Of equal interest to many readers will be the discussion in Chapter Seven of the merits of the "knifelike thrust" proposed by General Montgomery to end the war in 1944. Taken together these chapters shed new light on some of the most important campaigns of modern military history.

Supplying War concludes with a short, six-page chapter which summarizes the important points of the book. A reader will gain from this work a deeper understanding of the role of logistics in warfare. I highly recommend this book to anyone even slightly interested in this subject.