Part 1

In the last issue, this article traced the history of the tank from its origins to the end of the Second World War. In this issue, we follow the tank from its use in the early Arab-Israeli wars to current NATO and Soviet armor doctrine.

The Post-War Years: The Sons of Shem

Since the Second World War, the major proving ground for armored vehicles and doctrine has been the Middle East, where periodic spats between the Arabs and Israelis have successfully proven that the tank has an enduring place on the modern battlefield.

The Israeli army has in recent years been intimately associated with the history of the tank, but such was not always the case. The small army of untrained recruits that Israel used to successfully gain its independence had virtually no tanks at its disposal.

When faced with the problem of building a permanent standing army in the early fifties, tanks were low on Defense Minister Dayan's list of priorities. Dayan was a firm believer in mobility, and for that reason, suprisingly, he did not consider the tank a cost-beneficial addition to the Israeli arsenal. In 1948 the Israeli infantry had successfully defeated Arab armor when it was used, and Dayan was convinced that with better equipment they would again be able to do so.

Motorized Israeli infantry would be able to shift rapidly from threatened area to threatened area, and after achieving a breakthrough would be able to pursue and outflank Arab units. Tanks, with a lower basic speed, would merely slow up these motorized columns. Tank leaders in the Israeli army were able to secure only a very few armored vehicles in the early fifties, most of them M4 Shermans purchased from the United States as scrap and painstakingly cannibalized and rebuilt.

When the 1956 war with Egypt came, the Israelis had much less armor than did the Egyptians, amounting to less than a half dozen battalions of tanks. Armored brigades had one or perhaps two battalions of tanks, the bulk of the brigade being mechanized infantry. Nevertheless, the Israelis were able to achieve decisive results primarily due to their superior training and elan. The armored brigades spearheaded the assaults, achieving results far out of proportion to their numbers.

The experience of this war convinced Dayan of what the armored commanders had been trying to for some time, that the tank in a hostile environment is more mobile than motorized or mechanized infantry due to its superior armor. Israel began acquiring tanks in greater numbers, and by the 1967 war fielded a much larger force which again decisively defeated the Arabs.

Lessons Learned

Several lessons were learned by the Israelis in these two wars. First, the Israelis learned that tanks operating on their own could, and generally did, achieve decisive results. Second, they learned that losses were generally light as long as the tempo of advance was maintained. It was therefore extremely important for mechanized infantry to keep up with the armor.

As a result, the Israelis took an unprecedented step in the 1950's they abolished the infantry arm. Infantry was divided into two groups: those which were attached to armored or mechanized brigades and those which fought in separate infantry or parachute brigades. The Parachute arm was responsible for training all pure infantry units, whether jump capable or not, and all were trained in infantry tactics as practiced by the paratroopers. The paratroopers had originally been brought to a high state of preparedness by Sharon, and his tactics, essentially commando tactics, became doctrine for the Israeli infantry.

Mechanized infantry, on the other hand, was now trained by the Armor arm, and the emphasis was on close support of the tanks. To keep up with the armor, the infantry was well trained in mounted combat as part of the armored charges which had proved so successful against Arab infantry. Since the Arabs did not use air-burst HE, the M3 halftrack was widely used because of the ease of all-around fire while mounted. The tactics first discovered in 1956 became doctrine: don't allow the enemy to prepare for your attack; launch a massed charge of tanks and APC's to overwhelm his defense and shatter his morale; rely on continued movement for protection.

Obviously, these tactics represent a considerable departure from the combined arms doctrine which had been gradually evolving during and after the Second World War, and approach more closely the pure tank philosophy of Fuller. The reasons for this are not hard to find. The Israeli doctrine of the superiority of the tank was based on repeated experiences against low-quality opposition that suffered from tank fright reaching epidemic proportions in the face of a massed armored charge.

The experiences of 1918 had been duplicated, but with modern equipment. The result before the 1973 war was that many armored brigades were not even assigned active mechanized infantry battalions - if the brigade had to be under strength, it was far better in the Israeli view to part with the infantry than the tanks. The result during the 1973 war was a tactical catastrophe.

1973

In 1973 the Israelis faced a renewed Arab army. Many of the social problems which plagued the Egyptian Army in 1956 and 1967 had been eliminated. College graduates were drafted, and a new corps of intelligent, well-educated, and highly motivated junior officers and NCO's appeared.

The Army had trained vigorously and Soviet advisors instructed the Arabs in the use of the massive infusions of new equipment. In 1973 the Arabs were, for the first time, well supplied with potent anti- tank weapons, and their rigorous training in their use gave them the confidence needed to stand up to Israeli tank assaults without panic.

When the crossing of the Suez canal came, the Israelis immediately launched a series of classical Israeli tank counterattacks. Whole battalions of Israeli armor were lost to Arab anti-tank missiles and rockets. The response of a combined arms team would be to send in the infantry, supported by the tanks, to clean out the Arab infantry. But generally, there was no infantry in close support.

When the mechanized infantry was present, they were unable to deal with the threat, as their training had emphasized mounted combat and not the traditional infantry skills now required. Additionally, the M3 halftrack equipped units suffered casualties since the Arabs, not surprisingly, were now using air-burst HE. In short, the first three days on the Suez front proved the bankruptcy of Israeli doctrine.

On the Golan front, the situation was somewhat different. After the initial rupture in the front, the Syrians exploited with their armor. Based on the Soviet organization, the Arab armored divisions were no more of a combined arms team than were Israeli units, and the tank battle the Israelis wanted soon developed. In a matter of days the Syrian armor had been destroyed and the Israelis were on the offensive.

Again, once the Israelis reached the Saasa fortification belt they ran out of steam. Syrian infantry well dug in and confident in their positions were able to stem the offensive and even launch local counterattacks. In Syria and on the Golan the Israelis had proven that their doctrine of tank- heavy spearheads were capable of defeating enemy armor in the open, but could not conduct a combined arms assault on prepared infantry positions.

On the Suez front, the Egyptians launched their armored divisions against the Israelis in an attempt to relieve pressure on the Syrians. Again the pure tank fight that developed went in the Israelis' favor and they were able to convert the resulting confusion to their advantage.

Creating a fluid situation in the center, the Israelis were able to cross the canal and exploit in the Egyptian rear area. Even in this phase of the war however, the inability of the tanks and mechanized infantry to conduct a true combined arms battle was noted as a handicap and partially remedied by the use of infantry and paratroopers, the troops trained in conventional operations.

The Israelis are usually quick to learn from their mistakes, and the new Israeli organization seems to reflect a renewed recognition of the necessity for combined arms operations. The new Israeli platoon is the first permanent combined arms unit at that low a level, consisting of three tanks, an APC mounted infantry squad, and organic anti-tank guided missiles. The current trend of Egypt away from Soviet doctrine also seems to derive in part from a dissatisfaction with the employment of armor in the last war.

The Post War Years: Current Nato Doctrine

Current NATO doctrine is a progressive development of the doctrine of combined arms which grew throughout World War Two. In the U.S. Army, there is still a different designation for Armored and Mechanized divisions.

The difference in organization and tactics is not so apparent. Both divisions have three brigade headquarters serving the same function as the World War Two combat commands, and a variable number of armored and mechanized infantry battalions, depending on the availability of units and the mission of the force. Each brigade will contain a mix of armored and mechanized battalions, none of which are likely to fight as complete units.

Battalion headquarters will serve as the core of battalion-sized task forces, with the battalions crossattaching maneuver companies so that each task force has a mix of armor and mechanized infantry. Within the battalions the company headquarters will serve as the core of companysized combined arms teams, formed by cross-attaching mechanized and armored platoons from the various companies. Thus from division level down to company level, each maneuver element will, in theory, be a combined arms team specifically tailored to its mission. The emphasis in U.S. training on this method makes it seem likely that what proved impossible for the Americans in World War Two may very well work the next time.

The Post War Years: Current Soviet Doctrine

The Soviets drew several important conclusions from World War Two, upon which much of their current doctrine is based. First, casualties tend to be highest when retreating, defending against a prepared assault, and assaulting a fixed position. Second, casualties tend to be lowest when pursuing or fighting a mobile battle against an unprepared enemy. Third, to conduct a successful mobile battle a sophisticated combined arms team is necessary. Lastly, to break through a prepared position, sheer weight is usually sufficient.

To best take advantage of this experience, the Soviets have organized their army into two types of divisions: the Tank Division and the Motorized Rifle Division. Each division contains four maneuver regiments, three being of the type indicated by the title of the division, and the fourth being one of the other type.

Thus, a Motorized Rifle division has three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment. The Motorized Rifle regiment is a true combined arms force, consisting of three mechanized battalions and one tank battalion. The tank battalion is routinely broken down into companies and attached to the mechanized battalions. The Tank regiment, on the other hand, was until recently a pure tank unit.

Soviet Doctrine calls for attacks in echelons. Generally, the first echelon will consist of the integrated motorized rifle regiments capable of a wellbalanced assault on NATO combined arms teams, while following echelons will consist of massed tank units to carry out the pursuit. (Interestingly enough, the increase in the proportion of combined arms units vis a vis tankheavy formations has lead to a reversal of their World War II roles.)

Since extended pursuit and/or mobile operations will gradually erode the cohesion of units, each echelon is given a specific objective. Once that objective is reached, the echelon halts with the next echelon passing through to continue the battle. Thus the tempo of the battle is maintained and the enemy is not given an opportunity to organize a concerted defense. Additionally, enemy units in action for extended periods of time are repeatedly hit with fresh units.

Such a doctrine imposes certain requirements on the nature of the Soviet Army. Most important among these is a clear numerical superiority in combat divisions. The Soviet Army has ten times the number of U.S. combat divisions, although the number of men in the Army is not even twice the number in the U.S. Army. This puts a tremendous strain on the supply of suitable material for junior officers and NCO's. Obviously, Soviet units cannot be expected to exhibit the same flexibility or initiative as comparably sized Nato units. The result is a tactical rigidity at lower levels, offset in a large degree by the institutionalization of combined arms tactics at the battalion and company level.

If there is any clear weakness in this approach, it is in the employment of Tank divisions and Tank regiments, as was illustrated in the destruction of the Egyptian and Syrian armor in the 1973 war. It appears that this deficiency has been recognized and corrected to some extent, since first a mechanized company, and now an entire mechanized battalion, has been added to the organization of the Tank Regiment since the 1973 war.

But as was illustrated by the attachment of a troop of anti-tank guns to Crisp's troop of tanks in Libya in 1941, mere augmentation of organization does little good unless there is sound doctrine and training to back it up. At the time of this writing, it does not appear that the Soviets have been able to completely solve the doctrinal problem of how to employ massed tank units on the modern battlefield without suffering catastrophic losses.