Advance praise for Peter Hofschroer's 1815: The Waterloo Campaign; Wellington, his German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras comes from John Elting. He writes: 'Napoleon has humbugged me, by God!' said the Duke. 'He has gained twenty four hours' march on me.' "This is the most important book on the Waterloo campaign written in many years and is an intensely researched account of how Wellington came to be so bamboozled and of the almost fatal consequences thereof." "Since 1815 it has been an article of faith among German historians that Wellington deceived Blucher during the opening phase of the campaign, promising quick support that was actually impossible because of the tardy concentration of the British forces. So assured, Blucher stood to fight at Ligny, got whipped and - except for D'Erlon's inexplicable meandering - undoubtedly would have been completely crushed, leaving Wellington with an unpleasant assortment of alternatives including a nineteenth-century Dunkirk." "Almost all British historians have vehemently rejected such imputations, the Duke's immaculate omniscience being a basic article of their faith. American opinion has varied but some, at least, of us have believed that, whether inadvertently or intentionally, Wellington did mislead Blucher as to when and in what strength British reinforcements might reach him." "Peter Hofschroer believes that this deception was intentional, that Wellington deliberately risked sacrificing Blucher in order to gain time for his own fumbled concentration. He traces this Anglo-Prussian friction back to the squabbling Congress of Vienna and Wellington's role in the British effort to restrain Prussian territorial rapacity, followed by - after Napoleon's return from Elba - the two nations' competition in getting the contingents of the smaller German states for their respective armies. Hofschroer does not whitewash Prussia: the arrogant stupidity with which Blucher and Gneisenau mishandled the Saxon troops, the sloppy Prussian staff functioning and the ramshackle state of the Prussian Army itself are presented in detail." "The opening moves of the campaign are traced in depth, backed by exhaustive research and careful space-and-time studies. A good many myths and alibis bite the dust. It appears that the Allies were better informed of Napoleon's concentration than has been previously realised, but that Wellington badly misjudged Napoleon's probable stategy and, though promptly warned of his advance, was slow to react. If this version of Wellington seems less than omniscient, remember that the Duke never was exactly a timidly soul, and that a commander who could devastate his Portuguese ally's territory to cover his retreat into the Lines of Torres Vedras just might have been capable of considering Blucher's army an expendable rear-guard." "Serious students of the Hundred Days may disagree entirely or in part - but they should first read this book." In the following excerpts from 1815: The Waterloo Campaign the German contingents are in the midst of battle: 'Suddenly, on my left flank, along the Ligne brook, I saw an enemy staff officer with about 50 horsemen. While his men moved to attack my position in the rear the officer called out in German, "Surrender, gunners, you are taken prisoner!" With this cry he charged for the gun on our left flank, far in front of his men, and slashed out at limber rider Borchert, killing his horse. The blow was so forceful, that the sabre stuck fast in the saddle, but Borchert jumped off in time. Gunner Sieburg, seizing the opportunity, picked up the trial spike of a 12-pounder, and with the words, "I'll show him how to take prisoners!" hit this officer so hard on his bearskin hat, that he fell from his charger with a smashed head. The riderless horse galloped away into the enemy skirmish line, followed by the 50 enemy horsemen. They lost control of their mounts and rode over their own skirmishers, causing the greatest disorder among them.' The Hanoverians were also in the thick of the fighting. Their official report described the action [not far away from Quatre Bras] that followed, 'As the enemy advanced on Quatre Bras, the Battalions Luneburg and Osterode had to deploy in range of enemy cannon fire; the sharpshooters formed a chain of skirmishers in front of the line. The remainder of the brigade followed in the second wave. We advanced thus until the line reached the cobbled road running from Nivelles to Namur, where it stopped and used the ditches along the roadside for its position. The Verden Battalion now linked up with the English brigade which was advancing over the cobbled road on the left flank of the Hanoverians. One of its companies was sent to join the skirmish line ... The enemy's advance was in full swing. His cavalry had just attacked, and ridden through the 42nd Scottish Regiment, which had rushed into action with great boldness. They now reached the skirmish line. This part of the Verden Battalion was not able to fall back quickly enough and was largely ridden down or taken prisoner. The cavalry was on the point of advancing farther over the cobbled road when the two battalions in the ditch fired on them with such effect at close range that they turned around immediately. This way, the breakthrough in the centre was prevented, and fortunately without great loss, and without the remaining battalions of the brigade coming into action.' General Best's report outlined his perspective on the episode. 'About 4pm, Lieutenant-General Sir T. Picton ordered one battalion of my brigade into a position to fire at the enemy in such a way from the ditches along the Namur road. I gave this order to the Battalion Verden under the command of Major Christian von der Decken. General Picton positioned it himself, and used it to support and extend our line of sharpshooters, with the 1st Company advancing in open order into the skirmish line. Inexperienced in this type of fighting, but full of courage and determined to distinguish itself, part of this company pushed so far forward that it was cut off by the enemy and taken prisoner. This was Lieutenant von der Horst, Fahnrich Plate and Fahnrich Kotzebue along with several sergeants and 63 men. The captured skirmishers were replaced immediately, and the battalion stood its ground, even though it suffered terribly from the larger number of enemy skirmishers. Lieutenant Waegener of this battalion, and Lieutenant Jenisch, commander of the sharpshooters of the Osterode Battalion, were shot. Major von der Decken gave me the following report of the courageous behaviour of his battalion, particularly the sharpshooters and their leader, Lieutenant Hurtzig: "Lieutenant Hurtzig was deployed with his sharpshooters, men of the 1st Company, against some enemy skirmishers. The enemy were behind some bushes and trees, pouring deadly fire into our line, which was standing in the open with no cover. Nobody dared to attack this fire-spitting hedge, although troops of all types, English, Scottish, and Hanoverians, were standing opposite it. Then Lieutentant Hurtzig ordered his sharpshooters to storm the hedge, with Lieutenant von Hinuber promising to support the attack with part of the 1st company. These two officers then placed themselves at the head of their men, who were at first deterred by the heavy enemy fire. Encouraged by the words of their officers, they charged the hedge, and, with their supports, drove off the enemy. Lieutenant von Hinuber was wounded, later dying of this wound. Although wounded at the commencement of this action, Fahnrich Best of the King's German Legion, who had been posted to these sharpshooters, courageously led his platoon of sharpshooters into the fire. "Lieutenant Hurtzig led his men in another attack on the enemy skirmishers and drove them out of their next position, but, so as not to become surrounded, fell back to the first hedge, to which the English and Scots troops, positioned to the left and right, had moved up..." ' Later in the battle, the Brunswickers also came under fire as they took up positions in the allied line. 'Ney's response to this movement was to have a battery of 12-pounders unlimber on the path from Gemioncourt to Pierrepont and open fire, along with the batteries already deployed, on the unfortunate Brunswickers. This artillery bombardment was supported by the fire of skirmishers from Foy's division who had moved up to the bushes on the bank of the Gemioncourt brook. Major von Rauschenplat, commander of the Brunswick Vanguard, had his left arm ripped off by a shell splinter. Major von Cramm, commander of the Brunswick Hussars, was fatally wounded. Duke Friedrich Wilhelm, ignored warnings from Major von Wachholtz about his own safety, and stayed on his horse, calmly smoking his pipe to set an example to his young soldiers. The Brunswickers endured this bombardment for the best part of an hour.' Back to Greenhill Military Book News No. 81 Table of Contents Back to Greenhill Military Book News List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by Greenhill Books This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com