Last year Greenhill published a successful book giving the German perspective on the D-Day landings. The book, Fighting the Invasion, drew on German post-war debriefs to give a detailed look at the build up to the Allied attack, and the invasion itself, and included accounts by leading commanders entrusted with the defence of Fortress Europe. Now Greenhill are to publish the companion volume, Fighting in Normandy, and this will focus on German attempts to contain the invasion, counterattack and frustrate Allied plans between 7th and 13th June 1944. Compiled by David Isby, Fighting in Normandy includes accounts by von Schweppenburg, von Lüttwitz, von der Heydte and Heinz Guderian. Guderian’s views on the Normandy campaign, and the way in which the German defence was conducted, feature in a chapter on the use of tanks in Normandy. The chapter is presented in the form of a question and answer session, with Guderian being asked questions by a member of the American Historical Division: Q. Would mass counterattacks by two or three Panzer divisions have been possible in the bocage country [of Normandy]? A. Yes, they were possible, but only outside the range of naval gunfire, and the Panzer divisions would have had to be broken down into small groups of tanks and infantry, because of the terrain. We had prepared for this eventuality. Q. What objectives would have been attacked? A. Naturally, the forces of the enemy, particularly his armour and infantry. We would also have attacked reserves, and the flanks and rear of the enemy, particularly Patton’s, following his breakthrough at Avranches. Counterattacks to the beaches were feasible on the first or second day after the landing, while confusion reigned, but not afterwards. However, this would only have been possible if the Panzer divisions were already in reserve, but such was not the case. Rommel thought the invasion would be in the Calais-Dieppe area, and, therefore, the bulk of the Panzer divisions were assembled north of the Seine. I was in favour of having the reserve on both sides of the Seine. Hitler sided with Rommel, and the reserve went north of the Seine, around the Somme. Possibilities for counter-attack arose later [following the first few days after the invasion] but either we did not take advantage of them, or the counterattacks made were mismanaged by von Kluge. He ordered frontal counterattacks on strongpoints such as Caen; or else they were made by committing units piecemeal and in insufficient numbers, as at Avranches, where no division was employed intact, but only elements of various divisions. Q. What decisive results could have been achieved? A. Restriction of the invasion to Normandy. This would have been possible, though only if we had had a better or stronger Luftwaffe or Navy: they were absolutely necessary to the success of such an endeavour. As it was, the whole burden rested on the Army, and it was no longer ‘first class’. The infantry divisions were weak and practically immobile, particularly their artillery and supply services. What Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions there were, were used only piecemeal. This was a terrible error of the high command; the fault lay partly with Hitler, partly with OKW, and, of course, with von Kluge as well. Back to Greenhill Military Book News No. 109 Table of Contents Back to Greenhill Military Book News List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by Greenhill Books This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com