by Lionel Leventhal
Communicating with hostage-takers and armed suspects, as author Leroy Thompson is keen to point out in his forthcoming Hostage Rescue Manual, is rarely credited as a vital part of this most tentative of military operations. As Thompson explains in the book: “The good negotiator is absolutely essential in dealing with virtually any hostage incident. He or she may be able to diffuse the situation and talk the hostage-takers out without violence. If, however, it proves impossible to negotiate the hostage-taker out, then the negotiator can help provide intelligence for the entry team, can prolong the incident to allow an effective entry plan to evolve, and may even be able to contribute to the entry by providing a distraction. ... the best chance for hostage survival normally rests with the hostage negotiator.” In this extract from the book, we can see why: “The fact that the negotiations may fill needs for different types of hostage-takers aids the negotiation process. For example, the criminal may see the negotiations as a way to save his life and perhaps make a deal with the authorities. The mentally ill hostage-taker will be allowed to draw attention to his problems. Finally, the terrorist may see the negotiation process as a way to further his agenda by helping him reach an audience. For many terrorists, too, the negotiation process allows them a chance to survive, perhaps to strike another day. Good negotiators follow a strategy designed to wrest control of the incident from the hostage-takers and to defuse the likelihood of violence. Among the techniques used by negotiators are the following:
This last technique attempts to use a phenomenon often noted in hostage incidents to the advantage of the hostages. Often called the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, this bond between hostage-taker and hostage is normally cited in reference to cases in which the hostages, through dependence on the hostage-takers for their safety, begin to identify with them. The syndrome takes its name from an incident in the summer of 1973. There was a bank robbery in Stockholm which resulted in the taking of hostages. One of the hostages became so involved with her hostage-taker that she later married him. In another case, during the rescue at Princes Gate, the youngest terrorist was shielded by women hostages to protect him from the SAS. The possibility of the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’having converted one or more hostages to accomplices is the reason that freed hostages are often restrained and isolated until authorities can ascertain that they are not dangerous. In longer sieges, the hostages may also come to view the authorities as the enemy since they have done nothing to alleviate their distress. FBI behavioural unit studies have even shown that during entries, hostages may be more likely to obey the commands of the hostage-taker than the authorities carrying out the rescue. On the positive side of the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, it may also work to protect the hostages as many hostage-takers have developed a relationship with the hostages which keeps them from killing them. As a result, the negotiator and sniper/observer teams as well as those gathering electronic intelligence should watch for one hostage being removed from the others and maybe even being hooded, as this is often indicative that this hostage is being de-humanised and prepared for execution. Interesting studies have also been done on which hostages are most likely to be chosen as the ones to be made examples of. In various training simulations, the hostage who acted as a sycophant and tried to ingratiate himself with the hostage-takers was chosen because he or she was annoying. At the Princes Gate siege, the hostage who argued in favour of the Ayatollah Khomeini and emphasised flaws in the doctrine espoused by the terrorists was chosen. In still another situation in which hostage-takers and hostages had to sleep in close quarters, the hostage who snored loudly was executed since he had kept everyone awake! The hostage negotiator must remember that he, too, can fall prey to the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ and must constantly be aware that he does not become overly emotionally involved with the terrorist or hostage-taker on the other end of the telephone. A negotiator who became so wrapped up with talking a terrorist out that he gave even an unintentional warning -’It’s really, really important that you come out right now!’- could prove disastrous if it compromised an entry in progress. It should be noted, however, that though this is a consideration, it is virtually unknown for a negotiator to give away an entry; while again and again negotiators have aided an entry by providing timely intelligence, identifying the most dangerous hostage-taker, or helping to provide a distraction. To put a buffer between the negotiator and those who make the decision about the use of force, an axiom in most hostage rescue units is: negotiators never command and commanders never negotiate.” Hostage Rescue Manual: Tactics of the Counter-Terrorist Professionals is a special format paperback with 192 pages, 31 photographs and 17 line drawings. Back to Greenhill Military Book News No. 108 Table of Contents Back to Greenhill Military Book News List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by Greenhill Books This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |