British Forces:
- 6 British Regular bases ( 5 companies 1/24 foot and 1 company 2/24 foot )
1 artillery base ( 7 pdrs )
3 NNC bases
2 Light Horse bases ( Natal Native Horse) total 12 bases
+2 baggage train bases ( the camp )
Zulu Forces:
Right Horn:
- uDududu amabutho - 2 bases
iMbwbe amabutho (1 base) and isAngqu amabutho (1 base) For this scenario, treat these as one combined amabutho.
1 Zulu rifle base
Left Horn:
- iNgobamkhosi amabutho - 4 bases
uVe amabutho - 2 bases
1 rifle base
Chest:
- uNokenke amabutho - 2 bases
umCijo amabutho - 3 bases
uMbonambi amabutho - 2 bases
1 rifle base
Loins ( reserve ):
- uThulwana - 2 base
iNdlandlo - 1 base
iNdluyengwe - 1 base
1 rifle base
total 24 bases
Use standard victory conditions.
Special Rule
Whenever the British player rolls an unmodified 1 in fire combat only, place a marker on the camp. This symbolizes ammunition shortage and all British player bases fire at - 1 for the rest of the game. A maximum of 3 markers may be accumulated and their effect is additive. They may never be removed.
Scale: 1" = 150 yds; 1 turn=10-15 minutes; Zulu bases 1/1000; British Regulars 1/100; Artillery 1/2 ; Light Horse 1/50; NNC 1/200
Design Notes
These rules owe a great deal to Phil Barker's popular set De Bellis Antiquitatus, and are basically an adaptation of them to the Colonial period, specifically the Zulu War of 1879. I also consulted the other rules sets listed in the bibliography, but the most important factor in adapting DBA mechanisms to this period were the books in the bibliography. In reading them, it became apparent that at the grand tactical level the Zulu commander could do little more than choose the initial direction / timing of his attack and decide when and where to commit his reserve.
The rest depended on carrying out the traditional double envelopment battle plan of the horns and chest and the willingness of the warriors to brave the superior British firepower to close into melee where they were at least a match for the British. Unfortunately, the eagerness of the warriors to attack often resulted in premature attacks, and if these were made when the British were prepared for them, the Zulus would suffer heavily. The restrictions on the Zulu player to deploy in traditional battle formation and command control reflect these realities. Some players may not like these limitations, but I believe they contibute a great deal to period feel. I am indebted to Artie Conliffe for this principle which is one of the basic premises of his TACTICA ancients rules.
The British player has an entirely different set of problems. He has a technological superiority but his core of regulars are usually heavily outnumbered. The baggage train is vulnerable and he will have to plan his formations carefully because the Zulu player catching the British unprepared as at Isandhwala or Intombe River is in for a long day. The restrictions on British Regulars in melee reflect the psychology and game scale - 100 men are not going to fix bayonets and charge the flank of a mass formation of 2000 men - they would have used their rifles, and in the game this is very effective as the Zulu player will be frustrated time and time again to see his warriors recoiled by fire before the melee portion of the phase. But if the fire is ineffective or slackens ...
Bibliography
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