Having subscribed to "The Gauntlet" for over 3 years, I thought it was about time I had a go at contributing something. Fifteen months later and I've pulled together enough (nearly) original thoughts for an article, when Ken Baggaley pips me to the post in Gauntlet No12! On a closer look, however, Ken and I have approached the problem from rather different angles, so here's my attempt anyway; see what you think. As pointed out in "Carry On Campaigning", C16 and C17 battles were fairly well spread out. In my own campaign (based loosely on the TYW) battles are generally the culmination of several months manoeuvre. The ideas below are a little long-winded and detailed, but with a hard battle able to destroy an army and make or break a campaign, I think some time and effort on a game-within-a-game is justified. Background To help you adapt these ideas to other campaigns here are some notes on my own system to put things in context. a. The campaign covers an area about the size of England and Wales. The map is divided into 24 regions of about 2,500 sq miles for the programmed enemy to move around in a suitably vague manner. For the use of my own forces the map is also divided up into hexes, 10 miles across (= about 30 hexes to a region). b. Strategic turns are weekly and armies move in order depending on the draw of an initiative card for their General. c. Armies are mostly 5,000 - 15,000 strong. Tactical figure ratio is 1:25. d. General's abilities of relevance here are Strategic Ability on a scale of 1-3, Caution and Impetuosity1, both on a scale of 1-6 and Aggression on the usual scale Rash / Bold / Average / Cautious. Scouts Dragoons and one Arquebusier in 20 is suitable for employment as a scout. More than this may be employed, but they are only half as effective, prone to desertion and may not return for battle. Croatians and similar light horse may also be employed in this role. Scouts are employed in patrols of 25 men under the army's Scoutmaster General. The Scoutmaster's force is assessed as follows: 1 - 4 patrols -- Very weak 5 - 9 -- Weak 10 - 17 -- Adequate 18 - 24 -- Strong 25+ -- Very strong If unreliable men are employed as scouts roll 1D6 per week for the number of figures that desert. General Keilig (SA 2) has been dispatched (by me) with 6,000 men to secure the support of the currently neutral city of Zell. His force of 2,000 horse includes 600 Arquebusiers and 200 Dragoons, giving 9 patrols (5% of 24 Arquebusier figs = 1 fig/patrol + 8 Dragoon patrols). Keilig's scoutmaster's force is therefore "weak" Making Contact When an army enters or moves through a region containing an enemy army calculate the number of patrols active and roll 2D6 to make contact as follows: Patrols Very Strong 9 or less Strong 8 or less Adequate 7 or less Weak 6 or less Very Weak 5 or less Die modifiers: -1 General's SA rating higher than opponent +1 General's SA rating lower than opponent If contact is made the difference, if any, between the required score and that thrown is the number of reports received (see later). For the opposition, the Margrav von Steindorf (an NPC)(SA 2) has also been dispatched to secure Zell. Keilig's move comes up first and he enters the region around Zell, rolling a 6 to locate the enemy force in the same region. He receives reports of an enemy force in the area, but no indications of its strength. Intelligence of the area/population controlled by enemy forces suggests von Steindorf's force will be about 5,000 men, so Keilig works on this basis for now. Determining a random hex for the enemy we find von Steindorf is 30 miles away and 20 miles short of Zell. Sticking to orders Keilig uses the remainder of his strategic movement to move into camp on the outskirts of Zell. As he does so he gets another patrol roll to gain more intelligence (i.e. he gets one roll to locate the enemy on entering a region and another for moving through a region containing an enemy force). This time he rolls 5 on 2D6 so gains 1 report of enemy strength. Opponents Strength The starting point for determining the enemy strength is the intelligence assessment from the area/population controlled. This strength is the datum of 100. To determine the reported strength roll 2D6 on the table below: 12 = 200 11 = 180 10 = 160 9 = 140 8 = 120 7 = 100 6 = 85 5 = 65 4 = 45 3 = 25 2 = 15 This reported strength is likely to be only part of the picture. It is entirely possible that the reports are inaccurate, but the more reports a general gathers the less likely this is and the smaller any error is likely to be. Rolls for reported strength always use the initial assessment as the datum. But we're getting ahead of ourselves. Keilig rolls a 4 so his scouts report 0.45 x 5000 or 2250 men. This is the end of Keilig's move, but later on (in the same week) von Steindorf's strategic move comes round. He rolls against each potential target in priority order, fails his roll against the enemy army (Keilig) but passes to move against Zell. It seems therefore that he either doesn't realise Keilig is there or doesn't want a battle. As it is, his most direct route to Zell brings him into the same hex as Keilig, so the two armies do meet this week. Initial Range When two armies enter the same hex both generals must decide on their initial reactions. The first step is to determine the range at which the two armies confront each other. Roll 2D6 and modify as follows: General is Rash/Aggressive -1 General is Cautious +1 Army has 0 - 11 patrols out -1 Army has 25 + patrols out -1 Result 2 or less Battle 3 - 4 Close (about 1 mile apart) 5 - 7 Short (2 - 4 miles) 8 - 9 Medium (5 - 7 miles) 10 - 15 Long (8 - 10 miles) 16+ Out of Contact If the two armies meet on the battlefield then move straight to resolving the cavalry skirmish to determine what sort of battle develops. If the two armies end up still out of contact then there will be no battle this week. Otherwise the general must assess the ground and decide what to do. As von Steindorf's force enters the same hex, Keilig rolls a 4 for the range the two armies notice each other. Neither General is Rash or Cautious, but Keilig only has 9 patrols out so the score is modified to 3; Close range. Terrain At close or short range roll for and place terrain items. At longer ranges roll only for the terrain items present, giving a general impression of the sort of ground present. Random terrain generation gives both armies a good defensive position. Keilig has a hill on his left flank and can secure the right flank of his foot on a large farm. Von Steindorf's army is to the left centre and has large wood and another farm to secure its flanks on. The real show stopper however is the large marsh smack bang between the two armies. Options The friendly General's options for action are: Impetuous attack (advance 2 range bands - counts as a forced march) Attack (advance one range band) Manoeuvre to force opponent out of his position Observe (endeavour to maintain current range) Manoeuvre to better ground Hold current position Withdraw Keilig apparently outnumbers his opponent 5:2, but he is in a strong position and, given the delicate negotiations with Zell, the risks of battle probably outweigh the benefits. Keilig opts to Hold and dig in. Enemy Decision What of the enemy in all this ? Establish the odds based on the initial intelligence assessment of enemy strength. Using this as the start point on the table below roll +ve and one -ve DAv and move up or down as appropriate to determine what he thinks the odds are, then adjust his Impetuosity and Caution : 4:1 +5 I 7:2 +4 I 3:1 +3 I 5:2 +2 I 2:1 +1 I 3:2 0 1:1 0 2:3 0 1:2 +1 C 2:5 +2 C 1:3 +3 C 2:7 +4 C 1:4 +5 C +1 I per victory this season +1 C per defeat this season -1 C SA 3 +1 C SA 1 +2 C enemy entrenched +1 C Hill/wood hex and stronger than opponent -1 C Hill/wood hex and weaker than opponent +2 C Forest/mountain hex and stronger than opponent -2 C Forest/mountain hex and weaker than opponent Next determine the enemy's tactical approach based on his strategic activity this week: Moved (between 2 sectors) 1-2 Offensive, 3-5 Demonstrative, 6 Defensive Besieging town 1 Offensive, 2-4 Demonstrative, 5-6 Defensive Attacking 1-3 Offensive, 4-5 Demonstrative, 6 Defensive No move 1 Offensive, 2-3 Demonstrative, 4-6 Defensive Not moved yet 1-2 Offensive, 3-4 Demonstrative, 5-6 Defensive Resolve odds Impetuosity ; Caution and cross reference with approach on table below: A Impetuous attack (advance 2 range bands)(counts as a forced march) B Attack (advance one range band) C Manoeuvre to force opponent out of his position D Observe (endeavour to maintain current range) E Manoeuvre to better ground F Hold current position and deploy for battle G Withdraw Von Steindorf (C = 5, I = 3) rolls +3 & -4 so moves down one from 1:1 (using 5,000 for his force, not the 2,250 Keilig thinks he has). Von Steindorf believes himself outnumbered 2:3, but this has no effect on his C&I. Enemy entrenched, however, means +2 C. Moving onto his strategic approach, for all that he is using diplomacy, von Steindorf's target is Zell so he rolls on the besieging a town line. Rolling a 4 his approach is Demonstrative. Odds (I:C) are 3:7 or 1:2, which equals F on the Demonstrative line. Von Steindorf therefore decides to Hold also. Skirmishing Whilst the two main bodies are milling about deciding whether to have a battle or not the scouts and screens of both sides will be getting stuck in gaining intelligence, taking or holding key ground, frustrating the enemy and generally getting in everyone's way. At the beginning of each week the friendly general may commit as much of his cavalry as he sees fit to the scouting, screening and skirmishing. In addition, if the range between the armies is "close" commanded musketeers may be employed (counting as half strength for ratio purposes except in hilly, mountainous or forested hexes). Before throwing in the lot, however, note that troops committed thus may not be available for any ensuing battle (1 on 1D6 per squadron (8 figs)) The enemy will commit so many men per 1000 men (assessed). Roll 2D6: 2 150/1000 3 175 4 75 5 150 6 100 7 125 8 100/1000 9 75 10 50 11 50 12 125 Having determined relative numbers now see how aggressive each side want to be. Roll 2D6 and modify by General's SA if desired: 2-3 Timid (1) 4-5 Cautious (2) 6-7 Deliberate (3) 8-9 Bold (4) 10-11 Aggressive (5) 12 Rash (6) Both generals roll a dice against 3 x SA rating. The die to be rolled depends on relative strengths and aggression: 4:1 1D4 3:1 1D6 2:1 1D8 3:2, 1:1 1D10 2:3, 1:2 1D12 1:3 or worse 1D20 If more aggressive than opponent move up one row. If less aggressive move down one row. The difference in the amount by which each general makes or fails his roll determines the outcome. 0 - 2 Inconclusive 3 - 4 Marginal 5 - 8 Clear 9+ Decisive Consequences: Inconclusive - General gains 2D6 reports on enemy strength. No advantage either way so no effect on mainbody manoeuvres. Marginal - Winning General gains best 2 of 3D6 reports and +1 to die roll if trying to avoid an encounter battle, adjust ground or deploy units where a manoeuvering army has been caught on the march (see later). Loser gains worst 2 of 3D6 reports and -1 to die roll if trying to avoid an encounter battle, adjust ground or deploy units where a manoeuvering army has been caught on the march (see later). Clear - General gains best/worst 2 of 4D6 reports. +2/-2 to die roll to avoid an encounter battle, adjust ground or deploy units where an army has been caught on the march. Decisive - General gains best/worst 2 of 5D6 reports. +3/-3 to die roll to avoid an encounter battle, adjust ground or deploy units where an army has been caught on the march. The clash may cause casualties to both sides depending on how well they did (or didn't !) and on the intensity of the clash. The latter is an average of the aggression demonstrated by both sides (round up): Results 1 2 3 4 5 6 Inconclusive 0/0 1/1 2/2 3/3 5/5 6/6 Marginal 0/1 1/2 1/2 2/3 4/5 5/6 Clear 0/2 1/3 1/3 2/4 3/5 4/6 Decisive 0/4 0/5 1/5 1/5 2/6 2/6 Each side rolls the number of D6 specified, losing 1 figure for each 1 thrown. The figure before the slash is the winners; the figure after the losers. If any additional reports of enemy strength are gained roll again for the reported strength. This may be different from the original reported strength, in which case average out the assessment using the number of reports for each strength as a weighting. In this way the assessed strength of the enemy will be refined as more reports come in and the picture slowly builds. Keilig throws out his Dragoons (200) plus a Squadron of Arquebusiers (200). The force rolls 3, modified to 5 by Keilig's SA, so adopts a Cautious approach. Von Steindorf rolls a 5 so deploys 150 horse per 1,000 men or 750. They roll a Timid approach. Keilig's horse are outnumbered 1:2, but are more aggressive so roll 1D10 vs 6 (Keilig's SA x 3). He rolls 8 so fails by 2. Von Steindorf's horse have 2:1 odds but are less aggressive so roll 1D10 vs 6 also. They roll 5 so succeed by 1. The difference is therefore 3 in von Steindorf's favour, a marginal victory. As the loser, Keilig receives the worst 2 of 3D6 reports. He rolls 6, 5 & 1 so receives 6 reports, this time of 3,250 men (roll of 5 = 0.65 x 5,000). Average with his previous report ((1 x 2250 + 6 x 3250)/7) he now thinks faces 3,100 enemy. Keilig rolls 2D6 for casualties and von Steindorf 1D6. No 1s are rolled, so no losses. Army Manoeuvres Advancing and withdrawing. Having decided how much they wish to close or open the range both generals roll 2D6. Having made the roll the general may modify the score by up to his SA rating, or SA rating +1 if his force is all cavalry and his opponents has a mixed or all foot force: 0 or less: Closes 2 more than declared 1 - 5: Closes 1 more than declared 6 - 8: Achieves desired manoeuvre 9 - 12: Opens 1 more than desired 13+: Opens 2 more than desired This may mean that the armies end up closing or opening more than the generals want; even being sucked into battle or losing contact altogether. Of course the general may use his SA rating to exaggerate the "error" in order to achieve a particularly swift advance or retreat. If the armies move out of contact then that is the end of the manoeuvering for this army. There may still be interaction this week if the non-moving general has not yet had his strategic turn and wishes to initiate contact, but that is up to him. It may be that the total closure takes the two armies through the battle range. Each point over the closure required to get the two armies into battle is a chance on 1D6 that they will clash on the march and that an encounter battle will ensue. Both generals make this roll. If they fail their army enters the field in line of march. If on the other hand the general makes the roll the enemy is spotted in time to deploy. The results of the cavalry skirmishing may modify the die roll. In any event determine terrain from scratch and randomly. An Observing general decides how much he wishes to open or close and rolls for achievement after his opponent has completed his moving, thus giving him a better chance of maintaining the range he wishes to. Manoeuvering There are two reasons for manoeuvring; to move your own army to better ground or to force your opponent out of his position. In either case the procedure for trying to adjust the ground is the same. Having randomly determined the initial terrain roll 1D10 per terrain piece and per battlefield sector and note the score. This is now the score the manoeuvering general must roll under with 1D10 to either move or remove the terrain item. The score for each sector is rolled against if the general wishes to add a terrain piece there. Moved pieces move to a randomly determined new sector (and may end up back where they started !) and new pieces are of a randomly determined nature. This reflects that there are only so many suitable battlefields in a given area or an outmanoeuvered army may find an equally good defensive position near by. If it is the enemy manoeuvering against a friendly force the friendly general must roll above the terrain piece score to prevent it from being moved or removed. The enemy general will move pieces if he thinks he is weaker than the friendly force, or remove if he thinks he is stronger. Only a weaker enemy will try to add terrain pieces. The result of skirmishing will give a die roll modifier for this process. If one or both armies are manoeuvering to new positions (as opposed to trying to manoeuvre his opponent out of a defensive position) roll 1D6: 1-2 the desired ground means closing one range band; 3-4 the ground is at the same range; 5-6 the ground is further from the enemy. An army manoeuvering to a better position is assumed to achieve the opening or closure desired. An army outmanoeuvring an opponent is assumed to be aiming to hold about the same range, but may end up closing or opening the range as in "Advancing & Withdrawing". Now roll for any closure or opening desired by the opponent as above. If the manoeuvering results in a battle the manoeuvering (not advancing) General rolls 1D6 modified by the skirmish outcome: 1+ Both sides deploy for battle 0, -1 Defender deploys and Manoeuverer rolls for each unit as per encounter battle -2 Manoeuverer ambushed on line of march. What Next ? If all the running about has resulted in a battle or loss of contact, deliberate or otherwise, then all well and good. If not the generals will get another chance next week. Adjust scouting/screening strengths as desired and perceived ratios as required, and begin the process again. As both sides held that was the end of things in the first week. The following week Keilig held again and von Steindorf manoeuvered to a better position (wood on his left flank became a large wood and a farm was added to the far left centre). Keilig came off worst in the skirmishing again, but still gained 8 reports of 5,000 (average now 15 reports of 4,100). In week 3 von Steindorf digs in and looks set to stay. Keilig is now fairly confident the odds are about 3:2 in his favour and decides some sort of positive action might help the Burghers of Zell decide which way to vote. Keilig tries to manoeuvre von Steindorf out of his position. He rolls 4 & 7 on D10s for the large central marsh and 6 & 4 for the large wood on von Steindorf's left (both features are 2 terrain items rolled to be placed in the same sector). Just to be on the safe side the Dragoons and 3 squadrons of Arquebusiers are committed to covering the manoeuvre. The enemy, however, still gain a definite victory in the skirmish and all Keilig's die rolls against the terrain features are subject to +2 modifier. Rolls of 1, 7, 4 & 8 become 3, 9, 6 & 10, enough to remove one of the marshes and one of the woods. Keilig is assumed to be trying to maintain the same (Close) range, but a roll of 3 for closing/opening means, even allowing for the +2 for his SA, he ends up closing one band into Battle range. Fortunately he rolls a 5 for the encounter, modified to 3 by the skirmish result, so both sides spot each other and deploy. Actual Strength When the two armies meet roll 2D6 against the number of reports gathered. If the score is achieved then the enemy is as reported. If the score is missed the difference multiplied by 10 is the percentage of inaccuracy. Roll (yet another) 1D6, if the roll is even the scouts overestimated the enemy strength, if odd they underestimated. Accuracy of reported strength: Reports Score or less to be accurate 1 - 3 2 4 - 6 3 7 - 9 4 10 - 12 5 13 - 15 6 16 - 19 7 20 - 23 8 24 - 27 9 28 - 31 10 32+ 11 A score of 12 always means a complete cock-up. Roll 2D6 and compare the result without any modification to the reported strength table. Somewhere along the line the Scoutmaster has got completely the wrong end of the stick and the enemy strength may be considerably different to that expected. As part of the last skirmish Keilig gained a further 4 reports of his enemy's strength, this time of 4,250. All in all then he has 19 reports averaged out to 4,150. He rolls a 9 and then a 4, meaning his scouts apparently overestimated by 20% and only 3,325 men deploy opposite him. Tactical Outflanking If, when both armies are deployed for battle, the enemy appears to be weaker than you expected it may be because the enemy commander has dispatched some men on a tactical outflanking manoeuvre. Take the amount of overestimation from "Actual Strength" above and modify as follows: Enemy General is Cautious -20% Anticipated force was smaller than own force 10% Visible force is equal to or larger than own force +10% Result of cavalry skirmish was Clear or better in own favour -10% Result of cavalry skirmish was Clear or better in enemy's favour +10% The result is the overall chance of an outflanking force. Convert this figure using the table below to get the roll to be made on D100 on moves 3-7 until the force appears or the danger passes. If an outflanking force does appear it will be 10 x 2D6% of the difference between anticipated and visible enemy forces. Von Steindorf's visible force is 20% smaller than expected, the anticipated force was still smaller than Keilig's, but the skirmish was a Clear enemy victory so there is a 20% chance that an outflanking force has been dispatched. Converting this, there is a 4% chance per move in moves 3-7 inclusive that an enemy force will arrive on the flanks. Encounter Battles If one or more forces are fighting straight from the line of march roll 1D6 per unit per move, needing a 6 to appear. Add one to the dice each move (i.e. +1 move 2, +2 move 3 etc.). Any unit which has not appeared after rolling to do so on move 5 will not appear at all. Epilogue Rolling for returnees and casualties from the skirmish Keilig found that one squadron was badly mauled and another failed to turn up at all. Against the odds it was von Steindorf who attacked first and this initially seemed to catch Keilig's men off guard. Both wings were driven back and the first line of foot badly shaken. The reserve foot stabilised things in the centre, however, and the left wing of horse rallied and returned. With no reserves to commit, von Steindorf's forces were steadily driven back and after a further hour withdrew in good order. Keilig held the field and claimed the victory, but his losses had been half as great again as von Steindorf's and there was no chance of a pursuit. The next day Zell declared for the Gustavin cause and Keilig withdrew into its fortifications to lick his wounds. Von Steindorf pulled off a little way and then settled down to await reinforcements..... Back to The Gauntlet No. 17 Table of Contents Back to The Gauntlet List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by Craig Martelle Publications This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com