The massive battles of the Russo Japanese war are often over-looked by wargamers. Perhaps because miniatures were so hard to come by. This has been corrected in recent times so in this article we take a look at the action around Lao-Mu-Tun, one of the series of engagements that come under the collective title of "The Battle of Cha Ho."
While the Army of General Nogi was besieging the garrison of Port Arthur, the rest off the Japanese Army were busy on the Manchuria/Korean front preventing the Russians from sending a relief force. The Russians were dependent upon the railway line from Harbin through Mukden. The only heavy carriageway link with Port Arthur because of the Japanese Naval blockade and sea control.
Realising this the Japanese had pushed the Russians northward out of Korea, cutting the rail line and sitting astride communications. After some considerable delay in gathering forces, the Russian Army of Manchuria under the command of General of Infantry KUROPATKIN launched an offensive that met with initial success.
The Japanese being a smaller nation had great difficulty matching the Russian man-power while at the same time, keeping up with the terrible losses NOGI was suffering on the defences of Port Arthur. What troops could be diverted were and reserves called up from the Home Islands. Eventually the Russian offensive ran out of steam and the Japanese Field Army, under the command of Marquis OYAMA counter-attacked strongly.
This action, takes place near the end of the counter -offensive. Much of the style of fighting was similar to that at the beginning of WW1 but without as many machineguns. Although many European observers were present during the entire campaign, the lessons of their observations seem to have sadly been lost on their own General Staffs once they returned home.
TERRAIN.
Although the armies had been fighting through some pretty rough, hilly country, by this stage they had come out onto a flat plain traversed by the River Cha-Ho. The ground had only a few folds in it to prevent observation and much of was relatively barren, with the result there was not much grass or shrub cover either.
There was little barbed wire available, but some use was made of abatis and pits with spikes inthe base.
The soft earth was such that it was dusty in dry conditions and muddy in the wet. The River Cha-Ho is wide, but also very shallow. In most places it is only knee deep and at the deepest, waist deep. The river was therefore fordable almost everywhere and of no great obstruction. Despite heavy rain in recent days the water level did not seem much effected.
One feature taken advantage of by the Japanese on the first day, was that the banks of the river were relatively high and although presenting no great difficulty getting up and down them, they provided enough cover for infantry to move unseen along the edge of the river blind to the direction of a viewer.
The village buildings were poor peasant dwellings but surrounded by very solid walls made of impacted mud. This made each one a potential fortress for infantry fighting and close street fighting took place. The artillery firing in support, although numerous, was mostly of the smaller range of fieldguns. This meant each such strongpoint was of great value to the defending force.
The railway bridge was wood trestle affair of no other importance than what it was, since the river was so easily forded on foot or by wheeled transport & guns.
The Russian trenches were of a typical three deep row. They were very narrow fire trenches, not intended for lengthy occupation. They were also quite shallow, being intended to allow a standing man to fire over the lip. More permanent accommodation was provided in a few bunkers and the fortified towns. It was normal practice for the trenches only to be manned when expecting an attack. Because of the numerous villages nearby and plentiful supply of wood in them, the defenders had been able to provide themselves with a certain amount of overhead protection by the use of doors and beams, sheets of tin etc. covered with dirt.
The open ground has almost no trees and only shallow grass. Much of it has been ploughed and there are rough hay stooks dotted about on the areas still in stubble.
Russian positions in (1) (9) and (10) had all been mutually supporting and the field artillery of both sides could stand well back and still see the action.
Roads were very bad, most being little more than local tracks, heavily rutted. The Mandarin Road was a main route for travel purposes, but while better than the tracks, was showing the pressure of all the Military activity moving across it in recent months.
THE WEATHER.
The wet conditions of previous days had given way to a much dryer day, but there was some ground mist in the morning and a few showers of rain. Mostly it was fine and clear with visibility of several miles.
THE RUSSIANS
XVIII Manchurian Army Corps commanded by Lt.General WOLKOV had seen considerable action during the retreat of previous days. It was battle hard and the units reasonably reliable. Because of losses, many regiments had used their fourth battalion to fill out their first three but in some cases they were down to only one or two battalions. There had been 24 Maxim guns with the Army, but none of these were on this particular field.
Some artillery losses had been experienced and indeed one captured battery was in use by the enemy, but generally the Russian Artillery was plentiful, well supplied and had superior guns. These were mostly Krupp Model 00 fieldguns of 76.2cm.
The Russians had the advantage that they were falling back on their own railhead making re-supply easier. Unlike their opponents they do not seem to have suffered any inconveniences due to ammuntion shortage.
An examination of the campaign reveals many glaring errors of judgement by the very senior officers and a slowness to re-act resulting in lost chances. Certainly considering the massive superiority in cavalry, the failure to carry out active reconaissance and subsequent lack of information on Japanese movements is incomprehensible.
Middle rank officers would appear to be loath to do anything they do not have in writing from their superiors. If they are uncertain they are liable to send for instructions and then wait for them to arrive. They certainly cannot be relied upon to lead the men to 'the sound of the guns' or to take risks in command decisions.
The low ranking officers seem to carry out their orders well enough and with great bravery but only that, individual initiative again being stifled.
The troops were mostly experienced veterans, but as with Russian armies of the time, the men did not take and were not expected to show, any individual initiative. If therefore the officers became casualties, it was normal for the other ranks to simply fall back until they came across officers who could take command. Some staffs and Generals became involved in this way as junior officer casualties mounted. This was apparently not considered unusual or bad, merely inconvenient. It would seem the Czarist officers prefered the men to be totally subservient. The troops were tough in hand to hand fighting and fought hard, repulsing many Japanese attacks.
No Russian Cavalry participated on this field.
Note. Numbers in brackets represent the position of HQ & Units on the map.
XVIII CORPS.
Lt.General WOLKOV. (11)
3rd INFANTRY DIVISION.
Major General JANSHUL. (11)
1st BRIGADE.
Major General SHASHTSHUK (11)
9th (Old Ingermanland). 1 composite battn.(11)
10th (New ingermanland) 2 battn. (10)
2nd BRIGADE.
Major General JAKUBINSKI. (8)
12th (Weliki-Luki) Regt. 1st Battn. (8)
2nd,3rd,4th Battn (7)
35th INFANTRY DIVISION.
Lt.General DOBRSHINSKI. (12)
1st BRIGADE.
Major General GLINSKI. (12)
137th (Njeshen) 2nd Battalion only. (12)
138th (Bolchov) 1 Battalion only. (13)
2nd BRIGADE.
Major General GLASKO. (11)
139th (Morshansk) 1st & 2nd Battn. (7)
140th (Saraisk) 1st Battn. (9)
2nd & 3rd Battn. (11)
35th ARTILLERY BRIGADE.
Major General TERPILOVSKI.
1st Battalion. 3 Batteries. 76.2mm (8)
2nd Battalion. 3 Batteries. 76.2mm (7)
RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE.
On Octoner 13th Russian XVIII Corps HQ was informed by its forward commanders that three main columns of Japanese troops were approaching. One along the Mandarin Road, one along the West bank of the Cha Ho and one on the road to the west of the river.
The most westerly column attacked Lin-Shin-Pu but after heavy fighting the first two attacks were stalled on the defences. At this point the Japanese used the river banks to infiltrate some companies of infantry onto the flank of the defenders, causing a general withdrawal. The Russians none the less fought hand to hand through the town and even after being pushed out the northern end of it, continued to counter-attack until 11pm. By the end of the day therefore, the Japanese held a breach in the line on the river bank and the town of Lin-Shin-Pu itself.
The eastern column, troops of the Japanese 3rd Division had been attacking CHA-HO-PU from the east, but after gaining a toehold in the defences, became exhausted. By the morning of the 15th the Japanese 3rd Division are on the other side of the CHA HO, but showing no signs of an attack.
Infantry patrols sent out during the night report that the column which was coming down the CHA-HO River bank apparently crossed to the eastern side and were disposed between CHA-HO Railway Station and SHU-LIN-TSY. Their disposition is aligned with a likely advance on LAO-MU-TUN.
The bulk of the enemy Western column are at Siasan Kiatsy with its advance elements in Lin-Shin-Pu. The artillery is presumed to be to the rear somewhere near Shu-Lin-Tsy.
The enemy Eastern column seems to have mostly fallen back onto Tchan-Sintien and concentrated there, removing the immediate threat of a flank attack on Cha-Ho-Pu.
The threat for the day of the 15th would therefore seem to be a Japanese assault on Lao-Mu-Tun and an attempt to expand the breach in the Russian lines at Lin-Shin-Pu.
RUSSIAN SOLUTIONS.
The Russians had been in retreat for days, but were still ready to fight. A series of spoiling attacks were launched and various troop movements made to bolster the threatened areas.
(1) 6am. Three battalions of the 12th Regt. from Zo-Fan-Tai carried out a surprise attack on Lin-Shin-Pu under the cover of dawn and ground mist. This was a full blown assault with the intention of re-capturing the town. They got within 30 metres before being sighted. The Japanese put up a rapid fire, but two battalions of the 139th also came up and the attackers pushed into the town. A melee developed amongst the mud walls. Although eventually forced to retire, the attack spoilt all actions by the Japanese at Lin-Shin-Pu for that day as they were also required to stand too, in case of further assaults.
(2) 10am The composite battalion of the 9th Regiment was ordered from Cha-Ho-Pu to re-inforce Lao-Mu-Tun.
(3) 11am. 2nd Battalion of the 12th Regt. and two companies of the 140th Regt. made a spoiling attack from Zo-Fan-Tai. They were easily repulsed.
(4) 11am. 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 140th Regt. ordered from Cha-Ho-Pu to Lao-Mu-Tun.
(5) 11am 1st and 2nd Battalions 139th ordered from Cha-Ho-Pu to Zo-Fan-Tai.
(6) Noon the 1st Battalion of the 12th Regt. ordered from Kin-Kuan to the defences of Lao-Mu-Tun.
(7) 2.30pm 1st and 2nd Battalions 139th carried out another spoiling attack on Lin-Sin-Pu. This successfully keeps its garrison pinned down, but the Russians are not aware that the 45th Regiment previously in reserve behind has moved to the other flank.
THE JAPANESE
The Japanese army had been fighting against the Russians for seven months with considerable success in open warfare. When the Russians were able to adopt defensive positions however, the situation had been much different. The offensive zeal of the Samurai spirt was spent against barbed-wire, trenches and a new weapon, the machine-gun. Pushing doggedly onward however, the Japanese gradually forced a breach between the Russians they entrapped in Port Arthur and the Siberian Army guarding the vital rail link with European Russia, through Mukden and Harbin. Stubborn Russian defenders and a lack of Japanese manpower prevented either the defeat of the Siberian Army or garrison of Port Arthur. In the interval the Russians were steadily building up their forces for an attempt to defeat the enemy field armies and lift the siege.
The Japanese army recoiled at the initial offensive and was forced back away from Mukden. Within days however they had avoided an attempt to outflank them, stopped most of the Russian attacks and launched a counter offensive of their own.
2nd Army wasexperienced and battle hard, but had been weakened by campaigning and losses during the Russian attacks. Its modest cavalry were no match for the large Russian formations and dared not venture far from the protection of the infantry, thereby rendering its use for reconaissance almost void.
The capture of Russian artillery had helped with it's deficiency in that area. The Japanese were mostly equipped with the small KRUPP 7cm gun which was outclassed by the later KRUPP 76.2mm of the enemy. The 2nd Army also had 12 Hotchkiss Machine-Guns, which were kept in reserve and issued to where required. No one was quite sure how to use the new weapon in an attack.
The success of the counter-offensive had a bad side in that the more it succeeded, the further the longer the Japanese line of supply became. Mukden, which they were now approaching, was a long way from the supply ports in Korea and the roads bad. Because of this Japanese troops and artillery ran short of ammunition at crucial times. Food was also a problem and even the indomitable Japanese Infantry fought badly when hungry.
The terrain was much more familiar to the Russians than the Japanese as the former had built the railway line through it. There were very few maps. The location of towns, villages, roads and terrain points had to be pieced together from Chinese Villagers and distances from one place to another were only able to be estimated.
All the senior officers of the army had been Samurai and seen the army raised in the western fashion from the Feudal force it had once been.
Unlike the Chinese, who had made some token efforts to modernize their military forces, the Japanese embraced the need for change with dedication. From the most senior ranks down to the lowest, the spirit of duty and loyalty to the Emperor required each man to train for war in the Western manner. Although no one could doubt their courage, the practice of officers leading assaults with drawn sword, meant a very high casualty rate amongst them. Unlike the Russians who would do nothing if their officers were removed, the Japanese soldier would attempt to carry on and fulfill his task.
The private soldiers were of peasant stock and no less hardened to the difficulties of life than their Russian counter-parts, but their inner fear of failure in duty to the Emperor and the resultant disgrace and loss of face for their families gave them an edge of tenacity their enemy lacked when things were going badly.
Japanese Cavalry were off the left flank of the battle area, but played no part in the battle.
NOTE:- Number in brackets denotes position on the map. If no number they are not on the map.
JAPANESE FORCE
SECOND ARMY.
General Baron OKU
6th DIVISION
Lt.General Baron OKUBO
24th BRIGADE. (re-inforced for attack)
Major General KOIZUMI (3)
23rd REGIMENT. (Col Eguchi) 3 Battalions. (4)
48th REGIMENT. (Col.Kagawa) 3 Battalions. (3)
1 Battalion of General Reserve. (Which unknown) (4)
6th Pioneer Battalion. (3)
6thFIELD ARTILLERY REGT.(Colonel Hara) (3)
1st, 2nd 3rd, batteries. (4 x 7cm guns in each) (3)
4th, 5th, 6th batteries. ( 4 x 7cm guns in each) (2)
11th BRIGADE.
Major General Iida. (2)
45th REGIMENT. 3 Battalions. (Col.Ota) (2)
13th REGIMENT. 3 Battalions (Col.Yoshihiro) (1)
4th DIVISION.
Lt.General Baron Tsukamoto.
7th BRIGADE.
Major General Sunaga. (5)
8th REGIMENT. 3 Battalions. (Lt.Colonel Nomi) (5)
4th Pioneer Battalion. (5)
4th FIELD ARTILLERY REGT. (Col.Fukunaga) (5)
6 batteries of 7cm field guns. (4 in each) (5)
1 Battery captured 76.2cm guns. (6 guns) (5)
3rd DIVISION.
Lt.General Baron Oshima. (6)
17th Brigade of 3rd Division (6) is guarding the flank of the attack but did not take part as it was exhausted from the previous day.
JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE.
On October 13th the 11th Brigade fought its way into the position at Lin-Sin-Pu. The re-inforced 24th Brigade under KUIZUMI crossed the Cha-Ho River at Shu-Lin-Tsy. There was little action that day, except for a half battalion of infantry sent up along the river bank to outflank the Russians as the 11th launched its 3rd assault.
The 24th Brigade had remained at readiness in case it was needed for Lin-Sin-Pu, although it was already under orders to prepare for an attack on Lao-Mu-Tun. Patrols sent out that night found the Cha-Ho railway station un-occupied. Two battalions of the 23rd Regiment under Colonel Eguchi were sent to occupy this position and later still a battalion sent up from the Army General Reserve was added to the garrison. A Hotchkiss Machine-gun section of 4 guns was also sent here. It was intended these troops would screen against any Russian counter-attack and put down fire against enemy positions near the railway bridge, during the assault on Lao-Mu-Tun.
The railway station position was aware of being scouted by Russian infantry during the night. Patrols sent out by Eguchi found that the Russian 138th Regiment were holding the positions on the southern side of the River Cha-Ho. The force was then ordered to take part in the attack on Lao-Mu-Tun.
Russian lines could not be penetrated for further reconaissance opposite the whole Japanese front, but it was known there were several enemy battalions at Cha-Ho-Pu and Tai-Lin-Tun. The enemy was thought to be the 35th Division of the XVIII Corps. Its full strength was not known and there was no intelligence of how strong the other Russian forces present were, nor if they would take part in the defence of the line.
JAPANESE SOLUTIONS.
(1) 24th Brigade troops were to make an all out assault on Lao-Mu-Tun with those from Shu-Lin-Tsy jumping off at 7.30am, followed by the railway station at 10.30am. The reserve Battalion would hold the railway station.
(2) 11th Brigade were to 'roll up' the enemy trenches on either side of Lin-Shin-Pu while the bulk pushed on to capture Kin-Kuan, threatening the rear of the whole Russian position.
(3) Baron Oku ordered a re-inforced Brigade of 4th Division to be added to the reserve, with orders to attack up the network of tracks from Sankia-Tsy if 24th Brigade were in difficulties.
THE BATTLE.
The tenacity of the Russian attacks on Lin-Shin-Pu ruined all Japanese plans for the assault and outflanking move by 11th Brigade Infantry. As mentioned in the Russian solutions section, these continued throughout the day and although the attackers failed to re-capture the town, they kept the defenders very busy. The first Russian assault at dawn had so nearly re-captured Lin-Shin-Pu that there could be no question of weakening its garrison.
This left the attack to the two columns of 24th Brigade. The troops from Shu-Lin-Tsy moved off at 7.30am as planned and commenced to move across the open ground. They were immediately brought under intense and accurate Russian artillery fire which slowed their progress and inflicted casualties. By 9am the attack had ground almost to a halt in the face of heavy Russian fire from the supporting artillery. In addition the attack from the Railway station was being enfiladed by the trenches on the souther side of the river and the troops pinned down in the open.
At this point the Japanese artillery was concentrating on supporting the individual brigades it was attached too and this involved a certain amount of counter battery fire.
By noon the attack was going nowhere. The two columns were all pinned down, although in some places they had managed to get within 600 metres of the Russian defensive line. Although the attacks on Lin-Shin-Pu had been worrying, the 45th Regiment at Siasankiatsy was needed elsewhere and was ordered to cross the Cha-Ho and march to Sankia-Tsy, then assault Lao-Mu-Tun.
In the meantime Japanese 2nd Army HQ were aware of the effect of the Russian defensive fire and took action to relieve the troops pinned in the open. All 13 batteries were placed under a single command and ordered to pour rapid fire into Lao-Mu-Tun, which they commenced to do at 12.30pm.
At 1pm the 7th Brigade was ordered to attack to relieve the pressure on the 24th but they were soon pinned down in the same open ground.
At 3pm a mistake of orders was disasterous for the Russians. Corps HQ called for two companies to be withdrawn to help establish a new defensive line between Zo-Fan-Tai and Kin-Kuan in case the frontal line collapsed. Seeing the movement of these troops from the area of Tai-Lian-Tun passing across his rear, the commander of the 138th Regiment thought this was part of a general withdrawal. His orders specified that in the even of his right flank being turned he was to fall back on the second defensive line. (Exactly where the reserve companies were headed).
Being aware that Lin-Shin-Pu was still in enemy hands despite repeated attacks, he assumed that the movement toward the fall back position indicated a defeat of the troops on his right. He immediately ordered a withdrawal. The fire on the flank of the Japanese 24th Brigade immediately slackened and they crept further forward toward their objectives.
Part way through this withdrawal, the error was realized, but although a few companies were stopped, the bulk had commenced to withdraw in quite good order. To have left some companies in position and the rest withdrawing to the new line, was clearly un-satisfactory. The order was given again to withdraw.
The effect of this was a certain amount of confusion. The defenders of Lao-Mu-Tun were reeling under the concentrated fire of 13 batteries and the sight of troops on their flank withdrawing was too much. Individuals, then small groups started to break off and head for Cha-Ho-Pu.
Fortune was smiling on the Japanese because at 3pm their 45th Regiment, having crossed from one flank to the other, deployed out of Sankia-Tsy and moved on Lao-Mu-Tun. In addition the troops of the 24th, no longer pinned from the flank moved to assault the village.
This was not to suggest the Russians were finished however and at 4pm there was a savage fire fight as the two sides contested the buildings and walls.
7th Brigade were also engaging the Russians at Yukialatsi, forcing them back up along the river toward Cha-Ho-Pu.
By 4.30pm the street fight for Lao-Mun-Tun was over and the Russians fled to the north pursued by the fire of infantry and artillery, while the victorious Japanese occupied the positions and got ready to rest for the night.
At this point of time a strange event occurred. In the Russian HQ reports were coming in of Japanese troops in large numbers, crossing the Cha-Ho south of Lin-Shin-Pu near Shu-Lin-Tsy. These reports were undoubtably accurate several hours before but were not hopelessly out dated.
Fearing that the Japanese were about to launch a follow up, hitting the newly forming second line before it could get established, Lt.General DOBRSHINSKI took it on himself to order all the Russian field artillery to mass and fire on this new threat as he had no infantry to use.
8,000 rounds were poured into the area during a furious 40 minute barrage, with a total of 48 guns joining in. A rateof fire of 8 to 9 rounds a minute was achieved by some guns. Although observers claimed the Japanese were quiteshattered and the columns broken up, there were in fact none in the area. All the Japanese attackers and reserves were up in the original Russian positions on the Cha-Ho.
So ended the battle of Cha-Ho and the Japanese advance on Mukden had taken another step.
CONCLUSIONS.
The Japanese were attacking a position without a sufficient majority to ensure success. The troops of both sides were weary but none the less fought hard in both fire fights and close quarter fighting.
One cannot help but wonder if the Japanese plan was not somewhat 'fraught with danger' considering the open country and their already considerable experience of Russian firepower. Most of the attacks were brought under heavy fire from the moment they were launched and the Japanese infantry only closed with their objectives due to courage and determination. That most were then pinned down in front of the Russians is hardly surprising.
The Russian early attacks on Lin-Shin-Pu were delivered with ferocity and certainly kept that flank of the Japanese busy all day. It is understandable that late in the day, as casualties mounted, these became more half hearted, but still achieved the object of pinning the Japanese in the town.
The Japanese victory would seem, to me, to have mostly been achieved due to the mistake of the commander of the 138th in thinking his right was turned and a general withdrawal taking place. He then obeyed his written orders. That he attempted to correct this shows that he grasped the gravity of his mistake, but too late. Freed from the flanking fire that had pinned them most of the day, the Japanese were able to advance again. In the face of this and the withdrawal of the supporting troops on their right, it is no wonder the defenders of Lao-Mu-Tun decided to retreat. Without a flank guard and now facing the combined strength available to the Japanese by 4pm, they were in grave danger of being over-whelmed by weight of numbers.
Lt.General WOLKOV had adjusted and allocated his reserves well, kept the enemy left off balance and with night approaching, seemed likely to win the day, just as had happened two days before against the Japanese right hook on Cha-Ho-Pu. The mistake of calling on troops from virtually the front line at Lin-Sin-Pu to withdraw and set up a new defence line can be seen, in retrospect to have been an unfortunate decision. Although the town was not under threat and could be spared, other troops east of the railway line were not to know that.
General Baron Oku seems to have relied far too much on the courage of his men. His tactics seem to suggest he was prepared to sacrifice men to achieve his objectives, even though the Japanese strength was ebbing and losses were getting hard to replace. Success does, however smile on "Lucky" commanders and the mistake of the Russian 138th was his good fortune.
TACTICS.
The Russians were still reliant on forms of column attack still practiced in most of the European Armies. On more than one occasion they marched on to the field and deployed in attack columns. The Officers then dismounted and inspected them, before sending their horses to the rear and leading the men in attack. Despite a lack of machineguns, these columns made good targets for the fairly poor Japanese musketry.
The Japanese on the other hand were using open skirmish tactics in line, as practiced by European Jager type troops, but which would still have proved fatal if the Russiand had had more Maxim-guns.
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