In November 1975, Battle Group Foxbat of the South African Defence Forces, had routed an Angolan MPLA brigade, which retreated across the Nhia river, blowing the bridge in their wake. The pursuit by the South African forces along the only tarred road to Quibala was brought to a halt - heavy rainfall in the area coupled with swampy terrain, meant that the bridge was the only means of crossing with heavy vehicles.
Sergeant Danny Roxo of Task Force Zulu was despatched with a platoon of infantry and a couple of armoured cars to the bridge area to recce the situation.
It wasn`t long before the main South African force could hear the rattle of small arms and din of mortar fire. Suddenly, the two armoured cars could be seen driving helter skelter at full speed back towards the main column, closely followed by exploding mortar shells. Commandant Breytenbach ordered the cars to return to assist Roxo and the infantry, but the commanders refused. A short while later Roxo and his men appeared and were brought to safety clinging onto the superstructure of the armoured cars.
Roxo reported that the bridge was down, and mentioned offhand that a few enemy soldiers had been killed during his reconnaissance.
In fact, as Roxo moved forward to check the bridge, he had seen a Cuban on the far side and shot him. He began to move back and more enemy troops emerged from cover and began shooting at him. Roxo returned fire from the hip, killing eleven enemy soldiers including four Cubans. Roxo had unwittingly run into elements from a strong blocking force which included Stalin Organs, and a combined force of Cuban and Fapla infantry. He was later awarded the Honoris Crux (the South African equivalent of the Victoria Cross) for this encounter.
Task Force Zulu established an OP on a nearby hill called Top Hat, from which they could see the bridge and nearby enemy positions.
The OP successfully directed artillery fire onto mortar positions in a nearby kraal and against both an armoured car a rocket position, both of which were destroyed.
The OP later spotted Cuban and Fapla troops wading across the river and brought accurate fire down on them which broke up the attack.
A stalemate now ensued as the river became swollen and Battle Group Foxbat arrived, to take up defensive positions on the southern approach to the bridge.
In the first week of December, reinforcements arrived for the Cuban/Fapla force. Two nights later, on the 7th, a group of South Africans from No.1 Recce Commando were landed on the north side of the river by helicopter, but soon after passing a cattle kraal they came under accurate machine-gun fire. The patrol commander Sergeant Wannenburg, moved from cover to cover, firing continuously. Caught in a cross-fire he was badly wounded, so Sgt. Major Conradie took over command, regrouped the men and sent out a flanking party which closed with the enemy and, although under heavy fire at close range, forced them to retreat. By the time a helicopter could be called in to evacuate the patrol, Wannenburg had died.
By day the OP on Top Hat was able to bring brought devastating artillery fire down on anything within sight on the north bank. This caused the enemy to withdraw to positions further back from the river, allowing the South Africans to occupy the southern bank unmolested.
On 10 December the South African engineers started to rebuild the bridge, using Bluegum logs readily available from the bush nearby, but this act provoked the enemy to concentrates artillery fire on the bridge and its surrounds. All efforts to repair the bridge were temporarily abandoned.
A patrol of infantrymen and sappers crossed over the bridge early the next morning to lift the mines from the road on the north side. A patrol of Cubans attacked them, killing an infantryman and wounding one of the sappers. The Cubans were driven off, but then a Fapla patrol appeared. In the fighting that ensued all were killed, but by that time it was too dark for the South Africans to find their way back to the bridge through the enemy positions in its vicinity.
By 11 December the South African artillery bombardment of the enemy positions had made the area safe enough for the engineers to continue their efforts to repair the bridge, although "Red Eye" rockets continued to fall close to them. Observers who could see the salvos being fired in the distance would quickly warn the men who then took shelter until the explosions were over and they could continue with their work.
During the afternoon of 11 December the CO of Task Force Zulu, Col. Blackie Swart, paid a visit to the Foxbat positions and the two COs made a quick reconnaissance of the enemy positions. Swart pointed out that it was imperative that his force get moving again, and Kruys agreed to try and complete the work for a crossing that night or next day.
The sappers sweated to get the bridge ready in time and at first light on December 12 the South African artillery prepared for a supreme effort. The morning was misty and the artillery was delayed in starting its bombardment until the enemy targets became visible to the observers.
The attack by the infantrymen and armoured cars was scheduled to take place in three phases:
1. A central attack by the Eland armoured cars and a company of infantry to drive the enemy back towards Bridge 15 near Cassamba.
2. An attack by a company of infantry to take the "Kraal".
3. An attack by a company of infantry on the hill positions to capture the high ground and then link up with the armoured cars of phase 1.
Ranged against them was a battalion of over 1,000 infantry, many of them Cuban troops. Further back were anti-tank weapons, including Sagger missiles, deployed to cover the road that Foxbat would have to advance along. In their second defence line Fapla had several 120mm Cuban-manned mortars, 75mm cannons, and an entire battery of 14,7mm
anti-aircraft guns together with 122mm rocket launchers.
Most of the enemy positions had been carefully pinpointed during the preceding days by the observers and when the South Africans started with the heaviest artillery barrage of the battle, the enemy was taken by surprise. Some of Fapla's ammunition trucks were hit and exploded. Enemy artillery positions were hit and wiped out, the Cuban mortars receiving direct hits, killing most of the crews, and within a few hours the South African artillery commanded the battlefield.
At 07:00 phase 1 of the attack was set in motion, with phase 2 following almost immediately.
The armoured cars rolled over the bridge and after advancing about 500 yards engaged the enemy, firing continuously. The cars deployed 100 metres to the sides of the road, confusing the enemy Sagger crews who were positioned to fire on the road. The enemy infantry began to retreat, and one of the armoured cars surprised a mortar position, destroying six mortars with one of its 90mm shells. When they ran out of ammunition a further three Elands were sent in to take their place. 2/Lt. van Vuuren, in command of the second unit, rolled past the first group and then received a warning that Cuban tanks were approaching from the north. Enemy artillery fire was still exploding around the cars when a retreating Russian truck full of Cuban troops drove up behind the Elands. At first van Vuuren thought they were his own troops in a captured vehicle (many were used by the South Africans), but a quick radio message confirmed that they had to be the enemy. The truck's occupants were apparently also confused. They didn't fire, but tried to drive past the Elands, using the truck's indicator lights to signal their intention. Van Vuuren waited until it had overtaken his Eland and then slammed a 90mm shell into the rear of the truck, killing all of its 20 Cuban occupants.
The armoured cars then moved forward towards a farmhouse, where another 20 Cubans stood outside, apparently in conference. Van Vuuren had by now also run out of ammunition for the Elands, and ordered his commanders to close hatches. The Cubans swarmed over the Elands and began firing. Van Vuuren returned their fire with a pistol, shooting through a turret hatch and killing eleven of the Cubans as they tried to climb onto the armoured cars. It later transpired that the Cubans had been smoking marijuana at the farmhouse, which explained their reckless attack on the Elands.
The armoured cars had advanced so rapidly that the infantry had been unable to keep up with them. Phase 2 of the attack had been carried out according to plan, with little resistance being offered at the kraal, which had been abandoned by the enemy after the South African artillery shells began to land on it. They left their heavy weapons and ammunition behind.
Phase 3 had been delayed after the commander of the Unita infantry had been slightly wounded and his men refused to continue without armoured car support. Their attack was therefore taken over and completed by the troops of phase 2.
Battle Group Foxbat did not, as originally envisaged, stop at Cassamba, but continued fighting and advancing until they reached Bridge 15. The enemy fought hard to stay in possession of the area, but their armour had retreated after one of their armoured cars had been hit by artillery fire.
By 12:00 the attack had been completed and the troops began to consolidate their positions.
By 13:00 it had begun to rain heavily and troop movement was severely hindered, although the engineers continued to work on the bridge. The area between the hills and Almeida was now secured and patrols of South African troops and armoured cars began to clear the area of the remaining pockets of enemy troops.
The road to Quibala was now open and the South Africans moved forward to about 6 kilometres north of Almeida, although mined areas and bombardments by "Red Eye" rockets slowed the advance of Task Force Zulu.
When news of Foxbat's successful attack was received at HQ the staff officers were surprised. In view of South Africa's decision to withdraw from Angola, a message had been sent to Cela canceling the operation to capture Bridge 14, but it only reached Colonel Swart after the battle had already taken place!
The victory at Bridge 14 was so complete that the CO of Foxbat, Brig. George Kruys, had to restrain his armoured car commanders from chasing even further after the retreating enemy, an order which they accepted with some reluctance. Kruys knew that his force was too small to be able to transform the retreat into a full-scale rout.
During the battle the South Africans lost four men killed. The Cubans and MPLA lost over 400 men, although the exact number was difficult to ascertain since, as the BBC later reported, truckloads of corpses were constantly driving out of the area towards the north. Among the Cuban dead was the commander of the Cuban expeditionary force, Commandant Raul Diaz Arguelles.
Although the South Africans had decided to pull out of Angola by January, Lt.Gen. Magnus Malan visited the front on 15 December and told all the commanders that although they would receive no further reinforcements, they were to capture and hold as much territory as possible with the troops available.
For the South Africans the battle for Bridge 14 was a highly successful operation and proved that speed, surprise and an aggressive offence could tip the balance in favour of a numerically weaker force with fewer heavy weapons.
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© Copyright 1997 by Craig Martelle Publications
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