Some interesting facts and figures I have turned up on the British Army of 1914, who were pretty well all professional career soldiers or men called back from reserve, who had been professionals. Because so many had served in India or the Middle East, they had 'shorts' and actually wore them in the field during the hot marches and actions of August, only dragging out their long trousers when it got cold. The Infantry carried a pack load of 61 lb, which was extremely light compared to the Germans, French & Austrians but double that of the Russians. Many were heavier however, because being mostly experienced campaigners they knew how to strike a personal balance between what they felt they needed and what they knew was practicable to carry about. The Infantry *standard* rate of fire was 25 rounds per minute rapid, or 10 aimed. This was double that of any other European army of the time. Many British Infantry could fire 30 rounds per minute. The men were poorly educated, but even then, apparently that was better by far than their opponents or French allies. Even the Coldstream Guards could not escape being described by one of their own officers as having "Never seen a Battalion so low in literacy or so high in venereal disease." Individual initiative was encouraged in the field and the BEF truly skirmished...whereas the Germans and French fought in controlled skirmish lines. (German Jager partially exempted) Off the field however individualism was strongly discouraged as being potentially seditious. Men of the Guards could not even speak directly to an officer...they had to do this through an NCO. Battalions The War Establishment of battalions leaving for France with the BEF was 1005 officers and men. Within a month they averaged 4 - 500 per battalion. By December many no longer existed but the stronger ones were down to 150 to 200 men per battalion. Based on the fire power they could put up, it had been deduced in the field that 300 would have been adequate for a battalion in comparison to German and French units. That suggests and combat reports seem to indicate it, that one British Battalion was therefore worth 3 German in sheer firepower in August of 1914. (Of course there were a hell of a lot less British!!!) By January of 1915, the original BEF battalions averaged one officer and 30 men.....leaving a huge shortage of men able to lead the new army in training. In the 1st Corps **there were insufficient infantrymen left** to have formed one battalion on the establishment strength at which they had sailed for France. Although the Territorial Army which replaced these Battalions, had many men who could fire at the 25 rpm rate and did so well, the 'hostilities' Battalions being raised were not able to maintain such a rate of fire purely and simply because **there simply was not sufficient spare ammunition** to train them to that standard. If the ammunition had been available, it would have been possible apparently, because the British training methods were fairly simple. The hostilities troops therefore had a firepower approximating that of the German Battalions, so technically it needed 3 of them to do the work, one BEF Battalion had been able to do. They were simply one on one, with their opponents, rather than superior. The BEF had an average of 1 to 2 Maxims per Battalion...supposed to be Vickers but most of these were not ready....but some had purchased their own Maxims' from Regimental funds and had more. The British Cavalry were the heaviest loaded in Europe. On the average 288 lb...allowing man, rider, weapons, equipment and kit for both man and horse, plus spare fodder. Although they turned out at 553 men and horse mounted at overseas service strength, the horses required tending, plus they had to carry more gear on them (because of a lack of transport wagons) so needed more to stay back. They could, therefore never muster anything more than "400 Rifles" and a Hotchkiss Cavalry Machinegun. The men were however also trained and proficient in the "rapid fire" or "Mad Minute". Therefore in firepower (apart from machineguns) each dismounted regiment was equivalent to a strong German Battalion of 1100 to 1200 men....and superior to those of the average 1,000. The 1908 sword was disliked at first, because it was much shorter, but equipped most of the Cavalry and was found to be an excellent, well-balanced weapon in service. The reservists however, had never used it and most had to be given older swords...so they went to war with the same as had been in service during the previous century. When the Scots Greys dismounted to fight at the Battle of the Mons, it was the first time the Regiment had fought in that fashion since the days of Marlborough!!! Kitchener had been urged to have mounted riflemen in his cavalry divisions but refused on the basis it was better to have trained cavalrymen who could either dismount to fight or fight as cavalry, than trained infantry not able to fight mounted at all. This rifle firepower includes German Guard troops were trained in 'shock tactics' over musketry and so were not as proficient. Only German Jager tended to be anywhere near on a par with the British infantryman and then only the Regular Jager who are rated about half as good. (as opposed to 1/3rd as good). Line or Guard apparently made no difference in the BEF when it came to firepower and staying power...the Guards just looked smarter....although by December 1914, the remnant of even those crack units were bearded and gaunt....but with shiny boots!! Cavalry losses were just as heavy as those of the Infantry and the trained horses would prove hard to replace, (in fact taking almost two years). Artillery Because the old 30cwt 6" 1885 Howitzer was considered obsolete, none were sent with the BEF (and the 26cwt 6" M15 would not be ready in any numbers until 1916.) The heavy artillery of the BEF therefore comprised 16 x 60pdr guns **total**. There were only a few spare guns kept back for training and the BEF took almost all those in service with it. The 60pdr had **NO** equipment for directed fire and if it could not see where it was shooting it could only fire in a random 'blind fire' fashion. It was, however excellent for demolishing substantial stone buildings in the direct fire role having been intended as giving the infantry a means by which to blow away enemy cover. Although the 18pdr and 13pdr were in service in the correct designated numbers per division, both were only equipped with 'shrapnel'. The 18pdr did not get HE until early 1915, and adequate numbers until late 1916. The 13pdr not until 1917 and then only about 50:50. Neither of these weapons could engage a target by any means other than direct fire and there would not have been sufficient officers and equipment for any form of directed fire until much later in the war. They were, however, very proud of the enormous rate of fire they could keep up in the direct role. The BEF artillery crew casualties were so high, because they were usually under machine-gun fire...the great failing of being only able to fire direct. The 4.5" Howitzer had a rapid rate of fire, had plenty of HE and was equipped for blind fire.....if rather short of people trained in directing it....but was only in small numbers. During the battle for NAMUR the Germans were able to concentrate more guns in just that sector alone than the British army had **in the field total**, yet even they were complaining about having to use older obsolete weapons to make up the numbers. The British soldier was only paid 1/10th that of an Australian Soldier, but **double** that of the French or German soldiers. Transport The worst part about the BEF was its lack of transport as this was the largest commitment of the British Army since Waterloo. Consequently it was heavily dependent upon civilian volunteers and 'adventurers' who wanted to see some excitement. The vehicles sent were mostly motor vehicles, requisitioned. This was not because of a preference or modern thinking....it was because there were not enough horses to go around....and for a while petrol was actually more plentiful and able to be transported than fodder, which the French needed themselves. Despite this the total fodder shipped, far exceeded any other war supplies. British Staff Officers are often criticized for remaining so far behind the lines during WW1. This originated after the battle for Hooge in October 1914, when a combined HQ of two Divisions was hit by enemy artillery firing indirect. (remember the British were mostly not able to do that) and all but two of the entire Divisional staff of both were wiped out....of all ranks...plus Corps detachments. With the resources of the British Army shrinking rapidly, it was realized in December 1914 that *if that only occurred every couple of months*....within two years there would be a desperate shortage of experienced and trained potential new senior officers and staff. The Army could bring in recruits and even junior officers could be trained, but there were very few with the experience or the ability to command higher formations and as the army was growing and growing, these were getting fewer and fewer. Hence it was because of this that the decision was taken to pull Higher HQ's further back and Corps even further...it had nothing to do with comfort. In 1914, the British Staff had been right up near the front most of the time sharing the danger with the men. Several HQ staffs had got into the fighting. The subsequent losses in senior officers and even senior HQ. NCO ranks was disastrous. While the NCO and other ranks HQ staff were initially able to be filled by experienced men from Bank Staff's and those of large companies....Generals could not. Despite the enormous number of Generals in 1914, the greatest number were Brigadiers who were over-age and never intended to be sent further up the path of seniority. Of the Generals, more than 1/3rd were considered unfit for service of any kind and another 1/3rd fit for only rear echelon duties. Therefore the remaining 1/3rd would have to be used to absorb the demands of the new divisions....which were more than ten times the demand of the BEF. Promotions Because officer losses in the BEF were so high in 1914, the natural pool of men waiting to be promoted upward had almost evaporated....leaving the British Army with a huge vacuum between the high ranks and the lower ranks of officers. Besides that, the very best had been with the BEF, so those who would have been naturally promoted upward were now dead....and those who would not have been promoted too high, hd been left behind and were still alive!! Consequently the army was facing a 'promotion prospects Officer' shortage which resulted in a lot of Officers having to be promoted upward in the hope they would not prove to be the 'duds' their seniors already thought they were. Because of this sort of problem, even as late as 1918, staff were still under orders to get out and get out quick if the enemy broke through. Even in the otherwise laid back Australian Corps, it was realized that despite shortages, infantry could be replaced more easily than people with the capability of running the Divisions and Corps level HQ efficiently. As brave as they might be, if the men did not get ammunition, food and supplies, they could not fight. Without a chain of command they were leaderless. From 1914 to 1917 the highest number of useless Generals available in a single area was in Cairo where there were over 110, each with his own staff. Most were retired or semi-retired men who had served in India and had chosen Cairo to live as being easy to travel between England and India, yet with the "Mysteries of the East" and especially 'affordable servants' for their wives who had been so pampered in India. The original CinC allowed them to keep a small staff or at least a batman or two, which absorbed a huge number of people down the chain of supply and demand. General Allenby abolished this system, took away the staffs from those not doing anything important and gave the rest the opportunity to retire fully....or take a ship home through the U-Boat infested seas of the Mediterrannean. Nearly all retired gracefully. Back to The Gauntlet No. 10 Table of Contents Back to The Gauntlet List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by Craig Martelle Publications This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com