The Army would be challenged to provide sufficient numbers of certain types of non-divisional support units for two major regional conflicts. The Army had difficulty providing such units in the Persian Gulf War--a single regional conflict In addition, after completing its most recent Total Army Analysis in March 1993, the Army decided not to allocate resources to some of the non-divisional support units required to support its current active force of 12 divisions and allocated resources to other areas. Army officials expect this trend to continue. Furthermore, an analysis of current war-fighting plans for responding to two specific regional conflicts revealed that the Army does not have sufficient types of certain units required for these plans. An option for augmenting the Army's non-divisional support capability is to use existing support capability--units, personnel, and equipment--in the eight National Guard divisions that DOD did not include in the combat force for executing the two-conflict strategy. These divisions contain several support units that are functionally similar or identical to non-divisional support units that were not allocated resources during the 1993 Total Army Analysis. These divisions also have many of the same types of slimed personnel and equipment that the non-divisional support units have. By using units, personnel, and equipment in the eight divisions, the Army could create additional non-divisional support units or augment existing ones. Back to Table of Contents Force Structure US Army Back to GAO List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US GAO. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com