Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Army's ongoing Total Army Analysis, (1) identify the specific unresourced non- divisional support requirements that could be met using National Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in these units and (2) work with the National Guard to develop a plan for employing this capability. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation DOD concurred with our recommendation but partially concurred with the report, believing that we failed to address certain concerns. Specifically, DOD noted that (1) current low resourcing of National Guard divisions, if unaddressed, would lead to degradations in personnel, equipment, and training readiness for these units; (2) non-divisional support units, while similar to divisional support units, are not trained or equipped to perform the same missions; and (3) while it may be expedient to access divisional support units to provide non- divisional capability, this alternative must be weighed against the value of these divisions for other missions. In making our recommendation, we recognized that the Army and the National Guard would need to further examine its feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and impact on National Guard divisions. Consequently, we agree that DOD's concerns merit further examination and expect that any analysis performed by the Army and the National Guard in accordance with our recommendation would consider these points. DOD disagreed that the Army lacks units to support its total combat force and specific regional conflict plans. While DOD acknowledged that support shortfalls exist for the current 12-division force, it believes that our analysis of these shortfalls, dual-tasked support units, and the Army's difficulties in providing non- divisional support units during the Persian Gulf War implies that the Army could not support the bottom-up review force and two major regional conflicts.  We did not conclude that the Army could not support the bottom-UP review force and two major regional conflicts. Rather, we showed that (1) shortfalls for the current 12-division force, a single regional conflict plan, and the combined requirements of two regional conflict plans; (2) dual-tasking of units; and (3) the Army's experience during the Gulf War suggest that the Amy would be challenged in meeting this requirement. DOD stated that the planned aggregate active and reserve end strength will give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need and that using host nation support, contractors, and other resources are available alternatives for addressing any shortfalls. DOD also stated that it is premature to draw conclusions about possible support shortfalls until the ongoing Total Army Analysis is completed. We disagree that the planned end strength will provide the Army the flexibility to provide more support forces. The changes in end strength resulting from the bottom-up review represent a net decrease in end strength for the active component and the U.S. Army Reserve--those components that provide most of the Army's support units--and an increase in the National Guard's end strength, which will be used to retain combat positions. As a result, the Army has less flexibility for providing more support units. We believe that using Guard divisional support capability will increase the Army's flexibility to provide more non-divisional support in areas of need within the aggregate active and reserve end strength. We agree that the extent of actual support shortages will not be determined until the Army completes its ongoing Total Army Analysis. Until DOD knows the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most appropriate alternatives for addressing them. DOD's comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV. Scope and Methodology To determine whether the Army might be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and obtained documents at the Department of the Army headquarters and the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C; Forces Command, U.S. Third Army and U.S. Army Reserve Command, located at Fort McPherson, Georgia; and two war-fighting commands responsible for developing and executing specific U.S. plans for responding to major regional conflicts. To document specific shortfalls, we obtained Total Army Analysis data on unresourced non-divisional support requirements and compared actual requirements for selected types of non-divisional support units in two specific regional conflict plans with the inventory of available units. To determine whether support capability in Army National Guard divisions could be used to augment the Army's non-divisional support capability, we interviewed knowledgeable officials and obtained documents at the Department of Army headquarters and the National Guard Bureau. At our request, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations provided data on support units in National Guard divisions that had similar or identical characteristics to non- divisional support units the Army decided not to allocate resources to during its most recent Total Army Analysis, completed in 1993. Using this data and the data from our analysis of personnel and equipment authorizations for National Guard divisions, we identified specific matches of National Guard divisional units, personnel, and equipment to unresourced non-divisional support units. We conducted this review from October 1993 to October 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As you know, 31 U.S. C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Commitee on Government Reform and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A written statement must also be submitted to the Senate and the House Committees on Appropriations with an agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Army National Guard, the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. The major contributors to this report are Sharon Pickup, Barbara Gannon, and Samuel L. Hinojosa. Sincerely yours, Richard Davis Director, National Security Analysis Back to Table of Contents Force Structure US Army Back to GAO List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US GAO. 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