by GAO
United States General Accounting Office
March 2,
1995
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense (DOD), in its bottom-up review of the nation's defense needs in the post-Cold War era, judged that it is prudent to maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. In responding to a single conflict during Operation Desert Storm, the Army had difficulty providing support units, even though it deployed only a portion of its total combat force. Because of this experience, we examined whether
(2) support capability in certain Army National Guard units could be used to alleviate any potential shortfalls. This report discusses our detailed findings on these issues. We reported
separately on DOD's bottom-up review. [1]
In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review. In particular, the
review outlined an overall defense strategy for the new era, specific dangers to
U.S. interests, strategies for dealing with each danger, and force requirements.
Chief among the dangers was the threat of large-scale aggression by major
regional powers.
To counter regional aggression, DOD evaluated various strategy and force
options. DOD selected the two-conflict strategy and determined the combat forces
capable of executing the strategy. For the Army, these forces consisted of 10
active divisions and 15 Amy National Guard enhanced readiness combat brigades.
[2]
DOD also provided for other National Guard combat forces, now organized as
eight divisions, that it does not envision using in a two-conflict situation. These
divisions are expected to perform missions, such as providing rotational forces for
extended crises and protracted peace operations. These forces are also called
upon to meet domestic dangers, such as natural disasters and civil unrest.
In addition to combat forces, the Army maintains support units to repair
equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide services, and otherwise
sustain combat operations. These units are (1) divisional support units, which are part of active and National Guard combat divisions and
provide support to divisional units, and (2) non-divisional support units, which are
separate units in the active component, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve
that support divisional and non-divisional units.
[3]
The numbers and types of divisional support units are determined by Army
doctrine. For example, all divisions are doctrinally required to have one military
police company to provide security and law enforcement For non-divisional
support, the Army determines the numbers and types of units that are required for
its total combat force through a biennial process, referred to as the Total Army
Analysis. [4]
The Army then identifies, based on weighing its priorities, the units that will be
allocated resources-personnel and equipment. In July 1994, the Army began the
Total Army Analysis process to determine non-divisional support requirements for
the bottom-up review force, and it expects to complete the analysis in mid-1995.
[1] Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD
Assumptions (GAO/NSLAD-95-W, Jan. 31,1995).
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