OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301 RESERVE AFFAIRS Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General National Security and International Affairs Divisions U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548 Dear Mr. Hinton: This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability," dated January 12, 1995 (GAO Code 701058/OSD Case 9809-A). The DOD partially concurs with the report. Although the DoD agrees with much of the information in the GAO report, there are additional concerns the report fails to address. First, current resourcing priorities for Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions are low when compared with enhanced readiness brigades and early deploying U.S. Army Reserve units. Unaddressed, that condition would inevitably result in degradation in personnel, training, and equipment readiness. Second, despite similarities between divisional and non-divisional support units, doctrinally they are not trained or equipped to perform the same mission. Doctrinally, the forces are designed to fight like they are trained. A dual mission tasking on the ARNG support units, without increased resourcing for training, would not produce the desired payoff in support of Active Army combat forces. Lastly, in an era of diminished resources, "breaking" ARNG divisions by accessing their divisional support units for non-divisional support to the Army in a crisis may seem expedient. However, that alternative must be weighed carefully against the value of these divisions for other missions as outlined in the national military strategy. The DoD concurs with the GAO recommendation and will take appropriate action pending the outcome of Total Army Analysis-2003 (TAA- 03), expected in May 1995. The detailed DoD comments on the GAO findings and recommendations are enclosed. Suggested technical changes to the report have been provided separately to the GAO staff. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Robert A. Goodbary Major General, USA Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training & Mobilization Enclosure: As stated  GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JANUARY 12, 1995 (GAO CODE 701058) OSD CASE 9809-A "FORCE STRUCTURE: ARMY NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS COULD AUGMENT WARTIME SUPPORT CAPABILITY" DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS FINDING : DOD Bottom-Up Review Selected the Two-Conflict Strategy The GAO reported that to counter regional aggression, the DoD evaluated various strategy and force options in its October 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The GAO noted that the DoD selected the two-conflict strategy to counter regional aggression and determined the combat forces capable of executing the strategy. The GAO pointed out that for the Army, those forces consisted of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced readiness combat brigades. The GAO further pointed out that the DoD also provided for other National Guard combat forces, now organized as eight divisions, that it does not envision using in a two-conflict situation. The GAO added that those divisions are expected to perform missions, such as assisting active forces in protracted peace operations. The GAO reported that in addition to combat forces, the Army maintains (1) divisional support units, which are part of active and National Guard combat divisions and provide support to divisional units, and (2) non- divisional support units, which are separate units in the active component, National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve that support divisional and non-divisional units. The GAO noted that in June 1994, the Army began the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to determine non-divisional support requirements for the BUR, and expects to complete the analysis in April 1995. (pp. 1-3/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE Concur. The eight National Guard divisions may or may not be directly employed in combat roles in the possibility of a two major regional conflict (MRC) scenario. Those divisions are, however, expected to perform missions, s~lch as providing rotational forces for extended crises (including those involving one or more MRCS) and assisting active forces in protracted peace operations. The divisions also provide a hedge that could form the basis of an expanded American force structure and serve as a deterrent to future adversarial regimes, plus providing capability to meet domestic crises. Finding B: Army had Difficulty Providing Supprt During The Persian Gulf War The GAG asserted that during the Persian Gulf War--a single regional conflict--the Army deployed virtually all of some types of non-divisional support units and ran out of some other types of units, even though it deployed only a portion of its total active combat force-- about 8 of 18 divisions. The GAO further asserted that the DoD was able to mitigate the potential adverse impact of shortfalls because (1) U.S. forces had a long lead time to deploy before conducting a counteroffensive against Iraqi forces and the counteroffensive was of short duration; (2) Saudi Arabia and other countries provided extensive host nation support, such as transportation and water; and (3) no second conflict developed at the same time requiring a U.S. response. The GAO concluded that in a two-conflict situation, the Army may face even greater challenges than it encountered during the Gulf war. The GAO noted that as envisioned in the BUR, the Army, with little warning, may need to simultaneously support at least 10 active divisions deployed to two major conflicts in two different regions. (pp. 4-5/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE Partially concur. It should be recognized that while the Army did encounter some shortfalls in non-divisional support units during the Persian Gulf War, the campaign was successfully brought to conclusion. In addition, the DoD does not agree that, based solely on the Operation Desert Storm experience, it can be concluded that the Army may face greater challenges in a two MRC scenario. Finding C: : The Army Lacks Units to Support Total Combat Force and Specific Regional Conflicts Plans The GAO concluded that as of November 1994, the Army did not have sufficient non-divisional support units to support its current active combat force. The GAO observed that based on its most recent TAA, the Army decided not to allocate resources to 838 non-divisional units required to support 12 active divisions. The GAO asserted that although the 838 units are a small portion of the total non-divisional support requirement, they represent important capabilities required to support combat operations. The GAO analyzed the non-divisional support requirements in two U.S. plans for responding to regional conflicts for 17 types of units that were unresourced in the 1993 analysis. The GAO noted that those plans were developed by two separate war fighting commands and covered a specific regional conflict. The GAO found that the Army is lacking 238 units (medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units) needed for one of the two plans and in analyzing the combined requirements of the two plans, found that the shortfall would increase from 206 to 338 units. The GAO also found that 656 of the same non-divisional support units were assigned to both of the regional conflict plans-- dual-tasked to support combat operations in both conflicts. The GAO noted that like the shortfalls previously mentioned, the largest number of dualtasked units--a total of 464 units--consisted of medical, engineer, quartermaster, transportation, and military police units. (pp. 5-8/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE Nonconcur. The DoD acknowledges that shortfalls exist in the 12 division Army support structure. However, the DoD does not agree with the GAO analysis and conclusions that the Army does not have sufficient support units to adequately support the combat force. The GAO based its analysis on specific unit shortfalls for the current 12 division Army and then implied that the Army could not support the BUR 10 division force and the specific plans for two MRCs. According to the GAO, a total of 656 Army support units are dual-tasked, which the GAO implies would preclude effective U.S. operations in two NRCS. It should be understood, however, that the existence of dualtasked units does not necessarily represent the existence of shortfall in capabilities. The GAO apparently based its analysis on the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) supporting specific Commander-in-Chief (CINC) warplans. Both the data and the plans are based on the 1993-1995 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which assumed a 12 division active component force structure. Therefore, combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) dual-taskings shown in the report probably overstate the potential shortages. As the active Army force structure is reduced to 10 divisions, planned aggregate active and reserve end- strength will give the Army the flexibility to provide more support units in areas of need. In many cases, the use of hostnation support, contractors, and other resources can also be employed to provide workable alternatives. The Army is currently addressing its force structure requirements (both active and reserve component) through its Total Army Analysis-2003 (TAA- 03), projected for completion by May 1995. Until the TAA- 03 is complete, it is premature to draw conclusions regarding shortfalls in the Amy support structure. FINDING D: Army has the Option of Using National Guard Divisions to Augment Non-Divisional Support Capability The GAO asserted that the eight Army National Guard divisions that the DoD does not envision using during a two-conflict situation contain support capability that the Army could use to fill non-divisional support unit's needs. The GAO noted that at their request, the Army performed a broad analysis comparing the capability in support units in a typical National Guard division with the capability reflected in non-divisional support units. The GAO pointed out that the analysis identified several examples of support units in a National Guard Division that are similar or identical to unresourced non- divisional support units. The GAO analyzed Amy data on the personnel and equipment assigned to the eight National Guard divisions and found that those divisions have many of the same skilled personnel and equipment needed for non-divisional support units. The GAO cited several examples of some areas where those divisions could provide 100 percent of the unresourced non-divisional personnel and equipment support requirements. The GAO concluded that given the similarities of National Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in those units with the types of unresourced non-divisional support units, the Army should consider using the support capability in the eight National Guard divisions to augment its non-divisional support capability. The GAO asserted that the army has the option of using National Guard divisional support units to (1) fill the requirement for non-divisional support units, (2) provide personnel and equipment to form a new non-divisional support unit, or ( 3) provide personnel and equipment to augment an existing non- divisional support unit. The GAO noted that the Army, in the past, has not considered using National Guard divisions in that manner because the divisions were planned to be used as follow-on combat forces in the event of a global war. The GAO pointed out that according to Army officials, National Guard divisions are a potential source for meeting non-divisional support requirements, but emphasized that more extensive analysis is required to determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of that option and the impact on the divisions of using them in this manner. (pp. 8-10/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE Concur. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding A, the primary mission of the 8 National Guard divisions is to provide a strategic hedge in a war fighting related mission, extended crisis, or operations other than war. Based upon the final conclusions of the TAA-03, now being performed, the Army may then need to address the additional concerns of resourcing, readiness, and reorganization associated with using Army National Guard support units as the GAO recommends. (See also the DoD response to the GAO recommendation.) RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDATION The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army, as part of the Army's ongoing TAA, identify the (1) specific non-divisional support requirements that could be met using National Guard divisional support units and the personnel and equipment in those units and (2) work with the National Guard to develop a plan for accessing that support capability. (p. II/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE: Concur. As discussed in the DoD response to Finding C, the Army is currently analyzing its force structure requirements in the TAA-03. The TAA-03 analysis will include both active and reserve components and will consider unresourced non-divisional support requirements. Completion of the TAA-03 is projected for May 1995. Based on the results of the TAA-03, the Army will then determine whether there is a need to address resourcing, readiness, and reorganization issues using Army National Guard support units; and take appropriate action. Back to Table of Contents Force Structure US Army Back to GAO List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US GAO. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com