Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a Russian article by Major G. Menshikov in "Krasnaia Zvezda" (Red Star) 16 May 1945.
One of the distinguishing features of street fighting in large towns and cities consists in the fact that the main part of the artillery employed is used in direct firing. For instance, in the battle for Berlin, around eighty percent of all the batteries at the disposal of the infantry units conducted their fire, as a rule, from open positions.
This method of employing the artillery is dictated by the characteristics of street fighting. In the complex labyrinth of streets and alleys of European cities it is difficult to determine the line of contact between the fighting forces. The enemy is separated from one's own forces in the majority of cases by no more than the width of a street, at times only by the interior walls of buildings or the floors between the upper and the lower stories. It is obvious that, under such conditions, it is impossible to conduct fire from concealed positions.
Direct fires increase to a marked degree the ability of the infantry to advance. On account of the very nature of the battle, it is the artillery that crushes and the infantry that seizes the objective.
In the defense of inhabited places the enemy relies on solid stone buildings. Our infantry is literally forced to fight for every building. The success of the attack depends on how well-prepared the assault operations have been from the point of view of the artillery, that is, how completely the enemy's fire means have been suppressed.
One important circumstance should be emphasised: An attack in a large inhabited place will not be successful in the absence of fire superiority over the enemy. The infantry is not in a condition, without the help of the artillery, to gain the upper hand; its weapons are not possessed of sufficient destructive power. For this reason, when the street fighting begins, most of the artillery weapons should be turned over to the infantry units as reinforcement.
The subordination of the artillery pieces to the commanders of companies and battalions does not denote complete decentralisation of control. It is not permissible to disrupt the entire artillery organisation. It is extremely necessary to leave a certain number of guns, preferably of heavy and extremely-heavy calibre's, to engage in independent firing. These guns should be under the division artillery commander as a fire reserve to be used in support of the operation as a whole.
The fire reserve is used mainly to counteract the enemy's artillery and mortars. In addition to this, the concentrated fire of this group of batteries may be used for action against especially powerful enemy strongpoints. These batteries may also be assigned supplementary missions: interdiction fires and the destruction of supply installations and command posts.
Another peculiarity of the combat activities of artillery in towns and cities is the difficulties relative to the controlling of fire, not only of large masses of artillery but also of the direct support artillery of the infantry. Due to limited observation of the field of fire within a city, it is difficult to select a firing position for a battery or even a platoon. Therefore the artillery fire is controlled for the most part by the commanders of the individual guns. This circumstance does not minimise, of course, the role of the various staffs in the organisation of reconnaissance during the course of the street fighting. The activities of the reconnaissance organisations will, however, be conducted mainly in the interests of small units.
It is well known that in the fighting in the streets of Berlin the enemy defended himself with exceptional stubbornness. He made an effort, to the full extent of his ability, to hold the positions he occupied. It is obvious that this called for calmness and objectivity on our part. Elaborate preparation preceded the taking of any proposed objective. The objectives were carefully studied, along with the approaches leading to them, the composition of their garrisons and their systems of fire. After this, under cover of darkness, our guns were brought up in order to open point-blank fire with the break of dawn. Depending on the assigned mission, the fire was conducted either for the neutralisation of the enemy forces or for the complete demolition of the buildings. The battle was terminated by an assault by the infantry and consolidation of the seized objective. The seizure of other strongpoints was prepared in a similar manner; each forward movement of our forces was preceded by an artillery preparation of the objective in the above-mentioned manner. Complete co-operation was thus secured between our artillery and infantry.
Combat in a large city, as has already been shown, is characterised by extreme complexity. In addition to the physical and moral strains involved, a high degree of combat skill is required of the participants.
From the standpoint of the artillerymen, this means above everything else, the ability to find their targets quickly and destroy them in a single blow and to manoeuvre skilfully in the labyrinth of streets, alleys, and courts. Let us examine a typical example from the battle for Berlin.
A gun commander was assigned the mission of supporting an assault on a large building. To begin with, he studied in detail the targets on which he was to open fire and selected a firing position. The position selected (the ground floor of a corner building) answered every necessary requirement. It afforded protection for his gun and was provided with suitable approaches. A broad, low window insured sufficient traversing fire, and thick outside walls securely protected the crew and the gun itself from enemy action.
Having secretly taken up his position, the commander unexpectedly opened fire on the enemy. In a short while the artillerymen had fired twenty-two rounds, destroying five enemy machine guns. The unexpected and accurate fire produced a stunning effect on the enemy. The enemy soldiers that had escaped injury abandoned their posts in panic and concealed themselves in the basement, where the assault forces cornered them. The gun was moved, in the meantime, to another location, and at once prepared to lend support to the infantry in its assault on the next strongpoint.
Not infrequently, in cities, one runs into buildings with very thick walls and narrow, embrasure-like windows. Medium artillery guns are not very effective against them. In such cases, the assistance of large calibre's is hurriedly sought.
At the intersection of two Berlin streets stood an ancient brick building of small size, but with very strong walls. Numerous, narrow, ambrasure-like windows enabled the enemy to fire from almost any position.
When it became evident that the 76mm and 122mm guns were powerless to crush the weapon emplacements in the building, it was decided to call on the 152mm guns. From a distance of 400 meters, these guns destroyed the building and annihilated it garrison.
Frequently there were observed cases in which a building that was being defended by the enemy was literally riddled with holes by artillery projectiles; yet the garrison continued to defend it. This is explained by the fact that the enemy personnel took refuge in the basement during the time that shelling was in progress. Since the basement was lower than the ground level, it was impossible to reach them with the fire of our guns.
In such cases, in order to crush the enemy resistance, the building was destroyed down to its very foundations, obstructing the entrance to the basement and thus rendering it useless for future use. To demolish a building is not such a simple matter. Even point-blank fire from a single high-power gun could not complete this mission. Under such circumstances, the artillerymen fired at the same spot with several guns at the same time. After two or three salvos the walls and ceilings of a medium-sized building of three or four stories would collapse, ending further resistance on the part of the enemy.
In narrow streets with tall buildings, where it was not possible to bring up the guns on account of the proximity of the enemy and where buildings were to be destroyed, out forces made considerable use of rocket projectiles. The projectiles were brought up in their containers and placed in second and third stories, usually on a table opposite a window, and the containers were laid out in the direction of the building to be destroyed. The simultaneous firing of two or three projectiles brought about the collapse of the building.
The enemy acted quickly as soon as the building they occupied was set on fire. As a rule, setting a structure on fire forced the enemy to abandon the objective being defended. For this reason, it is necessary to make extensive use of incendiary artillery shells in street fighting.
The artillery engaged in indirect firing, as a rule, fires counterbattery fire. But this does not exclude its employment when massed fire is required for direct co-operation with the infantry, especially in preparations for attacking large enemy defensive positions.
Indirect fire should be preceded by careful preliminary preparation. Fire for adjustment must be conducted with extreme care. It is indispensable that the commanders obtain, with the help of the infantry commanders, a definite knowledge of the terrain and the dispositions of the infantry. In order to avoid firing on one's own forces, it is necessary to begin fire for adjustment by shooting over the target, gradually bringing the fire down on the target. This will prevent hitting anything that may be nearer than the target. Observation of every shot is necessary when firing for effect.
Back to Frontline Vol. 1 Iss. 2 Table of Contents
Back to Frontline List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1999 by Rolfe Hedges
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com