The question of play balance in the game FitE/SE/Urals is a hotly debated topic among Europa devotees. This is not surprising since SE is the most widely owned and frequently played title within the Europa series of games. Furthermore, the Eastern Front is typically cited by historians as the field of combat upon which the ultimate outcome of the Second World War in Europe was decided. And since at any given time the bulk of the Reich's armed forces were allocated to this front, it follows that it is around the battlefields of eastern Europe that the fortunes of Germany will most likely revolve in future games of Grand Europa. Given the above, the issue of play balance in SE would seem to be central to play of the entire series.

There are undoubtedly as many different opinions on this subject as there are players. Because of this lack of consensus, players are curious to discover how their own experiences compare to those of others around the country. Are the events transpiring on their game table comparable to those of other games in progress nationwide? Are there new plans being developed and refined which will revolutionize offensive or defensive strategy in SE? Are the rules accurate; that is, do most games unfold and progress within historical bounds? Does each side have the proper chance to win? Finally, which side is winning most frequently and why?

In the next several issues of TEN we plan to assemble input from the readership on a wide spectrum of SE play balance issues. Taken as a whole this discussion should bring the current state of play balance in SE into sharper focus.

One perplexing complication encountered when trying to assess play balance is the requirement for "equally skilled and committed teams". In practice, this ideal is impossible to achieve. Even in solitaire play such things as fatigue, inspiration, carelessness, and unconscious bias, to name just a few factors, can influence symmetry of play. And if one could somehow assemble two identically talented squads, there is no guarantee of reliable results. For example, a game between "equal" players who were not very good would probably produce a game which would bear little resemblance to one played by uniformly excellent competitors. There is no solution to this imperfection; indeed, a very important aspect of the debate is how evenly matched the two historical "teams" were. In the actual event were the

Germans a "crack" squad, while the Soviets were competent, but less highly skilled? Or did they just possess less "play experience"?

Given these imponderables, let's take a brief look at the issues to be weighed.

First and perhaps most important, what is the "correct" probability of a German win? That is, what percentage of games should end in a German victory?

This raises the fundamental question of whether a contest between equal teams should ever produce an Axis win. Louis Rotundo, one of this country's most informed scholars on Soviet potentials during World War II, expresses the opinion that the Germans never came close to winning in Russia. The vast amounts of new information released by the Soviets in the last few years relative to their troop strengths and equipment levels have convinced him that only in light of this new data may one begin to grasp the true magnitude of the margin by which the Germans were overmatched. As for theories earlier advanced by western historians about a few extra weeks of clear weather or less meddling from Hitler changing the outcome, in the words of Mr. Rotundo, "It just didn't matter!"

As Europa gamers we don't seem to have much trouble accepting the inevitability of a Polish, French, or Yugoslavian defeat at the hand of Germany. Axis victories in these campaigns are just a matter of time. After all, this is what happened historically. But faced with the historical reality that Germany lost the Eastern Campaign totally and completely, the vast majority of us argue that the Germans nonetheless had a real chance for victory. And we expect to find this chance present in the game and with a rather high probability.

Otherwise, would we really want to play the game competitively? So one question we should all ask ourselves is, "Under what circumstances, if any, could the Germans have won the war historically?"

Moving on, here are a few game topics important to determining the outcome of play in SE to be covered in this project.

The expected losses of the Soviet ground and air forces during the combined Jun 1141 turns will be examined. This is important because it sets the tone for the entire Barbarossa operation. What occurs during this turn is a good barometer of the ultimate outcome of the game. Indeed, extremely experienced veterans can often accurately predict a winner based on observation of this one turn.

Further evaluation will look into such things as: What is the average per-turn loss for each side? What is the "normal" mix of combat odds utilized (the road to Moscow is not paved in 7-1's)? How close to the order of baffles for the 1942 Scenario are most teams upon reaching Apr 1 42 in a campaign game of SE? How are the Luftwaffe and VVS being used? Do most groups play using house rules or confine themselves to the "Rules As Written"? Which side has the advantage in the game? Is this realistic? What, if anything, should be done to rectify the situation? Finally, in games played to a reasonable conclusion, how many wins for each side have been recorded?

We're convinced that this feedback will be of great interest to readers, and so we invite you to respond to these topics. There is a great deal of data out there which would be instructive to all of us. Please share it and your ideas with us.

A Note to Playtesters

Several people have asked if the announcement in TEN #8 advising prospective playtesters to contact GR/D applies to those people who previously requested to participate in various playlests through other channels. The answer is YES. The kits will be supplied by GR/D and as mentioned there will be a nominal, refundable fee charged. Contacting GR/D is essential to confirm your desire to participate and ensure your involvement in the process. Please send a type-written request to GR/D, P.O. Box 591, Grinnell, IA 50112, ATTN: Playtest.

Specify the playtest in which you wish to participate (Second Front, For Whom the Bell Tolls, The Winter War, or MaritaMerkur).

It is worth stating that playtesting is serious business and, if done properly, hard work. It is riot for curiosity seekers. Europa playtests are pivotal focal points in the development of the individual games and the series itself. The playtest of Europa games is a very fundamental part of the design process; it is how things get decided. GDW and GR/D need the thoughtful input of people (that is, gamers) in the field. As such, one should not enter this process lightly, but with dedication to submit the required reports and follow instructions throughout the process.

What Is "Europa Order"?

Why, it's the sequence used to list the cities within each country in John Astell's Europa Almanac. As mentioned in the Almanac "cities are listed based on map orientation, from map north to map south and, within a hexrow, from map east to map west."

For instance, in the case of the USSR if one assembles the Europa maps containing the Soviet Union in a north-south orientation the northernmost city would be first on the list and the southernmost city last. All cities listed before Moskva would be north of it on the maps. The city of Ryazan would be found east of Roslavl since it is listed ahead of Roslavl and is within the same hexrow. Got it? BUT, you say, the northernmost city in the USSR is Murmansk, and it is not first on the list; in fact, it is riot on the list at all! Well, inevitably there were some errors and omissions in the Almanac. We will present a comprehensive list of adjustments in issue TEN #10.

Rick's Tricks

The sick trick for this issue is the infamous "staging intercept". This depravity is spawned through the unholy alliance of the transfer and interception missions. The villains attempting this act will quickly gloss over their crime by glibly stating that the rules specify that a unit may stage to an airbase within range of its printed movement rating and then initiate a non-transfer mission, one of which is interception. The point they choose to overlook is that staging is a transfer mission and so must be flown during the air movement step. The preamble to Rule 20 states very specifically that each mission lists when the mission may be flown. And transfer missions, and therefore staging, may not be flown during the Interceptor Movement Step.

The slick trick is to coordinate partisan attacks with VVS air strikes, particularly when using Rule 33. Note that partisan attacks are resolved during the initial phase and so success (or lack thereof) will be seen before the Soviets commit their air units to missions that turn.

Normally, it is almost impossible to catch a German fighter on the groun

If threatened, the Huns will scramble to another airbase or intercept a weak target in range and return to base after the Mission Resolution Step is over.

To prevent this and give the Germans something to think about in the future, the Soviet team picks an Axis fighter unit stationed in an ungarrisoned reference city (or any other ungarrisoned airbase with a capacity of only 1). Such targets are often found as the Axis strive to provide fighter cover for the front line.

If the partisan attack on the airbase is a success, the fighter is rendered temporarily helpless. It's 1 capacity field is reduced to 0 and so the unit may not patrol, intercept, or scramble. In other words, it is a sitting duck for an enemy air unit bombing mission. It is especially satisfying for the Soviets to swoop in and blow a high quality German unit away with "I" class fighters.

Geography Quiz Answers:

The answers to A.E. Goodwin's Europa Geography Quiz which appears in this issue's "EXchange" are:

1. Hex 2A:0126
2. Hex 13:3716
3. Hex 513:5026
4. Map 13 - Initials RRB in the lower righthand corner.