Well, I'm up to two issues in a row, unless something happens to this column in the mail. I've yet to hear much reaction to my "Attacker Repulsed" suggestion in TEN #7 - if you have an opinion on it, send a note to EXchange.

Ghost of Issue Past

As last time, I'll lead off with some comments on the last issue of TEN.

EASTERN TROOPS

Frank Prieskop's article on the Kalmuck Cavalry Corps in TEN#7 tells the tragic story of one of the many ethnic nationalities in the USSR that provided soldiers for the Germans. However, don't take this story as typical of the German management of their Eastern Troops (Osttruppen in German). The Kalmucks were one of a very few nationalities that seem to have gotten halfway decent treatment by the Germans. For most of the others, they soon discovered that they had traded the nightmare of Stalinism for a Nazi hell.

Nazism proclaimed that the "Slavic race" was sub-human, and it held the "Asiatic races" in even greater contempt. Although many Germans disagreed with this ideology, many others were fervent supporters, while the vast majority went along with official policy. And, official policy was that sub-humans made good slaves, not good soldiers. Himmler promoted the publication of Der Untermensch (The Sub-Human) magazine and its racist propaganda; Goring stated that the best way to deal with the dissident Soviets was to "shoot anybody who looked sideways." Hitler proclaimed "Only the German may carry arms, not the Slav, not the Czechs, not the Cossacks."

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, many Soviets did volunteer their services against their government. While their reasons ranged from base - such as pure gangsterism under Kaminski, later praised as "the famous Kaminski" by Field Marshal von Kluge to Hitler - to noble, most hoped for liberation from Stalin's tyranny. These volunteers were ignored and discouraged by the Nazis. Although officially discouraged, the eastern volunteers found unofficial welcomes by many German units, which were more than willing to take any help they could get.

Many Soviets served as unarmed auxiliaries for these units. Armed eastern troop units sprang up much more slowly, on their own initiative despite official policy or through sponsorship by individual Germans promoting their cause. Due to their irregular status and German doubts about their reliability, the eastern troop units were rarely used in the front lines against the Red Army. Instead, they were employed mopping up pockets of Soviet forces and especially against the partisans.

When the eastern campaign failed to end quickly and victoriously, the German government slowly changed its position in 1942 and 1943 about using "eastern troops," but it was too late. The Nazi occupation in the east had proven to its victims that German liberation meant murder, enslavement, and starvation. Any hope of gaining the trust or cooperation of the populace was gone forever.

While hundreds of thousands were still helping or fighting for the Germans, even more joined or sided with the partisans. New eastern troop recruits were rarely true volunteers, but were induced to join to escape starvation at the hands of the Germans. However, serving the Germans brought little better treatment. For example, the SS raised Druzhina I and II in the spring of 1942 from Soviet POWs. Intended for special operations against the Red Army, Druzhina was employed against the partisans instead. Due to continually poor treatment by the SS and other racist Germans, Druzhina deserted as a unit in August 1943 and became the Soviet 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade.

Faced with increasing prospects of desertions and unreliability as the tide turned against the Fatherland, the Germans resorted to brutal measures. As the Nazis began their long retreat to oblivion, they would evacuate the families of the eastern soldiers out of the USSR. While this did prevent the Soviets from using the families as hostages, this was much less the humanitarian gesture that it seems. Instead, once settled in western or central Europe, the families became hostages of the Germans, to ensure the loyalty of the eastern troops.

Even with hostages in hand, the German government placed little trust in the eastern troops. With the failure of the Kursk offensive and the growing disaster of the Soviet summer offensive, most of the eastern troops were withdrawn from the USSR and sent to the Balkans, Italy, or France. While this prevented mass desertions to the Soviets, it removed their last motivation to fight for the Germans - the chance to fight against Stalin's state. Only the best of these units, such as the Cossacks, survived the transfer with good morale. In the east, only the most loyal remained, such as the Kalmucks and Crimean Tartars. In the end, no matter where they served or to whom they surrendered, they were turned over to Stalin's vindictive security services. Caught between a Communist system they found intolerable and a merciless Nazi ideology, the eastern troops met with ill treatment from all sides.

Frank Prieskop's article is misphrased concerning Stalingrad, where he states "However, in January of 1943, the encirclement of Stalingrad took place and it was necessary for the German troops in the Caucasus to withdraw..." Stalingrad was encircled in November 1942, and Frank must have meant to say that the deteriorating situation at encircled Stalingrad in January 1943 forced the withdrawal of the Germans in the Caucasus.

Frank's suggestion about receiving the Kalmuck unit is OK, although I'm not sure that having a special reinforcement rule for just one unit is worthwhile. I don't agree with his suggestion that the unit should have an anti-partisan zone of control. While used for anti-partisan warfare, this was due to German policy and not because the Kalmucks were necessarily skilled at it. With no security training, undisciplined (however valorous they might be), and employed in regions where they were as foreign to the population as the Germans, I think the Kalmucks don't rate an APZOC.

MY TWO CENTS

I agree with almost everything Roy Lane wrote in his article on strategy and tactics for the Soviets in Scorched Earth. And, since I'm at it, here's my two cents on the subject: When Roy says destroy everything, destroy EVERYTHING. Aside from its direct game effects, it can be a psychological weapon against your opponents. In one game I've played, the Soviets pulled this off in the Ukraine in July 1941.

The Army Group South player became visibly depressed when he realized he'd have to rebuild every rail line and airbase for the next couple hundred miles, and his play became less aggressive for a turn or two - a temporary effect, but one helpful to the Soviets. If you can't destroy everything, and often you can't, always take out the airbases first. Denying the Luftwaffe forward bases is more important than destroying the railroads.

Roy's plan of attacking the German infantry instead of the panzers is a good one. Also, hit the Axis Allied infantry whenever possible. Not only is it weaker than German infantry, its replacement rate is extremely low. When it shows up in a section of the front line, you can be fairly sure the German player doesn't think that sector is very important. Smashing an Axis Allied line is a good way to force the German player to send stronger forces there from positions he does consider more important.

"The Battle for Kiev" article by Timothy O'Shenko, was great. Fats Tooten, a friend who's busy writing a book, See Russia and Die, says the article is right on the money, especially about how full of M*A*S*H von Mellenthin's book, Panzer Battles, is. He notes, however, that O'Shenko got a bit involved with listing the German tank losses in November 1943 and forgot to list any total.

Totaling Jack's figures, just for November, it appears the Germans lose at least 335 tanks, and possibly many more. Even accepting the Germans'claim of knocking out 600 Soviet tanks, they don't quite KO two tanks for every one they lose themselves. If the Germans continued to give the Soviets "lessons in maneuver' at this rate, they'd be holding a few hundred square miles more of battlefield, but would have no tanks left, while the Soviets will still have a few thousand!