James E. Vandine

Keep up the good work! The News is definitely worth the price! How many TENs do I have left on my subscription? I'd like to extend.

Your Ghost in TEN #7 is too easy: Litvinov, the Jewish Foreign Minister for the U.S.S.R. until replaced by the slimeball (Racley would say the warm and caring) Molotov, in 1939. Litvinov was a proponent of collective security vs. Germany. I wonder how many lives would have been saved if the west - and the Soviets - had listened to him?

About the 36" gun, Little David: Surely it is located in Maryland and not New Mexico? Or are there more Aberdeens than I am aware of?

Radey (a.k.a Timothy O'Shenko, in "The Battle for Kiev" from TEN #7) makes me wonder how the peace-loving, heroic Soviet troops ever had a setback against the cowardly, lying German army. Perhaps Vatutin et. al. felt a certain sympathy for the Nazis and stretched out the war over the last eighteen months as a gesture of support... or maybe there were a fair number of German officers and men who were NOT trying merely to save their own skins by fleeing in lorries, like the cur-like C.O. of 25th Panzer Division.

I detest versions of history that make any side look pure and God-like, regardless of the political stripe; I see little to choose between the Soviets and Germans. The western democracies would perhaps be better off if the two totalitarian nations had made common cause against them, giving us the option of defeating them both during the 1940's, once and for all.

The idea that Stalin and crew, after the secret protocol on Poland and eastern Europe, were any more moral than the Nazis is a joke. Can Radey really believe this? Does he really believe anybody else is buying it? I enjoy his history, without the gibes at German manhood. Just tell the story and give the strength returns, and save the sermonizing for a Berkeley lecture or a Spanish Civil War reunion!

Thanks for the opportunity to spout off; sorry for the lecture.

I'm glad you are enjoying the magazine. Winston Hamilton explains how subscriptions and membership in The Europa Association work in this issue's "News from GRID".

Aberdeen, Aberdeen, prettiest town that I've never seen... Although there are several Aberdeens, the largest of which is in South Dakota, there doesn't seem to be one in New Mexico. Indeed, Little David is said to be located at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, as you state.

I suspect Jack Radey's "The Battle for Kiev" stimulated a great deal of thought among our readership. Like me, some might even have been motivated to do some supplemental reading (or rereading) of the works cited in the article. After weighing Panzer Battles and other related works on the subject, one is free to draw one's own opinion - that is the democratic way. However, isn't it unfortunate that we can not fully rely on the recollections of those who were actually there (von Mellenthin's numerous and well publicized misstatements being illustrative)? Can we better trust the conclusions of later researchers who sift through the data and shape their own vision of events secondhand? In the final analysis it is doubtful that the real truth surrounding the events of November - December 1943 in the Ukraine will ever be fully known. And so we are left with opinions...

There is one small point I would like to make about your suggestion that the Western Allies should have taken on Germany and the Soviet Union in a common crusade. What if the "Good Guys" had lost? I suggest we should be content with history as it is and try make the most of it.

Deen Wood

I hear with more than a little trepidation of the intent to apply across-the-board penalties for attacking in poor weather. (See "From the Editor" in this issue.) I think that this is the wrong solution to a problem that does not really exist. GDW's instincts were correct on this one from the start.

Why should there be a penalty for attacking in mud/snow? So that the events of the winter of 1941-42 can be duplicated for the Germans? Or to degrade attacks in poor weather in general?

I am of the opinion that the first winter is not far out of kilter. Much depends on how the German handles things. Attacks in poor weather are already penalized through the proper channels of supply, air, movement and terrain.

First, a quote on the winter of 1941: "We are faced with the sad fact that the Supreme Command has overreached itself by refusing to believe our reports on the increasing weakness of the troops ... [I have decided] to withdraw to a previously selected and relatively short line which I hope that I shall be able to hold with what is left of my forces. The Russians are pursuing us closely and we must expect misfortunes to occur." (General Guderian, 8 December, 1941 - the Soviet offensive got going on December 4-6.)

The German Army in late 1941 was overextended, exhausted, and out of supply. The culprits of the disaster were supply and manpower shortages. Horrible weather simply exacerbated a situation of the Germans' own making that would have led to a defeat under any circumstances or weather.

Long before the debacle at Moscow, on October 1, 1941, Army Group Center reported a net shortage of 80,000 men. A loss of even 1200 riflemen can critically damage a division's fighting power. Tremendous losses had been taken by the infantry divisions of AGC in August and September when they were bashed by the Russians who took advantage of the panzers' absence to the north and south. Even at this point, even in good weather, disaster for AGC was narrowly averted. Things got so critical in Fourth Army sector that Bock decided that the situation could be salvaged only by a major panzer counterattack, and pulled 10 PZ XX into the fray.

The severe losses in manpower caused by these battles permanently reduced AGC's strength. The culprits were lack of troops and supply, even in good weather and even that close to Germany. As German supply caught up, the Germans concentrated and lashed out again, carrying their banners to the outskirts of Moscow, via Vyazma. The same thing stopped them there, not the weather.

Okay, yes it helped. But, do not be mesmerized by the well publicized weather.

The Axis was stopped by the Red Army and its own mismanagement. General Winter caused some casualties, but he did not have the only or even the largest army. Normal preparations by the Germans could have reduced the winter's role even more.

By the time the Soviets attacked in December, the Jerries had wasted themselves. As Zhukov told Stalin on 29 November, 1941, before the temperature collapsed or the winter offensive began, the Germans had been "bled white." In game terms you should probably reduce much of the Wehrmacht, at least AGC, to Kampfgruppe and put them out of supply. You bet a Russky player could smash that up! But gee whiz, the Russian player complains, the German player never overextends himself like his real life counterparts did. TOO BAD! (Isn't that why we play?) That is no reason to penalize the Germans in 1941 for being more prudent than their historical counterparts. Leave the small special edge the Russians now enjoy alone.

Now as far as penalizing the attackers in bad weather goes... Why?

In most instances, lulls in the fighting occurred when both sides ran out of bullets or men or beans. In bad weather that just happens faster and is reflected in reduced supply ranges.

In game terms that means the fighting stops when everybody gets flipped to cadre or outruns their supply. Sure, there was degradation in combat ability, but this is reflected in loss of AEC, halving of air power, and reduction of mobility. When in supply the Russians, Allies, and Germans continued to fight and fight effectively in all types of weather.

As examples, look at the opening phases of Operation Typhoon, the Soviet Stalingrad offensive and the successive blows afterwards which carried them to Kharkov, the U.S Fifth Army attack from the Volturno through the Bernhard line and into the Gustav line in Fall/Winter, 1943 (this against an experienced and entrenched foe in tough terrain; no mean accomplishment!), and Fifth Army's Operation Encore in February, 1945.

I would point out that despite the bad weather, the Gustav line may well have been broken in February, 1944 if the main assault had gone in on the south coast (where the French finally broke the line) rather than at Cassino. A word on the Italian operations: most of the lulls were supply or exhaustion induced. On only a few notable occasions did weather truly hamper combat operations, although it certainly impacted supply efforts almost as much as the terrain.

If there is a problem in the game it is with generous supply rules for a severe winter in Russia in 1941, when the Axis was just not up to it and perhaps in the mud RR regauge rates. But, whatever the year, do not blame the effectiveness of your opponents' good resource management, good supply line maintenance and well executed assault down supply lines on a lack of weather penalties.

To summarize, attacks in poor weather should not be modified. Perhaps the introduction of a severe winter weather ru le which further penalizes Axis supply ranges (if it occurs) would be appropriate in 1941. The RR regauge ability in mud may be too high. Doing anything more drastic may assure that nobody will ever get in a backhanded blow.

References and recommended reading: Published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History: Stalingrad to Berlin by Earl F. Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad by Earl F. Ziemke, Salemo to Cassino by Martin Blumenson, Cassino to the Alps by Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Historical Study., Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign, and Historical Study: Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia.

Other sources: Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World War I/ by Maj. Timothy A. Wray, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Operation Barbarossa by Bryan I. Fugate, Panzer Leader by Hans Guderian, and Lost Victories by E. von Manstein.

Here's one last tidbit for discussion: Rule 37 states that "The German player gains victory points for cities he controls at the end of the game.... The German player gains half the victory point value of a city's hex if it is Soviet owned, but isolated." I would suggest that in the campaign game the German player should gain only half the victory point value for German owned cities at the end of the game if they are isolated.

James Broshot

I thoroughly enjoyed #7 of The Europa News; it was the best one ever (except for the one that had my article in it). I really appreciate Shelby Stanton's "Facts Behind the Counters" column and it was good to see our token Marxist Jack Radey again as well.

Other comments:

1. Are we to take the new RR engineer rules in TEN#7 as official?

2. I sure wanted to attend Europafest, but it was on a day when I had to be in court in two places. Maybe next year... if it's still in the Midwest.

3. Re my note in the TEN#7 "Appeals Court" column. Things get worse for Trento if you use (like I do) the house rule (adapted from MM) that units with heavy equipment cannot land at minor ports. However, why not supply breakdown counters and I'd like to point out that in SE all Italian divisions are 3 RE equivalent.

4. It you guys are going to turn out Soviet Asia, why not go on to "Pacifica". After all, a lot of the troops that the Japanese kept in Manchuria ended up going to the Pacific, to places like Peleliu, Luzon, Okinawa, etc. Thanks for the opportunity to be heard.

You're welcome, and as for a response:

1. See this issue's "Rules Court".
2. See this issue's "News from GR/D"
3. See this issue's "Inside Europa"
4. Well, we can't anticipate all your questions in advance. As it happens there are some plans, still very nebulous at this point, of one day taking Europa to the Pacific. If this were done, I think it's safe to assume that it will NOT be at a 16 mile per hex scale. To say more at this point would be rumor-mongering, so having thus piqued your curiosity, I will say no more.

Courtnay Footman

I would like to make some suggestions about the defensive air support mission in hopes the designer will see them. A reply to this is not necessary, although an opinion would be appreciated.

The defensive air support mission is quite different in its application from the offensive air support mission: the hex a defensive air unit is supporting is often not attacked at all; when it is attacked, a very high concentration of antiaircraft assets will usually be allocated against it. Furthermore, planes that fly defensive support/harassment missions are immune from enemy bombing attacks (since they are not at a base). Finally, the presence of defensive support makes a very large difference in combat odds much more frequently, and for a much smaller effort, than does offensive support.

Historically, one great advantage of defensive air support was its ability to be concentrated where the enemy was actually attacking. To recreate this flexibility, decrease the range of units flying the mission, and their escorts, by one (as in the air-naval interaction mission), and allow the non-phasing player to move all defensive support units one hex at the start of the phasing player's air phase. (After the enemy's ground movement phase, but before he allocates air missions.)

To allow proper interception and patrol ranges, the interceptors/patrollers may fly to any ONE hex adjacent to the hex in which the defensive air support units ended their movement.

Allowing a reaction to enemy ground movement also solves the problem of the phasing player ganging up on defensive air with AA guns. The ability to thus manipulate AA is obviously wrong - one does not go hunting planes with AA guns! In a previous game of SE, I recall where a forest hex with defensive air support found itself under attack from an infantry division (the SS Polizei division) and four AA regiments, which is absurd. Under my proposal all an attacker can do is commit AA where he rnost wants to attack. Then the defender has to decide if he will brave the AA or support a hex with less intense AA presence.

The odds of finding a plane on the ground are about the same regardless of whether it is flying missions against attacking enemy units or defending enemy units. That is not the case in Europa. The way I avoid this problem is to allow the phasing player, at the start of his air phase (after the movement of the enemy's defensive air support units as described in the preceding paragraph) to request the non-phasing player to replace any air units on defensive support/harassment missions with markers indicating the strength of the planes on those missions, and to return the defending units to base where they can then be bombed. A marker may be fired at by AA, but all results (K,A, R) simply cause the marker to be removed. This allows the phasing player to try to kill/abort planes on defensive support/harassment either by AA or by bombing, but not both.

This is not a perfect solution, but it is better than what now exists. This change seems particularly important because it allows a superior air force to attempt to gain control of the air, which is impossible under the current system, as the weaker air force can make itself invulnerable to attack by launching a few heavily escorted defensive air strikes each turn. This would be particularly ridiculous in Second Front; the Luftwaffe should not be able to last long if tries to stay near the front.

Defensive support may already be too powerful; if one allows it more flexibility, it certainly will be. To remedy this, simply halve the bombing strength of planes on the defensive support mission.

Something along the lines of what you have proposed will have to be devised and tested if we are to remove the abuses you point out and bring more realism to the air system.

I do have a question for you. If the phasing player asks the defender to return a defensive mission air unit to base in order to bomb it, and then in fact scores a hit on that unit in his mission resolution phase, is the corresponding marker for that unit removed before ground combat (or attacker's AA fire) is resolved?

Kenneth C. Kettering

In TEN #7, John Astell provided a new set of rules on rail regauging ("Rails through the Russias") and a corresponding new OB for Axis rail engineers in SE. The substance of the rule is sensible and well justified, and it seems to deal effectively once and for all with the recent problem of abusive use of the rail construction and road upgrading rules.

The essential fix - to deprive construction units of any role in the rail regauging and upgrading process, and add to the countermix a sprinkling of new rail engineers in compensation - harms the German mildly (since they no longer will be able to give all six of their rail engineer regiments quick construction capability in 1941 merely by mating each to a construction unit, and they are given additional railroad engineers only sufficient to give quick construction capabilities to five of the six), but that does not give rise to any obvious problem. Two technical points about the new rules seem worth making.

(A.) The new rules award the Finns a railroad engineer, Unless a special rule is added, the German player is apt to ship this unit out of Finland and use it to regauge rails on the Greater Germany/Leningrad or Greater Germany/Moscow axis. Rule 32B allows Finnish units to operate anywhere in weather zones A and B and does not restrict them from leaving the Finnish theater. Finnish units may not attack any hex outside the Finnish theater, but this does not cramp the style of a rail engineer. This seems rather ahistorical and I doubt that it was intended by Mr. Astell. Perhaps a clarification is in order.

(B.) The new rules give a new slant on the quick construction rule. The new rules permit two brigades to combine for quick regauging (1/4 MP each in clear weather), two regiments to combine (1/2 MP each), and two battalions to combine (1 MP each). Various intermediate combinations are allowed. This is interesting in several respects.

First, the rules hitherto have in effect limited quick construction to no more than two 1 RE units combined. The suggested rules break that barrier in several respects (e.g., one brigade and four battalions are allowed to combine), and raise the question whether there should be any limit to the number of units that should be allowed to combine for quick construction.

Second, the suggested rules permit some combinations for quick construction but not others; e.g., four regiments may not combine (even though they are the equivalent of two brigades, which may combine), three regiments have no advantage over two, etc. This seems to me to be the consequence of the fact that the engineering rules have consistently tried to scale construction costs to the number of units in the hex. As the suggested rules indicate, such scaling becomes clumsy when units of different RE size are allowed to combine for purposes of quick construction; such scaling would become virtually impossible to manage if different engineering units have different proficiencies (e.g., British pioneers, which are half capable under optional rules in FF, German penal units, which are double capable, etc.) These issues will become more acute as Europa expands, because I suspect additional units will be entitled to double construction capability (such as U.S. construction engineers, lavishly equipped with all manner of heavy equipment).

These issues would be easy to fix without changing the substance of the present rules by rephrasing the existing rules so that they are scaled not on the basis of the number of units joining in the task, but rather in terms of the number of REs joining in the task and their relative proficiencies. To take into account the fact that certain engineers may have greater or lesser proficiency than average, introduce the new concept of "construction rating", reflecting the relative proficiency of each construction unit, and rescale construction costs appropriately. In summary:

"In general, each construction unit has a construction rating equal to its RE size. For example, a German construction regiment has a construction rating of one. Some construction units have a construction points rating equal to twice or half their RE size; such units are specified where appropriate.

"Each construction task described in these rules is completed upon expenditure of a specified number of construction points by one or more construction units in the hex where the construction is to take place. A construction unit may expend construction points on such tasks if it is present in the hex and expends movement points for the purpose. The number of construction points expended by a construction unit is equal to its construction rating times the number of MPs it expends upon the task. Example: An ordinary construction battalion (1/2 RP and hence 1/2 construction rating) which expends 4 MPs on a construction task has expended 1/2 times 4, or 2 construction points toward the completion of the task.

"Engineers that are stacked together may each contribute construction points toward completion of a particular construction task, dividing the cost between them as they wish. Construction of permanent airfields and forts must be begun in the initial phase, even if quick construction is used, and all units (other than workers) participating in such construction must be in the hex in the initial phase."

The construction costs for various tasks then would not be scaled to M Ps spent per unit, but rather to construction points. Naturally, construction point costs would vary with the weather as they do now, e.g., repairing a broken rail hex would take 4 CPs in clear weather, 8 CPs in poor weather.

I have developed this concept further in a lengthy article in the process of preparation, but would be interested in other people's reaction to this issue in the meanwhile.

This concept has much to recommend it, even though it adds yet another level of complexity. It is indeed strange that the new RR engineer battalions have the same capability to repair rail hexes as their bigger brothers, the regiments, despite the regiments being nominally twice their size.

It would be useful to apply a similar technique to destruction of items. For instance, under the current rules, a 4-6 rifle division can break down into regiments and suddenly augment its ability to destroy rail hexes threefold.

I would disagree, however, with your characterization of the new rule 38C2 as mildly harmful to the Germans. Consider this: the Germans start play with their six regiments of Eisenbahntruppe as before, plus ten new RR engineer battalions. As you note, it is now only possible for railroad engineers working together to effect quick regauging, and since two battalions are required to combine with each regiment to achieve this, the German player is only able to field five "quick regauging teams" as opposed to the previous six.

The solution to this "problem" is to FORGET QUICK REGAUGING. Let each unit regauge independently. The maximum number of hexes which the Germans could convert in a turn under the old system was 6 x 4 = 24 hexes. Under the new arrangement, each regiment can independently regauge three hexes and each battalion two hexes per turn. Therefore, the new maximum regauging capability for the Axis per turn is (6 x 3) + (10 x 2) = 38 hexes, a theoretical increase of 58%!

To prevent the Axis from achieving this frightful maximum, the Soviets will have to structure their defensive scheme accordingly. Movement of the RR engineers must be constricted in order to prevent their stringing out. This argues for a forward defense by STAVKA, which carries the penalty of risking more troops to elimination. And even if constricted, the Germans can use the enhanced flexibility of the battalions to effect regauging on more lateral and secondary lines than previously possible.

The Germans also benefit from the fact that the ten new RR engineer battalions can each lend their 6 MPs to repairing broken rail lines. This is roughly equivalent to 40 MPs worth of additional rail repair, or about 10 hexes per turn. At the very least this would allow some of the combat engineers to be released to the front where they could assist in air base construction or even used in combat. And don't forget the six 6 MP construction units previously consumed performing quick regauging with the RR engineer regiments. They are free to undertake other activity as well.

Therefore, I must conclude that if the new rules on regauging are harmful to anyone, it is to the Soviet player.

Jason Long

I really like what has been done with TEN the last few issues. I like your illustrations, especially the poster for my article on the Luftwaffe. I hope that John Astell continues with his valuable comments in "Inside Europa". It is good to have his opinions on proposals made by people. Having served my time as a scout in the U.S. Army, I-agree with him about the ZOCs in Europa, though I can imagine how an extremely large stack might have a Z0C, of some sort through sheer numbers of uncoordinated patrols and scouts and things.

But I don't really think that it is desirable to have a rule that states that only stacks of over 6 REs in size will have a reduced ZOC. I just don't see how it matters that much.

The columns by Shelby Stanton and Charles Sharp are very handy for those of us creating our own scenarios as they enable us to derive our own OB/OA's by letting us understand what goes into each counter it we have the raw data or to determine if a unit was present at a certain battle or not. After Shelby finishes his series on the assault gun units, I'd like for him to do a similar one on German artillery units and then the Luftwaffe AA and field units. I'd like Charles to explain the compositions of the artillery divisions and a brief history of each. I can only presume that his mention of 105 artillery divisions in his latest article includes AA divisions.

I've received my copy of The Urals and am fairly well impressed. The maps are superb, though their improbable use would not have led to their purchase. I did buy it because of the 1943 scenario without which you would probably be stuck with quite a few unsold copies.

I don't think that your proposed Book Two of Grand Europa is doable or even really necessary. I can't see any war occurring in 1936, as it would have gone against the political consensus and military reality. The Brits had yet to make a decision to even fight on the continent and therefore the army wasn't ready for any kind of combat and the RAF had just started to expand. Another factor is that researching the mid-30's OB-wise is going to be a bitch. In my own specialty of aviation I can find the info on the French and Brits and guesstimate the Germans, but I'll only have a few clues about the size and structure of most of the rest of Europe.

I'm not going to be satisfied if I have to fudge things if the data isn't out there. I'm in favor of starting Grand Europa during the Munich crisis as I believe that is the first time that any country was ready to go to war.