The two battlecruisers Germany possessed during World War II, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, were originally to be repeats of the pocket battleship Graf Spee. As it became apparent how superior the French response, Dunkerque, would be to the pocket battleships, the design for the new ships grew in speed, armor, and armament until they were equal in size to battleships. Both Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were laid down in May of 1935, one month before the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty gave them any legality. It was proposed that the ships be given a battleship armament commensurate with their size, but, aside from the delay this would cause, Hitler made the decision to keep the smaller 283mm (11-inch) guns to placate the British.

Gneisenau was commissioned in May 1938, and Scharnhorst in January of 1939. Scharnhorst had slightly more powerful turbines, but was to experience more mechanical problems. Like all major German warships, the battlecruisers needed extended shakedown periods followed by dockyard work for repairs and alterations before they became operational. Despite the addition of clipper-style bows, both ships suffered from water coming over their forecastles in heavy seas.

First Action

The ships saw their first action on September 4, 1939 when they were bombed at anchor off Brunsbuttel by 14 Wellingtons; all bombs missed. On October 7th Gneisenau sailed with the light cruiser Koln and nine destroyers under the command of Admiral Boebm as far north as Stavanger. The plan was to draw out the British Home Fleet across a line of U-boats and into range of the Luftwaffe. The German ships were spotted on September 8th by a Coastal Command Hudson and attacked without success by 12 Wellingtons. As hoped, the Royal Navy sailed the battleships Nelson and Rodney, the battlecruisers Hood and Repulse, the aircraft carrier Furious, six light cruisers, and 12 destroyers to intercept. The German ships turned back, and the Luftwaffe sent up no less than 127 He I 11 s and 21 Ju 88s, but those bombers that found the British ships were unable to inflict a single hit.

Scharnhorst was declared operational in mid-October after early defects with her boilers and salt water contamination of her lubricating oil had been put right. Both battlecruisers departed Wilhelmshaven on November 21, 1998 under Vice Admiral Marschall to sortie into the Iceland-Faeroes gap and create a diversion for the Graf Spee, now being hunted by the British and French navies in the South Atlantic. Two days later they spotted the Rawalpindi, an elderly armed merchant cruiser (16,697 tons, 8x 152mm guns), south of Iceland and quickly turned her into a burning pyre. Scharnhorst received light damage from a single 152mm hit on the quarterdeck. The battlecruisers started to pick up survivors, but the British light cruiser Newcastle (11,350 tons full load, 12x. 152mm guns) appeared in the Arctic twilight, and the Germans cut the lifelines and sped off.

The Allies, determined to catch the two perpetrators, sent the battleship Warspite and two light cruisers to cover the north Atlantic, the battlecruisers Hood and Dunkerque, with two light cruisers, and five destroyers to cover the eastern Atlantic, the battlecruiser Repulse and aircraft carrier Furious to cover the mid-Atlantic, and the battleships Nelson and Rodney, along with 15 cruisers, 16 destroyers, and four submarines to block the route back to Germany. Using a storm whose waves inundated their navigation bridges and caused flooding of the forward turrets, the German ships eluded the double picket line of cruisers that the British had set up across the North Sea to arrive back at Wilhelmshaven on November 27th.

Gneisenau needed a seven week overhaul at Kiel, while Scharnhorst spent the rest of 1939 repairing damage and having more work done on her boilers. Both ships spent January conducting trials and training in the Baltic. Their next operation was a sweep into the North Sea as far as the Shetland-Bergen gap to intercept convoys between Norway and Great Britain. Departing from Wilhelmshaven on February 18, 1940 with an escort of two destroyers, the battlecruisers returned two day later after failing to sight any shipping.

Late on April 4th the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst set sail under the command of Vice Admiral Gunther Lutjens to provide cover for the landing group assigned to Narvik in the German invasion of Norway. Spotted the next day by Coastal Command reconnaissance, the German ships survived an attack by 12 RAF bombers undamaged. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst separated from the landing group bound for Narvik late on the eighth and headed east to draw the British away from Norway.

The British, however, were already at sea, and early the next day Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were intercepted in near gale conditions by the British battlecruiser Renown (36,080 tons full load, 6x 381mm guns) west of the Lofoten Islands. Renown opened fire at 11,800 meters against the two German battlecruisers, who, although surprised, returned fire in three minutes. In theory the 350mm side armor of the German ships provided protection a ainst the 879-kg shells of Renown from 13,700 to 25,000 meters while their 130mm of horizontal armor provided protection from plunging fire inside 24,000 meters. In other words their vitals had an immunity zone between those two distances. The inclined 230mm side armor of Renown provided protection against the 330 kg shells of the Germans from 24,200 meters out to 33,000 meters and her 102mm deck armor protected inside 28,000 meters. By staying near the middle of their immunity zone the German ships should have been able to inflict more serious injury to Renown than they received. In addition, the 150 mm secondary armament of the Germans outgunned the 113mm secondary weapons of Renown.

However, naval battles are not fought by actuaries, and it was Renown that scored first with a shell that struck the fore tower of Gneisenau. Although the shell did not explode, it cut power and communications to the 10.5 meter main armament range finder, destroyed the secondary armament range finder, and probably unnerved Lutjens a few feet away. A second shell knocked out Gneisenau's aft turret and a third shell struck her superstructure as the two German ships tried to disengage by sailing north into the teeth of the weather. Renown, having received superficial damage from two 283mm shells which failed to detonate, tried to follow but slowed down to avoid damage from the stormy seas. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were willing to accept that damage as they maintained 28 knots to escape.

Circling around to the west, the ships arrived back at Wilhelmshaven on April 12th. Both ships were repaired by the end of the month. Gneisenau, however, exploded a magnetic mine on May 5th in the Elbe estuary, which required two weeks to repair followed by a one-week shakedown.

Planned Operation

When both battlecruisers became available, an operation was planned for attacking the Allied shipping off Harstad, thus cutting off their ground forces around Narvik. On June 4th Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, and four destroyers departed from Kiel under Admiral Marschall. The cruiser and the destroyers refueled from a tanker south of Jan Mayen Island on June 7th before the whole force sailed west towards Harstad. The German ships sank a tanker and its escorting trawler and then sent an empty transport to the bottom, but they left a hospital ship unmolested. Detaching Hipper and the destroyers back to Trondheim, the two battlecruisers sailed on and later in the day sighted the British aircraft carrier Glorious (27,400 tons full load, 48 aircraft) escorted by just two destroyers, HMS Acasta and HMS Ardent.

Although the Glorious had taken aboard RAF Hurricanes and Gladiators the previous day, this does not explain why she had none of her own aircraft out patrolling. Scharnhorst opened fire at 25,000 meters, and early hits destroyed the aircraft brought up on deck in a desperate attempt to launch. The two destroyers valiantly tried to protect the carrier with smoke screens but the Germans were successful in using their radar for fire control. Glorious was doomed, but against all odds the two destroyers turned on the battlecruisers and made a torpedo attack. Both destroyers were quickly sunk, but not before one torpedo, fired by Acasta's Leading Seaman Nick Carter (also the destroyer's sole survivor) had struck and heavily damaged Scharnhorst. For all their prowess at land warfare the Germans never matched British courage in naval warfare. The two battlecruisers made no effort to rescue the hundreds of survivors floating in the sea.

Both ships arrived at Trondheim on June 9th where temporary repairs were made on Scharnhorst. Spotted by a Coastal Command aircraft the next day, Scharnhorst was bombed unsuccessfully by 12 RAF Hudsons. Three days later the British carrier Ark Royal launched an attack of 15 Skuas against the Scharnhorst. Only seven Skuas survived the defending fighters; one hit the battlecruiser with a bomb, but it failed to detonate. Meanwhile Gneisenau had sortied from Trondheim with Hipper and four destroyers to again attack the shipping off Harstad, but returned the next day once it was learned how heavily the convoys were now being escorted.

To create a diversion to allow Scharnhorst to sail back to Germany, Gneisenau and Hipper departed from Trondheim on June 20th with the intention of sailing towards the Iceland-Faeroes gap. Waiting nearby, however, was the British submarine Clyde which blew a hole through the bow of the Gneisenau with a torpedo. The Scharnhorst, meanwhile, sailed from Trondheim on the 21st escorted by four destroyers and four torpedo boats, but was spotted by the ubiquitous Coastal Command and attacked first by six Swordfish and then nine Beauforts. The Royal Navy also set out in an attempt to intercept her and got within 35 miles before Scharnhorst turned and hid in a fjord near Stavanger. The next day she set out again and soon reached at Kiel. Her repairs were to take six months.

Gneisenau meanwhile had limped back to Trondheim. Temporary repairs took over a month there as what was left of her bow had almost broken off. She departed from Trondheim on July 25 th escorted by Hipper, light cruiser Nurnberg, four destroyers, and six torpedo boats. Although the British battlecruisers Renown and sortied along with numerous cruisers and destroyers, the Gneisenau arrived at Kiel on July 28th. Her repairs were to take five months.

It was late December of 1940 when both ships became operational again, and by now the strategic picture had changed considerably. France and its Atlantic ports were controlled by Germany, and the plans to invade England had been replaced with plans to cut off her seaborne trade. On December 28th , Gneisenau and Scharnhorst departed to break out into the Atlantic and wage mercantile warfare. Stormy weather off Norway, however, caused part of a forward deck on the Gneisenau to buckle and the operation was called off.

On January 22, 1941, following repairs, the two battlecruisers departed from Kiel under Admiral Lutjens to again attempt to break out into the Atlantic. They were spotted almost immediately and the intelligence relayed to the British. The battleships Nelson and Rodney, the battlecruiser Repulse, eight cruisers, and 11 destroyers sortied to intercept. The German battlecruisers ran into one light cruiser picket on January 280' but managed to break contact in the foggy weather. They hid in the Arctic Ocean where they refueled from one of the numerous tankers that had been pre-positioned ahead of them. A few days later they made another attempt, and on the night of February 3rd succeeded in passing through the Denmark Strait and into the Atlantic.

After refueling from a tanker south of Greenland on February 6th, the two battlecruisers ran into the convoy HX 106 two days later. It was escorted by the elderly battleship Ramillies (approx. 34,000 tons full road, 8x 381min guns), whose 330mm armor sides and 5 1mm armor deck provided an immunity zone between 15,500 and 19,200 meters against the German shells. Gneisenau and Scharnhorst had the same immunity zone as they had against Renown, but shifted in slightly because the Ramillies was still firing the older, ballistically inferior 871 kg shells. The Scharnhorst started to maneuver to draw off Ramillies, but Admiral Lutjens canceled the attack.

The two battlecruisers withdrew and refueled again south of Greenland on February 16th. On the 22nd they fell upon an. unescorted convoy heading west and together sank five ships (total 25,784 tons). Heading south the battlecruisers refueled near the Azores and on 8/3/41 intercepted the convoy SL 67, escorted by the elderly battleship Malaya (35,380 tons full load, 8x 38 1mm guns). With 330 mm armor sides and a 127mm armor deck, the Malaya had an immunity zone between 15,000 and 37,200 meters. The two battlecruisers again declined to give battle, although they closed to within 24,000 meters, just beyond the range of the 871 kg shells aboard Malaya.

Gneisenau and Scharnhorst refueled, found and sank an independently sailing steamer (7,926 tons), and then refueled again. Their most successful day came on March 15th when they intercepted another westbound convoy. Scharnhorst sank six ships (total 35,080 tons) while Gneisenau sank seven (total 26,693 tons) and captured three more (total 20,139 tons), which were manned with prize crews and sent off to France.

By this time the British battleships King George V, Nelson, and Rodney, along with numerous cruisers and destroyers were hunting the German battlecruisers. On March 1661 Gneisenau was surprised by the Rodney (38,300 tons full load, 9x 406mm guns), but managed to break contact before any shots were fired. She would have had a slender immunity zone between 22,800 and 23, 100 meters against the 929 kg shells of Rodney, while the inclined 3561nin side armor and 159mm. deck armor of Rodney gave her an immunity zone from 12,800 meters to 40,200 meters against the German 330 kg shells.

Meanwhile, from Gibraltar the carrier Ark Royal and the battlecruiser Renown also joined the search, and on March 21st the two German battlecruisers were spotted by an aircraft from Ark Royal 700 miles west of Brest. Because the German ships had turned north when the aircraft had appeared, the British assumed they were on their way back to Germany via the northern route and deployed their ships accordingly. In fact, the two battlecruisers had intended to reach the French port all along, and although they were spotted again by a Coastal Command aircraft the next day it was then too late to intercept. The two German ships arrived at Brest having accounted for 22 Allied merchant ships (total 115,622 tons).

Dry Dock

Scharnhorst had suffered boiler problems throughout the voyage and needed an extended overhaul during which her superheaters were retubed. Meanwhile the first of many RAF raids on the battlecruisers at Brest occurred on the night of 30-31/3/41. This raid produced no hits and neither did the second raid on the night of 3-4/4/41, but a daylight strike on 6/4/41 by four Coastal Command Beauforts seriously damaged the Gneisenau with a torpedo. On the night of 10-11/4/41 she was further damaged by four bombs while in drydock. The Germans utilized countermeasures such as smoke screens and even a fake warship built with three French ships and covered with camouflage netting, and they became somewhat successful in neutralizing the frequent raids.

The engine problems of Scharnhorst and the damage to the Gneisenau prevented them from joining the Bismarck on her famous sortie into the Atlantic in May of 1941. Scharnhorst was repaired by mid-July, and sailed on down the coast to La Pallice to conduct trials away from the lurking British submarines and the hundred of mines laid across the entrances to Brest. Discovered, she was bombed by eight Halifaxes on July 23rd and hit by three 455 kg armor piercing bombs, none of which exploded but still inflicted considerable damage by punching all the way through the hull, and two 227 kg armor piercing bombs, which did explode. A rare daylight raid on Brest the same day by 63 Wellingtons, 18 Hampdens, and three B-17s failed to hit Gneisenau.

During repairs the close-in AA on both ships was augmented with 20mm vierlings, and triple torpedo tubes were added. In December of 1941 both ships were declared operational, although the high changeover in crew, to support the U-boat program, and the lack of training at sea had reduced their fighting efficiency. The strategic and tactical factors had also changed. The entry of the United States into the war had increased the Allied naval forces and the war against the Soviet Union had cut off a significant source of oil to Germany, factors which made ocean raiding less feasible. In addition, Hitler had become obsessed with defending Norway, the ground forces for which were being drawn off to the eastern front. Tactically, the extension of air patrols over the oceans and the growing use of aircraft carriers and radar made it far more difficult for raiders to remain undiscovered or to break contact with shadowing ships. Finally, using codes taken from a sinking U-boat and two German weather ships, the British had hunted down the German tankers and supply ships hidden at sea on which all German raiders depended. These factors along with the constant threat from bombs negated any reason for keeping the German battlecruisers at Brest.

Channel Dash

Sending the ships back by the northern route was now much more risky, so Hitler ordered a surprise dash through the English Channel. During the night of February 11, 1942 Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, and six destroyers left Brest under the command of Vice Admiral Ciliax. Escorted along the way by minesweepers and torpedo boats and covered by the entire Luftflotte 3, the German ships escaped detection through a series of fumbles by the British until midday on the next day when they were already in the Strait of Dover. Only as they were moving out of range did British coastal batteries open up. Then eight MTBs, six Swordfish torpedo bombers, and five elderly destroyers made a series of disjointed attacks. The RAF got into action last, but only a small proportion of the aircraft sent out could find the German ships and they scored no hits.

It appeared that the German ships would escape unharmed until both battlecruisers ran over magnetic mines laid in their paths. The damage to Gneisenau was not so severe and she continued on to Brunsbuttel. On Scharnhorst, however, not only was the flooding greater, but the shock damage knocked out her electric circuits causing her turbines to shut down. As she was getting them back on line, she ran over a second magnetic mine. Although the new flooding, now on the other side of the ship, helped bring her back to an even keel, again her circuits were knocked out and she lost propulsion. Once again power was regained and Scharnhorst limped into Wilhelmshaven on February 13th From there she sailed to Kiel two days later for extensive repairs.

Gneisenau had also arrived at Kiel for repairs, but on the night of February 26th , a 455 kg RAF bomb ignited the forward magazine. The damage was catastrophic -- the bomb destroyed the forward turret and surrounding area. Given the amount of work needed to repair her and the necessity of manufacturing at least one new turret, plans were drawn up to replace her 283mm guns with six 380mm guns in twin turrets. Arming the ships with such guns had been considered from the beginning, and the barbettes for the 283mm turrets were designed to accept 380min turrets. The barbettes' supports, however, needed to be strengthened and the bow lengthened to compensate for the extra weight. On April 6th she arrived at Gdynia and work started with the removal of what was left of her bow. Conceivably she could have been rebuilt by late 1943, becoming a more potent warship, but work was suspended on February 2, 1943 after Hitler decided he could no longer spare the resources. Gneisenau remained at Gdynia, a rusting hulk, until March 23, 1945 when she was scuttled as a block ship.

The mine damage to Scharnhorst was repaired by July of 1942, but while running trials in the Baltic during August she was damaged in a collision with a U-boat. This was repaired by September when she again ran trials. In October of 1942 she moved to Gdynia to have new rudders installed, and then spent the rest of 1942 having her boilers overhauled.

Declared operational, the Scharnhorst set sail on January 9, 1943 with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen and three destroyers for Norway. Spotted by reconnaissance aircraft in the Danish Belts, the German ships turned back after heavy activity was reported at airfields in northern Britain. Another attempt to sail to Norway two weeks later turned back for the same reason. On February 10th Scharnhorst damaged herself by grounding, and needed the rest of the month for repairs. Finally, departing Gdynia on March 8th and using bad weather to cloak her movement, the Scharnhorst sailed in stages to Bergen and then Trondheim to arrive at Narvik on the fourteenth of the month.

Later in the month, Scharnhorst with the battleship Tirpitz, the pocket battleship Lutzow, six destroyers, and two torpedo boats sailed north from Narvik to Altaford from where they could threaten the convoys to the Soviet Union. After damage incurred during the passage north had been repaired, Scharnhorst engaged in training, which was marred by an internal explosion on April 8th that need two weeks to be repaired. Because the Allies had suspended the convoys, the German ships spent most of the summer lying idle. On September 6th however, Scharnhorst with Tirpitz and ten destroyers departed Altaford under Vice Admiral Kummetz carrying troops of the 349th Grenadier Regiment to attack a Norwegian weather outpost the island of Spitzbergen. As the troops landed on the eighth of the month, the Scharnhorst used her main armament to knock out a pair of 76mm coastal defense guns and destroy a few small buildings. It would be the only time she ever fired at a shore target. The Norwegians retreated into the mountains, the German troops re-embarked, and the ships were back at Altafjord on September 9th

Finally in late December with the resumption of the Allied convoys, permission was received to attack the Allied convoy JW 55B. On Christmas day Scharnhorst with five destroyers departed Altafjord under the command of Rear Admiral Bey. The next day in a gale off the North Cape the Scharnhorst ran into the convoy's close covering force composed of the heavy cruiser Norfolk (14,600 tons full load, 8x 8" 203mm guns]), the light cruisers Belfast (14,900 tons full load, 12x 6" [152mm] guns) and Sheffield (12,190 tons full load, 12x 152mm guns), and four destroyers.

The British cruisers had tracked the German battlecruiser with their radar and opened fire at 8,600 meters. The Scharnhorst, which had switched off her radar to avoid detection, was surprised and turned away after being struck by two 8" (203mm) shells. One shell failed to explode, but it still started a small fire. The other destroyed the 10.5 meter range finder on her foretop and with it the forward radar. Scharnhorst tried to use her superior speed to maneuver around the British cruisers. However, the British cruisers interposed themselves again. Although Scharnhorst, now able to see her antagonists against the faint arctic mid-day horizon, damaged Norfolk with two 283mm hits. Adminal Bey decided to disengage and return to Altafjord.

Meanwhile the German destroyers, which had formed a scouting line to find the convoy, lost all communication with the battlecruiser. Laboring hard in the gale-force winds, these ships were finally ordered to return to port, leaving Scharnhorst to face the enemy alone. This now included the distant covering force, composed of the battleship Duke of York (approx. 44,500 tons fall load, 10x 14" [356mm] guns), the light cruiser Jamaica (approx. 11,000 tons full load, 12x 6" [152mm] guns), and four more destroyers, all racing east to get in between the battlecruiser and Altafjord,.

Although a radar equipped Bv 138 had spotted the distant covering force, the Luftwaffe failed to relay the information to Scharnhorst, and thus she was surprised when Duke of York opened fire at 10,060 meters. With her 381mm side armor and 152mm deck armor, Duke of York had an immunity zone from 13,700 meters out 39,800 meters against the German 11" (283mm) guns, while the Scharnhorst had an immunity zone from 12,400 meters out to 26,500 meters against the 721 kg shells of the Duke of York. Scharnhorst returned fire within five minutes, but early on 14 inch shell jammed her forward turret. Although more shells from the British ships struck, Scharnhorst was pulling out of range when another 14 inch shell penetrated and exploded in a boiler room. This slowed her down enough for the British destroyers, who closed to within 2,000 meters and struck her with at least three torpedoes. Mortally wounded, the Scharnhorst lost speed, and the British ships pounded her at close range. Hit by at least eight more torpedoes in a seven minute span Scharnhorst quickly sank late on December 26th.

Although Scharnhorst had fired off all the 11" (283mm) ammunition for her two operating turrets, she hit Duke of York only twice, with both shells failing to explode. Scharnhorst was hit by at least 13 shells out of the 80 broadsides fired by Duke of York at least 12 shells from the cruisers, and numerous shells from the destroyers. The large number of torpedoes used to sink Scharnhorst does not indicate any superior torpedo protection, as the extensive damage from previous single hits shows. Due to the loss of buoyancy, these torpedoes were probably striking her armor belt and not her more vulnerable undersides. In addition, the torpedo hits were equally distributed on both sides of the ship and caused counter flooding which prevented capsizing. To her credit, Scharnhorst fought to the last against unequal odds and did not scuttle herself as other German ships had done. Only 36 out of a crew of 1,968 could be saved in the stormy arctic night.

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German Battlecruiser: Scharnhorst