Keith Jacobs Washington State

Welcome aboard, Peter! But, then you've obviously been a long time follower anyway. Referring to TEM #58, page 38-39, note the following clarifications:

The original OKB Mig drawing of 1-200 flight test prototype showed 8 total RS-82 unguided rockets. The first production MiG-1 did not differ in any major way from 1-200 flight test development prototype, because of simultaneous acceptance trails and commitment on production. Only operational improvement was use of rubber-based sheathing on fuel tanks offering a modicum of bullet proofing. The fast 1-200 prototype came out of Khodinka airfield assembly plant on March 30, 1940. First flight: April 5, 1940. [Now you understand the confusion].

Jason Long's article fails to mention that Russian sources state Mig-I could also carry either of following underwing ordnance: two 50-kg FAB-50 or two 100-kg (220-lb.) FAB-100 bombs.

Recent Russian sources agree with Green [Warplanes of the Second World War, Fighters, Vol 3], on the range at 550 km/hr (297 knots) with 70% and 10% fuel reserve [for Mig-1].

MiG-3 underwing ordnance: increased to four underwing attachment points to allow mixed loads of up to 8 FAB- I00s, or eight RS-82 rockets, or two VAP-6M/ZAP-6 chemicalincendiary spray containers.

As Long notes, the MiG-3U was planned to use two 20mm ShVAK cannons, but this cannon was not continued in future production plans resulting in abandonment of fitment plans. Some MiG-3s also were fitted with two 12.7mm UBS heavy machine guns.

Range, Mig-3: recent Russian sources give range at 550 km/h with 70% weight and 10% fuel reserve, 820 km (510 miles).

I-210 / Mig-3 w/M-82 engine: five prototypes were converted during Nov-Dec. 41. Some OKB documents refer to this conversion as the first Mig-9. 1-230 / Mig-3U [Ulushchenniy, improved] also known to some as Mig-31) [Dalnostrniy, long range]. Range generally reported as 1,350 km (840 miles).

I-231 prototype - with new AM-39A aircraft did not fly until 1943, as Mig OKb group continued to look for production successor to Mig-3. AM-39A was rated at 1,104 kW at 5850 m (19,190 ft). Armament was intended as 2x 20mm ShVAK cannon. Performance listed differs from Long, as follows: 707 km/h (382 knots) at 7100 meters (23,290 R), with service ceiling of 11,400 m (37,400 ft).

With mass production of Lavochkin and Yakovlev fighters and their design bureau's influence in Kremlin politics, the situation was a bit like British Martin MB.3 and MB.5 prototype fighters going up against the Supermarine Spitfire supporters in London: despite the promising performance increases offered by the new development designs, those who owed their "bread and water" to the existing power structure were unwilling to risk that in making an production allocations in another direction.

Bradley Skeen Missouri

I am very pleased to see TEM gearing up for the publication of Total War. However, I think the most important step in that direction would be a brief article by John Astell and other directly concerned parties about the design philosophy behind the revision, especially in regard to supply considerations, command and control, NODLs, etc.

More unfortunately, I noticed in TEM 58 a large number of typos and similar mistakes. For example, Mark Swenholt's article on what to do with ahistorically lingering Soviet tank divisions seeks to take advantage of reorganizations of tank corps to mech corps in Oct 41-Jan 42; clearly something is garbled here. In any case I believe Mr. Swenholt goes to too much trouble to solve a problem I addressed years ago in a house rule that is both simpler and better history than the proposed solution. Simply add the following to the Soviet OB:

Feb I 42 Special: Disband all C/M divisions and cadres, except Gds units. Add units to the replacement pool as substitutions for fragile divisions as if the disbanded units were eliminated. If the NKVD motorized division is disbanded, it yields 3 Arm RPs and I Inf RP.

The biographies of von Manstein and Zhukov that were added to the "Lost Victories" scenario are riddled with errors; entire lines seem to have dropped out in places. However, the most egregious errors were committed by the dunder-headed designer of that scenario. He left out key units--whole armies-from the Soviet OB. During the war he could have been shot for staff work that sloppy. Nevertheless, I will correct his worst mistakes and hopefully shame him from making such a display of his ignorance again. Many more faux pax could be found in this scenario if one had the time. To use a more accurate Soviet OB, add the following units:

Initial Deployment:

24 Army: 1x 9-6 Art XX 4
21 Army: 1 x 9-6 Art XX 1

Feb I 43 RR: 70th Army

5x 5-6 Rifle XX 102,106,162,175,181

(These units were freshly formed from NKVD border guards in the far east and were well over establishment strength, justifying the 5-6 configuration. Note that they are not fragile divisions and have a 2-6 cadre. Since no counters are available, use spare 5-6 Gds Rifle units).

[Mark Swenholts original article was correct, with Soviet tank corps appearing in 1942; the 1941 was a true typo on our part. it was a goof that several pointed out! - FIN.]

Alan Conrad (from the Europa Internet list-server)

As someone has already pointed out, there were a couple of typos/errors in Mark Swenholt's article in TEM #58. First, the typos: "Oct I 41 thru Jan I 42" was certainly meant to be "42 thru 43" since the tank corps themselves don't show up until mid 42 for the tank divisions to get turned into. Secondly, the last reorganize section tells us to use tank corps counters for the mech corps units the author is talking about. Obviously this is a mistaken repeat of an earlier paragraph and the author intends one to use mech corps counters.

More important is the intent behind the article. I much preferred an earlier idea (TEM letter?) that said that the men from these tank divisions were the glue that made the new tank corps units possible. This is certainly true to an extent, what the Soviets teamed while getting all those tank divisions shot up is what made them go to the tank corps they then produced. The question for Total War and Grand Europa is what should one put into the game to reflect all this? For one thing surviving tank XXs don't just become 'different but the same' tank corps. If any had survived, and the personnel from them was not needed to make the new tank corps, I expect these new and improved (with new tactics and experience and better equipment) would be bigger and better than the tank corps. The TO&Es of the tank divisions were as I understand it much better than the newer tank corps; more tanks, more infantry, more support.

Of course one of the reasons the Russians went to the new TO&E for the tank corps was that they say they did not have the command and control to use such a bigger unit. So I would suggest that some kind of rule should be used: new tank corps must get some RPs from old units. Perhaps special RPs from units lost count towards the arm RPs necessary to build the Tank corps. Tank divisions that survive may provide a bonus to these building requirements. But the Russian armored force is limited by production and trained personnel to some limitations of total tank units, probably the current number of tank corps units. If more armor survives the early way the Soviets have more arm RPs saved for future operations, but not more units. This can all be a very tricky set of rules to write up, but if possible makes for a more accurate situation.

This is a worthwhile and needed point. Our esteemed Rules Guru Rich Velay had wondered if any tank divisions actually survived. Well in the east front games we play they certainly do. My last game had 20 tank and mech divisions survive into 43; our current game has 21 alive in Dec 41; other games I have seen have many surviving the entire war. These additional armor units have many advantages, They can effectively double the size of the Russian armored forces in 1942. And in the non-fluid situations then in effect the fact that they have limited mobility is no problem. And by pairing them up with tank corps you take all losses with the corps so the divisions continue to survive. Later in the war, as the corps get larger, the divisions lose usefulness since they are not big enough to still be part of the Soviet offensive punch. But they still can threaten German infantry in side theaters.

Now as to how the divisions can survive? The way we play, just by keeping them back out of harm's way they mostly will survive. Make big tank army stacks, several right next to each other. Keep them away from the German infantry corps. If the German armor wants to come out and play both sides can take a lot of losses. But the way we play the Germans do not want to sacrifice their tanks that early.

This points to the two basic types of Europa players I have observed. In our group all attacks and gains are measured and looked at vs. loss and hexes. The CRT mandates only attacking at high odds. Take few losses, chances taken will only make you too weak for the future. But the other group, as evidenced by many of the movers and shakers in TEM and Europafest play, is attack anything that you can reach, no matter the odds or the future consequences. And of course to this type of play the divisions will not last. Either the Germans will come out to get them, or the Russians will go after some Germans that look to be ripe for the taking. I don't know if there are any players that are between these two extremes, but I do dream that someday, in some future Europafest, where we can all take a long time to play out some games, take we could pit the cautious against the aggressive and see what the outcome is.

Alan Tibbetts Maine

Bradley Skeen hit on an issue which I've been following for some time. In his "Lost Victories" designer notes he said "it is obvious to me that any Europa action which does not take into account the effect of Hitler's unbalanced mind on German operations is not simulating history, but (rather) alternate history" This is a point with which I wholeheartedly agree!

German operational restrictions are a something that all designers need to consider. There has been a lot of debate on what role the players have in Europa, and what role they should have in Grand Europa. I'm in the camp which believes players do not, and should not, represent national leaders (Hitler, Stalin, FDR, etc). Anyone who wishes to go down the road of player as the National Command Authority needs to consider the reasons for such a decision. What is the purpose, and intended outcome?

While I can not speak for someone else's purpose or intentions, I can predict the outcome. A game so different from World War II that it would be incorrect to call it a historical simulation. Given the opportunity to play the Allies in any such endeavor I can almost guarantee a Nazi (or whatever name the Germans are going by) defeat. Even a sane Hitler couldn't take on the rest of Europe and win. Doubly so when the other nations are headed by players who know their history well and don't have their hands tied by the rules.

Every country has "idiot rules" by which it must live. The Soviets must set up close to their border, and can't attack Finland on June II 1941. The French and Belgians can't cover the Ardennes. Holland must set up in such and such a way. Britain won't send Spitfires to Egypt. Hider was a very important influence on German (and Allied) operations. In my opinion, if Europa (and Grand Europa) is to simulate history with any claim to accuracy, Hider's decisions need to be reflected more than they currently are. If the intent is to explore alternate "What if" history then ignoring the existence of a lunatic head of state is one alternative. Ignoring Hider while enforcing bad decisions on Hitler's opponents says something about the purpose and intended outcome. If that is the road the designer takes it should be clearly stated so consumers can decide if they wish to spend time and money following that branch of alternate history.

John Madison Illinois

A higher command countersheet released for the Soviet Armed Forces would be nice to see.

Dave Tinny Arizona

One final point regarding both overruns and combat. I think there should be 10: 1 and 11: 1 columns on the combat table; everyone can figure out what they would look like, and that any overrun or combat at 12:1 regardless of the modifiers is an automatic DE. I just can't see some little unsupported antitank brigade in wooded rough almost guaranteed a retreat if attacked by an armored force at 20:1 or 30:1.