by Peter J. Rogers
The Mannerheim LineThe first and most important area for the Finnish player to consider is that of the Kannaksen Army and the Mannerheim Line. Since the Finns are generally on the defensive in this sector, the first thing that any Finnish player must understand is the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Northwest Front. Table 1. The Mannerheim Line. Soviet attack possibilities and Finnish defense possibilities for turns 1-3. The Finnish objective is to prevent Soviet attacks against the Mannerheim Line of 3:1, -1 or better. I don't think it's possible for the Finns to prevent 3:1, -2 attacks beyond the first turn. These will always be exciting for the Soviets with a 1/3 chance of an AH and for the Finns with a 1/3 chance of EX or HX. Table 1 illustrates the maximum Soviet attacks possible against each hex of the line on turns 1-3, assuming the Soviets control all the hexes south of the Line and including air and naval support, and the Finnish defenses necessary to prevent 4:1 or 3:1 attacks. When the table shows two numbers separated by a slash (/), the first number is the strength for a Soviet maximum attack where all the non-divisional units are tank or artillery brigades, and the second number is the strength when eng regiments are used instead to obtain the combat engineer modifier against the forts of the Mannerheim Line. This difference, as we discovered in our test game, can be critical - a maximum attack faces a -2 die roll modifier and an engineer-led attack faces a -1 die roll modifier. The impact of just one regular stacking corps marker for the Soviets can be clearly seen from this table. We'll get to available Finnish forces in just a second, but starting with turn 3, the Finns will face an increasingly difficult time preventing successful Soviet attacks against the Mannerheim Line. The Kannaksen Army (and Friends)At the start of the game the total defensive strength available to the Kannaksen Army in its defense of the Mannerheim Line is 43 factors, excluding the 0-1-5 construction regiment. The High Command Reserve (HCR), if totally committed to the Karelian Isthmus, can weigh in with another 9 factors. However, and it took me a while to realize this, the Coastal Defense Command (CDC) can also be called upon to help defend hex 4717 of the Mannerheim Line. It is, after all, a "coastal hex along the Gulf of Finland." This adds another 5 factors, though these ants will present some stacking challenges. So the Finns can count on 57 defensive factors on the first turn and 60 on the second turn if all their Dec I reinforcements are directed to this front. However, I'd rather start the HCR 4-5-6 division with the Finnish Fourth Corps. This means the Finns will have 52 factors on turn 1 and 55 on turn 2. As will be shown, this is just enough. So where does the Finnish player put these factors? The first thing to consider is how much of an effort the Finns want to make in front of the Mannerheim Line. The choice here is between what I'll call the minimum and maximum options. However, remember to get someone over to Kotka, 4521, by Feb 11 if the Soviets are island hopping across the frozen Gulf of Finland. The maximum option (see Table 2) starts Finnish units in hexes 4715, 4815, and 4816 right up along the border. On the second turn, the Finns will continue to hold 4716 with ski units. Done correctly, such a strategy will prevent any Soviet attack against the Mannerheim Line until turn 3. The danger is that the Soviets might inflict so many casualties on the Finns south of the line that the Finns will be unable to successfully man the forts of the Mannerheim Line. A problem with this defense is that it means the automatic loss of at least the I6 artillery regiment in 4815 and probably also the ski unit. There is also the danger of EX or HX results against the stacks in 4816 and 4715, the former feeling the full weight of the Soviet naval units in Kronshtadt at a range of only one hex. Basically, the risk of massive first turn losses more than outweighs any delay suffered by the Soviets. Limiting the ability of the Soviets to attack the Mannerheim Line on turn 2 doesn't make that much difference because the major factor hobbling the Soviets at that point is their reduced stacking. No matter what the Finns do, they can't prevent a major Soviet attack on turn 3 when the first regular stacking corps marker arrives. Table 2: Kannaksen Army's "Maximum Option" Setup and Table 3: Kannaksen Army's "Minimum Option" Setup For these reasons, I recommend the minimum option (see Table 3) for any Finnish forward defense scheme. Here, the Finns are only trying to hold 4716 for one turn before falling back completely into the Mannerheim Line. The best attack that the Soviets can get against any exposed fort on turn 1 is 2:1, -1, and the Finnish ski troops in 4716 have a fairly good chance to retreat before combat. During their portion of the first turn, the Finns have to prepare themselves to meet the potential attacks outlined in Table 1. The goal is garrison each fort with enough factors to prevent a Soviet 3: 1, -1 engineer-led attack. Assuming the Finns lose only one of their ski units in 4716, then the deployment shown in Table 3 is possible. From this point on, the roll of the combat die makes precise advice impossible. If the Soviet player fails with or chooses not to try a turn 2 attack, then the Finns must make plans for turn 3 and beyond when it is no longer possible to prevent attacks against the Mannerheim Line with a reasonably good possibility of success. In effect, which forts should the Finns sacrifice first? The eastern forts, while less important strategically, are protected by excellent defensive terrain and will produce few extra troops if drawn down. The fort in front of Viipuri, 4616, should probably be the last to go. The fort in 4717 needs to be protected through at least turn 4 if at all possible, so the alternative position in 4617 can be completed. This leaves 4615 as the remaining candidate for an early sacrifice. Since it's protection would require a very large garrison, offering an attack here to the Soviets will free up extra troops for other positions in the Mannerheim Line. There is also always the possibility that a weak Soviet occupying force can be counterattacked while it is surrounded, though if a clever Soviet advances a NKVD political police unit in after combat this becomes a bad idea. As additional Finnish infantry regiments and divisions slowly become available, try to use them to replace the various ski units defending the Mannerheim Line. The ski units are needed up north where their mobility makes possible the sort of short, sharp local counterattacks that the Finns will have to make to kill Soviet divisions, rolling back their advances and earning some VPs. One thing I still dislike about my suggested setup is the commitment of the two HCR 1-6 ski regiments to the Kannaksen Army. Eventually, the Soviets will start to break through the Mannerheim Line. The most important thing for the Finnish player to do at this point is to not panic. One lost fort does not equal the collapse of the Mannerheim Line. Remember, the Soviet player will also be facing problems. Do the Soviet lunge north or first attempt to widen their breach? The former strategy risks attacks against surrounded Soviet units at the tip of a narrow salient. The second takes more time, which of course is almost always to the advantage of the Finnish side. While all this is going on, the Finns should be busy building additional forts behind the Mannerheim Line. The first of these will be in Viipuri as noted above. Construction starts in turn 2 and will be finished on turn 4. At the same time, start a fort in 4617. When these two forts are finished, the two construction regiments can move to 4518 and engage in quick construction of forts to be finished on turn 6. The Fourth CorpsThe Fourth Corps area, encompassing city clusters 4 and 5, represents the worst of both worlds for the Finns. (This definition of the Fourth Corps is slightly different from the setup area described in the rules, but it more accurately reflects the tenor of the game once it gets underway.) Figure 2: Map 35 - The Finnish 4th Corps area north of Lake Ladoga While Soviet strength is not so plentiful here as it is in front of the Mannerheim Line, this area is still dominated by the "big unit" tactics and operations favored by the Soviets. Since it lies south of the A weather line, nondivisional units lack ZOCs, exploitation movement is possible, and the less severe reduced or regular stacking restrictions are used. All of these favor the Soviet side. In addition, the Finnish player will find most of his divisions committed to the defense of the Mannerheini Line and most of his ski units operating north of the A weather line where they really come into their own. As a result, the Finns will be forced to defend themselves with an inadequate collection of reserve divisions and miscellaneous regiments against an ever growing Soviet forces amply supplied with infantry divisions and supported by armor and artillery brigades. Another thing working against the Finnish side at the start of the game is the fact that they deploy most of their forces first and move second. The ability of the Finns to setup their High Command Reserve after having seen the Soviet setup is, to my mind, of little value. Generally, the Finnish player will already have made his decisions regarding where the HCR units will go before seeing the Soviet deployment. There are just too few Finnish units to afford the Finnish player the luxury of not putting the HCR units right on the front lines from the very start. Thus, a cautious initial deployment is called for to avoid the disaster of a first turn surrounded attack. This means setting up as far back from the border as the rules allow. However there is some virtue to this. The deeper the Soviets are in Finland at the end of their first turn, the more hexes the Finns have for deploying their partisans. With these thoughts, Table 4 shows my suggested deployment for the Finnish Fourth Corps and the one 4-5-6 DIVISION from the HCR assigned to aid it. Table 4. Fourth Corps Setup
35:4210 : 1x 4-5-6 Rifle XX (HCR) 35:3910 : 1x 3-4-6* Rifle XX 35:3711 : 1x 3-4-6* Rifle XX 35:3512 : 1x 1-2-6 Ski III 35-3412 : 1x 1-6* Ski III 35:3513 : 1x 0-1-5 Cons III As noted above, the southern part of the Fourth Corps area is the most critical for Finland. For that reason I have placed the 4-5-6 division directly in the path of a potential Soviet advance. The 3-4-6* divisions cover the front from Lake Janis to the forest in front of Joensuu. The two ski regiments cover the northeast approach to Joensuu and screen the 0-1-5 construction regiment so it can rail to Viipuri on the first turn. The more open nature of the Fourth Corps area makes it impossible for the Finnish player to try and precisely choreograph their first few turns as is possible with the Kannaksen Army. One consideration of which both sides need to be aware at all times is the length of Soviet supply lines. Using rail and road, the southern Soviet supply line will reach to 4110 and then out from there in a four hex long arc including hexes 4114, 4313, and 3712. This allows the Soviets to remain in supply while attacking and occupying all three cities in cluster 5. Soviets are more limited in the north, lacking a rail spur running up to the border. Running straight down the road from Medvezhyegorsk, 3704, it will only reach as far as 3712, two hexes short of Joensuu. Initially, the Finnish player should try to defend a line in front of the north-south rail line. Keeping this open aids the lateral movement of forces. The northern end can make use of the forest in front of Joensuu, and part of the southern end can defend behind the frozen lake at hexside 4010/4011. Eventually, Soviet pressure will probably force the Finns into two enclaves at either end of the line, one in front of Joensuu and the other around Sortavala. Of the two, Sortavala is more difficult to defend because it lacks any sort of defensive terrain bonus and also will most likely face a larger Soviet force. If the defense of Sortavala becomes untenable then the Finnish player must consider falling back yet again. At this point, the Finns might want to consider withdrawing out of the Soviet range of supply. Such a withdrawal surrenders no more cities and offers the potential for a counterattack against weakened Soviet forces. However, there are two considerations that must be kept in mind if such a withdrawal is executed. One, don't allow the Soviets free access to the rail line which runs to the northwest from hex 4314. This is a quick route into the Finnish rear through the otherwise untraversible lake country. Two, any withdrawal must be planned in conjunction with the defense of the eastern end of the Mannerheim Line. Note that the reverse is also true. Otherwise a withdrawal in one sector could very well spell disaster in the other. Two last general points remain to be made, one on when to withdraw and when to fight and the other on the threat posed by Soviet exploitation movement. First there is the temptation on the part of the Finns to continually withdraw in the face of the Soviet threat. As a strategy for preserving the outnumbered and fragile Finnish army this makes perfect sense. However, as a strategy for winning the game this can be a quick road to disaster. At the risk of repeating myself yet again, each Finnish reference city is worth five VPs to the Soviet player. Conversely, Finnish military losses are relatively unimportant in terms of VPs with each division in the replacement pool at the end of the game only worth one VP. Obviously, a forward defense strategy right up at the border which leads to the destruction of the Finnish army in the first few turns is a bad idea, because the Soviets can then spend the remainder of the game picking off weakly defended cities at their leisure. However, as the game progresses the Finnish player must be willing to risk significant elements of his army in order to hold and perhaps even retake victory point cities. The second general point is the threat posed by Soviet exploitation movement. While the Soviets face numerous restrictions in this area, the impact of winter limiting Soviet c/m units to two hexes per movement phase in clear terrain and rule 30131, Soviet Mobility Limits, it is still possible for them to gain a small advantage from their c/m units. The key is to stack potential exploiters with the attack force or adjacent to the anticipated breakthrough hex. These exploiters-to-be cannot attack nor can they be in a Finnish ZOC at the start of the exploitation phase. However, these two conditions are not difficult to meet away from the area of the Mannerheim Line. If the attack is successful, then the exploiters can move into the just captured hex and one more beyond it during the exploitation phase. It is true that no deep strategic gains are possible under these circumstances, but the Soviets can obtain favorable tactical situations by pushing their c/m units, especially the 4-8 motorized division, through holes in the Finnish line. In our test game, the Soviets were able to do this twice with significant gains from both moves. Finally, consider this tactic in combination with the Soviet regular stacking corps markers. While these corps markers are generally used against the Mannerheim Line, they can also be used in the Finnish Fourth Corps area to increase either the attack force and/or the number of potential exploiters after an attack. At any rate, this is yet another threat which the Finns must take into account when positioning their units. Northern Finland Defense AreaHere we finally come to an area where the Finns might just be able to have some fun. For my purposes, the Northern Finland Defense Area (NFDA) comprises city clusters 1, 2, and 3, an area of play almost entirely north of the A weather line. Figure 3: Map 35 - Murmansk, Petsamo, and Northern Finland Once again this differs slightly from the definition found in the Finnish order of battle, but is more useful for the purposes of game analysis. The special movement and retreat abilities of the Finnish ski units, combined with restrictions on stacking and supply as well as the possession of ZOCs by most non-divisional units, allow for an almost even contest of arms. This is the area where the Finnish player will need to score some much needed VPs through the elimination or end-of-game isolation of Soviet divisions. The initial Finnish forces in this area are very weak and at the start can do little more than screen the roads that cross the border from the Soviet Union into Finland. I suggest the following initial deployment (Table 5) for this purpose. Table 5. Northern Finland Setup
35:2912 : 1x 1-2-6 Ski III 35:2612 : 1x 1-6* Ski III 35:2011 : 1x 1-6* Ski III 35:1310 : 1x 1-6 Ski III As discussed earlier, city cluster I in the far north is written off as undefendable. Finnish strategy after the Soviet setup and opening move will generally be determined by two factors. One, where is the Soviet main effort? Two, how many additional ski units can the Finnish player afford to send north either from his reinforcements or forces elsewhere on the map? There are three main points where the Soviet player can launch a major attack across the border, hex 1508 (Allakurtti), hex 2109, or hex 3111. The road which crosses at hex 2511 is too far from any Soviet railhead to support more than a secondary effort. Wherever the Soviet player chooses to launch his main attack, the Finns can afford to wait a turn or two to let the Soviet forces advance along the road and into a position where they will be vulnerable to attacks against their flanks or the often unsupplied tip of the assault. The Finnish player should play special attention to any Soviet engineer or construction units and airstrips they might be trying to construct in order to increase the length of the Soviet supply line. Airstrip construction becomes very important for the Soviets if the Airborne Operations optional rule is use, because of the many die roll modifiers the Soviets face when trying to air drop supply points. Once the main Soviet effort north of the A weather line has been identified, then the Finnish player must mass his forces against this threat. The first source of additional forces will be those starting units guarding other parts of the border. However, one Soviet ploy for later in the game will be rail moving units to previously unthreatened border areas to grab a quick reference city or two, and the Finnish player needs to be aware of this threat. The second source of forces will be that portion of the Finnish reinforcements not needed at other parts of the front. The most important of these is the 3-8* Swedish ski X which should deploy to the NFDA where it will be critical for almost any Finnish effort. Other than this one wonderful brigade, the Finnish player does not receive any ski units as reinforcements. Generally the Finns should use their infantry reinforcements to replace ski units elsewhere, especially along the Mannerheim Line, so the ski units with their unique abilities are available for service where they will be able to perform at their full potential. One exception to this might be a few of the 6* HQs which will be invaluable in providing support to the often unsupported Finnish ski units. One hard decision that will be faced by the Finnish player is whether to break down his 4-5-6 and initial 3-4-6* divisions to provide additional ski units for the NFDA. Potentially, this could provide the Finns with seven additional 1-6 or 1-6* ski regiments. The Finns do not lose any offensive or defensive strength points when they breakdown their divisions, but they do lose the cadres of the 4-5-6 divisions and the divisions' ZoCs South of the A weather line. It is probably a good idea to break down a couple of divisions from the Mannerheirn Line, but not from Fourth Corps where their ZOCs are so desperately needed. In conclusion, the Finnish player will be forced to react to the Soviets for the first two turns. After that, it is essential that the Finns seize the initiative and make the Soviets react to Finnish threats against the attacking column(s). Each turn that the Soviet player is more concerned with Finnish threats than he is with continuing his attack is one very valuable turn gained. To a great degree, this sort of Finnish strategy is as much psychological as it is mechanical. Thus, knowledge of the habits and tendencies of your opponent is every bit as important as any consideration of terrain or reinforcement schedules. While this is of course true for any game, it is of particular importance for successful Finnish operations in the NFDA. Remaining Finnish UnitsThis final section will discuss the Finnish air force and the lone RR engineer regiment. Initially there is very little for the greatly outnumbered Finnish air force to do. The DXXI fighter should stay out of range of its Soviet counterparts and limit itself to bomber interception and patrol. The C.X attack unit is probably best held in reserve on the first turn, protected by the D.XXI. Since the Soviets can base fighters in Estonia, I keep the Finnish air force out of their range to the north. Table 6 shows my suggested setup: Table 6: Other Units Setup
35:4526 (Helsinki): 3 pts position AA 35:3825 (Tampere) : DXXI 3F4 0/6, C.X 1A3 1/8, 2 pts position AA I would like to offer one word of advice to the Soviets on the wisdom of strategic bombing, "Don't!" Despite its impressive numerical size, the Soviet air force is actually rather weak and the every single tactical bombing factor will be needed at the front. The only exception to this advice would be in the event of Western intervention. At that point, the Finns lose their Swedish supply source. Piling on the Tampere factory to put the Finnish army out of supply is probably a good idea. If the Soviets use their transports for aerial resupply of their forward units in the Fourth Corps area, then the Finnish player might want to send a fighter to the air strip at Joensuu to try and interfere with such operations. Once again, this is best done outside of the range of any Soviet fighters unless they are very few in number. Otherwise, its probably best for the Finns to keep their air force in reserve until towards the end of the game. At that point, it will have attained a slightly more respectable size and can contribute to the desperate defenses and counterattacks which tend to characterize this portion of the contest. Also, Soviet fighter cover will be less of a problem as these battles will be fought at a greater range from range from the Soviet air bases. The 0-6 RR engineer regiment should go to 4115 so that it can easily move to any rail breaks created by Soviet air attacks. Rail movement can be a key tool for the Finns allowing them to quickly concentrate for attacks against vulnerable Soviet units. For this reason, its important to keep at least one rail line open to and from the major areas of operations described above. PartisansLast, we look at the role of the Finnish partisans. There would seem to be three main options for their use. One, if the opportunity presents itself, there is the "death and glory" raid on the southern portion of the Murmansk rail line. Correctly executed, this can put almost the entire Soviet army north of the occupied hex out of supply for the next Soviet player turn. This can be prevented by a cautious Soviet player for the first part of the game by garrisoning his rear area so that no hexes in the rear of the 8th Army are available for partisan placement. Eventually, as the Soviets advance into southwest Finland, this will no longer be possible because the space to be covered is too large. Two, the Finns can use their partisans as regular troops. An extra 1-8 or 1-6 ski unit can almost always come in handy in the NFDA. However, this should probably be done only if their is a specific need, such as a vulnerable Soviet unit to be attacked. Otherwise, the Finns lose the special abilities of the partisans and if too many are revealed then the dummy units become useless. Three, the Finns can build up, but not reveal, a partisan force in the rear of the Soviet 9th Army. This is probably the best strategy for the Finns in the early and middle part of the game, unless a careless Soviet allows for the sort of raid against the Murmansk rail line discussed above. This sort of "force in being" draws off Soviet forces from the front and works very well with the psychological style of play necessary for Finnish success in the wilds of the Arctic. Partisans can be revealed as needed for important attacks and on the last turn to gain VPs for isolating Soviet divisions. ConclusionI hope that at the least this article has provided some food for thought. I would agree with those who feel that the Finnish side is the more difficult to play in A WW, but its position is far from hopeless. On the Karelian Isthmus, careful calculation and stoicism in the face of the inevitable Soviet breakthroughs should be the order of the day. Elsewhere, the key is keeping the Soviets off balance once their main efforts have been identified. To repeat a point already made, a careful line between prudent withdrawal and an aggressive defense, and occasional counterattack, to protect the VP cities is essential. It is a good idea to keep a running tally of the cities you have already lost to know when to stay and when to run. It will often be necessary to take risky attacks or attempt risky defenses. Sometimes, you will be burned, but I see no other choice. So have fun, good luck, and if nothing else works, always remember those immortal words, "Wait 'till next time." About Peter RogersPeter (and his regular opponent Steve Snook) are PhD candidates in African studies / political science at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Peter has recently left to complete his degree requirements "on-location" in Tanzania. Hopefully we'll have more submissions from Peter upon his return. "The Mannerheim Line is the Finnish soldier standing in the snow."
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