The Mannerheim
Line
The first and most important area
for the Finnish player to consider is that
of the Kannaksen Army and the
Mannerheim Line. Since the Finns are
generally on the defensive in this sector,
the first thing that any Finnish player must
understand is the nature of the threat
posed by the Soviet Northwest Front.
Table 1. The Mannerheim Line. Soviet attack possibilities and Finnish
defense possibilities for turns 1-3.
The Finnish objective is to prevent
Soviet attacks against the Mannerheim
Line of 3:1, -1 or better. I don't think it's
possible for the Finns to prevent 3:1, -2
attacks beyond the first turn. These will
always be exciting for the Soviets with a
1/3 chance of an AH and for the Finns
with a 1/3 chance of EX or HX.
Table 1 illustrates the maximum
Soviet attacks possible against each hex of
the line on turns 1-3, assuming the Soviets
control all the hexes south of the Line and
including air and naval support, and the
Finnish defenses necessary to prevent 4:1
or 3:1 attacks.
When the table shows two numbers
separated by a slash (/), the first number
is the strength for a Soviet maximum
attack where all the non-divisional units
are tank or artillery brigades, and the
second number is the strength when eng
regiments are used instead to obtain the
combat engineer modifier against the
forts of the Mannerheim Line. This
difference, as we discovered in our test
game, can be critical - a maximum attack
faces a -2 die roll modifier and an
engineer-led attack faces a -1 die roll
modifier.
The impact of just one regular
stacking corps marker for the Soviets can
be clearly seen from this table. We'll get
to available Finnish forces in just a
second, but starting with turn 3, the Finns
will face an increasingly difficult time
preventing successful Soviet attacks
against the Mannerheim Line.
The Kannaksen Army (and Friends)
At the start of the game the total
defensive strength available to the
Kannaksen Army in its defense of the
Mannerheim Line is 43 factors, excluding
the 0-1-5 construction regiment. The High
Command Reserve (HCR), if totally
committed to the Karelian Isthmus, can
weigh in with another 9 factors. However,
and it took me a while to realize this, the
Coastal Defense Command (CDC) can
also be called upon to help defend hex
4717 of the Mannerheim Line.
It is, after all, a "coastal hex along
the Gulf of Finland." This adds another 5
factors, though these ants will present
some stacking challenges. So the Finns
can count on 57 defensive factors on the
first turn and 60 on the second turn if all
their Dec I reinforcements are directed to
this front. However, I'd rather start the
HCR 4-5-6 division with the Finnish
Fourth Corps. This means the Finns will
have 52 factors on turn 1 and 55 on turn 2.
As will be shown, this is just enough.
So where does the Finnish player
put these factors? The first thing to
consider is how much of an effort the
Finns want to make in front of the
Mannerheim Line.
The choice here is between what I'll
call the minimum and maximum options.
However, remember to get someone over
to Kotka, 4521, by Feb 11 if the Soviets
are island hopping across the frozen Gulf
of Finland.
The maximum option (see Table 2)
starts Finnish units in hexes 4715, 4815,
and 4816 right up along the border. On
the second turn, the Finns will continue to
hold 4716 with ski units. Done correctly,
such a strategy will prevent any Soviet
attack against the Mannerheim Line until
turn 3. The danger is that the Soviets
might inflict so many casualties on the
Finns south of the line that the Finns will
be unable to successfully man the forts of
the Mannerheim Line.
A problem with this defense is that
it means the automatic loss of at least the
I6 artillery regiment in 4815 and
probably also the ski unit. There is also
the danger of EX or HX results against
the stacks in 4816 and 4715, the former
feeling the full weight of the Soviet naval
units in Kronshtadt at a range of only one
hex. Basically, the risk of massive first
turn losses more than outweighs any
delay suffered by the Soviets. Limiting
the ability of the Soviets to attack the
Mannerheim Line on turn 2 doesn't make
that much difference because the major
factor hobbling the Soviets at that point is
their reduced stacking.
No matter what the Finns do, they
can't prevent a major Soviet attack on turn
3 when the first regular stacking corps
marker arrives.
Table 2: Kannaksen Army's "Maximum Option" Setup and Table 3: Kannaksen Army's "Minimum Option" Setup
For these reasons, I recommend the
minimum option (see Table 3) for any
Finnish forward defense scheme. Here,
the Finns are only trying to hold 4716
for one turn before falling back
completely into the Mannerheim Line.
The best attack that the Soviets can get
against any exposed fort on turn 1 is 2:1,
-1, and the Finnish ski troops in 4716
have a fairly good chance to retreat
before combat.
During their portion of the first
turn, the Finns have to prepare themselves
to meet the potential attacks outlined in
Table 1. The goal is garrison each fort
with enough factors to prevent a Soviet 3:
1, -1 engineer-led attack. Assuming the
Finns lose only one of their ski units in
4716, then the deployment shown in Table
3 is possible.
From this point on, the roll of the
combat die makes precise advice
impossible. If the Soviet player fails with
or chooses not to try a turn 2 attack, then
the Finns must make plans for turn 3 and
beyond when it is no longer possible to
prevent attacks against the Mannerheim
Line with a reasonably good possibility of
success. In effect, which forts should the
Finns sacrifice first? The eastern forts,
while less important strategically, are
protected by excellent defensive terrain
and will produce few extra troops if drawn
down. The fort in front of Viipuri, 4616,
should probably be the last to go.
The fort in 4717 needs to be
protected through at least turn 4 if at
all possible, so the alternative position
in 4617 can be completed.
This leaves 4615 as the remaining
candidate for an early sacrifice. Since
it's protection would require a very large
garrison, offering an attack here to the
Soviets will free up extra troops for other
positions in the Mannerheim Line. There
is also always the possibility that a weak
Soviet occupying force can be
counterattacked while it is surrounded,
though if a clever Soviet advances a
NKVD political police unit in after
combat this becomes a bad idea.
As additional Finnish infantry
regiments and divisions slowly become
available, try to use them to replace the
various ski units defending the
Mannerheim Line. The ski units are
needed up north where their mobility
makes possible the sort of short, sharp
local counterattacks that the Finns will
have to make to kill Soviet divisions,
rolling back their advances and earning
some VPs. One thing I still dislike about
my suggested setup is the commitment of
the two HCR 1-6 ski regiments to the
Kannaksen Army.
Eventually, the Soviets will
start to break through the
Mannerheim Line. The most important
thing for the Finnish player to do at this
point is to not panic. One lost fort does
not equal the collapse of the Mannerheim
Line. Remember, the Soviet player will
also be facing problems. Do the Soviet
lunge north or first attempt to widen their
breach? The former strategy risks attacks
against surrounded Soviet units at the tip
of a narrow salient. The second takes
more time, which of course is almost
always to the advantage of the Finnish
side.
While all this is going on, the Finns
should be busy building additional forts
behind the Mannerheim Line. The first of
these will be in Viipuri as noted above.
Construction starts in turn 2 and will be
finished on turn 4. At the same time, start
a fort in 4617. When these two forts are
finished, the two construction regiments
can move to 4518 and engage in quick
construction of forts to be finished on
turn 6.
The Fourth Corps
The Fourth Corps area,
encompassing city clusters 4 and 5,
represents the worst of both worlds for
the Finns. (This definition of the Fourth
Corps is slightly different from the setup
area described in the rules, but it more
accurately reflects the tenor of the game
once it gets underway.)
Figure 2: Map 35 - The Finnish 4th Corps area north of Lake Ladoga
While Soviet strength is not so plentiful here as it is in
front of the Mannerheim Line, this area is
still dominated by the "big unit" tactics
and operations favored by the Soviets.
Since it lies south of the A weather line,
nondivisional units lack ZOCs,
exploitation movement is possible, and
the less severe reduced or regular
stacking restrictions are used. All of
these favor the Soviet side.
In addition, the Finnish player will
find most of his divisions committed to
the defense of the Mannerheini Line and
most of his ski units operating north of
the A weather line where they really
come into their own. As a result, the
Finns will be forced to defend themselves
with an inadequate collection of reserve
divisions and miscellaneous regiments
against an ever growing Soviet forces
amply supplied with infantry divisions and
supported by armor and artillery brigades.
Another thing working against the
Finnish side at the start of the game is the
fact that they deploy most of their forces
first and move second. The ability of the
Finns to setup their High Command
Reserve after having seen the Soviet setup
is, to my mind, of little value. Generally,
the Finnish player will already have made
his decisions regarding where the HCR
units will go before seeing the Soviet
deployment.
There are just too few Finnish units
to afford the Finnish player the luxury of
not putting the HCR units right on the
front lines from the very start. Thus, a
cautious initial deployment is called for
to avoid the disaster of a first turn
surrounded attack. This means setting up
as far back from the border as the rules
allow. However there is some virtue to
this. The deeper the Soviets are in Finland
at the end of their first turn, the more
hexes the Finns have for deploying their
partisans.
With these thoughts, Table 4 shows
my suggested deployment for the Finnish
Fourth Corps and the one 4-5-6
DIVISION from the HCR assigned to aid it.
Table 4. Fourth Corps Setup
Hex : Units
35:4210 : 1x 4-5-6 Rifle XX (HCR)
35:3910 : 1x 3-4-6* Rifle XX
35:3711 : 1x 3-4-6* Rifle XX
35:3512 : 1x 1-2-6 Ski III
35-3412 : 1x 1-6* Ski III
35:3513 : 1x 0-1-5 Cons III
As noted above, the southern part
of the Fourth Corps area is the most
critical for Finland. For that reason I have
placed the 4-5-6 division directly in the
path of a potential Soviet advance. The
3-4-6* divisions cover the front from
Lake Janis to the forest in front of
Joensuu. The two ski regiments cover the
northeast approach to Joensuu and screen
the 0-1-5 construction regiment so it can
rail to Viipuri on the first turn.
The more open nature of the Fourth
Corps area makes it impossible for the
Finnish player to try and precisely
choreograph their first few turns as is
possible with the Kannaksen Army. One
consideration of which both sides need to
be aware at all times is the length of
Soviet supply lines. Using rail and road,
the southern Soviet supply line will reach
to 4110 and then out from there in a four
hex long arc including hexes 4114, 4313,
and 3712. This allows the Soviets to
remain in supply while attacking and
occupying all three cities in cluster 5.
Soviets are more limited in the north,
lacking a rail spur running up to the
border. Running straight down the road
from Medvezhyegorsk, 3704, it will only
reach as far as 3712, two hexes short of
Joensuu.
Initially, the Finnish player should
try to defend a line in front of the
north-south rail line. Keeping this open
aids the lateral movement of forces. The
northern end can make use of the forest in
front of Joensuu, and part of the southern
end can defend behind the frozen lake at
hexside 4010/4011. Eventually, Soviet
pressure will probably force the Finns
into two enclaves at either end of the line,
one in front of Joensuu and the other
around Sortavala. Of the two, Sortavala is
more difficult to defend because it lacks
any sort of defensive terrain bonus and
also will most likely face a larger Soviet
force.
If the defense of Sortavala becomes
untenable then the Finnish player must
consider falling back yet again. At this
point, the Finns might want to consider
withdrawing out of the Soviet range of
supply. Such a withdrawal surrenders no
more cities and offers the potential for a
counterattack against weakened Soviet
forces. However, there are two
considerations that must be kept in mind
if such a withdrawal is executed. One,
don't allow the Soviets free access to the
rail line which runs to the northwest from
hex 4314. This is a quick route into the
Finnish rear through the otherwise
untraversible lake country. Two, any
withdrawal must be planned in
conjunction with the defense of the
eastern end of the Mannerheim Line.
Note that the reverse is also true.
Otherwise a withdrawal in one sector
could very well spell disaster in the other.
Two last general points remain to
be made, one on when to withdraw and
when to fight and the other on the threat
posed by Soviet exploitation movement.
First there is the temptation on the part of
the Finns to continually withdraw in the
face of the Soviet threat. As a strategy for
preserving the outnumbered and fragile
Finnish army this makes perfect sense.
However, as a strategy for winning the
game this can be a quick road to disaster.
At the risk of repeating myself yet
again, each Finnish reference city is
worth five VPs to the Soviet player.
Conversely, Finnish military losses are
relatively unimportant in terms of VPs
with each division in the replacement
pool at the end of the game only worth one VP.
Obviously, a forward defense
strategy right up at the border which leads
to the destruction of the Finnish army in
the first few turns is a bad idea, because
the Soviets can then spend the remainder
of the game picking off weakly defended
cities at their leisure. However, as the
game progresses the Finnish player must
be willing to risk significant elements of
his army in order to hold and perhaps
even retake victory point cities.
The second general point is the
threat posed by Soviet exploitation
movement. While the Soviets face
numerous restrictions in this area, the
impact of winter limiting Soviet c/m units
to two hexes per movement phase in clear
terrain and rule 30131, Soviet Mobility
Limits, it is still possible for them to gain
a small advantage from their c/m units.
The key is to stack potential exploiters
with the attack force or adjacent to the
anticipated breakthrough hex. These
exploiters-to-be cannot attack nor can
they be in a Finnish ZOC at the start
of the exploitation phase. However,
these two conditions are not difficult
to meet away from the area of the
Mannerheim Line. If the attack is
successful, then the exploiters can move
into the just captured hex and one more
beyond it during the exploitation phase. It
is true that no deep strategic gains are
possible under these circumstances, but
the Soviets can obtain favorable tactical
situations by pushing their c/m units,
especially the 4-8 motorized division,
through holes in the Finnish line.
In our test game, the Soviets were
able to do this twice with significant gains
from both moves. Finally, consider this
tactic in combination with the Soviet
regular stacking corps markers. While
these corps markers are generally used
against the Mannerheim Line, they can
also be used in the Finnish Fourth Corps
area to increase either the attack force
and/or the number of potential exploiters
after an attack. At any rate, this is yet
another threat which the Finns must take
into account when positioning their units.
Northern Finland Defense Area
Here we finally come to an area
where the Finns might just be able to have
some fun. For my purposes, the Northern
Finland Defense Area (NFDA) comprises
city clusters 1, 2, and 3, an area of play
almost entirely north of the A weather
line.
Figure 3: Map 35 - Murmansk, Petsamo, and Northern Finland
Once again this differs slightly from
the definition found in the Finnish order
of battle, but is more useful for the
purposes of game analysis.
The special movement and retreat
abilities of the Finnish ski units,
combined with restrictions on stacking
and supply as well as the possession of
ZOCs by most non-divisional units, allow
for an almost even contest of arms. This
is the area where the Finnish player will
need to score some much needed VPs
through the elimination or end-of-game
isolation of Soviet divisions.
The initial Finnish forces in this
area are very weak and at the start can do
little more than screen the roads that
cross the border from the Soviet Union
into Finland. I suggest the following
initial deployment (Table 5) for this
purpose.
Table 5. Northern Finland
Setup
Hex : Units
35:2912 : 1x 1-2-6 Ski III
35:2612 : 1x 1-6* Ski III
35:2011 : 1x 1-6* Ski III
35:1310 : 1x 1-6 Ski III
As discussed earlier, city cluster I
in the far north is written off as
undefendable. Finnish strategy after the
Soviet setup and opening move will
generally be determined by two factors.
One, where is the Soviet main effort?
Two, how many additional ski units can
the Finnish player afford to send north
either from his reinforcements or forces
elsewhere on the map?
There are three main points where
the Soviet player can launch a major
attack across the border, hex 1508
(Allakurtti), hex 2109, or hex 3111. The
road which crosses at hex 2511 is too far
from any Soviet railhead to support more
than a secondary effort. Wherever the
Soviet player chooses to launch his main
attack, the Finns can afford to wait a turn
or two to let the Soviet forces advance
along the road and into a position where
they will be vulnerable to attacks against
their flanks or the often unsupplied tip of
the assault.
The Finnish player should play
special attention to any Soviet engineer or
construction units and airstrips they might
be trying to construct in order to increase
the length of the Soviet supply line.
Airstrip construction becomes very
important for the Soviets if the Airborne
Operations optional rule is use, because
of the many die roll modifiers the Soviets
face when trying to air drop supply points.
Once the main Soviet effort north
of the A weather line has been identified,
then the Finnish player must mass his
forces against this threat. The first source
of additional forces will be those starting
units guarding other parts of the border.
However, one Soviet ploy for later in the
game will be rail moving units to
previously unthreatened border areas to
grab a quick reference city or two, and the
Finnish player needs to be aware of this
threat.
The second source of forces will
be that portion of the Finnish
reinforcements not needed at other parts
of the front. The most important of these
is the 3-8* Swedish ski X which should
deploy to the NFDA where it will be
critical for almost any Finnish effort.
Other than this one wonderful brigade, the
Finnish player does not receive any ski
units as reinforcements. Generally the
Finns should use their infantry
reinforcements to replace ski units
elsewhere, especially along the
Mannerheim Line, so the ski units with
their unique abilities are available for
service where they will be able to perform
at their full potential. One exception to
this might be a few of the 6* HQs which
will be invaluable in providing support to
the often unsupported Finnish ski units.
One hard decision that will be faced
by the Finnish player is whether to break
down his 4-5-6 and initial 3-4-6*
divisions to provide additional ski units
for the NFDA. Potentially, this could
provide the Finns with seven additional
1-6 or 1-6* ski regiments. The Finns do
not lose any offensive or defensive strength points
when they breakdown their divisions, but they do
lose the cadres of the 4-5-6 divisions and the
divisions' ZoCs South of the A weather line. It is
probably a good idea to break down a couple of
divisions from the Mannerheirn Line, but not
from Fourth Corps where their ZOCs are so
desperately needed.
In conclusion, the Finnish player will be
forced to react to the Soviets for the first two
turns. After that, it is essential that the Finns
seize the initiative and make the Soviets react to
Finnish threats against the attacking column(s).
Each turn that the Soviet player is more
concerned with Finnish threats than he is with
continuing his attack is one very valuable turn
gained. To a great degree, this sort of Finnish
strategy is as much psychological as it is
mechanical. Thus, knowledge of the habits and
tendencies of your opponent is every bit as
important as any consideration of terrain or
reinforcement schedules. While this is of course
true for any game, it is of particular importance
for successful Finnish operations in the NFDA.
Remaining Finnish Units
This final section will discuss the Finnish
air force and the lone RR engineer regiment.
Initially there is very little for the greatly
outnumbered Finnish air force to do. The DXXI
fighter should stay out of range of its Soviet
counterparts and limit itself to bomber
interception and patrol. The C.X attack unit is
probably best held in reserve on the first turn,
protected by the D.XXI. Since the Soviets can
base fighters in Estonia, I keep the Finnish air
force out of their range to the north. Table 6
shows my suggested setup:
Table 6: Other Units Setup
Hex : Units
35:4526 (Helsinki): 3 pts position AA
35:3825 (Tampere) : DXXI 3F4 0/6,
C.X 1A3 1/8, 2 pts position AA
I would like to offer one word of advice to
the Soviets on the wisdom of strategic bombing,
"Don't!" Despite its impressive numerical size,
the Soviet air force is actually rather weak and
the every single tactical bombing factor will be
needed at the front. The only exception to this
advice would be in the event of Western
intervention.
At that point, the Finns lose their Swedish
supply source. Piling on the Tampere factory to
put the Finnish army out of supply is probably
a good idea.
If the Soviets use their transports for
aerial resupply of their forward units in the
Fourth Corps area, then the Finnish player might
want to send a fighter to the air strip at Joensuu
to try and interfere with such operations. Once
again, this is best done outside of the range of
any Soviet fighters unless they are very few in number.
Otherwise, its probably best for the Finns
to keep their air force in reserve until towards
the end of the game. At that point, it will have
attained a slightly more respectable size and can
contribute to the desperate defenses and
counterattacks which tend to characterize this
portion of the contest. Also, Soviet fighter cover
will be less of a problem as these battles will be
fought at a greater range from range from the
Soviet air bases.
The 0-6 RR engineer regiment should go
to 4115 so that it can easily move to any rail
breaks created by Soviet air attacks. Rail
movement can be a key tool for the Finns
allowing them to quickly concentrate for attacks
against vulnerable Soviet units. For this reason,
its important to keep at least one rail line open to
and from the major areas of operations
described above.
Partisans
Last, we look at the role of the Finnish
partisans. There would seem to be three main
options for their use. One, if the opportunity
presents itself, there is the "death and glory" raid
on the southern portion of the Murmansk rail
line. Correctly executed, this can put almost the
entire Soviet army north of the occupied hex out
of supply for the next Soviet player turn.
This can be prevented by a cautious
Soviet player for the first part of the game by
garrisoning his rear area so that no hexes in the
rear of the 8th Army are available for partisan
placement. Eventually, as the Soviets advance
into southwest Finland, this will no longer be
possible because the space to be covered is too large.
Two, the Finns can use their partisans as
regular troops. An extra 1-8 or 1-6 ski unit can
almost always come in handy in the NFDA.
However, this should probably be done only if
their is a specific need, such as a vulnerable
Soviet unit to be attacked. Otherwise, the Finns
lose the special abilities of the partisans and if
too many are revealed then the dummy units become useless.
Three, the Finns can build up, but not
reveal, a partisan force in the rear of the
Soviet 9th Army. This is probably the best
strategy for the Finns in the early and middle
part of the game, unless a careless Soviet
allows for the sort of raid against the
Murmansk rail line discussed above. This
sort of "force in being" draws off Soviet forces
from the front and works very well with the
psychological style of play necessary for Finnish
success in the wilds of the Arctic. Partisans can
be revealed as needed for important attacks and
on the last turn to gain VPs for isolating Soviet
divisions.
Conclusion
I hope that at the least this article has
provided some food for thought. I would agree
with those who feel that the Finnish side is the
more difficult to play in A WW, but its position is
far from hopeless. On the Karelian Isthmus,
careful calculation and stoicism in the face of the
inevitable Soviet breakthroughs should be the
order of the day. Elsewhere, the key is keeping
the Soviets off balance once their main efforts
have been identified.
To repeat a point already made, a careful
line between prudent withdrawal and an
aggressive defense, and occasional
counterattack, to protect the VP cities is
essential. It is a good idea to keep a running tally
of the cities you have already lost to know when
to stay and when to run. It will often be
necessary to take risky attacks or attempt risky
defenses. Sometimes, you will be burned, but I
see no other choice. So have fun, good luck, and
if nothing else works, always remember those
immortal words, "Wait 'till next time."
About Peter Rogers
Peter (and his regular opponent Steve
Snook) are PhD candidates in African studies /
political science at the University of Florida in
Gainesville. Peter has recently left to complete
his degree requirements "on-location" in
Tanzania. Hopefully we'll have more submissions
from Peter upon his return.
"The Mannerheim Line is the
Finnish soldier standing in the
snow."
Geography and Victory Conditions
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