GEnie Forum

On Grand Europa
Strategic and Operational Control

by Excerpted from GEme Messages


Message 289 Thu Mar 16,1995 A.TIBBETTS1 [Alan]

What decisions should be left up to the players, and what should be hard-wired?

Field-Marshal von Manstein's book Lost Victories contains an interesting discussion of the decision-making process inside Germany. Here are some excepts to help guide Europa designers and tinkerers:

    "The elimination of OKH, or the General Staff of the Army, as the authority responsible for war policy on land is generally assumed to have been effective from the time when Hitler dismissed Field- Marshal v. Brauchitsch and took over the leadership of the army in addition to that of the Wehrmacht as a whole. In actual fact, however, the General Staff was eliminated for all practical purposes-even if this was not yet formally the case-in the weeks immediately following the Polish campaign."

    "It is true, of course, that the question of how the war should be continued after the defeat of Poland was a matter of OVERALL WAR POLICY which ultimately had to be decided by Hitler as the Head of State and Commander-in- Chief of the Wehrmacht. However, if the solution were to be a land offensive in the west, this must depend entirely on HOW, WHEN and WHETHER the army would be able to tackle the task. In these three respects the primacy of the army leadership was inalienable."

    "Yet in all three Hitler confronted the High Command of the army with a fait accompli when on 27th September-without prior consultation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army-he informed the Commanders-in-Chief of all three services of his decision to take the offensive in the west that same autumn and, in so doing, to violate the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The decision presently found expression in an OKW directive of 9th October 1939."

    "I could only deduce, therefore, that OKH had in this case renounced any claim to be the authority for land warfare and had resigned itself to acting as a purely technical, executive organ."

    "Hitler and his OKW not only decided what operations the army should conduct, but also when and how they should be conducted. OKH was left to work out the appropriate orders whether or not it agreed with what it was being called on to implement. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army had been demoted from the status of military adviser to the Head of State to that of a subordinate commander pledged to unquestioning obedience."

Europa games recreate the individual campaigns of WWII in Europe. Players are presented with the initial setup and political situation and are asked to fight that campaign to conclusion. The players are "subordinate commanders," well below the level of Commanders-in-Chief of their countries' services. Rightfully, they are left with little or no say in HOW, WHEN and WHETHER their forces tackle the task. Part and parcel of this are orders of battle requiring out-of-theater deployments and strictly limited reinforcements.

Grand/"Greater," Europa will recreate substantial portions of WWII in Europe and cover several campaigns. As Commanders-in-Chief of the services (as opposed to Chiefs of State) the players should be given much more latitude in deciding HOW, WHEN and WHETHER they commit their forces.

Take for example, a "Greater Europa" campaign covering 1939 to June 1941. The Germans, starting the game at war with Poland, France, and Britain might be allowed to pursue a western offensive and holding action in the east.

If they choose to pursue a historical eastern offensive which results in a quick victory, what next? Should German players be allowed to decide HOW, WHEN and WHETHER to open a western offensive? Which units Italy or Britain send to North Africa, and when they send them, should be up to the players. Italy's decision to invade, or not to invade, Greece (or Yugoslavia) might not be a player decision; but Italian players should have some input, perhaps some chance to influence the decision and timing. Playing a game that straitjackets the major powers into replaying the campaigns on a historical timetable would be a soulless activity.

Victory conditions and the internal politics of minor belligerents/neutral countries should be flexible enough to accommodate a variety of player strategies and campaign results. If the Axis defeat Greece without violating Yugoslav neutrality, what effect does that have on Bulgaria (who then gets no territory)? What would an Italian victory in Africa (without German help) be worth in Victory Points? If Italy lost Africa to brilliant British play would Mussolini be so hot-to-trot to attack Greece? Should this be reflected in political rules or retained within player control?

What is the opinion of the Europa hierarchy? What decisionmaking authority should reside with Grand Europa players?

Message 290 Fri Mar 17,1995 M.MARTTNO [JAY]

Alan: You raise some good points re Grand Europa. The von Manstein quote only illustrates a fact of life for most military organizations: the politicos make the decisions. Unfortunately, in the gaming world you'll always have those who want either more, or less, control. 'Me ideal solution is to provide the ability for players to micro-manage as much as they want, but using optional rules.

Message 293 Fri Mar 17,1995 J.BROSHOT [JIM]

Query: will the Grand Europa Nazi hierarchy allow Goring to have his own Luftwaffe army (with its 21 or so field divisions, 11 or so parachute divisions, and the Herman Goring Corps) or will the air force personnel be properly retrained as infantry and fed into the Heer?

Message 294 Sat Mar 18,1995 D.POWELL4 [Dave]

For that matter, doing away with Himmler's private army would also make better manpower sense. The SS divisions were often a waste of equipment and good recruits to no good gain.

Private armies are a bad thing.

On the other hand, giving the players these choices seems like far too much control over political life in the Third Reich, not something I'd be in favor of.

Message 295 Sat Mar 18,1995 R.FOLSUM [BOB]

Too much control and hindsight is a problem, not just with the composition of armies and air forces, but also political interactions. Unless someone can prograni some kind of supermatrix into a PC where all of the various factors can have their impact on other courses of events that may occur, it would be best to leave this out Example: If Germany invades Yugoslavia in 1940, what does/can the USSR do?

Message 297 Sun Mar 19,1995 J.BROSHOT [Jim]

Right Dave. Any dictatorship will require its praetorian guard and political police (like the NKVD troops). The Luftwaffe's army was too much of a luxury. As for the British OB, it would be fixed for the early part of the war by prewar political developments with the following possible alternatives: no 1939 doubling of the Territorial Army; no over-expansion of armored divisions and no commandos. The latter two would presuppose no Winston Churchill (which, given some of the books that I have read lately, would mean that the British would sue for a separate peace after Hitler overruns Western Europe).

Message 300 Mon Mar 20,1995 L.HANNA [Gen.Lee]

If no private am-des, then the US should have the option to use the USMC (Ernie King's private army) and the divisions that went to Australia in '43 and never got used until the Philippines in '45 (Doug MacArthur's private army). Not to mention the shipping and carriers. Let's just imagine TF 58 off the German coast. :-)

Message 301 Mon Mar 20,1995 G.LESAUVAGE [George]

Of course, eventually some players will try all sorts of options, but for GE's actual rules, you can't drop the "private armies." In all the cases mentioned, and other analogous ones such as the Foreign Legion, the oddities were just too much a part of the entire approach of each nation to waging war. What if the whole Empire and Commonwealth had a unified, rational defense? There had been attempts, you know.

Changes at this level get us close to the point at which it ceases to be meaningful to discuss WWII at all--if all the countries' evolved that differently, they may well have fought differently, or even aligned differently.

Operationally, I oppose straitjackets, but at the highest strategic, political, and even cultural levels, we just have to take what we're given.

Message 302 Tue Mar 21,1995 J.BROSHOT [Jim]

We're stuck with the Waffen SS, the Luftwaffe ground forces, the Marines in the Pacific, and all of the British "private armies." Deployment may be something else, though.

Message 303 Wed Mar 22,1995 A.TIBBETTS1 [Alan]

Re: Deployment

Yes, we're certainly going to see some markedly different deployments. Can't for the life of me understand why so little of the R.A.F. was deployed to Africa in 1941. And of course the BEF isn't going to be sacrificed in France.

What liberties the Soviets might be allowed with their OB and setup in summer 1941 will be a key decision. Also, what political options will they be allowed: take out Finland, ignore Finland? And what about Soviet intentions towards Rumania, Turkey, and others?

Message 304 Thu Mar 23,1995 T.STATLER [OKH]

If political decisions are involved, but not controlled by the player...

Each country would have to have a surrender table based on territory lost and REs killed (such as Italy's in SF or the optional Soviet table in TEM #33).

Certain production items are based on combat results that occurred (the changing of 8-6 and 7-6 to 5-7-6 Inf XXs, the production of Mk V and Mk VI panzers after the Germans met up with the T-34s, and German increase in fighter production after the reorganization of the Luftwaffe production bureau).

As you see, it ain't easy. No plan survives contact with the enemy.

Message 305 Fri Mar 24,1995 A.TIBBETTS1 [Alan]

Re: Political Decisions

Political decisions (or call it Grand Strategy) are going to be affected by the outcomes of past campaigns. Would Germany invade Russia if France had not surrendered? I think not. Would Germany have invaded Norway if it had started (but not finished) the campaign in France as Hitler intended (late 1939)? I think not.

What possible penalty will the German player face for NOT initiating the Battle of Britain? And what, in fact, would constitute a failure to conduct the Battle of Britain?

Could Italy attack Tunisia or Egypt after declaring war? Could France attack Libya? At what point can Britain invade Norway? Or Stalin attack Hitler? Wouldn't these options depend on other events?

What happens if Germany doesn't invade Belgium or The Netherlands? Where does that leave the Western Allies? (Try bombing the Ruhr from England using 1940-41 RAF units without violating Belgian/Dutch airspace.) What effect does that have on the German war economy? Might this affect the types of aircraft the British build? What political repercussions will a British blockade of neutral Belgium and Holland have?

Well, how about it GR/D? Surely some thought has been given to these issues?

How might these things be addressed? Right now I'd say political events (to include Italian surrender) should be on some type of national morale track similar to World in Flames.

OBs will need greater flexibility, probably some type of production system.

It's not too early to start talking about GE political rules!

Message 307 Fri Mar 24,1995 J.BYRNE2 [Jim Byrne]

Re: Political Decisions

One of the interesting problems facing Grand Europa (GE), besides the raising and maintenance of military formations outside of the historical model, is the reconciliation of what is essentially a study of corps level military operations, with a real/weltpolitik strategic framework. The question to be answered is, "What role does the game player take on in Go."

If the players are representative of their countries' national government, then there should be a number of limits placed on their ability to micro-manage combat. If they are representative of their countries' military command, then there should be stringent limits placed on their ability to control domestic production and foreign policy.

If the game gives both roles to the players, without reasonable limits, then I fear that the result is not going to find much favour. If limits are placed on the players which force the game along historical lines through the use of idiocy rules, then this is likely to be met with even less enthusiasm. The trick will be to provide a reasonable, and understandable, means of determining and imposing a political consequence on the military choices made by the players during the course of the game.

Assuming that the focus of GE remains that of Europa itself, that is, a corps level simulation of ground combat in Europe circa 1939-45; then the political decisions, as such, should be made for the player by the GE game system. To allow for the effect of unanticipated events or ahistorical outcomes of historic events (a successful Seelowe, for example) some form of national will / domestic stability / foreign alliance variable scale could be used.

This could be implemented as three separate scales for each country, ranging in value from -3 to +3 in increments of 1, with the zero value representing neutrality or change of state, and the positive scale representing increasing steadfastness/ determination/ stability, and the negative scale representing increasing disaffection/unreliability/ instability.

The three scales would separate domestic political stability from public support of the war and from public support of allies. A government can be strong without being popular, but even a strong government has great difficulty imposing policies which the majority of the population do not support and passively, or actively, resist.

For example, Germany in 1939 could have the scale for domestic stability start at +1, representing the Nazi party's control of Germany, while showing that their domestic control was a fragile thing. The national will index could be set at +2, showing the German people's support for Germany's aggressive foreign policy while still showing the reserve most nations have about actually going to war. The alliance track could show France/Britain/Poland et al at -2 indicating open hostility towards those nations. The USSR could be set at +1 showing the result of the Molotov pact. The USA could be at 0 or even +1 and the unaligned neutrals of Europe could be ranged on the scale according to the best estimate of the situation.

Each country would have its own scale which would determine how much flexibility the player had with respect to the employment of military forces of that country while under his control.

As military losses are incurred or countries are conquered/liberated allied with, the national will index and alliance index of each nation affected would be adjusted. When certain index thresholds are reached, then specific political rules come into play. As an example, if the national will index of an active participant in a war reaches 0, then the player controlling that country might have to either reduce the political stability index by 1 or the foreign alliance index of their highest-rated ally by 1. If all allies were already below the current political stability index, then the political index would have to be reduced.

If a country's stability index reaches 0, then certain rules regarding a change of government with the potential of mandated changes to the other scales might come into play. If the indexes move into the negative regions the likelihood of a government collapse, the signing of a separate peace or the repudiation of a former ally could increase dramatically with each additional level.

If an alliance index reached 0, certain restrictions on the number of military units available from that country or on the employment of those units would come into play (the increasingly restrictive availability of the Spanish Blue Division comes to mind). Conversely, as the alliance index went up the scale, increasing degrees of co-operation between foreign contingents and national forces would be permitted.

Similar limitations would occur if the national will index of allies or principal nations fell to, or below, zero. Production might drop, or negative DRM's might be employed to show the flagging interest in the war effort. Rebuilding cadres into full strength units might increase in cost.

Political considerations might then shape the actions of the players with respect to their military operations (can't kill off too many of those Romanian divisions, as we can't afford to do without the oil and we don't have the troops to garrison the place against a popular uprising, or, if we lose another six divisions, then recruiting is going to drop like a stone).

Such a system need not be designed so as to be so convoluted as to generate an entire subgame, but certainly something along these lines would be required if only to create a reason for some of the campaigns that were actually fought during the war and are already modeled by Europa itself.


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