Rommel's operations in North Africa graphically show the tension between operational and sustainment imperatives in the conduct of warfare. Certainly the fact that War in the Desert devotes so much effort to logistics relative to the other Europa games indicates the importance of supply in this campaign. Rommel often succeeded in operations to gain positions that subsequently proved to be insupportable logistically. Adequately simulating his difficulties challenges any game set in North Africa.

The main thorn in the Axis side was Malta. The island lay in the middle of the Axis supply bottleneck between Europe and North Africa. War in the Desert handles the effect of Malta nicely, but it ignores one possibility available to the Axis-a supply route that avoided Malta altogether. Following the capture of Crete, a direct route from Athens to Benghazi and Tobruk becomes possible, easily defended by air power based at Crete and Tobruk. This article examines the Axis supply situation, and proposes an Axis option for opening the Athens-to-Cyrenaica supply route.

The Axis Supply Situation

In May 1941, General Paulus, later of Stalingrad fame, prepared a logistics estimate on the North African theater. He estimated that the Axis forces required 50,000 tons of supply per month. Of this, 30,000 tons were for current maintenance, represented by general supply in WitD terms. This left 20,000 tons per month for combat supplies. Unfortunately for Rommel, these numbers were easier for Paulus to report than for the Axis to reliably achieve.

In his war of logistics, Rommel fought against a number of enemies besides the British. First, Africa was an OKW (Defense Department) theater instead of an OKH (Department of the Army) theater. OKH, not OKW, had long dominated military affairs in Germany, and OKH showed little interest in a theater outside its administration. This left Rommel low on the priority list for resources.

Second, the failure of the Luftwaffe to maintain air superiority in the theater resulted in frequently interdicted lines of communication. German aircraft repeatedly left the theater to support operations against Greece and Russia, and later to guard against the growing British and American threat to the mainland of Europe.

Third, the ports in the theater were few and far between. They lacked capacity and what did exist was frequently reduced by Allied bombing. Tobruk rated 45,000 tons per month, yet rarely exceeded 18,000 tons. Benghazi, because of Allied bombing and a shortage of air defense weapons, rarely exceeded 15,000 tons per month. The Italians were reluctant to risk sending their precious merchant vessels across the Mediterranean to any port other than Tripoli. Thus, supplies from Europe typically went to Tripoli, and then via road or coastal shipping to Benghazi or Tobruk.

Fourth, Rommel required large numbers of motor transports to maintain his lines of communication since he had no rail and only a single, very long, coastal road. Rommel pushed the Axis transport to the limit. By the end of 1941 over 85% of his motor transport was captured Allied equipment. This caused predictable maintenance problems; by that time the Afrika Korps averaged only a 65% readiness rate among transport vehicles.

Coastal shipping from Tripoli forward could augment the road by some 29,000 tons per month. This figure approximately meets the 30,000 tons estimated by Paulus to be required for general supply. In Europa this means that coastal shipping can handle the requirements for general supply, leaving any buildup of supply for offensive actions to be moved overland by truck as is quite adequately simulated through the use of SMPs.

The Eastern Route

But was there an alternative? What of the shipping route through the Aegean Sea that both avoided Malta and landed cargo much closer to the front? OKW's main objection to this route lay in its dependence on the single high-volume rail line from Germany through Yugoslavia and Greece to Athens. This rail line had a nasty habit of blowing up, courtesy of Tito and his Yugoslav partisans. Starting in 1942 this route did indeed become an additional supply route. What if the Germans had opened the route earlier than they did historically?

Given that the Germans eventually took control of the supply of Africa from the Italians, this is an alternative route for which they could have opted earlier. Additional security units would have been required in Yugoslavia. The transfer of the aviation committed against Malta to the defense of the route Crete/Tobruk/Benghazi could have secured it against most sorties by the British Mediterranean Fleet and also provided air defense of the forward ports.

Optional Rule

As with any optional rule, players should mutually agree before play begins that this option is available to the Axis. If this option is in use

• At any time after Jul I 41, the Axis player can declare he is opening the Athens/Tobruk/Benghazi shipping route.
• Upon declaring the route open, the Axis must immediately withdraw three Italian infantry attack strength points from play. These strength points can never return to play, but are not counted as eliminated for victory purposes.
• On the turn he declares the route open and on each succeeding turn, the Axis player may ship one step of supply per turn from Europe to either Benghazi or Tobruk. Each supply step may only be shipped if the Axis player controls 9 or more REs of usable port capacity in Cyrenaica at the instant of shipment.

If playing WitD combined with Balkan Front, you can allow this option two turns after Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete, are Axis owned (instead of Jul I 41).

The removal of Italian units represents the need for additional garrisons in Yugoslavia. The contingency of the option on usable port capacity encourages the Allied player to destroy the port capacity by any means and also encourages the Axis player to increase the air defense capabilities and construction engineer support for his ports.

If properly maintained, using this option vastly simplifies the supply situation for the Axis player.

References

Playfair, I. S. 0., The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol II, London: HMSO, 1956. Rommel, Erwin, The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddel Hart, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1953. Van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Warlimont, Walter, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-45, translated by R. H. Barry, New York: Praeger, 1966