Because of French concerns regarding the reliability of the heavily German Foreign Legion, no pre-war Legionary units as such actually served in the battle for France. This task fell upon the new units formed to make use of the 83,000 foreigners who volunteered to fight for France against Germany. Many of these men were refugees from Franco's Spain and Hitler's Germany. The French were deeply ambivalent about these men, believing them to be unreliable and of suspect loyalty and fighting quality.

The French created five regiments to utilize these volunteers. The 11eme and 12eme Regiments d'Etrangere d'Infantrie (REI) [Regiments of Foreign Infantry] were formally part of the Legion and had the highest proportions of transferred regular and mobilized reserve Legionnaires. The others were Regiments de March des Volontaires d'Etrangere (RMVE) [Regiments of Foreign Volunteers], numbered 21 through 23, and had no formal connection with the Legion though enough informal ties existed that their battle honors were formally given to the Legion after the war. Many more foreigners were initially assigned to the Legion, but wrangled transfers to line units as soon as possible.

The large influx of volunteers during the last year of the Spanish Civil War caused the Legion much heartache, as they were highly politicized and introduced ideology to the Legion, with political loyalties that could not be easily replaced by the traditional loyalties to their regiment and the Legion itself. As one Legionnaire wrote after the war, "The pro-Hitler Germans said they weren't going to fight, while the "antis" declared themselves volunteers for the front and made pronouncements which would have brought tears to the eyes of President Lebrun [President of the Third Republic]... The Czechs took on the Sudeten Germans, the Poles denounced both the Nazis and the Reds, but everyone abused the two or three Italians who had not yet decided which side to be on." Many were highly educated and Jewish, factors not conducive to their acceptance by a Legion hostile to intellectuals and even more antiSemitic than the rest of the French Army. These characteristics caused problems as Legion training methods and tactics demanded unquestioning obedience and discouraged initiative in the ranks. The veterans of the Spanish Civil War were not impressed by the Legion's tactical training and had a concept of discipline considerably looser than that of the Legion. The Spanish Legionnaires were not the only ones to bring political awareness to the Legion, but they and the Jews had the most problems adapting to the Legion or perhaps it could be said that the Legion had the most problems adapting to them!

Consonant with its low repute within the French War Ministry, the Legion's newly formed units were at the bottom of the list when the time came for modern weapons to be issued. Many of the heavy weapons received were lacking essential equipment such as sights or manuals. The mortars of the 12e REI lacked sights and had to be sighted by the use of a weighted string! The 12e never even received anti-tank guns, a critical deficiency given the kind of war that it was to face. It lacked so much equipment that it was known by the Germans as the string regiment, because its soldiers had to tie their personal equipment together with string! 10 company of the 22e RMVE had only fired automatic weapons twice before being attacked by the Germans.

Despite the outdated training methods, lack of modern weapons and discipline problems of the new units of the Legion, they wrote a chapter in the history of the Legion equal to that of any of the existing regiments.

The 11e fought tenaciously north of Verdun against numerous German attacks until forced to retreat on 11 June. A counterattack mounted to maintain the honor of the regiment helped to reduce it to only a quarter of its former size by 18 June. The survivors escaped encirclement and moved south. It was at Toul at the time of the Armistice.

The 12e was ordered out of its training camp on 11 May and ended up at Soissons by the 24th after much toing-and-froing. Despite an ineffective attack by Stukas on 5 June, it was never decisively engaged; the Germans preferring to encircle Soissons rather than attack it directly. It was ordered to retreat on 8 June, but many of its soldiers were cut off so that it was reduced to 300 men from its original 2800 by the Armistice.

The 21e had a fairly uneventful war. It had only recently been assigned to the Maginot Line interval troops when the Germans attacked. It was moved north of Verdun at the end of May. It joined the general retreat and ended the campaign at Nancy.

The 22e was sent to Alsace on 6 May lacking much equipment, but was sent to the village of Marchelepot on the Somme by 22 May where it withstood a number of heavy German attacks before being withdrawn on 26 May. On 5 June, as it prepared to attack the village of Villers-Carbonnel near Marchelepot with the 112e Regiment d'Infanterie, it was hit by German units launching Fall Rot, the German offensive designed to breach the Somme line and finish off France.

Although hit by a combined assault of tanks, aircraft and infantry, the 22e rebuffed the attack at a high cost. A second German attack was broken up when a bombardment by 81mm mortars operating at the limit of their range coincided with a bombing run by 3 French aircraft to spread panic among the German infantry. Despite casualties of over 50% in men and weapons and a shortage of ammunition, the 22e still held its position and was in good spirits that evening. The morning brought renewed assaults that were repulsed and the Germans let the artillery and Luftwaffe attempt to break the 22e. After turning one flank the Germans launched a general assault that succeeded because of the Legionnaires' lack of ammo and skillful German infiltration tactics.

By 11 o'clock the 22e was reduced to 8 light and 2 heavy machine guns, 1 81 mm mortar and 9x 25mm anti-tank guns and all communications between the regiment and its companies and with its division had been severed. The Germans offered the regiment a choice, either surrender or 300 prisoners would be shot. Chef de Bataillon Hermann refused and the Germans were able to begin storming the houses occupied by the regiment because of the shortage of ammunition. By nightfall, after extensive hand-to-hand fighting, including a fierce fracas in the regimental command post, and exhaustion of all ammunition, the regiment surrendered.

Some Legionnaires committed suicide with their last bullet rather than be captured. The Germans executed several Legionnaires of German extraction and most of the Spanish Legionnaires eventually ended up in concentration camps. The 22e upheld the traditions of the Legion by doing a Camerone (where a company of Legionnaires fought to the last round and the 5 survivors launched a bayonet charge at the besieging Mexican troops) despite only a tenuous connection to the Legion itself.

The 23e was committed to the front on 5 June and broke and ran near Ste. Menehould on 13 June. Inadequately trained and armed, no blame can be attached to it for reacting badly to a situation for which it wasn't ready. In Europa terms, the situation is best simulated by the unit incurring a failed activation die roll when attempting to leave the forming box.

Grand Europa : Legion Etrangere Order of Battle

Nov I 39
Forming:
1x 2-3-6 Inf III 22 RVE (LE)
2x 2-6 Inf III 21 RVE, 23 RVE (LE)

Dec I 39
1 x 2-6 Inf III 11 REI (LE)

Feb I 40
Forming:
1x 2-6 Inf III 12 REI (LE)

May I 40
Full:
1x 2-3-6 Inf III 22 RVE (LE) lx 2-6 Inf III 21 RVE (LE)

Jun I 40
Full:
1x 2-6 Inf III 12 REI (LE)

Aug I 40
Full:
1x 2-6 Inf III 23 RVE (LE)